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The main premise of this treatise is to discuss the Mauritian Law of
Procedural Fairness within the context of Dismissal for Misconduct: A
comparative study with the South African Doctrine of unfair Labour
Practice. It analyses in detail the types of misconduct that eventually
leads to the dismissal of an employee. The dismissal has not only to be
substantively fair but also procedurally fair.
To support the views expressed in the research, reference has been made
to labour law cases decided mainly in Mauritius and South Africa. There
are, however, references to other jurisdictions such as India, England,
Australia, Namibia.
The major constraint that the researcher encountered was the
unavailability of decided cases referred from the Industrial Court of
Mauritius. Most of the cases referred to in the Mauritian context are the
Supreme Court decisions on dismissals due to misconduct. Thus for lack
of relevant cases in Mauritius, there is a heavy reliance on cases decided
in South Africa and other jurisdictions. These references have
constructively enhanced the legal dimension of the topic under
discussion.
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SYNOPSIS
In Mauritius and South Africa, the present workplace law prescribes that
an employer having a prima facie ground to dismiss an employee for
misconduct will in great majority of cases not act rationally in treating the
reason as a sufficient reason for dismissal unless and until he/she has
taken the steps conveniently classified in most of the authorities as
"procedural" which are necessary in the circumstances of the case to
justify that cause of action. Consequently, for lack of procedural fairness,
the industrial court in Mauritius now hold that the employers action
would constitute an 'unjustified termination' of services, and in South
Africa it would constitute an 'unfair labour practice' .
Although momentous changes have taken place in the societal and legal
attitudes during the last two decades in Mauritius, the law relating to
procedural fairness within the context of dismissal for misconduct is not
yet firmly entrenched in the Mauritian law of dismissal. This study has,
therefore, become imperative, as with the development of workplace law,
the administrative law principles of procedural fairness has to be given a
precise substance. Hence the title 'The Mauritian Law of Procedural
Faimess within the Context of Dismissal for Misconduct: A Comparative
Study with the South African Doctrine of Unfair Labour Practice", is of
topical significance.
Chapter I attempts to highlight the key issues that will be discussed in
preceding chapters. The question, is it sufficient that a substantive reason
for dismissal exists, or is it also incumbent upon an employer to adhere to
an acceptable procedure prior to taking the decision to dismiss?, puts the
thinking process into motion.
Chapter II identifies three important concepts that have to be defined,
their meanings analysed and their implications critically examined. The
concepts are 'dismissal', 'misconduct' and 'procedural fairness'.
Chapter III examInes the enabling Acts on procedural fairness which
provide safeguards against dismissals that are procedurally unfair. The
Constitutions and the Labour Relations Acts of both countries are
carefully examined so as to make the comparative study significant.
Chapter IV refers mainly to Section 32 (2) (a) and (b) of the Labour Act
1975 of Mauritius and the Labour Relations Act 1996 of South Africa.
The South African labour jurisprudence is critically examined so as to
give a holistic approach to the requirements ofprocedural fairness.
Chapter V discusses those exceptional circumstances where the
employers have deviated from the accepted norms and deemed it
unnecessary to hold disciplinary hearing before the ultimate sanction of
dismissal is laid on an employee.
Chapter VI discusses and examInes critically, from a comparative
perspective, the concept of procedural fairness in Mauritius and South
Africa within the limits of unfair labour practice jurisdiction, and makes
proposal towards a legal regulation of procedural fairness within the
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The present study on the Mauritian law of procedural fairness within the context of
dismissal for misconduct is based on three important concepts, namely, 'dismissal',
'misconduct' and most importantly, 'procedural fairness'. They need to be defined,
explained and critically examined from a comparative perspective with the South
.African doctrine of unfair labour practice.
From the vast area of the law of dismissal, the topic of discussion has been narrowed
down to dismissal for misconduct only. This being the case, the study will exclude all
other forms of dismissals such as redundancy, retrenchment and constructive
dismissals.
With the advent of rapid industrialisation and the recognition of inherent dignity of
man at his workplace, the law of dismissal in Mauritius has become very significant,
but complex in nature and imprecise in practice. The central problem that occupies
t~e mind of the labour law practitioners, therefore, is that, how far can an employer be
said to have acted reasonably in failing to go through a procedure for dismissal when
it seems there were good and substantive grounds for dismissal? In more precise
terms it means, did the employer hold an enquiry in accordance with the rules of
natural justice so as to give the employee an opportunity to state his version and, if
necessary, in mitigation of the penalty?
The Mauritian labour jurisprudence does not have a clear and adequate answer to this.
It has left many contentious issues implicit in the definition of 'procedural fairness'
unresolved. Although statutory provisions on disciplinary procedures have been
made in section 109 of Part VIII of the Code of Practice in the Mauritian Industrial
Relations Act 1973 and Section 32 (2) (a) of Labour Act 1975 on 'Unjustified
Termination of Agreement', the term 'procedural·fairness' still remains elusive, fragile
and shrouded with uncertainty and confusion. It is, however, left to the Industrial
1
Court and the Supreme Court of Mauritius to develop the notion of substantive as well
as procedural fairness. These courts have been empowered to detennine the
reasonableness of an employer's decision to dismiss an employee on the criteria based
on equity and fairness. During the course of the discussion, examples from decided
cases in Mauritius and South Africa will show that where the employer has fairly and
honestly conducted an enquiry and come to a decision which is fair and reasonable, in
the circumstances, he cannot be faulted, but where he unreasonably and unjustifiably
failed to hold such enquiry' or where his decision is not fair and reasonable in the
circumstances, such failure may amount to a procedurally unfair dismissal which, in
the context of South African labour jurisprudence, is tenned as an unfair labour
practice.
It is against this background that it is proposed to look at, initially the absolute and
some times, irrational disciplinary powers of an employer under the common law
contract of employment in Mauritius and South Africa, and then discuss the way in
which the South African doctrine ofunfair labour practice, in its procedural fonn, can
provoke a search for a better version of procedural justice that will provide safeguards
to employees against unfair dismissals due to misconduct in Mauritius.
1.2 Deficiency of the Common Law Principles and the Public Law
Remedy
The employment law in Mauritius and South Africa is based on the common law
princ'iples I which has, particularly, in the area of dismissals, given the employers
wide discretionary and even arbitrary powers 2 to tenninate the services of an
employee with or without notice. 3 It therefore, offers little protection against
arbitrariness and unfair dismissals. In this regard Brassey points out: 4
"It (comnlOn law) confers on the party to whom it relates an absolute discretion to
perfornl or not, as he chooses ....it allows the party with greater bargaining power
to exact any bargain he wants, however oppressive, perverse or absurd it may be,
provided that it is not illegal or immoral ...•and all this he is allowed to do without
consulting the other partyfirst or paying him the slightest heed."
2
In supporting this view, Rycroft and Jordaan also write: 5
"The common law rule, however, has always been one of dismissal or nothing. It
holds that, unless the parties have agreed otherwise, there is no obligation on the
employer to warn the employee before finally dismissing him or her ; 6 or to
conduct an enquiry before dismissal; 7 or to grant the employee an opportunity to
improve his or her conduct or performance; or to consider alternatives to dismissal;
8 or to provide reasons for dismissals - all of which are nowadays regarded as
essential elements ofsound industrial relations practice. "
The symptoms of this perceived weakness of the common law to regulate the arbitrary
exercise of the employer's traditionally wide disciplinary powers has now stimulated
the administrative law principles and has found remedy in the public law process of
procedural justice. 9 Sedley acknowledges this phenomenon in labour law as "a high
point of development of the protection of an employee by ... the importation of what
are today recognisable as public law doctrines into private law relationship". 10
Implicit in this argument is that the new jurisdiction invoked by the public law
remedies of procedural justice has put brakes on the wide disciplinary powers, which
an employer enjoys at common law.
1.3 Substantive and Procedural Fairness
In the area of dismissals, in particular, the court has departed significantly from the
common law position. It has held in no uncertain terms that it is not sufficient for the
employer to act lawfully when dismissing the employee, it has also to act fairly. 11
This entails that for a dismissal to be fair, it requires not only sufficient reasons, it also
needs to apply fair procedures prior to termination of the employee's services. 12 Thus
to give full efficacy to the doctrine of fair dismissal, the court partly for
methodological reasons came to distinguish between the substantive and procedural
aspects of a dismissal. 13 Substantively, the dismissal has to have a " good and
sufficient cause." 14 and procedurally the employee has to be " afforded a fair and a
reasonable opportunity of speaking in rebuttal or in mitigation of the charge against
him. 15
3
Rationalising the VIew on the merits of procedural fairness as distinct from
substantive fairness, the House of Lords in West Midlands Co-operative Society Ltd v
Lipton 16 was of the opinion:
To separate them and to consider only one half of the process in determining
whether the enlployer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating real person for
disnrissal as sufficient, is to introduce an unnecessary artificiality into proceedings
in a claim of unfair disnlissal calculated to defeat rather than accord with equity
and substantial nlerits ofthe case.
Based on this distinction between the concepts of substantive and procedural fairness,
the industrial court jurisprudence fonnulated the principle that an employer who
wishes to terminate the services of an employee on grounds of misconduct, must be
satisfied that there are sound substantive reasons for the dismissal, i.e. legally
justified, and must follow a fair procedure in arriving at the conclusion. 17 In Mawu &
others v Stobar Reinforcing (Pty) Lld & another 18 the court was emphatic on this
point:
" The whole tenor of the decision seemed to support the view that the court was
concerned nlOre with the fairness ofthe dismissal than its lawfulness. "
These judicial interventions, to a large extent mitigated the harshness of the common
la\v principles and created a new jurisprudence, which introduced elements of equity
and fairness in the law of dismissal. 19
1.4 Procedural Fairness
Considering, therefore, that prevention of abuse of power is nowadays a preferred
ca.tegorisation of the nature and aims of the public law jurisdiction,20 the following
questions become invariably pertinent especially when an employer decides to
dismiss an employee for misconduct:
(i) Is it sufficient that a substantive reason for dismissal exists, or is it also
incumbent upon the employer to adhere to an acceptable procedure prior to
taking the decision to dismiss?
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(ii) How far can an employer be said to have acted reasonably in failing to go
through a fair procedure when it seems that there were good and substantive
grounds for dismissal?
(iii) And, most importantly, what is procedural fairness with regard to dismissal for
misconduct?
These questions show a powerful impetus to an emergent trend in administrative law,
which has not been thoroughly exhausted in the field of the law of unfair. dismissal. It
is evident from these questions that the issue of procedural fairness and dismissal lie
at the core of security of employment and it is the considered view ofjurists and legal
writers21 that the branches of law, namely administrative law and labour law, should
serve to enhance the security of an employee in his employment. There is an attempt,
therefore, to cover all possible exigencies that are created by the non-observance of
fairness in cases of dismissal due to misconduct.
It is found that although in a pure master and servant case there is no inherent or
imposed obligation to observe fair procedures,22 the discipline of fair procedure have
anyway largely been injected into the law of contractual employment by statutes23 and
judicial interventions. The landmark decision in Polkey VA.E. Dayton services Ltcf4
puts the new trend into practical perspective. It is stated:
An employer having prima facie ground to dismiss for one of these reasons will in
great nzajority ofcases not act rationally in treating the reason as sufficient reason
for dismissal unless and until he has taken the steps conveniently classified in most
of the authorities as procedural which are necessary in the circumstances of the
case to justify that cause ofaction. "
Lord Mackay of Clashfern LC quoted Neill LJ to support his view:25
"A failure to observe a proper procedure may make a dismissal unfair, but this is
not because such failure by itself makes the dismissal unfair but because the
failure, for exanlple to give am employee an opportunity to explain may lead the
tribunal to the conclusion that the employer in all circumstances, acted
unreasonably in treating the reason for dismissal as a sufficient reason. The
tribunal will look at the practical effect of the failure to observe the proper
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procedure in order to decide whether or not the dismissal was unfair. Where an
enlployee is alleged for misconduct and he then complains that he was unfairly
dismissed, it is to be anticipated that the industrial tribunal will usually need to
consider (a) tlte nature and gravity of tlte alleged misconduct: (b) the information
on which tlte employer based his decision; and (c) whether there was any other
information which the employer could or should have obtained or any step which
he should Itave taken before he disnlissed tlte en,ployee. "
This pronouncement by the House of Lords may be considered, as Davies and
Friedland put it, 'a real breakthrough,26 in the law of unfair dismissal. As already
discussed, for too long the employment law was governed by the common law
principles which made an employee always vulnerable to the abuse of an employer's
disciplinary power. Now it is upon the new concept of procedural fairness that the law
of dismissal has been able to build its central premise, and has subjected an
employer's decision to dismiss to a degree of judicial scrutiny on both substantive as
well as procedural grounds. Consequently, the benefit flowing from such an
opportunity has materially changed the employer/employee relationship. It means that
an employer who with a view to possibly having to justify his action to dismiss an
employee, will have to ensure that during the decision making process he had adhered
to the standard of procedural justice, i.e. the employer will have "to listen fairly to
both sides and to observe the principles of fair play; to discharge its duties honestly
and impartially; and to act in good faith.,,27 This innovation into the labour law not
only protects the employee, it also assists the employer. In NUM and Another v
Western Areas Gold Mining Co. LtJ28 the court held that an employer can also benefit
by following a fair pre-dismissal procedure:
"It is necessary because ifproperly and honestly held, it places the employer in a
position to judge the merits of the conduct of the employee after all the relevant
facts and considerations have been investigated and the applicant's version has
been stated. It also enables the employer, should he be reasonably satisfied that the
alleged infraction has taken place, to decide on the appropriate disciplinary
action. "
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1.5 Natural Justice and Procedural Fairness
Having much said about procedural fairness in dismissals for misconduct, it is
cornmon knowledge that central to this administrative law principle lies the rules of
natural justice. Brassey submits that "where the procedural fairness is at issue, the
court has sometimes had regard to the administrative law principles in particular, the
rules of natural justice.,,29 These principles have usually been expressed in the fonn of
two latin maxims, namely audi alteram partem (hear the other side), and nemo index
in propria causa sua (no man may be judge in his own cause). These rules have fully
been embedded into disciplinary proceedings. In Twala v ABC Shoes Stores30
Fabricus A.M. said
"...there are only three basic requirements of natural justice which have to be
complied with during the proceedings ofa domestic disciplinary enquiry:
• Firstly, that the person should know the nature ofthe accusation against him
• Secondly, that he should be given an opportunity to state his case
• Thirdly, that the tribunal should act in goodfaith. "
The nonns emerging from these judicial decisions have been incorporated in the
Industrial Relations Act 1973 and Labour Act 1975 of Mauritius3l and the Labour
Relations Act 1995 of South Africa.32 As much as it is the expressed intention of the
Labour Acts of both countries to simplify the pre-dismissal procedures, they also
enjoin the employers to develop their own procedures to deal adequately and
effectively with any disciplinary matters before they are taken to the Industrial Courts
or any other statutory dispute resolution apparatus for adjudication such as the
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration in South Africa.
Along with these statutory provisions there is also a growing number of case law
which by judicial precedent have contributed to the fonnulation of guidelines on fair
procedure before dismissal due to misconduct. In Mauritius, the court held in
Bundhoo v Mauritius Breweries Ltcf3 and reiterated in Medine Sugar Estate Co. Ltd v
Wodally34 that
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"Although in certain circumstances, an employer may be justified in terminating
the employment of a worker whose conduct is suspect in some serious measure,
nevertheless where no hearing is granted to the worker in order to give him an
opportunity to dispel the suspicion, then there is a violation ofSection 32 (2) (a) of
the Labour Act.... ~ .. "
Similarly, in J C.Paul v Longtill (Mauritius)35 the court ruled that
"It is now settled that an employer who avers having lawfully dismissed a worker
must prove not only that he had reasons to do so but that tlte dismissal was effected
in compliance with Section 32 of the Labour Act....(which) provides that a
disnlissal without a hearing as provided by its subsection (2) shall be deemed to be
an unjustified dismissal."
The Mauritian labour statutes and judicial decisions therefore pose two general
requirements to make a dismissal by reason of any disciplinary action fair. There must
be
(i) a valid and fair reason for a dismissal; and
(ii) the dismissal must be in compliance with a fair procedure.
1.6 Procedural Fairness and South African Unfair Practice
Concept
At this point it is interesting to note that both Mauritius and South Africa apply the
same terms to make a dismissal reasonable and fair. The entrenched provisions in
their respective Labour Relations Acts have set out basically the same requirements
for dismissal due to misconduct. These requirements are for instance:
(a) The right to notice;
(b) The right to fair hearing;
(c) The right to be represented;
(d) The right to appeal.
It is amply clear that by codifying the above requirements, there is a reasonable
consistency in the application of procedural fairness in both countries.
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South Africa has, however, gone a step further in its legislative enactment and case
law in ensuring some kind of protective shield for employees from the vulnerability to
dismissal that prevails at common law. As a result of the reforms contained in the
recommendations of the Wiehahn Commission (1979)36 the industrial tribunal was
replaced with an industrial court with an extensive "unfair labour practice"
jurisdiction3? to determine unfair labour practice disputes in terms of Section 46(9) of
the Labour Relations Act 1956, and to issue' status quo' orders in terms of Section 43
reinstating dismissed employees and preventing unfair labour practice. Consequently,
for lack of procedural fairness, the Labour Court in South Africa has held that the
employer's action constituted an unfair labour practice.38 Thus, although this
jurisdiction of the industrial court has left the common law regarding termination of
services intact, it has "held a dismissal to be an unfair labour practice, if the dismissal
did not comply with a two fold test. The dismissal had to be both procedurally and
substantively unfair. ,,39
It is also argued in NUM and others v Driefontein Consolidated Ltcf° that failure to
grant an employee the right to a hearing before dismissal can amount to an unfair
labour practice, and thus where the employees were dismissed without adhering to
proper procedure, it therefore, "prima facie constituted an unfair labour practice
because a proper predismissal enquiry had not been held. "
The second point that is worth highlighting in the South African jurisprudence is the
entrenched provisions on the right to procedural justice in The Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa Section 23 (l) casts an onus on the employer, as a decision
maker, to effect "fair labour practices", and Section 33 articulates the norms of
administrative justice which has the effect of strengthening the hands of the court in
enforcing standards of due process and fairness.
In addition to the above, with a view to give effect to the right to administrative action
that is "lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair" as contemplated in section 33 of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, the Promotion of Administrative
Justice Act No.3 of 2000 has been enacted to "promote an efficient administration and
good governance" at the work place. This Act relatively gives precise substance to
the administrative law principles of procedural fairness which makes it mandatory on
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the deci~ion maker to exercise hislher power according to the established code of
procedure and with due regard to the rights of the individuals including, the right to
natural justice.
In this respect, Mauritius has been less dynamic in widening the scope and giving
content to the concept of procedural fairness in dismissal. As it stands, Mauritian
statutes namely the Industrial Relations Act 1973 and the Labour Act 1975, have not
created an unfair labour practice jurisdiction as laid down and practiced in South
Africa. The sole concern of the industrial court in Mauritius is to see the law of unfair
dismissal within the narrow confines of the common law principles of contract, which
lacks consistency and stability. In Stratford College v Mrs K.B. Jugessur the court
quoted from Camerlynck:
Le contrat du travail a duree indeterminee demeure place par sa nature meme sous
le signe de l'instabilite par le jeu du droit de resiliation unilaterale qui lui est
inherent 41
Thus, unless the unfairness complained of actually leads to dismissal, the matter is not
justiciable. The only relevant question as mentioned earlier, is whether in dismissing
his employee the employer has acted lawfully in terms of the contract.42 Although
momentous changes have taken place in societal as well as legal attitudes during the
last two decades, the principle of procedural fairness based on the rules of natural
justice are -not yet firmly fixed in the Mauritian law of dismissal. Hence the
significance of the title of this research, "The Mauritian law of Procedural Fairness
within the context of Dismissal for Misconduct: A Con1parative Study with the South
African Doctrine of Unfair Labour Practice."
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lIn Harel Freres Ltd v Veerasamy and Anor 1968 MR 218 where Garioch
ASPJ pointed out "the fundamental freedom of the employer to dismiss his
employee under the common law" and "the employer's common law right to
put an end to a worker's employment unilaterally, "form the core principle in
employment relationship.
South African employment law is also based on the same common law principles.
Rycroft A and Jordaan B write in ''A Guide to South African Labour Law 1992 2nd
Ed.Juta & Co Ltd. at 44 "The common-law contract of employment constitutes the
broadfoundation ofthe employment relationship. "
2In Raman Ismael v United Bus Service 1986 MR 182 it was stated: "Whether
the power is extra contractual or derives from the contract (Dalloz notes 116
to 1i 3) which implicity recognises the power of the employer to enforce
discipline by sanctions, is non academic... This term of the contract assumes
that the employer has the power to impose discipline by sanctions. "
In United Bus Service v Gokool 1978 MR 1 Garrioch ACJ said: The employer has a
power to suspend a worker for misconduct. This power is not based on an implied
term in the contract, but on the inherent disciplinary power of the management" He
further stated: "Les sanctions peuvent etre prises par le chefd'entreprise en vertu soit
du reglement d'atelie, soit des principes du droit commun"
Rycroft writes: "The discipline of workers has traditionally been regarded as being
within the unilateral rule making power of management managerial prerogative."
.Between Employment and Dismissal: The Disciplinary Procedure (1985) 6 IV at
405.
Such arbitrary powers of the employers has been described by Freedland in 'The
Contract ofEmployment' at 5 in a more uncompromising way: "The application ofthe
general principles of contract law to the employer's right of dismissal... caused the
dismissal to be seen as the assertion ofan absolutely objective right analogous to the
right ofa merchant to reject unsatisfactory goods, or to load cargo in a different ship.
3 As H Col/ins puts it "from a narrower legal perspective the power of the
employer to regulate the conduct ofan employee and to issue codes ofconduct
is primarily to be found in the implied common law duties ofan employer.
In United Bus Service v Gokool 1978 MR1 the court expressed its opinion.
"L 'employeur a un pouvoir disciplinaire inherent asa qualite dont if a la faculte de
faire usage sous la seule reserve du controle de l'autorite judicaire, meme en
l'absence des disposition contractuelles. L 'employe en acceptant un contrat de travail
accepte voluntairement d'entrer dans une institution sociale et le pouvoir disciplinaire
decoule de la nature de l'institution. "
In Harel Freres Ltd v Veerasamy and Anor 1968 MR 218 it was stated: "An employer
who wished to terminate his workers contract, ifhe has given adequate notice to the
latter, did not have any reason to furnish for the termination. Even if it could be
shown that he had no valid ground for such termination he was not considered to
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have abused his contractual freedom and was not therefore liable to compensate his
employee in that c~se for wrongful dismissal. Incompetence, misconduct and other
like failings on the part of the employee entitled the employer summarily to dismiss
him."
Identical views have been expressed in South Africa. Rycroft A in the article
'Between Employment and Dismissal: The Disciplinary Procedure (1985) ILl 6 (4)
argues that in South Africa the discipline ofworkers has traditionally been unilateral
andfrequently arbitrary. In Horopane v Gilbeys Distillers and Vintners (Pty) Ltd and
Another (1997) 8 (3) SALLR 133 (LC) the Labour Court stated: "The common law
permits an employer to terminate the services of an employee either summarily,
without notice or on notice. The decision ofthe employer to give notice is not subject
to judicial scrutiny. The law is only concerned with the legality of the procedure
followed to the extent that it inquires whether proper notice has been given." Thus
"as long as contractual notice oftermination is given, the employer is free to dismiss
an employee for any reason he wished, with no obligation to reveal his reason for
dismissal to the employee, much less to justify it" Anderman 8.D, 'The law of unfair
dismissal 1985 London Butterworth at 3.
Fredman and Lee have also reiterated the same legal principle:
"... the fundamental right has not been available in an ordinary master-servant
relationship nor in cases of offices held at pleasure. The former is justified on the
basis that it is an implied term in the contract ofemployment that an employee may be
dismissed for any or no reason provided the relevant notice is given. .. this argument
assumes that it is unquestionable that no reasons are required to terminate a contract
if the appropriate notice is given. Sandra Fredman and Simon Lee: 'Natural justice
for Employees: The unacceptable Faith or Proceduralism' (1986) 15 ILl (1) At 26.
"M Brassey et ai, 'The New Labour Law', Strikes, Dismissal and Unfair
Labour Practice in the South African Labour Law: 1988 Juta & Co at p5.
5Rycroft A and Jordaan B. 'A Guide to South African Labour Law 1992 Juta
& Co. p96.
6Meerholz v;Vorman (1916) TPD 332
7Grundling v Beyers (1967) 2 SA 131 (W) at 141
8Nchobaleng v Director ofEducation (TVL) & Another (1954)
(T) at 438
9Mary Stokes in discussing the intrinsic value of procedural justice in the
development of administrative law principle to constrain the abuse of
executive pO'wer stated: "A dismissal will be quashed or declared void in
public law, thereby effectively reinstating the employee and leaving all rights
under the contract of employment intact. Since this is a superior remedy to
financial compensation, which is the usual remedy for wrongful or unfair
dismissal it provides one strong reason for an employee to invoke the public
law procedure" (1985) 14 ILl 117
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In Rampersad v BB Bread Ltd (1986) 7 IV 367 (IC), Bulbulia M said at 373: "It has
been said once disciplinary procedures are established, the failure to abide by them
will give an employee a prima facie right to reinstatement ifhe has been dismissed in
disregard to the procedure." See also Matshoba & others v Fry's Metals (Pty) Ltd
(1983) 4IU 107 (IC)
lOAs per Sedley J in Stevenson's case (1977) IC.R. 893: See pp 203-205 ofMr
Justice Sedley's article 'Public Law and Contractual Employment' (1994) 23
IV 201 at 205. The court was also of the opinion that "an. unfettered
discretion should be exercised according to the rules ofreason andjustice and
not according to private opinion." Horn v Kroonstad Town Council 1948 (3)
SA 861 (0)
11MA WU v Barlows Manufacturing Company (1983) 4 IV 383 (IC)
12In Medine Sugar Estate Co. Ltd v Wodally 1993 SCJ 173 at 320 the court
relying 'on the case ofBundhoo v Mauritius Breweries Ltd 1981 MR 157 held
that "although in certain circumstances an employer may be justified in
terminating the employment of a worker whose conduct is suspect in some
serious measure, nevertheless where no hearing is granted to the worker in
order to give him an opportunity to dispel the suspicion, then there is a
violation ofSection 32 (2)"
In JC.Paul v Longtill (Mauritius) Ltd 1983 Record No. 2183 at 52 stated: "it is now
settled that an employer who avers having lawfully dismissed a worker must prove not
only that he had reasons to do so but that the dismissal was effected in compliance
with Section 32(1) (b) ofthe Labour Act"
In South Africa the industrial court has formulated the principle that an employer
who wishes to terminate the services ofan employee on grounds ofmisconduct must
He satisfied that there are sound substantive reasons for the dismissal, i. e legally
justified, and must follow a fair procedure in arriving at that conclusion. The line of
cases supporting this principle are National Automobile Workers Union v Pretoria
Precision Castings (Pty) Ltd (1985) 6 IV 369; NUM v Marievale Consolidated Mine
(1986) IV 123 (IC) at 177 C: NUM v Durban Roodeport Deep (1987) 8 IV 156 (IC)
at 165,' Yichito Plastics (Pty) (1994) 15 IV 593 (LAC); Ndlovu v Transnet Ltd tla
Portnet (1997) 18 III 1031 (LC)
13NAAWUv Pretoria Precision Castings (1985) 6 III 36a (IC) at 377 E-F
J.lNtuli v Life Master Products (1985) 6 III 508 (IC) at 518 G-H
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NUM v Durban Roodeport Deep (1987) 8 IV 156 (IC) at 165; NUM v
Western Areas Gold Mining Co.Ltd. (1985) 6 IV 380 (IC) at 386 C-D.
16(198~) AC 536 at 538
17In Mauritius following cases support the view that "before a decision to
dismiss a worker should become effective his employer should have given him
an opportunity to answer any charges laid against him": Harel Freres Ltd v
Veerasamy and Anor 1968 MR 218; Cayeux Ltd v de Maroussem 1974 MR
13
166; Harel Freres Ltd v Jeebodhun 1981 MR 189; The Medine Sugar Estate
Co.Ltd. v I Wodally (1993) Record No. 4691; College Labourdonnais (Alliance
Francaise) v P.J.H Seenyen (1992) Record No 4668; Retreaders Ltd v
R.Marie (1989) Record No.376; Societe Union Saint Aubin v F Sansfleur
(1989) Record No. 4355; G.Nadal v Longtill (Mauritius) Ltd 1984 Record No.
3377; Tirvengadum v Bata Shoe (Mts) Co. Ltd (1979) MR 136; Latour v
Maurel of Cie (1967) MR 170; J. C.Paul v Longtill (Mauritius) Ltd (1983)
Record No 2/83/
18(1983) 4 IV 84 (IC) at 86-87
19Cameron et ai, The ·New Labour Relations Act, 1989 Juta & Co at 145:
"Fairness is a broad concept in any context...lt means that the dismissal must
be justified according to the requirements of equity when all the relevant
features ofthe case...are considered. "
20John Laws 'Public Law and Employment Law: Abuse ofPower', 1997 Public
Law at 460'
21Hugh Corder 'The content of the Audi Alteram Partem Rule in the South
African Administrative Law' 1980 THRHR 43 quoting Tindall ACJ in Minister
ofthe Interior Bechle 1948 (3) SA 490.
22Ridge v Baldwin (1964) A. C 40 per Lord Reid at 65 and Mallock v Aberdeen
Corporation (1971) 2 ALL ER 1278.
23J.Laws 'Public Law and Employment Law: Abuse of Power' 1997 Public
Law 455 at 461. The Industrial Relations Act 1973 and the Labour Act 1975 of
Mauritius, and the Labour Relations Act 1995 ofSouth Africa.
24(1987) 1 ALL ER 974 as per Lord Mackay ofClashfern LC. At 981
25Ibid at 981,· The same viel1Js are expressed in John v Rees (1969) 2 ALL ER
274. Megary J. said: ''As everybody who has anything to do with the law well
knows. the path of the law is strewn with examples of open and shut cases
which, somehow, were not unanswerable charges which, in the event, were
. completely answered; of inexplicable conduct which was fully explained; of
fixed and unalterable determinations that, by discussion, suffered a change.
Now are those with any knowledge ofhuman nature who pause to think for a
moment likely to underestimate the feelings of resentment of those who find
that a decision against them has been made without their being afforded any
opportuniq; to influence the cause ofevents. "
26Davies and Friedland, Labour Law: Texts and Materials 1984 Weidenfeld
and Nicolson, 2nd Ed at 514.
27Meyer v Law Society, Tvl 1978 (2) SA 209 (t) at 212 H
28(1985) 6 IV 380 at 386 B-C
'9
- Brassey et ai, The New Labour Law 1987 Juta & Co P310-311; Grogan J,
Workplace Law, 2000 Juta & Co. at 154, writes: "The requirements of
..
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procedural fairness were in fact developed by the Labour courts from the rules
ofnatural justice and the common law to suit the employment arena. "
30(1987) 8 ILl 714 (IC) at 716-717 See also Morali v President of the
Industrial Court & others 1987 (1) SA 130 (C): (1986) 7 ILl 690 (C) a matter
in which Berman J declared at 133 C-D: "The Common Law...provides and it
is indeed one ofthe cornerstones ofthe common law that a party be afforded a
fair opportunity to present his case which is a facet of the Audi Alteram
partem rule.
31 part viii of the Third Schedule of the Industrial Relations Act 1973 on
Disciplinary Procedures (Mauritius) Section 32 of the Labour Act 1975 on
'Unjustified Termination ofAgreement' (Mauritius).
32Items 3 and 4 ofschedule 8 ofLabour Relations Act 1995 on Code ofGood
Practice, Dismissal (South Africa).
331981 MR 157
341993 Record No 4691 SCJ 173
351983 Record No. 2/83 SCJ 52
36 Professor Wiehann was the chairman of the Commission of Enquiry into
Labour Legislation in 1979, the reports and recommendations ofwhich gave
rise to many of the key amendments to the statute in 1979, namely the
deracialising of the LRA, the establishment of the concept of unfair labour
practice to regulate both individual employment and collective labour
relations.
37 the task of defining the concept of unfair labour practice was left to the
industrial court. By virtue of section 46(9) (C) of the Labour Relations Act
1956, the industrial court was entrusted with the task of "determining"
disputes, concerning alleged unfair labour practices. "In determining the
dispute the court must obviously decide whether the practice concerned is
unfair or not (in terms of the statutory definition) and if it decides that it is
unfair it must resolve the matter by making a determination akin to an
arbitration award. " This was the decision in SEA WUSA v Trident Steel (Pty)
Ltd (1986) 7 ILl 418 (IC) at 437 C-D.
The Labour Relations Amendment Act of 1991 reintroduced an open-ended unfair
labour practice and defined the concept as " a conduct by an employer which unfairly
prejudices or jeopardises an employee's work security or employment opportunities
or which creates or promotes labour unrest or which detrimentally affects the
relationship between the employer and the employee." Although the new labour
Relations Act 1995 contains no general 'open textured' definition ofan unfair labour
practice, it has, however, given a statutory effect by setting out some rules in item 4
schedule 8 on code ofGood Practice which an employer must comply with in order to
make a disciplinary dismissal fair.
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Where there are no procedures the industrial court has itself laid down guidelines
regrading the requirements ofprocedural fairness. The approach in Mahlangu v ClM
Deltak,· Gallant c ClM Deltak 1986 7 IV 364, which will be discussed later in the
coming chapters, ha been considered as having formulated a new jurisprudence
based on the doctrine ofunfair labour practice.
38 Unilong Freight Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Muller (1998) 19 IV 552.
39 Maropane v Gilbeys Distillers and Vintners (Pty) Ltd and Another (1997) 8
(3) SAUR 133 (LC)
4() (1984) 51V j01 (IC)
41 Quoting from Camerlynck, Traite du Travail ed. 1968 in Statford College v
Mrs k. Jugessur 1990 Record No. 4483 as per Ahmed ACJ
42 In Chamroo v Belle Vue Mauricia S-E (1980) MR 309 the appellate court
held that "pleadings before court of summary jurisdiction being necessarily
concise, where the worker alleges that he has been summarily dismissed. The
employer who pleads dismissal for serious misconduct inevitably puts in issue
the fat that the dismissal was in accordance with the requirements ofthe law. "
See also 1vlLootfun v C.E.B (1984) SCJ 407: "Thus the substantive decision of
the employer who summarily terminates the services ofthe employee, is liable
to be scrutinized by the court only ifsuch an action is not awful.
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Chapter 2
Definition, Meaning and Critical Examination of Concepts
Introduction
The area under research has three identifiable concepts that need to be defined, their
meanings analysed and their implications critically examined. The concepts are
namely, 'dismissal', 'misconduct' and 'procedural fairness'. Although 'procedural
fairness' is the key concept, it is suggested that an attempt to define it will be made
after defining 'disnlissal' and 'misconduct'. The rationale of this presentation is to
have an understanding and implications of 'dismissal' and 'misconduct' first and then
see how they impact on the rules of procedural fairness .
.Chapter 2 will, therefore be divided into three aspects under the following
subheadings:
2.1 Dismissal: Definition, Meaning and Explanation.
2.2 Misconduct
2.2.1 Definition of Misconduct
2.2.2 Misconduct in the Social Perspective
2.2.3 Dismissible Misconducts
2.2.4 Illustrative list of Dismissible Misconduct.
2.3 Procedural Fairness
2.3.1 Meaning and Purpose of Procedural Fairness in relation with
Dismissal due to Misconduct.
2.3.2 Scope of Procedural Fairness in relation with Dismissal due to
Misconduct
2.3.3 Content and Form of Procedural Fairness In relation with
Dismissal due to Misconduct.
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2.1 Dismissal: Definition, Meaning and Explanation
There has been no specific definition of the term 'dismissal' in the Mauritian Labour
Act 1975 and the South African Labour Relations Act 1995. Those who drafted these
legislations might have thought that the word is too simple and too well known to
require any definition or they might also have thought that the words are too familiar
to all classes of employee~ for whose protection it may be used. Whatever might be
the intention of the drafters, it is important to construe its meaning according to the
established rules of interpretation.
In the present instance, the meaning of the word 'dismissal' has to be contextualised
as it is not intended to look at its meaning from a broad perspective as provided in the
South African Labour Relations Act 1995. It obviously means that dismissal due to
redundancy, retrenchment, non-renewal of fixed term contract of employment,
selective re-employment, refusal to resume work after taking maternity leave,
absenteeisn1 and constructive dismissal are not within the purview of this research.
The meaning of the term 'dismissal' will, therefore, be confined to situations where
the services of an employee are terminated as a punishment on account of some
misconduct committed by him during the course of employment. The conduct must
have been unlawful and the relationship of trust and confidence must have
irretrievably broken down.
l It is therefore, within this context that the term 'dismissal'
will bear its meaning.
For lack of definition of 'dismissal' in the Mauritian labour legislation, reference can
thus be made to the South African Labour Relations Act 1995 which defines dismissal
as follows in Section 186:
Dismissal means that -
(a) an employer has terminated a contract of employment with or without notice.
From this definition. 'dismissal' refers to termination of the contract of employment at
the initiative of the employer. 2 It is implied, as well, that the tennination is as a result
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of the conduct of an employee which has made the continuation of the emploYment
relationship intolerable. 3
The legal implication of dismissal is also explained in a more precise manner by the
Calcutta High Court in Union ofIndia v Someswan Banerji:4
Dismissing a man is putting an end to his employment. He may be
dismissed rightly or wrongly, but the act of dismissal is an act of
terminating his employment. It matters not whether his employment is
ternlinated because of dishonesty, corruption or bad health. In all three
cases he has been dismissed...In all the cases, the services has been
terminated... "
Similarly, the British Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, has defined a
dismissal as a termination of an "employee's contract of emploYment." The
Employment Appeal Tribunal Rules 1980 has provided that "dismissal" means
(a) the termination by his employer of the employee's contract of employment with
the employer, whether prior notice of the termination was or was not given to the
employee.
These different jurisdictions mentioned above, have common points of understanding
that dismissal takes place when the contract is terminated at the instance of the
employer and entails the communication by it to the employee of the message that the
contract has come to an end.
The Mauritian labour legislation being deficient of any definition has borrowed from
the British Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 which provides to the effect
that an employee "shall be treated as dismissed by his employer if and only if-
(a) the contract under which he is employed by the employer is terminated by his
employer, whether it is so terminated by notice or without notice;...5
This provision was quoted in HPeriag v International Beverages Ltcf where the
Supreme Court of Mauritius has drawn a distinction between dismissal due to the
conduct of an employee and a dismissal where the "termination of the relationship is
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at the initiative of the employee but is triggered off by a breach of the contract of
employment by the employer." Here also the Supreme Court has evaded the issue of
defining 'dismissal.' Instead~ the Supreme Court has found it more convenient to give
the requirements of a 'justified dismissal' for nlisconduct. In Societe de Gerence de
Mon Loisir v Ootim7 where Glover Cl stated:
Section 32(1 )(b) of Labour Act lay down three conditions that must be
fulfilled before a worker is so dismissed namely that:
(1) he is guilty of misconduct;
(2) the dismissal is effected within a certain period, failing which the
employer will be deemed to have waived his right; and
(3) the employer cannot in good faith take any other course such as for
example, to impose a lesser sanction or not to inflict one at all."
Although~ from the above, the Court has not given a clear definition of 'dismissal', it
has nevertheless given an overview of the nature of dismissal due to misconduct at
common law. In this respect the ~outh African law of dismissal supported by the
doctrine of unfair labour practice has been able to encapsulate quite significantly the
meaning and implication of the term 'dismissal'
2.1.1 The Nature of Dismissal due to Misconduct and the South
African Common Law Principles.
At common-law, it should be noted that the employee's obedience to his employer's
lawful orders is the cornerstone of the employment contract so far as the employee is
obliged to obey those commands.8
The conduct of the employee towards his employer determines the relationship
. .
between the two parties. In Leask v French9 it was held that subordination of the
employee to the power of the employer is the hallmark of the employment
relationship. In that sense, a transgression of a workplace rule by the employee is
regarded as misconduct which may lead to the termination of the employment
relationship at the initiative of the employer.
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Before the 1979 amendments to the Labour Relations Act, dismissal for misconduct
was regulated by the common law contract of service whereby the nonnal remedies of
breach of contract were available to an employee who happened to face dismissal for
. d 10mlscon ucl.
In tenns of the common law, there are two kinds of dismissal on account of
misconduct:
-Dismissal on notice and
-Summary dismissal
2.1.1.1. Dismissal On Notice
It has been seen that before the concept of unfair labour practice was introduced,
employment contracts could generally be tenninated at the will of either party by the
giving of notice.
Bennett contends that it is no longer the position, as it is now necessary to have a
good substantive reason for dismissing the employee. He states that the 1988
Amendments to the Labour Relations Act finnly entrenched the element of
substantive fairness into the definition of an unfair labour practice by stipulating that
dismissals by reason of disciplinary action must be for a valid and fair reason, if it is
based on misconduct. 11
The rules regulating employment would depend on the specific employment contract
in terms of the disciplinary codes which were in existence at the time. Generally,
absence from work is a misconduct which reaffirms the importance of having an
enquiry to establish the reason for the absence of the employee. The court has been
assuringly quick to come to the assistance of employees whose reasons for absence
had been that their lives would have been endangered had they come to work. In the
case of Basontwa & Another v Homegas (Pty) Ltd12 the Court approved of the
approach of the employers who had been particularly sensitive to the predicament of
black employees caught in the cross-fire of unrest which has enveloped many black
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residential areas. It was ruled that an absence from work in such circumstances would
not be regarded as sufficient ground for terminating the services of the defaulting
employees.
The concept of procedural fairness surfaces when an enquiry is being held to establish
the reasons of the act of the misconduct and surrounding circumstances in regard to
the wanling given regarding the same misconduct. The Court will normally refuse to
uphold employer's procedures where these do not comply with the standards of
f: . h C . 13aIrness t e ourt reqUIres.
A refusal to obey a lawful instruction normally justifies dismissal if the refusal is
wilful and serious, provided the instruction forms part of an employee's contractual
obligations and is legitimate and reasonable. 14 In terms of the common law contract,
dismissal can only follow after a contractually agreed time period is given in notice or
payment is given in lieu of notice. Such disnlissal would be lawful if the employer
has complied with the terms stipulated in the contract of employment.
In the case of MA WU v Bar/ou's Manufacturing Co.Ltd15 the question was whether
the dismissal was fair. reasonable and justified in the circumstances and not whether it
was lawful in tenns of the common law. It was argued that where the required notice
was given, dismissal cannot be said to be unfair. The Court ruled that a lawful
dismissal, in tenns of the common law, was unfair.
The principle has since been followed by a large number of the Industrial Court
decisions and also has the blessing of the Supreme Court. The principle will be
discussed more in detail in the coming chapters.
2.1.1.2 Summary Dismissal
This is a fonn of dismissal without notice, whereby the employer unilaterally cancels
the contract of employment without giving notice to the affected employee on the
basis of the alleged misconduct committed by that employee. Riekert is of the view
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that misconduct must generally be of a serious nature to lead to summary dismissal of
such employee. He goes further to say conduct which has been held to constitute a
ground for summary dismissal includes dishonesty, drunkenness, gross negligence or
incompetence, insubordination and absenteeism. 16 Besides these substantive
procedures for instance, in the case of Seloadi and others v Sun International
(Bophuthatswana) Ltd17 an application for an order declaring that the summary
dismissal of the applicants from their employment with the respondent was unlawful
was instituted, on the ground that the respondent had not complied ·with the audi
alteram partem rule.
Before discussing misconduct which leads to a dismissal, there must have been a
contract of employment based on an agreement in terms of .which the employee
voluntarily undertakes to place his personal services at the disposal of the employer in
return for a fixed or ascertainable wage. 18 It has been a controversial issue to
establish the question whether the person claiming unfair dismissal was an employee
as defined in the old Labour Relations ACt. 19 In the case of Liberty Life Association
of Africa Ltd v Niselow2o the Court held that a person is an employee when that
person puts his "productive capacity" at the disposal of another. This naturally
entitles the employer to define the duties of the employee and to control the manner in
which the employee discharges them.21
At common law, the employer is entitled to dismiss the employee summarily only if
the employee's refusal to obey a lawful order is deliberate and of serious nature.22
The seriousness of the disobedience is determined with reference to the
circumstances, the question being whether the employee failed to perform the
agreement or a vital part thereof. 23 This has been tested in a number of cases by the
South African Courts to establish whether there has been a contract of employment
before one can rightfully claim that there has been a dismissal. The Court applied the
"dominant impression" test. In Srnit v WCC24 the Court held that one must establish
whether the dominant impression gained from the relationship in question, is that it
has features of a contract of employment.
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Substantive fairness requires that an employee should only be dismissed for a valid
reason. It is of vital importance that dismissal must be justified by good reasons for
the termination of the contract of employment. This can only be achieved if ~air
'procedures are obeyed and complied with.25 In an English case of Ferodo v Barnes26
the Court held that the Industrial Tribunal ought to ask itself a question that, had the
employer at the time of the dismissal, reasonable grounds for believing that the
offence put against the applicant was in fact committed?
This view was adopted in the case of Lefu v Western Areas Gold Mining C027 that all
that is required is that the employer should at the time of the dismissal have had
reasonable grounds for believing that the offence had been committed.
A dismissal will, in all probability, be regarded as substantively unfair if the
dismissed employee was unaware of the rule broken by him. It is common cause that
son1etimes there is no clear legal reascn for the dismissal in tenus of the disciplinary
code.28
2.1.2 Is Dismissal a fair and appropriate sanction for Misconduct?
Although the term 'Misconduct' will be discussed in the next section of this chapter, it
is useful to know. while considering the ultimate sanction of dismissal, whether or not
misconduct can be a reason to make the dismissal fair and appropriate. This has given
rise to tremendous debate and conflict in giving a proper meaning to 'dismissal due to
misconduct'.
From the very outset, it must be clear that not all types of misconduct do warrant
dismissal. But there are cases where the offence is so heinous and the facts so
manifestly clear that a reasonable employer could, on the facts known to him at the
time of the dismissal, take the view that whatever explanation the employee may
advance, it would make no difference. These types of misconduct will be discussed in
the next section of the chapter. However, just to have a brief idea whether or not
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dismissal is the fair and appropriate sanction for misconduct, reference can be made to
a few cases.
In Heathcote v PG Autoglass (Pty) LtJ29 the Court found that the question of fairness
of the dismissal must be assessed by the Court objectively in the light of objective
standards, norms and guidelines as applied to the circumstances of a particular case.
This approach does not imply that the Court will substitute its own decision for that of
the employer. What the Court must do is to consider whether the penalty of dismissal
in the circumstances of the case was fair and appropriate, judged objectively in the
light of prevailing industrial relations, standards and norms of the employer. The
question is n01 whether the Court itself, in substitution of the employer, would have
imposed the sanction of dismissal, but rather whether the employer, in imposing this
sanction, was acting fairly, as judged by objective standards and guidelines.
In SA CCA WU & Suping v City Lodge Hotels (Pty) Ltcf° it was found that the Court
must carefully consider the interest of both the employer and dismissed employee in
assessing the fairness of the dismissal. The same view was expressed in Mhlongo v
SA Mutual Life Assoc Society31 where the Court found that the punishment must not
be worse than the offence and that the interests of the employer must be counter-
balanced against those of the dismissed employee.
In Abrahams v Pick 'n Pay Supermarkets OFff2 it was said that the Court will hold
that the dismissal was fair when the employee's misconduct resulted in the
relationship of trust and confidence between employer and employee being broken
down irretrievably. The Labour Appeal Court in Scaw Metals Ltd v .Vermeulen33 also
echoed the view of Abrahams' case by stating that dismissal for misconduct is
justified if the misconduct had the effect of destroying or seriously damaging the
relationship .of employer and employee so that a continuation thereof becomes
intolerable. In Hotel Liquor Commerqial & Allied Workers Union ofSA & Another v
Fedics Group (Pty) Ltd tla Fedics Food Services34 the Court set certain guidelines to
determine whether the relationship of trust had irretrievably broken down. These are:
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(a) Whether the conduct destroyed reasonable hope for the restoration of an
employment relationship?
(b) Did the employee deserve protection in continuation of his employment
having regard to his conduct?
(c) Had trust been fundamentally destroyed?
(d) Did conduct go beyond that which the employer in the circumstances could
reasonably have been expected to tolerate?
In EA WTUSA & Another v The Productions Casting Co (Pty) Lul5 the Industrial
Court stated:
"As far as misconduct is concerned I believe that if the employer is ofthe bonafide
view that as a result ofthe enlployee's conduct which has come to his attention and
which he has investigated to such an extent that would exclude any grounds that he
(tke employer) acted arbitrarily, the relationship between him and the employee has
become intolerable for commercial or public interest reason, he will be entitled to
disnliss the enlployee. If an" enlployer for instance mistrusts an employee for
reasons which he nlust obviously justify (not according to any particular standard
ofproof), and he can show that such mistrust, as a result ofcertain conduct on the
part of the enlployee, is counter-productive to his commercial activities or to the
public interest (where appropriate), he would be entitled to terminate the
relationship. "
In Humphries & Jewell (Pty) Ltd v Federal Council ofRetail & Allied Workers Union
& Others36 SpoelstraJ also said at I037F-H:
"In nlY view, a disregard by an enlployee ofhis employer's authority in the
presence of other enlployees, amount to insubordination and it cannot be
expected that an employer should tolerate such coltduct. The relationship
of trust, nllltllal confidence and respect which is the very essence of a
ntaster/servant relationship, cannot under these circumstances continue.
III the absence offacts showing that this relationship was not detrimentally
affected by the conduct ofthe employee, it is unreasonable to compel either
ofthe parties to continue with the relations. "
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In Man Truck & Bus (SA) (Pty) Lld v United African Motor & Allied Workers Union37
the following was said by the arbitrator, Mr Brassey, at 185G-I:
"Conventional wisdom has it that there are three grounds of dismissal:
disnlissal for misconduct, for incompetence/incapacity (which I shall, for
simplicity, call dismissal for incapacity) and for operational requirements.
Three categories cover the field. In the first two there is work for the
el11ployee to do, but he cannot be trusted to do it properly; in the third he
can do the work, but there is none for him to do. That they overlap is
undeniable. Dismissal for theft, for example, is normally seen as dismissal
for misconduct; but it can also be regarded as dismissal for incapacity,
because the employee is revealed as someone who lacks one ofthe qualities
- trustworthiness - necessary for the job and with effort, it can even be
described as disnlissal for operational reasons because an employer
obviously cannot run a business with untrustworthy employees. The
overlap illustrates that (absenting any improper motive, like victimisation or
union bashing) we are ultimately asking a single question; did the dismissal
nzake conlnlercial sense in the circumstances?"
Rycroft and Jordaan stated as follows:
"As a general rule, nlisconduct (or accunlulated instances thereof) will be
sufficiently serious if it renders the continued relationship between
enlployer and el11ployee impossible. Relevant factors include the nature of
the nlisconduct, possible prejudice to the employer, and the employee's state
ofnlind. These are nlOre or less the same considerations that are applied to
determine the seriousness of an employee's misconduct for purposes of
dismissal in ternlS of the common law. Thus it is not surprising that the
industrial court often sought guidance from common law principles when
considering whether an employee's misconduct had been sufficiently
serious to warrant disnlissal. ,,38
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This vie'.\' is also adopted by Le Roux and Van Niekerk where the authors stated as
follows:
"A tltenle expressed in many decisions is that dismissal is the 'ultimate'
sanction and sltould not be imposed automatically. The tests most often
applied is an appropriate sanction ask the question (in various ways)
whether the conduct of the employee has led to the elnploynlent
relationship (which is often said to be based 'on mutual trust and
confidence ~ being seriously damaged or destroyed and/or whether its
continuation is possible or tolerable for the employer. For example, it has
been stated tltat dismissal is justified where the disciplinary offence .
conlmitted by the employee has the effect of seriously damaging or
destroying the relationship between employer and employee so that the
continuance of that relationship could be regarded as intolerable; the
relationship of trust, mutual confidence and respect cannot...continue; the
relationship is irreparably harmed; or where the continuation of the
relationship is jutile r39





Neither the Mauritian Labour Act 1975 not the South African Labour Relations Acts
of 1956 and 1995 have defined the tenn 'misconduct'. The rationale of this is
obviously, to avoid a restrictive definition especially at a time when the law of master
and servant is losing much of its rigour an.d some of the misconduct are no longer
considered sufficient for dismissal of an employee, unless there are aggravating
circumstances to justify such dismissals.
The brief introduction raises two important points, viz,
(a) the need for interpretation of 'misconduct' within the context of changing
values affecting the law of master and servant.
(b) the need to distinguish between misconduct that are no longer considered
sufficient for dismissal and misconduct with aggravating circumstances that
justify dismissal.
Thus to understand the nature and meaning of a 'dismissible misconduct' it IS
essential
(i) to seek a proper definition of the tenn 'misconduct' as contemplated in the
Labour Relations Acts of Mauritius and South Africa, and most importantly,
in the judicial pronouncements of both countries; then
(ii) to discuss the multidimensional nature of 'misconduct' from the perspectives
of the two issues raised above in (a) and (b).
29
2.2.2 DEFINITION AND MEANING
.In the absence of any statutory definition, as mentioned earlier, the word 'misconduct'
has to be understood in its ordinary dictionary meaning, and the meaning given during
numerous adjudication in Mauritius and South Africa. For further clarifications and
expositions reference will be made to other commonwealth jurisdictions.
The dictionary meaning of the word 'misconduct' is 'improper behaviour, intentional
wrong doing or deliberate violation of the rule of standard behaviour." Black's Law
Dictionary defines "misconduct' within the context of employment, as "transgressions
of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, an unlawful
behaviour, sometimes wilful in character, in fact, any improper performance or failure
to act in the face of an affirmative duty to act."
It stenlS from this definition that where the employee is guilty of a misconduct, it
should be such that the misconduct presents a "reel obstacle a la poursuite de
I'execution du fontionement de I' entreprise. ,,40 It is an all embracing concept "which
includes every and any act arising from the conduct of the employee, other than
incompetence or incapacity, which has negative effect on the business of the
employer or employment discipline at the undertaking or outside the workplace. ,,4\
Here discipline means "standardised organisational behaviour set up by rules and
regulations of an industrial establishment at a particular time, deviation from that
standard deliberately or negligently will be an act of indiscipline or an act subvertive
of discipline." 42
These decisions have gIven some guidelines for finding out the meaning of a
particular act which can be deemed to be subversive of discipline resulting in
dismissal in Mauritius and South Africa.
In Nawosah v Mauritius Drug House Ltd, Boolell P.M said, "Summary dismissal after
an act of misconduct by the employee is justified if keeping the employee after his
misconduct "est grave la faute susceptible d'apporter un trouble profond dans la
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fonctionnement et la marche de I'entreprise de telle sorte que le maintien du salarier
est l'impossible", 43 et "qui rend impossible le maintien du contrat du travail.,,44 The
opinions of the Industrial Court lay down the essentials that an employee is obliged
not only to discharge the duties faithfully and sincerely but also to ensure that while
doing so, he/she does not commit any act which is incompatible with the faithful
discharge or performance of hislher duties. Thus if the employee does'.' ... anything
incompatible with the due or faithful discharge of his duty to his master, the latter has
a right to dismiss him. ,,45
In South Africa, the court endorsed the principle that an employer is entitled to
dismiss an employee who is in breach of trust in the form of conduct involving
dishonesty and unlawful behaviour. There are abounding cases that have supported
the view expressed in Gerry Bouwer Motors (Pty) Ltd v Preller:
"I do not think it can be contended that where a servant is guilty ofmbwonduct that
is inconsistent with good faith and fidelity and which amounts to unfaithfulness
and dishonesty towards his employer the latter is not entitled to dismiss him. ,,46
Thus, even if the employee did not act dishonestly, but ifhislher conduct "was of such
type that it was inconsistent, in a grave way; incompatible with the emplOYment in
which he had been engaged as a "manager" the employer is entitled to dismiss
him/her.47
With such elucidations from the numerous judicial decisions it is clear that the
concept "misconduct", especially 'dismissible' misconduct, has greatly changed in
recent years.
To understand this phenomenon in the law of dismissal due to misconduct, it is
in1portant to view employees misconduct in a broader modem social perspective.
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2.2.3 'Dismissible Misconduct' In a Broader Modern Social
Perspective.
In earlier days even for a. minor misconduct (if it can be called even a serious lapse on
the part of the employee), the employer was within his right to dismiss an employee
summarily. The case of Turner v Mason 48 is an illustration in point. In that case, the
employee was dismissed because she left the place of duty to see her dying mother
after the leave she asked for was refused. It is a case of moral obligation owing to the
ailing mother versus legal obligation to the master. The order of dismissal was upheld
by the court on the ground that the servant had no sufficient ground to ignore her legal
obligation to the employer.
Ho\v then were the rules of conduct interpreted in Mauritius and South Africa?
The pattern was, obviously, not different from the precedence set by Turner v Mason.
In Town Council of Beau Bassin and Rose Hill v Jennah49 the Supreme Court of
Mauritius was of the view:
There was a time when the dismissals ofthe employees for mere trifler was held by
the court to be justified. Sometimes a single instance of insolence, negligence or
insubordination was held sufficient to justify dismissal.
In fact, both in Mauritius and South Africa, the state, far from ensuring equitable
disciplinary procedures and practices, has endorsed the employer's discretion and
authority in these matters and in many cases gone beyond tacit support to treating
breach of employment contract as a criminal offence.50 For instance, the Mauritian
Ordinance No.16 of 1862 stated that unlawful absences should be punished according
to the following penalties:
(1) Employers were liable to lawfully withhold the wages and allowances for the
whole period of absences;
(2) The employee guilty of absence to be sentenced (this was at the option of the
employer) by the stipiendary magistrate of the district for a period not
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exceeding 14 (fourteen) days imprisonment or to a prolongation of his service
for the said period of absence. 51
Similarly, in South Africa, from 1911 until 1974 there was a body of law which aimed
at controlling by criminal sanctions the conduct of black workers. The provisions of
section 14 of the Native Labour Regulation Act 15 of 1911 was repealed by the Black
Labour Act 67 of 1964 but the same provisions were found unaltered in section 15 of
the later Act which made any person guilty of the offence:
(a) without lawful cause absents himself from his place of employment or fails to
enter upon and carry out the terms ofhis contract of employment;
(b) wilfully and unlawfully does or omits to do anything the doing or omission
thereof causes or likely to cause injury to persons or property;
(c) neglects to perform any work which it is his duty to perform or unfits himself
for the proper perfonnances of his work through the use of dagga or other
habit-fonning drugs or by having become or being intoxicated during working
hours
(d) refuses to obey any lawful command of his employer or any person lawfully
placed in authority over him or uses insulting or abusive language to his
employer or any person lawfully placed in authority over him.
(e) after having entered into an agreement of service, whether oral or in writing
with a labour agent or holder of an employee's recruiting licence and after
having received an advance in respect thereof, accept another advance from
another labour agent a holder of an employer's recruiting license in
consideration of entering upon any other contract of service under the first
mentioned agreement shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding
fifty rand or in default payment, to imprisonment for a period not exceeding
three months.
Section 65 of the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 criminalises in specific
circumstances the instigation of a strike or lockout, as well as the incitement to take
part in a strike or lockout.
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Startling as it may be~ these statutory provision which favoured the .employer, were
far from being equitable and commensurating with the degree of misconduct. But now
the harshness of the punitive law has much abated in the context that have been
brought about by the concept of social justice and humanist trends of the modem
society based on social welfare laws. A new jurisprudence in the law of industrial
relations has. therefore, emerged with the growth of strong unionism and "recognition
of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the
human family.,,52 These social values have, as a result, enhanced the dignity of an
employee at his/her workplace. Where previously no tribunal could interfere with the
severity of punishment inflicted on an employee by his/her employer, now with the ..
change in social outlook, the court is empowered with the unfair labour practice
jurisdiction to protect the employee against any arbitrary or unreasonable disciplinary
action. 53 Commenting on this legal phenomenon Cooper said:
"Many of the nineteenth century cases should be read wit" caution for t"ey rest
upon a different social background and would probably be decided differently
today. ".'\-1
In Mauritius as well as in South Africa an employee is now in his permissible right to
organise. associate and practice labour relations55 which would otherwise have been
considered as a misconduct and liable to dismissal. Even to go on 'strike' is no longer
a misconduct if it is lawful and justified,56 and does not violate any statutory criteria.
In Mauritius and South Africa strike action will be illegal if it does not comply with
the statuto.ry pre-strike procedure. 57 Although, absenteeism without notification has
been considered to be a misconduct warranting dismissal, 58 the court has exercised
great care in determining whether or not it is dismissible misconduct. In Mauritius this
issue has been debated in the case of Noel Furniture Lld v Khoodeeram. 59 The
respondent was injured on his way to work and made several attempts to have his
~mployer notified of his absence from work. In fact, the employer was not notified
and the respondent was dismissed from his job. The appeal court held
(i) the obligation to notify the employer when a worker is ill, within the required
time lin1it and to send a medical cez:ificate in cases of prolonged illness is
mandatory. .
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(ii) But failure to comply with such requirements will not necessarily result in
dismissal. The provisions of the Labour Act regarding termination of
employment must be borne in mind. There may be occasions where it can be
shown that a worker has made efforts, albeit unsuccessful to notify the
employer. In these cases, summary dismissed is not warranted.
Thus with the advent of the notion of social justice and fairness in the law of
dismissal, disciplinary rules are no more "harshly administered, inconsistently applied
and arbitrarily enforced.,,6o In Jupiter General Insurance Co. Ltd v Shroff61 the privy
council gave some indication of the modern trend and of the principle by which courts
are guided today:
"Their Lordships recognise that the immediate dismissal ofan enlployee is a strong
measure..... On the one hand, it can be an exceptional circumstances only that an
enlployer is acting properly in summarily dismissing an employee on his
committing a single act of negligence, on the other, the Lordships would be very
loath to assent to the view that a single outbreak of bad temper, accompanied, it
may be, with regrettable language, is a sufficient groundfor dismissal. "
Sir John Beaumont, C.J observed in the case, "one must apply the standards of men
and not those of angels.,,62 Thus this modern attitude of governance which reflects the
principle of adminIstrative justice, imposes on the employer a positive duty to meet
the requirements of legality, fairness and reasonableness when deciding to impose
disciplinary action against an employee for misconduct. To give effect to the guest for
improved decision making, legislative as well as judicial interventions have become a
strong feature in the law of discipline in Mauritius and South Africa.
In South Africa, certain conduct that may have once been viewed as misconduct by
employers are now expressly permitted by the Act. Section 187 of the Labour
Relations Act 1995 lists a series of reasons for which an employee may not be
dismissed under any circumstances. Participation in lawful strike or refusing to do the
work of a striker or to comply with a collective bargaining demand of the employer
cannot now be treated as misconduct. Even a woman who left to have a baby was
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largely at the mercy of her employer in the sense that her absence was treated as a
reason for termination of the contract of employment. Now a woman may not be
dismissed in any circumstances merely because she is pregnant.63
The South African Labour Law has also extended its unfair labour practice
jurisdiction to view compassionately and flexibly those cases related to 'drunk on
duty'. The case of Molefe v Industrial Lead Works (Pty) Lttf4 is of singular
significance in this area of law, as it does not view "drunkenness" as a misconduct
personal to the employee, but as a problem known as 'dopstelsel' in fanns which was
introduced and encouraged by the employer to make the employees 'slaves of
alcohol' . Thus, in determining termination of a fann worker's services as an
appropriate sanction, the court had to look not only at the employer's contribution in
furthering the abuse of alcohol, but also the age old institutional custom of
encouraging alcohol dependence. The court further enjoined the agricultural section
employer to demonstrate a sense of moral duty towards the fann worker who is guilty
of alcohol abuse or related conduct so as "to develop a solution or sanction which
realises the commercial goal of the employer, ensures relationship and is directed at
rehabilitation." The court finally found that where the dismissal of a fann worker for
an alcohol related offence unfair, "(it) may order that the farm worker be reinstated on
a final written warning for such alcohol related offence to the effect that, in the event
that such farm worker again abuses alcohol, he may be dismissed without further
notice on the condition that the employer provides the farm worker support and
assistance in his fight against alcohol abuse, such assistance also takes the form of
active steps such as the withholding of the provision of drink to the farm worker and
the provision to the farm worker of alcohol-rehabilitative medication. ,,65
Thus, from the above instances, it is clear that the term misconduct has assumed a
multidimensional facet which has to be flexibly interpreted according to the standard
dictated by the economic interest and mores of the society, but its interpretation falls
entirely '''within the supervision and control of the courts ... which may pronounces on
the severity of the measure and if the measure was justified.,,66 Considering the
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principles laid down by the unfair labour practice jurisdiction, what would then be the
court's fonnulated criteria to detennine a dismissible misconduct?
2.2.4 Criteria set by the Court for determining Dismissable
Misconduct
The Court has acted decisively to protect employees by enforcing a unifonn and well
developed set of guidelines for application or to cases of dismissal due to misconduct.
Deep River Beau Champ Ltd v Baidhanan Beegoo67 is a landmark case in point
. decided by the Supreme Court of Mauritius. The Court conceded the fact that the
following principles should be taken into account when a conduct is considered as a
sufficient reason for dismissal:
(i) not every misconduct justifies summary dismissal;
(ii) misconduct must be viewed in the specific context where it occurs and in the
relevant nature of the relationship existing between the employee and
employer.
(iii) where the misconduct would have a direct bearing on the employer-employee
relationship to the extent that the worker brings about "un trouble profond
dans le fonctionnement et la marche de l'entreprise" (Jurisclasseur Travail
Fascicule 30 note 163) summary dismissal would be justified.
(iv) for misconduct to qualify under (iii) above, the employee must have damaged
the trust which an employer should have in an employee beyond repair and
they give the employer cause to worry;
(v) conviction on a criminal charge does not operate to give the employer an
automatic licence to dismiss an employee summarily on the ground of
misconduct.
In South Africa. several principles have also been enunciated to detennine the
sufficiency of the reasons for dismissal due to misconduct. In JefJeries v President
Steyn Mine
68
and Vermuth v Macsteel (Ply) Ltcf9 the court has enlisted essential
points to be considered when evaluating the justification of an employer to discipline
the employee for misconduct. They are:
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(i) The nature of the misconduct.70
(ii) The nature and the work performed by the employee.
(iii) The employee's state of mind. The employee knew he could be dismissed for
hislher misconduct.
(iv) The employer's disciplinary code.
(v) The consistency of the employer's actions.
(vi) Prior \varnings received by the employer.
(vii) The nature and size of the employer's workforce.
(viii) The impact of the misconduct on the workforce as a whole as well as on the
relationship between the employer and the employee, and the capacity of the
employee to perform hislher job.
(ix) The position which the employer occupies in the market place and the possible
rejudice to it/himlher.
(x) Any mitigating factor to be considered by the employer in determining the
appropriate sanction to be imposed for misconduct.
From these lists, noticeable points of similarities can be drawn on the criteria set by
the courts in Mauritius and South Africa. Emphasis has mostly been placed on certain
attributes that will make a misconduct justify dismissal. They are discussed under the
following subheadings:
2.2.4.1 Misconduct must be 'gross' and 'wilful'
In M9n Desert Alma Ltd v G. Charoux71 the Supreme Court of Mauritius has
attempted to draw a distinction between 'faute legere' and 'faute lourde'. The
respondent was publicly defying the authority of the General Manager who had, only
a few days before, spared him a dismissal which he would have "richly deserved".
Such conduct which was "susceptible d'apporter un trouble profond dans le
Fonctionnement et la marche de l'entreprise de telle sorte que le maintien du salarie
dans I'entreprise est impossible."
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The merit of the above decision in Mauritius has also found support in the form of the
South African Labour Relations Act 1995. Item 3(4) of schedule 8 states:
"Generally, it is not appropriate to dismiss an employeefor a first offence, except if
the misconduct is serious and ofsuch gravity that it makes a continued employment
relationship intolerable. "
Both Mauritius and South Africa have used the terms "serious", "grave", "gross" and
"wilful" as qualifiers when providing examples of the type of misconduct that may
warrant dismissal. The use of such qualifiers appear to suggest that, for example
dishonesty simpliciter as opposed to gross dishonesty, will not be sufficiently serious
to warrant dismissal for a first commission of offence. This in turn, raises the
debatable issue of when dishonesty, theft, assault, insubordination, damage to
property, become gross or what factors must be present to make these misconduct
'gross' .
Item 3(4), referred earlier, has provided an illustrative list to the type of offence which
may warrant dismissal for a first offence. It is noteworthy that in all the examples
provided therein, the element of intention is expressed:
"Examples of serious misconduct, subject on its merits, are gross dishonesty or
wilful damage to the property of the employer, wilful endangering of the safety of
others, physical assault on the employer, a fellow employee, client or customer and
gross insubordination."
Unlike the South African Labour Relations Act 1995, the Industrial Relations Act
1973 of Mauritius does not enumerate a list of gross or wilful misconduct that will
warrant dismissal except that Section 12 states:
"Where there has been misconduct, the disciplinary action to be taken will depend
on the circumstances, including the nature ofthe misconduct. "
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The provision has left the court with a wider ambit to decide on the rationale of a
dismissal based on the merit of each case. In Nanhuck v Ramlagun72 the Supreme
Court of Mauritius went to a greater length to discuss the meaning of 'serious and
wilful misconduct.' It gave an illustration from the case Brooker v Warren73 where the
facts were as follows:
A workman was employed in a factory at a circular saw which was driven by
IfIlachinery. His duty was to hold the wood and guide it when it was being sawn. He
was told on several occasions both by his employer and by the factory inspector, to
keep guard upon the saw when it was in use. The object ofthe guard was to prevent
the wood which was being sawn, if it was jerked up from being caught by tlte teeth
at the back of the saw and hurled about tlte worksllop, to tile danger of tllose at
work there. The worknlan had workedfor several years at circular saws before tile
guard was invented, and he had a great aversion to using a guard. Upon tile day in
question he intentionally did not place the guard upon tile saw wllen using it and
the piece of wood which was being sawn jerked up and was IIurled by tlte saw
against him, and he was killed. The Court ofAppeal held that serious and wilful
nlisconduct had been proved. The Master of the Rolls IIeld tllat the worker was
guilty of nlisconduct in deliberately and intentionally refusing to obey tile order to
note the guard, and the misconduct was wilful and tllat misconduct was serious
because it produced a condition of danger to IIinzself and otllers. He was therefore
guilty ofserious and wilful nlisconduct.
In Gobin v Ramruttun74 the issue of serious and wilful misconduct was discussed.
When the matter relates to serious and wilful misconduct of the workman, the onus of
proof is on the employer who has to show that the misconduct was both serious and
wilful. On the facts of the case it was held that
Uit was through the applicant's gross negligence that the accident took place and
that respondent is not liable under the Workmen's Compensation Ordinance,
1931"
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It was referred further to the provision to Section 2 of the Ordinance, as amended by
the Workmen's Compensation (Amendment) Ordinance, 1947, the employer shall not
be liable should:
(a) the accident proved to be attributable to the workman's own serious and wilful
misconduct which shall include:
(i) being in any degree under the influence of drugs or intoxicating drink;
or
(ii) a contravention of any law, regulation or order, whether statutory or
otherwise, expressly made for the purpose of ensuring the safety or
health of workmen, or of preventing accidents to workmen, if the
contravention was committed deliberately or with a reckless disregard
of the terms of such law, regulation or order; or
(iii) the wilful removal or disregard by the workman of any safety guard or
other device which he knew to have been provided for the purpose of
securing the safety of workmen; or
(iv) any other act on omission, which the court may, having regard to all
the circumstances of an accident, declare to be serious and wilful
misconduct.
From the reasoning of the court. it is clear that the issue involved is not of negligence
on the part of the employee, but something beyond it. The word 'wilful' imports that
the misconduct was deliberate and not merely a thoughtless act on the spur of a
moment. The word .serious' in the context of the accident does not mean that the
actual consequence was serious but that the misconduct itself had a serious bearing. In
Johnson v Marsho1l75 Sons and Co the Appeal Court explained that the word 'wilful'
must not only mean a mere intentional breach of a rule, but it also means wilful with
the intention to be guilty of misconduct.
Throughout the discussion. the general tenor lends support to the fact that misconduct
can be described as .gross' or 'serious' only if it satisfies the necessary requirement of
intention. The case of Nkomo v Pick n Pay Retailers76 contrasts squarely with the case
of Anglo American Farms tla Boschendal Restaurant v MKonjwayo.77 On the one
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hand in Nkomo' s case, the dismissal of a bakery assistant who had eaten part of a pie,
the property of the· employer, was held by the industrial court to be unfair; and on the
other hand, in Anglo American Fanns case the respondent was employed as a wai~er
and his duties necessarily entailed handling the appellant's stock-in-trade, including
soft drinks. It was part of the respondent's job to fetch drinks which had been ordered
by customers from the refrigerator in the office, carry them into the restaurant and
serve them to the customers there. In the nature of things, this task could not
practically be carried out without respondent's being placed in a position of trust,
especially where the appellant's stock control system was not very sophisticated or
effective and the cashier and other members of the appellant's restaurant management
staff could not have been expected to play the role of policemen watching every rnove
made by every waiter. However, the employee was dismissed for theft of one can of
softdrink. even after serving for nine years.
The court distinguished the two cases after analysing the facts. In Nkomo' s case there
was no evidence of premeditation, and nothing to show that the employee had a
thieying propensity which could cause his employer reasonably to conclude that the
employee was no longer to be trusted. The court concluded at 943 G-H that:
"The offence is in lily opinion not such that it shows a degree of dishonest intent
which would be unacceptable to an employer."
Whereas~ in the Anglo American Farms case, the court held that the respondent's theft
or atten1pted theft of the Fanta \vas premeditated and executed over a considerable
period of time by means of a surreptitious plan. Thring J, in conclusion held:
"In nly view it denlOnstrates a "thieving propensity on !lis part, and I cannot
conceive that theft of this kind by a waiter could ever be acceptable to a self-
respecting restaurateur. ,,78
It was thus a conduct of "such a grave and weighty character as to amount to a breach
of the confidential relationship between master and servant, such as would render the
servant unfit for continuance in the master's employment.,,79
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The approach adopted by the court is that where the dismissal is for dishonesty, it is
not the value of the 'goods stolen' that is detenninative of whether dismissal was the
appropriate sanction for the dishonesty but rather the issue of whether dishonesty
went to the root of the relationship of trust between the employer and the employee
and rendered the continuation of the employment relationship intolerable.
This leads us to the next criterion for a dismissable misconduct: which is 'misconduct,
breach of a vital tenn in the contract of employment'
.2.2.4.2 Misconduct - Breach of a Vital Term in a Contract of
.Employment.
In Mauritius and South Africa a contract of employment has always been the basis on
which the employer and employee relationship has been built.80 Added to this
common law principle, there is an impressive superstructure of statutory rights not to
be unfairly dismissed in the fonn of the Mauritian Labour Act 1975 and the South
African Labour Relations Act 1995.81
Once entered into, the relationship becomes more and more non-negotiable because of
the incorporation of unagreed (implied) tenns, and tenns, which the employee has
little choice but to agree. Rycroft and Jordaan illustrate the content of these implied
duties in the following terms:
"The core of conlnlOn law inlplied terms are, on the employee's side, a duty of
obedience to the enlployer's lawful and reasonable instructions, a duty offidelity, a
duty care and a duty ofreasonable efficiency and competence. ,,81
They even extended these duties, with other ramifications to such cannons of conduct,
which regulated the fiduciary relationship between the employer and the employee:
"The enlployee is obliged to further the employer's business interests. The
enlployee nlaY also not use his or her emp'oyment to make a secret commission or
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profit, nlaY not misappropriate the employer's property, may not divulge
confidential information and trade secrets obtained in the course ofemployment. ,,83
"Failure, therefore, to carry out any of these implied duties would constitute a breach84
of a vital term of the contract of employment85 which may entitle the employer to
dismiss the employee summarily.86 To make the dismissal valid and fair 87 the
employer must on balance of probabilities88 and establish objectively89 that the
misconduct is of such nature that it constitutes a breach so material that it goes to the
root of the contract,90 In Teka v Public works Department91 , on review, the Supreme
Court held:
"That the refusal of the labourers to take their turn as watchman every fortnight
was a breach of the condition of their employment which justified the employer
disnlissing them... Their refusal to comply constituted a breach of contract
justifying tlte defendant in rescinding the contract. The dismissal was therefore not
wrongful. "
The Supreme Court of Mauritius has gone further to make the dismissal of an
employee of a constructive nature in the event of the employee wilfully and
deliberately causing the contract to come to an end:
It is perhaps necessary to repeat tltat whenever an employee does, by his deliberate
conduct render inlpossible tlte continuance of tlte contract of work it is in fact he,
the enlployee who constructively puts an end to the contract although it is left to the
enlployer to take the initiative ofdeclaring the contract to be ended. ,,91
From the above mentioned, in trying to establish the fair and valid reason for
dismissal due to misconduct, the court has applied another test which is irretrievable
breakdown of employer-employee relationship.
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2.2.4.3 Misconduct - Violates trust and Destroys Employer-
Employee Relationship.
To ascertain the validity of a dismissal due to misconduct, the court has. invariably
asked:
Did the nlisconduct "have the effect of destroying or seriously damaging the
relationship of the employer and employee...so that the continuation of that
relationship could be regarded as intolerable?,,93
Two tests seem to emerge from this question, viz
(i) the misconduct must have had the effect of destroying or seriously damaging
the relationship of the employer and the employee; and
(ii) the continuation of that relationship could be regarded as intolerable.
It is clearly established that there is implied in a contract of employment a term that
an employee should not conduct himself/herself in a manner calculated or likely to
destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between an
employer and employee.94 This view was supported in Pearce v Foster95 where it was
stated:
"It is one of the fundamentals of the employment relationship that an enlployer
should be able to place trust in an employee. A breach of this trust in the form of
conduct involving dishonesty is one that goes to the heart ofthe relationship and is
destructive ofit. "
These rules are implicit in the law of dismissal in both Mauritius and South Africa. In
Deep River Beau Champ SE v Sydney Paul Etowar96 the court held:
"first, by his refusal to comply with a legitimate order, tlte respondent was
guilty of misconduct and, secondly, showed by his subsequent attitude that
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he could no longer work in the appellant's enterprise because of tile
incompatibility with-his superiors."
-Therefore, the employer could not, "in good faith, take any other course", 97 but to
dismiss the employee. In effect, it means that the employee has created such a
situation through his/her misconduct, that it had a destructive and damaging impact on
compatiTJility as well as the relationship of trust.
The Supreme Court adopted the same principle in Dry Cleaning & Steam Laundry Ltd
v J W -Clarisse98 when the facts were particularised as follows: The plaintiff
circulated a tract drafted and/or signed by the plaintiff which the defendant's company
considered to be tantamount to causing disruption and/or severe disturbance to the
defendant's running its industry. Further the nature of the tract was most illegal,
defamatory and injurious in the circumstances. The court was satisfied:
"tltat tlte tract contains very serious allegations against the defendant company. To
nlY nlind they amount to a breach 0/ trust. An enlployee owes loyalty to his
employer. Once an employer cannot trust his worker there is no way to keep the
agreement alive. "
These cases are quite evident of the fact that the bond of trust and good working
relationship are quite essential between an employer and. employee, and any breach
would compromise the necessary relationship and warrant dismissa1.97 Cases abound
in the South African law of unfair dismissal which illustrate that an employer is
entitled to dismiss an employee who is guilty of conduct that is inconsistent with good
faith and dishonesty_lOO The remark made by Thring J is quite pertinent here:
"It seenlS to me that the relationship between such an employer and such an
employee is o/such nature that,/or it to be healthy, the employer must, o/necessity
he confident that he can trust the employee not to steal his stock in trade. If that
confidence is destroyed or substantially diminished by the realisation that the
employee is a thief, the continuation can be expected to become intolerable, at least
/01 the employer. "JOl
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However, in turning to the question of dishonesty leading to dismissal, the court held
in JD Group Lld v De Beer after holding that the breakdown of relationship is
something that must be objectively established, even by inference, that conduct which
does not amount to theft in the true sense or which is not characterised by serious
dishonesty will not be readily assumed that the trust relationship has been destroyed.
2.2.2.4 Misconduct that is Repeated and lacks Mitigating Factor.
In Damon v Prinlpak (Cape/02 the court considered that in determining the
appropriate .sanction to be imposed on an· employee for misconduct, an employer
must look at the possibility of any mitigating factor. In the present case the mitigating
factors were:
1. the employee concerned has an unblemished disciplinary record;
2. the employee concerned has a long period of service with the employer;
3. the employee concerned has demonstrated sincere and extreme remorse
and openly and repeatedly apologised for his misconduct;
4. the employer was still favourably disposed towards the employee;
5. the victim of the employee's misconduct was not averse to the employee's
continued employment by the employer;
6. the en1ployee' s misconduct was totally uncharacteristic and consisted of an
impulsive act during a fit of rage;
7. the employee's personal circumstances such as circumstances entailing the
employee being the breadwinner of his family and the fact that, in an
instance where the dismissal has been imposed and the court has to assess
the fairness thereof, the employee had been unemployed since his
dismissal.
The Court in ECCAWUSA obo Gumede v Mr Price 103 considered different factors that
pleaded in mitigation of the criminal offence of theft. It was held that factors, that
may indicate that a final warning rather than dismissal, should have been imposed for
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the offence of theft in the fonn of removing cash from the employer's till, included
the following:
(1) the accused employee had not been charged with the same offence before;
(2) it had been the employer's policy not to dismiss employees for a shortage of
funds in the tills but instead, to require them to refund the money;
(3) item 1 (i) of the schedule 8 (the code of good practice) states that each case is
unique and departures from the norms established by this code may be
justified in proper circumstances;
(4) the fact that the amount involved was only +- R300.00, seen in conjunction
with the fact that the employer had a history of not dismissing employees for
the offence (principle (2» indicated that this not such good dishonesty as to
warrant dismissal- this was a mitigating factor.
But there are cases where the court has adopted that a serious offence would justify
dismissal without having regard to mitigating factors. 104 By way of contrast, however,
the more generally accepted approach has been that for a dismissal not to constitute an
unfair labour practice, it entails a clearly distinguishable two phase enquiry. In the
first phase~ regard has to be had to the issue of guilt while, in the second phase, factors
including mitigating factors are examined to detennine the appropriate sanction. 105
Midway bet\veen these two approaches is a type of combination approach to the effect
that where the offence is of a serious nature, dismissal will generally be appropriate
and that only very strong nlitigating factors will have to be present before a higher
sanction would be appropriate. 106
So far. it seenlS. that an employer may be able to dismiss an employee for a single
offence of whatever nature. But where the act of misconduct is not serious enough to
justify instant dismissal, repetition may suffice to make dismissal legally and
procedurally fair. For instance in Madlala v Wynne and Tedder fla Thorneville
Engineering
l07
it was held that wilful, repeated disobedience shows a complete
disregard of the condition essential to the contract of service, namely, the conditions
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that servants must obey the proper orders of their masters and that unless they do so
the relationship is struck at fundamentally,
2.2.5 Dismissable Misconduct
Unlike Item 3(4) of schedule 8 of the South African Labour Relations Act 1995,
neither the Industrial Relations Act 1973 not the Labour 1975 of Mauritius have
specified the types of misconduct that could be regarded as 'serious and of such
gravity that it makes a continued employment relationship intolerable," and would
subsequently warrant the dismissal of an employee,
However, numerous cases have been decided by the industrial court, which gave
substance to the meaning of dismissal due to misconduct. The following may be cited
as few examples: In the Town Council of Beau-Bassin Rose Hill v Jennah l08 where
the worker used coarse and vulgar language "with an added element of abuse" and an
unveiled threat of violent retaliation to the inspector of the Council; Chellen v Mon
Loisir SE I09 where the employee was found to be connected with a gang of thieves
who had stolen a "corbeille"; Desmarais Bros.Co,Lld v SE of Beau Vallon Lld v
Nilkomol llO where a supervisor had used his worknote book to write libellous and
scurrilous abuse towards his employers generally,
Examples of other types of misconduct are, absenteeism, III assault, I 12
insubordination, I 13 attending the duty late and falsely recording the time of arrival, 114
1 liS I' 116 b h f 117 d l'b d ' ,arceny, smugg Ing, reac 0 trust, e 1 erate an systematIc floutIng of
, 1 l' 118 J:: d 119 I' 120 d ,121Intema regu atlons, lrau, neg Igence, eceptlon, use of vulgar and brutal
language, 122 immorality,123 misappropriation of property,124 embezzlement, 125
insolence, 126 abandonment of work, 127 assault. 128
In South Africa, as already mentioned, Item3 (4) of the schedule 8 of the Labour
Relations Act 1995 categorises serious misconduct as "gross dishonesty or wilful
damage to the employer's property, wilful endangering of the safety of others,
physical assault on the employer, a fellow employee, client or customer and gross
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insubordination." Through an accumulation ofjudicial pronouncements these types of
misconduct, under different subheadings, have created a huge volume of precedence
in the case of a fair dismissals. These misconducts relate to:- breach of trust and
confidentiality; 129 dishonest behaviour of various shades - fraud, theft and
unauthorised possession of employer's property; 130 use of abusive language;Bl violent
and threatening behaviour; 132 fighting, drunkenness and disorderly behaviour; 133
sabotage of employer's business or property; 134 insubordination135 and disobedience
of lawful and reasonable orders; 136 unauthorised absence from duty137 and sleeping on




Unlike Mauritius where the Industrial Relations Act 1973 and the Labour Act 1975
impliedly lnakes reference to procedural fairness 139 with regard to dismissal due to
misconduct, the South African Labour Relations Act 83 of 1988 specifically refers to
discipljnary dismissal "without a valid and fair reason and not in compliance with a
fair procedure." 140 What constitutes a fair procedure is not laid down by any of the
statutes.
However, over the years industrial courts of both countries have formulated the
principle that an employer who wishes to terminate the services of an employee on
grounds of misconduct must be satisfied that there are sound substantive reasons for
the dismissal. i.e legally justified, and must follow a fair procedure in arriving at that
conclusion. 141 What it means is that "not only did the employer have to establish
objectively and honestly that there was a 'just cause' for the dismissal, the employee
had to be afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity of speaking in rebuttal or in
mitigation of the complaint. 142
Having established that the term 'procedural fairness' has come to be accepted in the
jurisprudence regarding dismissal for misconduct in Mauritius and South Africa, it
needs to be discussed what does the obligation to act in a procedurally fair manner
involve? To answer this question it is proposed to look at the concept of procedural
fairness from three different perspectives namely:
1. Meaning and purpose of 'procedural fairness'.
2. Scope of Procedural fairness.
3. Content and form of Procedural fairness.
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2.3.2 Meaning of Procedural Fairness
_Various attempts have been made to devise criteria of relative precision to detennine
the bounds of procedural fairness. The court's attitude has been that 'fairness' cannot
. . Id' d . ". I' t ,,143 Th t d t d thbe objectIve y etennlne as It IS an e uSlve concep . us, 0 un ers an e
meaning of 'procedural fairness', one should not focus on the meaning of the concept
as such, but what it implies. In National Automobile & Allied Workers Union v
. Pretoria Precision Castings (Ply) Ltd remarked that fairness "implies a general duty
to act fairly and in accordance with equitable justice;"I44 and what constitutes the
'duty to act fairly' has been elucidated by various legal writers and judicial decisions.
Baxter in his seminal work describes the 'duty to act fairly' as- being nothing other
than the "duty to observe the principles of natural justice in more fundamental
terms." 145 Brassey also submits that "where the procedural fairness of the dismissal
has been at issue, the court has sometimes had regard to the administrative law
principles, in particular the rules ofnaturaljustice.,,146 De Smith is of the opinion that
the 'duty to act fairly', which is a key element of procedural propriety, is increasingly
I · h ' I . . ,147rep aClng t e term natura JustIce.
From the viewpoints expressed by the legal writers, it is evidently clear that the public
law jurisprudence has in the area where a decision-maker has wrongly or
unreasonably exercised his discretion and caused injustice and unfairness on whom he
has official governance, has, therefore, found remedies in the administrative law
principles in the fonn of the concept called a 'duty to act fairly', 148 which in substance
means "acting in accordance with the rules of natural justice" 149
The thought that underlines the above statements rests on the fact that procedural
fairness, which is an essential component of the 'duty to act fairly', derives its
essential base fronl the rules of natural justice. ISO In the context of law of dismissal, in
particular, the industrial court's growing institutionalisation of guiding standards has
developed the requirements of the 'duty to act fairly' or more precisely 'procedural
fairness', from the rules of natural justice of the common law to suit the employment
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arena. 151 Thus from the readings of numerous other reported decisions of the industrial
court the essential principles of natural justice are emanated which are the basis to the
notion of 'duty to act fairly' and subsequently to procedural fairness as well. In Twala
v ABC Fabricus A.M said:
"There are three basic requirements of natural justice which have to be
complied with during a disciplinary enquiry: firstly that the affected person
should know' ofthe nature ofthe accusation against him; secondly, that he
should be given an opportunity to state his case; and thirdly, that the
tribunal should act in goodfaith... ,,151
Similarly, in Ndlovu v Transnet Ltd tla Portnet, the court found that:
"It isfor the employer to decide whether or not an employee has comnlitted
any disciplinary infraction and in order to do this in accordance with the
rules of natural justice, the employer is obliged to hold a disciplinary
enquiry. ,,153
.So high a value have the Labour Courts placed on procedural fairness that in many
cases employees have been given relief because of improper pre-dismissal
procedures, even though the courts were satisfied that the dismissal was substantively
fair. In Medine Sugar Estate Co. Ltd v Wodally, the Supreme Court of Mauritius
held:
Proof ofgross misconduct is a necessary prerequisite to dismissal, whether
at an infornwl hearing conducted under Section 32 (2) (a) of the Labour
Act or a nlOre fornwl hearing before the Industrial Court. It is an essential
ingredient of that hearing, more particularly at the hearing before the
court, that it should be fair. The element of fairness is lacking when
evidence of nwterial facts is led by a person who conducted an enquiry
from others... without those other persons being heard so as to give an
opportunity to the alleged offender to confront them and cross examine
them. ,,154
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Similarly in South Africa, the industrial court has consistently required that an
employee who faces dismissal for alleged misconduct should be given the opportunity
to state hislher case in relation to the charges brought against himlher, and to bri.ng
mitigating circumstances to the employer's notice. ISS
Thus in the employment context, the 'duty to act fairly', as a standard procedure,
imposes the duty on the decision maker "to go through procedures designed to ensure
that all the relevant information, options, theories and values have been brought to his
attention, and that in appropriate cases the decision maker is unbiased."Is6
From the reading of the above explanation, it is evident that the concept 'procedural
fairness' is a fundamental rule of justice which denotes "a process or series of actions
which must be performed or followed to give effect to the principles of substantive
law.'d57 This definition, therefore, attends to two important criteria, i.e substantive
and procedural~ to make a disciplinary action by an employer fair. In developing and
applying the notion of unfair dismissal, the court has applied both criteria:
Where an employee whose dismissal was justified substantively, under
section 46 (a) for want of hearing it need scarcely be repeated that doing
what is right nzay still result in unfairness if it is done in an inequitable
manner. ,,158
The essence of this formulation by the court is to develop a firm guideline and to test
the justification of an action of dismissal or practice effected by an employer in
disciplinary matters. The issue central to each case is whether the termination of
service of an employee is reasonable, 159 just160 and fair. I6I The normative standards
that are applicable to disciplinary proceedings must not only be fair, but they also
have to be applied fairly with due consideration of the employee's rightS. I62 This
principle was reiterated in Yichito Plastics and SA Clothing & Textile Workers
U · 163 h .nzon were It was stated:
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"It is well accepted tllat a dismissal will generally befair only where afair
procedure was applied i" arriving at the decision· to dismiss and the
decision itselfwas afair one in the circumstances. "
By this statement the court has laid down an important juridical foundation which
Brassey describes in the following way:
It is afundamental notion that a person should have the chance to state his
case before a decision is taken that may adversely affect him. What is
essential the" to procedural fairness is that the employer should take steps
to verify the truth of the allegations by way ofan investigation and give the
.employee an opportunity to state his case. ,,164
Having dealt with the meaning of 'procedural fairness' in relation with dismissal for
misconduct, it is essential to know what do the courts aim to achieve by imposing
procedural constraints on employers during a predismissal hearing?
2.3.3. Purpose of Procedural Fairness
The benefits flowing trom fair proceedings during a disciplinary hearing has been
articulated by both legal writers as well as the industrial court on a number of
occasslons.
As discussed earlier, the employer has an absolute discretionary power under the
common law to dismiss an employee on notice for any reason, for no reason at all,
and without giving the employee a fair hearing before taking the· decision. This
aspect of the law of dismissal raised concern in the mind ofjurists such as Wade and
Forsyth who asked:
"...after what would be the sense ofprocedural protection if the employer
was able to disnliss for any reason at all no matter how absurd orfair?,,165
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But now since the perceived weakness of the common law has found remedy in the
administrative law principles of natural justice, which embodies the concept of
procedural fairness, fair proceedings have become a constituent element of a legal and
democratic process which treats individuals with dignity and respect.
Giving due importance to human dignity in the entire process of a predismissal
hearing, Megary J said:
"Nor are those with any knowledge of human nature who pause to think
for a nlOment likely to underestimate the feeling ofresentment ofthose who
find that a decision against them has been made without their being
afforded an opportunity to influence the course ofevents. ,,166
Thus the very process has a value, at least to the employee, as
"It meets the expectation of the person who stands accused that he will be
given a hearing; it recognises the worth of a human being and gives him
the satisfaction ofknowing that he has said what he can in his defence. A
person who is not heard, feels aggrieved however guilty he may be. ,,167
This is. in fact, a fundamental improvement in the conceptual approach to the nature
and role of an unfair labour practice jurisdiction in labour relations. It focuses more
on the relationship rather than the acts of the parties.
Thus guided by these principle underlying the concept 'procedural fairness' the courts
have held that where there is an allegation of misconduct against an employee an
enquiry should be held~ the employee must be made aware of the nature of the case
against him; he should be given an opportunity to respond,168 and the person
investigating the alleged misconduct should act in good faith. 169
An application of these principles become greatly significant where there is always
room for a cynical manipulation of procedural forms on the part of the employer who
has no intention to be persuaded and whose mind is closed from thinking openly,
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fairly and impartially.170 In this situation, the rules of procedural fairness aim at
making the decision making process meaningful and not merely ritualistic. 171 Thus in
Plaschem (Ply) Ltd v Chemical Workers and Industrial Union I72 the court developed
firm guidelines to show the merit of procedural fairness:
(a) when considering the question of dismissal, it IS important that an
~mployer does not act over hastily;
(b) that he must give fair warning or ultimatum that he intends to dismiss so
that the employees involved in the dispute are afforded a proper opportunity of
obtaining advice and taking a rational decision as to what course to follow;
(c) both parties must have sufficient time to cool off so that the effect of anger
on their decision is eliminated or limited.
Considering these guidelines, it could be seen that procedural fairness as a concept
has "an intrinsic value"I73and "an end in itself with no further need for
justification." 174 It aims at improving the quality of decision making by requiring the
en1ployer to amass and take into account of all relevant infonnation and to exclude
irrelevant considerations. Basson states the benefits of a decision that is procedurally
fair. It enhances
(a) Improved decision-making;
(b) the provision of a democratic safeguard against arbitrariness; and
(c) a greater readiness on the part of the public to accept administrative
decisions. 175
These challenges fit into the pattern of a requirement that the employer's disciplinary
power be exercised rationally that is without bias or regard to irrelevant
considerations. A further aim of procedural fairness in this respect is, therefore, to
restrain the unfettered discretion of an employer to dismiss at will under the common
law doctrine. 176 Slagment (Ply) Ltd v BCAWU, Nkadimeng and
Mnqutheni
l77
illustrates that it would be unfair for the employees:
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(a) to be called upon to face a disciplinary hearing on 45 minutes notice and
even before the charges against them had been formulated;
(b) to be denied the opportunity of taking counsel, or reflecting on their
conduct and possibly of having second thoughts;
(c) not to be informed that dismissal was an option which might be exercised.
From the ruling of the court it is clear that there has been complete absence and
. departure from the essential principles of procedural fairness, which made the
decision by the employer devoid of any legal efficacy. In General Medical Council v
Spackman l78 the court held that:
"If the principles ofnatural justice are violated in respect ofany decision it
is, indeed, immaterial whether the same decision would have been arrived
at... The decision must be declared to be no decision. "
In this respect a decision taken with due consideration of the principles evocative of
procedural fairness would be upheld in a court of law as a valid administrative
action. 179
The other purpose which is a compelling reason to observe procedural fairness during
pre-dismissal hearing is stated in Mwasa & Others v The Argus Printing and
Publishing Co.Ltd: 180
"...a prevailing systenl ofprocedures is not a unilateral protection afforded
solely to employees, but serves as a bilateral mechanism affording
protection to tlte enlployer as well. "
Fair proceedings are, therefore, important to an employer as well before he decides to
di.smiss an employee. In NUM v Western Areas Gold Mining CO. 181 the court said that
an enquiry is necessary:
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"...because if properly and honestly held, it places the employer in a
position to judge the merits of the conduct of the employee after all the
relevant facts and considerations have been investigated and the employer's
version has been stated. It also enables the employer should he be
reasonably satisfied that the alleged infraction has taken place, to decide on
appropriate disciplinary action. "
Finally, due regard on non-compliance of procedural fairness may have a positive or
detrimental effect on the employer-employee relationship. The fact that observing
fair procedure in itself upholds democratic values and leaves any decision affecting
the lives of an employee to scrutiny, it forms a strong base for harmonious
relationship between the employer and employee. In Bissessor v Bestores fla Game
• TU IdI82 .• ·d hDIscount rr or It IS sal t at
"~It is conducive to fair and equitable labour relations and it is in
accordance with the principle that before an employee is dismissed for an
alleged misconduct the employer should hold a full and proper enquiry into
the circumstances ofthe alleged misconduct as possible. "
The Industrial Relations Act 1975 of Mauritius and the Labour Relations Act 1995 of
South Africa, have to a great extent given content to the concept of procedural
fairness and made dismissal without a hearing an unfair labour practice and, more
significantly, injurious to industrial harmony and serenity. 183
Thus the purpose of the concept of 'procedural fairness' in pre-dismissal hearings is to
prevent miscarriage ofjustice and operate as checks on the unfettered discretion of the
employer. In most cases in Mauritius and South Africa, the non-observance of
procedural fairness has invalidated the exercise of an employer's wide and arbitrary
powers to dismiss at will.
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2.3.2 Scope of Application of Procedural Fairness During
Predismissal Hearings for Misconduct
The area selected for research in this thesis is procedural fairness in relation to
dismissal for misconduct. It is important then to demarcate the limits of this research
so as to give a proper focus on the subject. These limits, commonly known as the
scope, may either be express or implied.
The express limits are laid down in statutory norms. In the present context the main
references will be the Industrial Relations Act 1973 and Labour Act 1975 of
Mauritius and The Public Service Commission Regulations 1967 (Mauritius). In the
South African context references will be made to the Labour Relations Act 1995, the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, the Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, and the Public Service Act 103 of 1994.
The implied limits are derived by the courts through the interpretative process. As the
express limits do not provide substantive content to procedural fairness the courts of
Mauritius and South Africa have evolved guidelines and areas where procedural
fairness is required the most, especially where the abuse of vast discretionary powers
of an employer to dismiss at will is concerned. In delineating the scope of procedural
fairness. it is proposed to adopt the following layout:
I.Procedural Fairness and the Contract of Employment: Extent of Application to
Private and Public Sector Employees.
2.Application of Procedural Fairness to other distinct areas of the law of unfair
dismissal.
(a)The unfair labour practice doctrine.
(b)Sunlmary Dismissals and Dismissals on notice.
(c)Quasi-judicial and Administrative decisions.
(d)The doctrine of Legitimate Expectations.
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2.3.2.1 Procedural Fairness and Contract of Employment:
Extent of Application to Private and Public Sector
Employees.
Wade distinguishes between an office which gIves its holder a status that IS
specifically protected by statutory law, and another type of employment that IS
regulated by the principles of a contract of service. 184 The distinction between the two
is that both persons are employed, one through a particular statute and the other in
.terms of pure principles of contract. Common between them is the contract of
.employment and the difference is the source of employment. The tenure of office
between the two types of employment effectively imparts on the application of
administrative law principles of procedural fairness. At first, let us discuss the
application of procedural fairness with regard to private sector employees whose
employment is regulated by the common law principles.
2.3.2.1.1 Private Sector Employee
In terms of the common law contract of service, an employer is entitled to dismiss
summarily only when an employee has committed a breach of certain material terms
of his/her contract of service, in this particular context, commonly known as
misconduct. 185 Even in the case of infinite period contracts, he is free to terminate for
any reason or no reason, provided the requisite notice is given. 186 In neither case is the
employer obliged to observe the principles of procedural fairness, especially the audi
alteram partem rule. In Embling v Headmaster, St Andrew's College (Grahamstown)
& Another it was stated:
"The rules of natural justice-succintly expressed in the maxim audi
alteram partem - have no application in the field of contract.•.As the
applicant's enlploynlent was terminated in accordance with the terms ofthe
contract he was not entitled to a hearing prior to the termination of the
agreenlellt. ,,187
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The question that is presently of academic importance is whether the courts will read
into a contract of employment an implied term that the employee will not be
dismissed with a good reason but without being given a hearing or, more broadly,
.whether statutory developments in dismissal law will be deemed tp form part of all
contracts of employment thus holding that there is an implied duty to follow the rules
of procedural fairness during a predismissal hearing for misconduct.
Mauritian case law has not made any substantial contribution towards evolving a
jurisprudence that will address the above stated problem. Expressing its inability to
operate beyond the confines of the express provisions of a contract, the court stated:
"Front the employee's point of view, there is no needfor the courts to give
legal protection and security of tenure which the worker is entitled to in
return for his labour ,,188
But the court has conceded that statutory protection in the form of Labour Relations
Acts has enhanced the position of the employees against dismissals effected in an
unprocedural manner:
"The rights ofthe worker derive their legal basis not only from his contract
ofentployment and also front further statutory means which superceded the
terms ofthe contracfitse!f. ,,189
Thus the reading of the court's decision brings into focus two significant points.
Firstly, although in a pure master and servant relationship there is no inherent
obligation on the employer to observe fair procedures, unless specifically provided
into a contract of employment,190 the disciplines of fair procedures have, however,
been largely injected into the law of contractual employment by statute in the form of
the Labour Act 1975 in Mauritius and the Labour Relations Act 1995, in South
Africa. Secondly~ by stating that the employee derives his rights "also from statutory
means which supercede the terms of the contract itself," it expressly recognises the
overriding powers of section 32 (2) (a) and (b) of the Labour Act 1975 and Schedule 8
of the Labour Relations Act 1995 of Mauritius and South Africa respectively, In
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remedying the procedural constraints unattended by the common law contract of
employment. These statutory provisions adequately supplement the lacunae left by
common law and provide the source of important guidelines which employers are
enjoined to follow in implementing disciplinary action against their employees.
In Tayab Ghoorum v A. G.Nabee & CO. 191 , the plaintiff averred that he was dismissed
without any notice or justification. The defence argued that the plaintiff had broken
his contract of employment by absenting himself from work on more than two
consecutive days without lawful excuse or justification. Alternatively, it was also
stated "that there had been a dismissal, it was for serious misconduct and that the
employer (defendant) could not reasonably be expected to keep the plaintiff in his
employment and that such dismissal was justified in the circumstances." Counsel for
the plaintiff was not given an opportunity to answer the charge since the company had
completed its enquiries thereby showing that the explanation which was asked to the
plaintiff was nothing but a preliminary investigation. In summary, it meant that the
plaintiff was denied of proper hearing.
The Supreme Court of Mauritius was of the view that "proof of gross misconduct is a
necessary pre-requisite to dismissal whether at an informal meeting conducted under
Section 32 (2) (a) or a more formal hearing before the court. ,,192 Thus Section 32 (2)
(a) of the Mauritian Labour Act. has substantially supplemented the common law
position of an employee facing disciplinary action of dismissal and extended to him
public law protection by making pre-dismissal hearing a mandatory procedure. He
has. therefore, found protection over and above the pure contractual remedies
available in a master and servant situation.
Thus with the statute 'superceding' the terms of the contract itself as stated in the
Raman Ismael's case. the implication of the Supreme Court's view is that the
application of the' audi alteram partem rule' should not depend on whether or not such
application has been made, expressly or by necessary implication, a term of the
contract between an employer and employee; that it is also on the relevant statutory
provision, in the form of Section 32 (2) (a) of the Labour Act 1975 which constitute
63
an express legislative recognition, to protect an employee against dismissal due to
unprocedural disciplinary action. This illustrates the point that the scope of
application of procedural fairness is greatly enhanced as it has made considerable
inroads into private sector employment relationship. Now the general notion that
pervades the law of unfair dismissal is: .
"The fact that by law ofcontract an indisputable right may have accrued to
an efflployer to dismiss an employee does not for tile purposes of
administrative law mean that the requirements of natural justice have no
t· . . I· t I . if h· ht ,,193app IcatlOll In re atlOn to ac ua exercIse 0 suc ng .
This VIew has been canvassed extensively In the South African Law of Unfair
dismissal.
2.3.2.1.2 Common Law Employees in South Africa and their
Rights to Procedural Fairness during Pre-dismissal
Hearings for Misconduct
Contracts of employment in South Africa was from the very outset, until the advent of
the concept of unfair labour practice and the codification of the rules of procedural
justice in the Code of Good Practice, Item 4 Schedule 8 of the Labour Relations Act
1995~ entirely influenced by the common law principles which concerned itself with
whether a dismissal was lawful, that is, whether the required notice was given in the
case of an infinite period contract, or whether there was a lawful cause for dispensing
with it.
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Procedural Fairness was applicable only to public sector employees since
such dismissals were seen to be an exercise of statutory power195 and were
implemented in a case where there was specific provision in the contract of
employment for the establishment of an adjudicating body or tribunal. 196 Thus, being
constrained by the comn10n law principles of contract inter partes, the principles of
administrative law including those of natural justice have no part to play.197 Broom
J.P clearly emphasised this legal principle in Thandroyen v Sister Annucia &
Another: 198
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The principle of Itatural justice including the right to be heard have no
place in realm of contract. If one party to a contract complains that tlte
other has committed a breach the courts will grant him relief on proof of
the breach and will not ordinarily be interested in tile principles of natural
justice or in whether B has given him an opportunity ofbeing heard. "
According to him, the principles of natural justice will only apply if the parties have
imported them into their contract. To give effect to this provision in a contract, the
parties should have provided specifically something in the nature of a tribunal to
decide matter affecting their relationship. If the contract has no such provision then
the affected party (the employee on dismissal) will have no recourse to any public law
199remedy.
Thl:ls unless the parties have specifically agreed upon setting a tribunal to discuss
predisnlissal issues there is no obligation on the employer to warn the employee
before finally dismissing him or her or to conduct an enquiry before dismissal; or to
grant the employee an opportunity to improve his or her conduct or performance. or to
provide reasons for dismissal.2oo It is explicit, in fact, that the common law contract of
employment offers little, if any, assistance in eliminating the arbitrariness of the
employer. and at the same time offering relief to an aggrieved employee who has been
deprived of his right to be heard before his dismissal.
But as pointed out earlier. with the advent of the unfair labour practice jurisdiction
and the codification of the concept 'procedural justice' in Schedule 8 of the Labour
Relations Act 1995. the industrial court created a new jurisprudence based on the
principles of equity and fairness within the employment context which mitigated the
harshness of the common law principles. The modem proposition is that "common
law employees whose conditions of service are not regulated by statute, can now
claim similar protection. ,,20 I
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The benefit flowing from such an opportunity have been articulated by the industrial
court on a number of occasions by virtue of its statutory powers.202 As a result, it has




2.3.2.1.3 Public Sector Employees
Today most of the public sector employees in Mauritius and South Africa hold office
in terms of legislation containing detailed provisions, setting out the ground upon
which they ~an be dismissed and the procedures which must be followed before such
a decision is taken.
For instance, in Mauritius, officers204 are appointed in the public service in terms of
various acts that govern the service commissions.205 It means that the exercise of
power between the public sector employer and the public servant is governed not
.exclusively by common law principles of contract but also by statute. Similarly, in
South Africa the Public Service Act 1994 regulate the appointment and tenure of
.office of the public servants.
In the event of a public officer being charged for misconduct and prior to hislher
dismissal, Section 10 (1 )206 of the Republic Constitution of Mauritius and the
regulations207 governing the public service have laid down elaborate disciplinary
procedures which give the officer every possible opportunity to speak against the
charge or plead in n1itigation. In South Africa, if a public servant is found guilty of a
misconduct disciplinary action is taken in terms of Section 21 of the Public Service
Act. Thus, be it the parent statute or regulations that govern the employment
conditions of public servants in Mauritius and South Africa, they confer the right to
dismiss a public servant for misconduct.
The question that is of immediate academic interest, is whether the provisions in the
Public Service Act and Regulations empower the public sector employers, as
exercised under common law principles, to dismiss on notice for any reason, or
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indeed, for no reason at all and without giving the employee a fair hearing before
taking the decision?
Section 30, Part iv of the Mauritius Public Service Commission Regulations 1967 in
no uncertain terms state:
The Com111ission shall not exercise its powers in connection with the
disnlissal, the 'disciplinary punishment or the termination of appointment
otherwise thall by way of dismissal of any officer in the public service
except in accordance with these regulations or such other regulations as
may be made by the commission. "
The finer details of procedures are listed in Section 37 (1):
where a responsible officer considers it necessary to institute disciplinary
proceedings against a public officer on grounds of misconduct which, if proved,
would justify his dismissal from the public service, he shall...forward the officer a
statenlellt of the charge or charges preferred against him together with a brief
state111ellt of the allegatiolls...alld call upon such officer to state in writing...any
groullds on which he relies to exculpate himself."
If the officer does not furnish a reply to any charge under paragraph 37 (1) and upon
consideration of the responsible officer's report, the commission shall appoint a
con1mittee to inquire into the matter.208 The committee shall inform the accused
officer that on a specified day the charges made against him will be investigated and
that he will be required to appear before it to defend himself.209
Throughout these legislative provisions, it is conspicuous that no mention has been
made specifically, of 'fairness' or the 'duty to act fairly.' Nevertheless, what is
implied is that the regulations make it mandatory for the commission to adhere to the
rules of procedural fairness before finally deciding to dismiss a public servant.
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In South Africa. the question asked earlier i.e. do such provisions in the statutes or
regulations grant the public institution the power enjoyed by employers under the
common law to dismiss or notice for any reason, or for no reason at all, and without
giving the employee a fair hearing before taking the decision, has been dealt with its
intensive ramifications.
The answer depends on whether dismissal in terms of such contract is regarded as the
exercise of a contractual right or an administrative power. The distinction is of great
importance:
"for ifpublic sector enlployers can contractually reserve for themselves an
unfettered power to dismiss or notice, they can in effect, nullify legislative
attempts to protect their employees against unfair dismissal - and the courts
capacity to ensure that such legislation is adhered to - by simply giving
notice required by contract. ,,210
Thus, where a statutory body enters into an employment contract with an employee, it
reserves the right to either act administratively against the employee or to use its
contractual capacity as a common law employer.211 If it decides to act in an
administrative capacity the dismissal is subject to review in terms of the requirements
applicable to any administrative action which affects the rights of a private individual.
It means that "the general requirements of the natural justice that are in the
circumstances postulated, the public official or body concerned must act fairly".212 If
however, it acts as a common law employer, the legality of its actions must be
determined by recourse to the express and implied provision of the service contract
alone. which. as a result, gives the employer an absolute discretion to dismiss at
wil1.213
Now. as it stands. there is a complete deviation from this common law rule and the
court, in numerous cases, has strongly affirmed that since summary dismissal affected
the legal right of the workers concerned, the responsible official was, therefore,
obliged to adhere to the audi alteram partem rule before exercising his discretion to
dismiss.214
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In Myburgh v ·Danielskuil Municipalitei? 15the applicant had been dismissed for
disciplinary reasons without an opportunity to state her case. The court appears to
have accepted that if the respondent acted in tenns of the contract between it and the
applicant, it would have had the right to dismiss any time with the requisite notice.216
The official concerned had chosen instead to rely on a section of the ordinance which
gave hi!11 a discretion to dismiss on certain grounds. The question was, therefore,
whether this made the dismissal an administrative action, or whether the respondent
had nevertheless acted as an ordinary employer. It was argued that the discretion was
acquired by respondent in its capacity as an employer and not as a statutory body
clothed with quasi-judicial powers over officials in its service.217 Accordingly the
Section 88 of the Ordinance constituted not more than a part of the service contract
between the applicant and the respondent.218 But the court rejected this line of
argument,219and also held in Rossouw v S.A. Mediese NavorsingsraaeP20 that although
the respondent was empowered by regulation to end the contract of service of its
employees on one month's notice, it was bound by regulation to give its officials a
hearing before summarily dismissing them for disciplinary reasons. The respondent
could not rely on its common law right to dismiss on notice exempting itself from the
duty to observe the principles of natural justice.
Similarly in Van Collier v Administration TransvaaP21 the applicant had been
dismissed in terms of a regulation providing for tennination on notice. (Applicant had
been given notice after refusing transfer). It was argued that the regulation conferring
the power to transfer was purely a service condition and should accordingly be
interpreted as "a common law master and servant rule in which there was no room for
the operation of the audi alteram partem rule.222 Mr Van Collier's conditions of
servjce were. however, regulated entirely by statute (The Transvaal Education
Ordinance 29 of 1953). This raised the question whether a provision in a statute which
gave the department a power of dismissal akin to that which any employer enjoyed
under the common law (e.g the right to dismiss on notice) should be interpreted as if it
were merely part of a common law service contract. The court answered in the
negative.
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There are few other cases decided by the court in South Africa which have put a seal
of affirmation to the notion that to every dismissal of employees for alleged breach of
contract in the public sector be it on notice, or otherwise, the public sector employer is
obliged to adhere to the audi principle.
In Tshabalala v Minister ofHealth223 Goldstone J while stressing that strike action by
nurses was particularly grave disciplinary offence and constituted a material breach of
contract. nevertheless held that they could not be dismissed in terms of the applicable
section of the Nursing Act unless they were first given a hearing.
This conclusion emanates from the premise that strikes are a form of misconduct and
that the applicable service codes on regulations impliedly compelled the authorities to
adhere to the principle of procedural fairness before dismissing for that reason.
Goldstone J. explained:
"The chief Superintendent is obliged to give a careful and bonajide
consideration to the case of each individual in respect of when he is
considering dismissal...He must give each such person that right to be
heard. He exercises a discretion, having regard to all tlte facts at his
disposal, and in particlllar also whether such person made himself or
herself guilty of unsatisfactory nlisconduct, meriting summary dismissal.
He must certain(v have regard to whether the facts established that the
individual participated ill unlawful strike action. In the case of students
who did strike, !le nlaY wis!l to have regard to tlte degree of their
participation. /n individual cases it may have been ofa short duration, or
sorne other nlitigating factor may have been urged upon him. "
In Zenzile v Administrator of the TransvaaP24 Coetzee J gave a stronger reason for
rejecting the respondent's claim that it was entitled to dismiss on notice in terms of the
agreement without following the rules of natural justice. It was argued that the
contractual relationship between the administration and the respondent was simply
one of master and servant governed exclusively by the common law contract. Since
the appellants participated in work stoppage it amounted to an unlawful repudiation of
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their contractual obligation to work, which entitled the employer to dismiss
summarily. The rule of natural justice, therefore, did not apply.225 Hoexter l.A's
response was that the employment relationship was "not. ..merely employment under a
contract of service between two private individuals but ...a form of employment
which invests the employee with a particular status which the law will protect. ,,226 His
Lordship therefore, concluded:
The fact that by the law ofcontract an indisputable right may have accrued
to an enlployer to disnliss his employee does not, for the purpose of
adnlinistrative law mean that tile requirements of natural justice can have
no application in relation to the actual exercise ofsuch r'ight. And when,
as here, the exercise ofthe right to dismiss is disciplinary the requirements
ofnaturaljustice are clamant.
After the decision in Zenzile there is no room now for the argument that, workers in
the public sector where the power to dismiss on notice or the power to dismiss
summarily flow from the statutory code~ have no right to a hearing because they have
no right to continue in employment beyond the date that the contract is terminated by
due notice or dismissal is effected due to gross misconduct. The point worth noting is
that it seems 'Zenzile' has also eradicated the contractual dimension from the public
sector employment relationship and located it in the domain of administrative law
which leaves no reservation that the distinction between public and public sector
employees is immaterial when it comes to the application of procedural fairness in
cases of dismissal from en1ployment due to misconduct or otherwise.
2.3.3 Application of Procedural Fairness to other Distinct Areas of
the Law of Unfair Dismissal
South African labour jurisprudence has certain distinct features, which have not yet
been thoroughly researched and applied with rigour in Mauritius. They are still
considered grey areas in the Mauritian Labour Law, especially in the law of unfair
dismissal. South Africa has gone a long way to restructure the, law of unfair
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dismissal. This is. no doubt, a high point of development in the South African law of
unfair dismissal which, as compared with the Mauritian labour jurisprudence, has four
unique characteristics.
2.3.3.1 The Unfair Labour Practice Jurisdiction
Mauritian labour jurisprudence has not specifically created an unfair labour practice
jurisdiction to deal with matters which "has the effect of suspending the common law
and law of contract consequences. ,,227 Within the South African labour law
perspective. the legislature introduced the· concept of unfair labour practice "as a
recognised device, scheme or action adopted in labour field,,228 to effect "the general
duty to act fairly. ,,229 The elements of the duty to act fairly, the industrial court has
held, include the right of the employee to a hearing prior to the termination of his
employment and challenge any action that is detrimental to credibility and integrity.23o
The court has also held that where the employer "unreasonably or unjustifiably failed
_to hold such an enquiry or where his decision is not fair and reasonable in the
circumstances, such failure may amount to an unfair labour practice. ,,231
_A number of reasons which have been put forward for not observing procedures or
not holding an enquiry before dismissals have been found to be unacceptable and an
unfair labour practice. These are the following:
(a) Relying solely on the provisions of a contract, the common law, or even statutory
authority. However, the employer's right to "dismiss an employee, whether
sun1marily or upon notice, does not in any way curtail an employee's right to a
disciplinary hearing, prior to his dismissal. ,,232 The fact that the dismissal may be
lawful does not necessarily imply that it is fair. 233
(b) Labour unrest per se does not justify not holding a hearing, particularly when the
individual employees who have participated in the unrest have not been identified;
collective guilt cannot justify dispensing with the holding of a hearing.234
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(c) Alleging that it will be impractical to hold hearings where some 348 employees
were on strike and involved in disturbance, does not mean that the employer is
absolved from holding an enquiry. Although the court has not formulated ~y
guidelines as to the procedure the employer should adopt during strike and labour
unrest, there is no reason why the employer could not have arranged for any suitable
procedure, appropriate in the circumstances, whereby it could have put charges to
those whom it intended dismissing.235
These decisions~ no doubt, gave a fresh impetus to the court a stronger foundation to
the newly formulated jurisprudence based on the doctrine of unfair labour practice.
De Klerk in Miksh v Edgars Retail Trading (Pty) Ltcf36 said:
The fact that the applicant eventually conceded her guilt and the fact that
her disnlissal was substantively fair is my view altogether irrelevant when
considering this aspect ofthe case. The end result was that she had no tilne
for reflection, no tinle to prepare her case to obtain advice and she had lost
out on the opportunity to be represented at the disciplinary hearing. The
fact that she co-operated and was a willing participant in her own undoing
is in tlte circunlstallCes of minor consequence. I am satisfied that the
respondent had in this regard committed an unfair labour practice against
the applicant. "
By categorising these forn1ulations under the jurisdiction of unfair labour practice it is
possible to judge the merits of each conduct of an employee and subsequently enable
the employer to decide on the appropriate disciplinary action. It is, no doubt, a
direction that the Mauritian labour jurisprudence should look at.
2.3.3.2 Summary Dismissals and Dismissals on Notice
It has become a matter of debate and academic concern whether or not procedural
fairness should be observed in cases where there is substantive reason warranting
summary dismissal. The Mauritian labour law has not given a clear direction on this
Issue. In South Africa. the position taken by the court is a way forward as it has
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categorically "collapsed the distinction drawn in the common law between summary
dismissal and dismissal on notice, and rendered all dismissals subject to judicial
. ,,237scrutIny.




The common law permits an employer to terminate the services of an
employee either summarily, without notice, or on notice. The decision of
the employer to give notice is not subject to judicial scrutiny. The law is
only concerned with the legality ofthe procedure followed to the extent that
it inquires whether proper notice has been given. On the other hand, the
substantive decision of the employer, who summarily terminates the
services ofan employee is liable to be scrutinised by a court oflaw although
no procedural steps are required."
Beyond these judicial protections, chapter 8 of the Labour Relations Act 1995 is by
far the most meaningful protection extended to employees whose employment is
terminated arbitrarily and \vithout proper procedure. According to Section 185
employees have a right not to be unfairly dismissed. This wide protection does not
differentiate between a summary dismissal and dismissal on notice. Thus applying
the provisions of the Labour Relations Act, the court in Chemical Workers Industrial
Union & Another v AIgorax (Pty) Lttf39found that there was insufficient evidence to
show that the applicant employee had been guilty of theft or an accomplice to theft for
which he had been summarily dismissed. The court also found certain procedural
irregularities at his disciplinary hearing and accordingly determined the applicant's
dismissal to be unfair and reinstated him with full benefits, retrospectively.
2.3.3.3 Scope of Application of Procedural Fairness with regard to
Quasi-judicial and Administrative Decision of the Employer
It has always been a contentions issue whether the disciplinary power of the employer
is based on quasi-judicial or administrative character, because, till very recently it was
the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law
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under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the
rules 0: natural justice.24o Thus in the early stages of development, the rules of natural
justice had application only to a quasi-judicial proceeding in which the authority
. concern,~d was required by law under which it was functioning to actjudicially.241
While the exercise of judicial and quasi judicial functions was in accordance with the
rules of natural justice, a body or tribunal which exercised "purely administrative"
powers needed only to act "fairly" in making its decisions. As Megarry ) puts in
Bates \' Lord Hailsham & St. Maryleborne:
"...in the sphere ofso called quasi-judicial the rules ofnatural justice run
and that in administrative or executive field there is a general duty of
fairness "U2
Thus the' rules of natural justice were held not to apply in situations where the
administrative body was acting in a purely administrative capacity, but with the
devc1opn1ent of the duty to act fairly it has become irrelevant whether or not the
adminis~rative power concerned is labelled 'judicial' 'quasi-judicial' or 'purely
administrative'. Irrespective of the labels procedural fairness is to be applied in all
situations.
In an employlllent situation, the power of the employer may be described as quasi-
judicial or administrative in character, and in either case, if the dismissal affects the
employee adversely, he must be given a fair hearing. In South Africa, this view finds
authority in Administrator, Transvaal and others v Traub and others243 in which
Corbett C.l rejected the classification approach which held that the rules of natural
justice applied only to judicial and quasi-judicial decisions and not to those that are
purely adlninistrative.244 In his landmark decision Corbett Cl has questioned the
validity of such a classification. This is, no doubt, a favourable approach to the
application of procedural fairness because the purpose of the rules of natural justice is
to prevent miscarriage of justice and fails to see why those rules should be made
inapplicable to administrative decisions. Aga~n, if the observance of fair procedure is
the test of applicability of the doctrine of' natural justice, then there can be no
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distinction between quasi-judicial function and administrative function245since
arriving at a just decision is the aim of both judicial enquiries as well as
administrative enquiries.246
Thus the dividing line between a quasi-judicial power and an administrative power
having been perceptibly mitigated, it enjoins an employer who is legally competent to
determine questions affecting the rights of the employees to act judicially.247 In
Ho/gate v Minister ofJustice248 Froneman J stated:
"I am of the view that since the decision in Administrator, Transvaal &
Others v Traub and Others 1989 (4) ~""A 731 (A), the emphasis has rightly
been placed on the duty of an administrative decision maker to act fairly
and rationally when exercising public power whenever a decision is made
to deternline what a person fS rights are. "
The position of the court is clear that an employer has to conform to the norms of
procedural fairness whether or not he is acting in a quasi-judicial or administrative
capacity. Thus the shift from the traditional approach that principles of natural justice
are applicable only to judicial and quasi-judicial functions is quite evident as
"...it is now well settled that a statutory body which is entrusted with a
discretion nlust act fairly. It does not matter whether its functions are
described as judicial or quasi-judicial on the one hand or as administrative
011 the other, or what you will, still it must act fairly. It mUst in a proper
case give a party a chance to be heard. ,,249
Within this developed doctrine, the scope of the application of procedural fairness in a
decision making process has widened greatly to accommodate flexibly to every
situation which would require an aggrieved party a fair and adequate opportunity to
present hislher case and challenge prejudicial information against him/her.
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2.3.3.4 Procedural Fairness and its Application to cases dealing
with Legitfmate Expectations.
The doctrine of legitimate expectation is a recent addition to the administrative law
principles of natural justice. By this doctrine the scope of application of procedural
fairness to dismissal due to misconduct has considerably been widened. It is
. d " . h ,,250recognIse as a new ng 1..
In the past English courts, where the doctrine of legitimate expectation originated,251
drew a distinction between the action that involved deprivation of rights and action .
that had the effect of merely depriving or refusing a privilege.252 And as a result of the
conceptual approach to natural justice, the court extended the duty to afford hearing
before an adverse decision is made in cases where privileges were involved.253
But it is now well established that the courts have broken away from the anachronistic
right-privilege dichotomy in administrative decision making towards a more flexible
and satisfactory approach to the application of the rules of natural justice.254
Thus the audi alteram partem rule which was traditionally enforced in cases where the
individual was prejudicially affected in his or her liberty, property or existing rights,
was extended to cases where the so-called legitimate expectations of a person were
affected, that is, in a case where a person's claim fell short of a legal right but the
interest at. stake rose to the level of legitimate expectation.255 And, Lord Diplock
stated that, for a legitimate expectation to arise, the decision:
"nlllst affect the other person... by depriving him of some benefit or
advantage which either (i) he had in the past been permitted by the decision
nmker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to
continue to do until there has been communicated to him some rational
grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an opportunity to
conlment; or (ii) he has received assurance from the decision-maker that it
will not be withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity ofadvancing
reasons for contending that they should not be withdrawn.156
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Thus the representation made by the decision maker (whether express or implied from
past practice) entitles the party to whom it is addressed to expect, legitimately, one of
the two things:
(1) that a hearing or other appropriate procedures will be afforded before a
decision is made; or
(2) that a benefit of a substantive nature will be granted or, if the person is
already in receipt of the benefit, that it will be continued and not substantially
varied.
In either case, procedural fairness dictates that the expectation of a hearing should be
fulfilled, and that the recipient of a benefit should at least be permitted to argue for its
fulfilment.257
This right is articulated in Section 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa, 1996 and Section 3 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act No.3 of
2000. Both statutes have created a powerful legislative structure to compel the
decision maker to comply to procedural fairness if his administrative action materially
and adversely affects the rights or legitimate expectation of an individual. (These
provisions will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter).
What are then the effects of the doctrine of legitimate expectation in an employment
contract, especially when an employer has decided to dismiss an employee due to
misconduct?
Mauritius Labour jurisprudence has not yet availed itself of the use of this doctrine to
reach out and assist the employees who are prejudicially affected by the employer's
decision to dismiss. As mentioned earlier, the Mauritius law of dismissal is strictly
interpreted in terms of the common law principles of contract and provisions in the
labour legisl~tion, which are both effectively silent about extending the public law
remedy (legitimate expectation) to af~ected employees, both in the public and private
sector. With reference to the earlier cases already discussed, it showed that
employees who sought to impugn their dismissals on the basis that they had not been
given hearings were, invariably and conclusively, confronted with the argument that
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neither their summary dismissals nor dismissals on notice attracted natural justice for
the employee had no right to remain in employment beyond the time the employer
. hi . h . h tr t 258chose to exerCIse s ng t to termInate t e con ac.
In South Africa, in an endeavour to uphold industrial justice, the Appellate Division
introduced the doctrine of legitimate expectation by its decision in Administrator,
Transvaal & Others v Traub & Others259 and extended the public law remedies to
employees who were dismissed without follo\ving a proper procedure.
Before Traub~ courts minded to come to the aid of dismissed employees searched for
rights ancilliary to the emploYment which were affected by the termination of the
employment contract. For instance, where the dismissal on notice meant that the
employee ceased to be a member of a pension fund, the courts held that his rights
were affected sufficiently to require him to be heard?60 In Administrator, Transvaal,
& Others v Zenzile & Others261 Hoexter lA acutely separated rights under the contract
of employment from the administrative decision to exercise of those rights. He said:
"one is concerned here with two separate and logically discrete inquiries. The fact
tllat by tile law of contract an indisputable right may have accrued to an employer
to disnliss IIis enlployee does not, for the purposes ofadministrative law, mean that
tile requirenlents of Ilatural justice can have no application in relation to the actual
exercise ofsuch rigllt. "
The effect of this opened the way to the use of rights quite unconnected with the
contract of employment. but affected by the decision to dismiss, to engage the rules of
natural justice. This view finds authority in Administrator, Natal & Another v Sibiya
& Another262 where temporary full time employees were dismissed on notice without
a hearing. They ~ere held to be entitled to a hearing, because t.heir dismissal caused
economic loss to them: that economic loss was comprised within the concept of
'property' and the audi alteram partem principle was engaged.263
Therefore. the decision in Traub's case, in an unequivocal term, establishes the view
that all employees covered by the Labour Relations Act including common law
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employees must be afforded the benefit of a fair hearing before being dismissed or
any decision prejudicial to them is taken if they have a legitimate expectation to be
heard under the circumstances.
This View was vehemently canvassed in the case of Embling v Headmaster
St.Andrews College (Grahamstown) & Another264 which concerned dismissal on
notice of a school teacher. The applicant conceded that the school had complied with
the provisions of the contract when it terminated his services, but complained that he
had not been given a fair hearing before being dismissed. The applicant then
launched review proceedings on the ground that the headmaster's decision and its
subsequent confirmation by the council were invalid for non-compliance with the audi
aIteram partem rule.265 This contention was based in part on the employment contract,
and in part on the wider proposition that "the duty to afford a hearing must be
respected by any domestic tribunal charged with quasi-judicial functions except to the
extent that it is expressly excluded by the contract",266 and that the applicant had
"acquired a right, interest or legitimate expectation,,267 by virtue of eight years'
employment which rendered it unfair for him to be deprived of employment without
an opportunity to respond to the allegations against him.
All these points were rej ected by the court. The essence of its reasoning is contained
in the following extracts:
There is nothing in the wording of clause 27 from which it can be inferred that
when the council acts in accordance with the provisions of clause 27, it functions
as a public body subject to administrative law... Second respondent (the council) is
a private body. It is thus inappropriate and misleading to describe the second
respondent a public body subject to the audi alteram partem rule, a rule which is
not applicable to ordinary master and servant contract...The rules of natural
justice, succinctly expressed in the maxim audi alteram partem, have no application
in the field ofcontract. Contractual rights and obligations are governed by the law
ofcontract...As the applicant's employment was terminated in accordance with the
terms ofthe contract he was not entitled to a hearing prior to the terminating ofthe
agreement. ,,268
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It is respectfully submitted, that this view is anachronistic and does not reflect the
contemporary attitudes of the doctrine of unfair labour practice and the new South
African Labour Relations Act. The decision has failed to look at comments elicited
by Hoexter lA in Administration, Transvaal & Others v Zenzile & Others where it
was stated: "In my view it is logically unsound and wrong in principle to postulate
that the audi principle has no application to a pure contractual relations.269 It also
failed to consider the point made by Baxter that it is a general principle that "any
private institution which exercises powers over individuals is obliged to observe
common law requirements which do not differ in principle from those applied to
public bodies. ,,270 Wiechers is also of the view that the courts have often insisted that
bodies are obliged to observe natural justice even though their powers spring from
271contract.
Development in the case law has also lent support to Embling's plea that he was
entitled to a hearing before being dismissed. The judgment in the appeal against
Zenzile, which was decided before. Embling but apparently was not brought to the
attention of the court, appears to affirm the approach that the fact that by the law of
contract an indisputable right may have accrued to an employer to dismiss his
employee does not, for the purposes of administrative law, mean that the requirements
of natural justice can have no application in relation to the actual exercise of such
right.272
The question. therefore~ remaIns do the developments outlined in the foregoing
paragraphs sustain the proposition that every employer is bound to observe the
principles of natural justice before terminating the employment agreement? After the
decision in Traub, the rights of individual employees have been significantly extended
by the unfair labour practice regime of the Labour Relations Act under which the
court invariably requires employers to afford workers hearings before they are
disnlissed~ irrespective of what their individual service contracts might say. In effect,
the court insists that employers should comply with the requirements of procedural
fairness before considering the dismissal of an employee.273
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Against this background, it might well be arguable that the current labour relations
practice in South Africa has developed to the point where an employee can
legitimately claim an expectation to be heard before he is deprived of his
livelihood,274 either by notice or not. The notion of an unfettered right to dismiss has,
therefore, been undermined by the statutory and judicial developments already
outlined above. In fact Pretorius and Pitman have cogently argued that the implied
terms of the comlnon contract of service offer sufficient scope for the courts to limit
the employer's powers to dismiss for unacceptable or inadequate reasons.275 Thus the
employee's expectation on entering into an employment contract that the employer
will not terminate without good reason, must surely be regarded as sufficient weight
to justify his expectation to be heard before being dismissed.
2.3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, with a view to determine the scope of the application of 'procedural
fairness' in cases of dismissal due to misconduct it was imperative to look at areas and
contextualise the use of administrative powers, more particularly the disciplinary
power of the employer.
In Mauritius, the concept 'procedural fairness' is provided for in the Industrial
Relations Act 1973 and the Labour Act 1975. By these statutory provisions the
common law employees enjoy great relief from the harshness of the employer's
decision to dismiss either summarily or on notice. Similarly, under the Mauritian
Public Service Commission Regulations 1967, the state has to follow fair procedures
before finally deciding to terminate the services of a public servant. However, in spite
of these statutory provisions and numerous judicial decisions the notion of the
application of the concept, procedural fairness, has not been adequately explored and
researched.
The South African law of unfair dismissal has, unlike Mauritius, certain distinct
features which have successfully enhanced the scope of the application of procedural
fairness. Firstly, because of the doctrine of unfair labour practice, the concept has an
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expanded and a more pervasive application. The South African labour jurisprudence
does not make any distinction between a private sector or a public sector employee, or
between a summary dismissal or dismissal on notice, when the matter relates to the
application of procedural fairness. The landmark decision in Traub has closed the
debate concerning the legal capacity of an employer who does not have to exercise
judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative power when effecting .the dismissal of an
employee. It is well established in the South African Administrative law that when an
·individual is prejudicially affected in his existing rights, liberty or property the
decision maker has to engage the audi alteram partem principle.276 Secondly, South
Africa ha's infused the notion of legitimate expectation as a unique feature into its law
of unfair dismissal. This addition into the procedural justice has not only widened the
scope of procedural fairness, it has also strengthened the position of employees who
are constantly exposed to the employer's rash decision to dismiss at will or on notice.
These unique features are quite consistent with the modem approach to workplace
governance which can effectively benefit and enrich the Mauritian law of 'unjustified
dismissal.' It is suggested, in fact, that the common law contract of employment is
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Even at the nascent stage of the development of industrial law, nearly a
hundred years ago, the English courts, in Robb v Green (1895) 2 Q..B.l) found
that:
"In the absence ofany stipulation to the contrary, there in involved in every
contract ofservice an implied obligation, call it by what name you will, or the
servant that he shall perform his duty, specially in these essential respects,
namely, that he shall honestly andfaithfully serve his master; that he shall not
abuse. his confidence in the matters pertaining to his service and that he shall,
by all reasonable means in his powers, protect his master's interest in respect
ofmatters confided to him in the cause ofhis service. "
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Conditions ofEmployment Act 75 of1997, which provides that its provisions
regarding notice do not affect the right of either employer or employee to
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In Council for Scientific & Industrial Research v Fijen (1996) 17 IV 18 (A)
where the employee has breached the contract of employment by conduct
which amounts to repudiation ofsome fundamental term, the employer is not
only entitled to terminate the contract summarily, but can also sue the
employee for losses occasioned by the breach.
Whether dismissal is justified for a single act of misconduct or whether
dismissal would only be justified in respect of an act of misconduct
perpetrated by an employee already warned against such misconduct has
received various answers in different decisions. In Miss A. Grifjiths v
Mauritius Touring Co.Ltd 1984 Record No. 3408 in answer to the question
whether a single act of misconduct (abandonment ofduties) was sufficient to
warrant the summary dismissal of an employee with no less than 28 years
service, the court held that the 'misconduct' reproached was in our view
certainly not the sort ofmisconduct which may leave the employer with good
faith with "no other course" than summarily dismissing the employee. But in
Plastic Industry Ltd v O. Koobarawa 1988 Record No 4164 because of
"multiples absences irregulieres et retards; " and HI 'intemperance" the court
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upheld the employer's plea that he could not in 'goodfaith' do otherwise than
to dismiss for misconduct certain employees who were in the habit of turning
up for four days' work in every week.
In South African this issue has been debated in greater length and the court
has held that wher.e an employee repeatedly refuses to carry out a particular
lawful instruction, that is issued to him several times, this alone mayjustify his
immediate dismissal even in the absence of any prior offence or warnings.
(National Education Health and Allied Worker's Union Obo Mthembu v
University of Witwatersrand (1994) 5 (3) SALLR 1 (IC):
In Alexandrakis v Rennies Ltd (1993) 4(7) SALLR 17 (IC) it was held that
conduct that amounts to gross insubordination is so serious that dismissal
without warning is justified, the employee should be put on his guard that a
further act of insubordination might lead to his dismissal before
insubordination becomes a fair and valid reason to dismiss.
However, outright dismissal is not an option that is approved by the court. The
Supreme Court of Mauritius has laid three requirements to determine a
summary dismissal to be fair and reasonable. In Societe de Gerance de Mon
Loisir v Ootim 1991 SCJ 161 it was held:
(1) Outright dismissal, even in a case ofmisconduct, is unjustified
if it is outside the prescribed time limits or the court is not satisfied
that the employer in goodfaith could not have taken any other course;
(2) The degree of misconduct is a factor to take into account to
determine whether the employer can be expected to lighten or forego
the punishment.
(3) Where the misconduct is serious, a combination of strong
mitigating circumstances, and not merely long and good service, is
needed to conclude that a worker does not deserve to be summarily
dismissed.
87 - Under the 1956 Labour Relations Act, the term 'valid' and 'fair' in
respect ofdismissal was used, to indicate that the employee has correctly been
. found guilty of [he misconduct in question-valid reason for the dismissal and
that dismissal was the appropriate sanction in such a case there was said to be
a fair reason for the dismissal.
Cameron et al. In 'The New LRA', the law after the 1958 Amendments, 1989
Juta & CO,at 111 explained: 'valid' means that the disciplinary reason/or the
dismissal must apply in the case of the particular employee. There must be
sufficient proof as a matter of objective fact that the employee charged
committed the misconduct alleged.
In ATASA and De Coning v Free State Consolidated Mines (1997) 8 (10)
SALLR 1 (LAC) at 7, the labour appeal court held that "the mine had a valid
reason to dismiss de Coning" given that what had been in issue was not the
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appropriateness of the sanction (that is, the fairness of the dismissal) but
whether or not the employee was guilty of the offence concerned (that is, the
validity ofthe dismissal).
88 _ Grogan 1, 'Workplace law' 2000 (5ed) Juta & Co. at 133 it is stated: It is
generally accepted that the employer need only prove the commission of the
offence on a balance of probabilities i. e the inference that the employee
committed the conduct alleged must be more likely than that he or she did not.
Refer to Moorghen v Britannia SE 1982 SCJ Record No.3177 at 27;
moletsane v Ascot Diamonds (Pty) Ltd (1993) 4 (8) SALLR 15 (IC); Fee Yam
Hing Kwong 1975 SCJ No. 154.
89 _ General Industrial Union ofSouth Africa & Sebase v V.M Construction
(1991) 5 (12) SALLR 1 (IC).
90 _ Ngpngomo v Minister ofEducation and Culture (1992) 13 IU 329 D at
335 A-B
91 _ 1954 MR at 6; Reega v Labourdonnais SE 1980 MR at 200; Rosebelle
SE VS Sarachi & 5 ors 1985 SCJ Record No. 3026.
92 -Alliance Spinners V JCarpen 1989 SCJ Record No. 4287 at a4.
In Encyclopedie Dalloz - Travail Vol.l contra du Travail a duree
indeterminee at 194 the consequence ofa serious misconduct is explained: la
fante grave n 'est elle pas, suivant la definition meme de la cour de cassation,
celle qui rend impossible to maintien des relations contractuelles?
93 - Anglo American Farms tla Boschendal Restaurant v Konjwayo (1992) 13
IV 573 (LAC) at 589 G-H
9-1 - Robinson v Crompton Parkinson Ltd 1978 lCR 401. See also D _
Anderman 'The law of Unfair Dismissal (2 ed 1985) chap.3 at 48-106 and
R. W Rideout 'Rideout's Principles ofLabour law (4 ed 1983) at 185-92.
95 _ (1886) Q B 356 at 359
96
-1987 SCJ Record No. 3723 at 223
97 - The Labour Act 1975 has a singular provision which makes dismissal for
alleged misconduct as an action oflast resort. Section 32 (1) (b) states:
1. No employer shall dismiss a worker _ .
(a) for alleged misconduct unless _
(i) he cannot in goodfaith take any other course.
In Medine Sugar Estate Co. Ltd v I Wodally 1993 SCJ Record No. 4691 the
S~pr~me Court observed that section 32 of the Labour Act permits summary
dIsmIssal on the ground of misconduct only where, inter alia, the employer
cannot in good faith take any other course. See also Plastic Industry Ltd v O.
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Knobarwa 1988 SCJ Record No.4164 at 460; Societe Union Saint Aubin v
F.Sansjleur 1989 SCJ Record No. 4355 at 258; v Jugat v ClE Sucrerie de Bel
Ombre Ltee 1983 Record No.3318; MC. Tanny v Belle Vue Mauricia S.E
1981 SCJ Record No. 3094.
98 -1992 SCJ Record No. 4021 at 89: See also The Mauritius Tuna Fishing &
Canning Entreprises Ltd v J.M Manne 1989 SCJ Record No. 4501 at 190;
Desmarais Brothers Co.Ltd v G. Sundanun 1979 SCJ Record No. 2828 at 160.
99 _ Le Roux & Van Niekerk, HThe S.A Law ofUnfair Dismissal (1994) Juta &
Co at 131, the following is stated:
·'Any form of dishonest conduct compromises the necessary relationship of
trust between the employer and employee and will generally warrant
dismissal. " See also Societe Malesherbes v Jamajaye Beelur 1990 SCJ Record
JvTO. 4438 at 145.
100 _ Central News Agency (Pty) Ltd v Commercial Catering and Allied
Workers Union and Miram Maile (1991) 12 IV 340 (LAC) at 344 F-l; Anglo
American Farms tla Boschendal Restaurant v M Konjwayo (1992) 13 IV 373
(LAC) at 389 B-E and at 592 A-I; Khoza v Gypsum Industries Ltd (1996) 7 (5)
SALLR 1 (LAC),· Lahee Park Club v Garrat (1996) 7(9) SALLR 13 (LAC)
101 _ Anglo American Farms tla Boschendal Restaurant v M Konjwayo (1992)
13lU 373 (LAC) at 590 G-591A.
102 _ (1994) 5 (3) SALLR 13 (IC) at 17
103 _ (1997) 8 (3) SALLR 1 (CCMA) at 11
10./ - Food and Allied Workers Union v S.A Breweries Ltd (1991) 2 (7) SALLR
3 (IC),· Malinga v The Cold Chain (1991) 2 (1) SALLR 1 (IC); National Union
of Jvie/al Uiorkers and Simelane v National Rnagers (Pty) Ltd (1991) 2 (7)
SALLR 11 (IC) and Food & Allied Workers Union and Sehlodi v S.A
Breweries (Ltd) (Denver) (1991) 2(8) SALLR 9 (IC).
105
- SACCAWU, Jan Hanyane and 18 others v Van Rhyn Building Supplies
(Pty) Ltd (1991) 2 (2) SALLR 6 (IC); ACTWASA obo E Majubane v Amarose
Lingerie cc (1991) 2 (3) SALLR 13 (IC) and M Ratisane v Joshua Doore
(1991) 2 (4) SALLR 1 (IC).
106 - S.A Breweries Ltd (Alrode) v Food and Allied Workers Union, Stanley
Selepe and Petros Bulekiswe (1991) 2 (9) SALLR 1 (LAC); Pitches & Rhoode
Assisted by Western Cape Omnibus & SSU v Golden Arrow Bus Services (Pty)
Ltd (1994) 5 (7) SALLR 7 (IC) at 15.
107 _ (1990) 1 lU 304 (IC) at 395 F-H
108 -1969 MR 18
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109 _ 1971 MR 180
lID -1979 MR 2]U
III _ Reega v Labourdonnais SE (1981) SCJ 235; Noel Furniture Ltd v
SKhoodeeram (1985) SC] 44; C.Hozary v The Union SE Co.1977 SC]
Record No. 2732; A.Rayapoulle v Taylor Smith & Co. Ltd. 1988 SC] Record
No. 4028: United Bus Service Co. Ltd v Too/ail 1975 Mr at 41; Gaetan Eric
Rene v General Construction Co. Ltd 1993 Case No. 223/92.
112 _ V]ugut v CIE Sucrerie de Bel Ombre Ltee 1983 SC] Record No. 3318.
113 _ Alliance Spinners v J.Carpen; Deep River Beau Champ SE v Sydney
Paul Etowar 1987 SCJ Record No. 3723; Teka v The Public Works
Department 1954 Mr at 6.
114 _ M Nayeck v The Local Government Service Commission 1990. SC]
Record No. 388883.
115 _ The Atfauritius Tuna Fishing & Canning Enterprises Ltd v J.M Manne
1989 Record No. 4501.
116 _ Desmarais Brothers Co.Ltd v G.Sundanun 1979 Record No. 2828
117 _ Dry Cleaning & Steam Laundry Ltd v J.M Clarisse 1992 Record No.
4021
118 _ Rosehill Transport Ltd v I Teelucksing 1989 Record No. 4413
119 _ Mauritius Meat Authority v B. Mungroo 1991 SC] Record No. 4608; The
Medine Sugar Estate Co.Ltd v I Wodally 1993 SC] Record No. 4691; V
Moorgen v Britannia SE 1982 SC] Record No. 3177.
120 _ The Beau Plan SE Co.Ltd v R.Kisto 1988 Scj Record no. 4003; A.
Bouton v Companhia Colonial do Buzi 1934 Mr at 282.
121 _ College Labourdonnais v P.J.H Seenyen 1992 Record No. 4668 Gungah
v IAyban 1976 SCJ Record No. 201,' Abbadoo v Mon Desert Alma 1977 SCJ
Record No. 245: RoseBelle SE Board v SSarachi & Sons 1981 SCJ Record
No. 3026: Hazary v The Union SE (1977) MR 21.
122 _ MC. Tanny v Belle Vue Mauricia SE 1981 Record No. 3094
123 _ The Willoughby College v C. Chukooree 1989 Record No. 4465
J?.J
- - Mrs R. Thomas v Hotel Des Isles Ltee 1984 Record No. 3451
125 _ L.Mouton v A. Bonieux & Co.Ltd 1984 Record No. 3443
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126 _ C.R Constat v Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Labour & Industrial
Relations 1980 SCJ Record No. 2913
127 _ B. Savrimootoo v Mon Desert Alma Ltd 1983 Record No. 3183
128 _ Soobrayen v Cie Sue. De Mon Choisy Ltee (1975) SCJ No. 79.
129 _ Council for Science & Industrial Research v Fijen (1996) 17 ILJ 18 (A)
26D-E; Sappi Novoboard v JH Bolleurs (1998) 19ILJ 784 (LAC); Khoza v
Gypsum Industries Ltd (1997) 7 BLLR 857 (LAC); Edgars Stores Ltd v Ogle
(1998) 9 BLLR 891' (LA C); Chauke & Ors v Lee Service Centre tla Leeson
Motors (1998) 19 ILJ 1441 (LAC);Nel v Ndaba & Ors (1999) 20 ILl 2666
(LC); Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v CCMA, Case No: JA 62198 of 24106199 (LAC);
Standard Bank of South Africa v CCMA (1998) 19 ILJ 903 (LC); Tucker v
Electra Personnel Consultants (1999) 5 BALR 598 (CCMA); SACWU obo.
Cleophas v Smith Kline (1999) 8 BALR 957 (CCMA).
130 _ Edgars Stores Ltd v Ogle (1998) 9 BLLR 891 (LAC); Nedcor Bank Ltd v
Jappie (1998) BLLR 1002 (LAC); Standard Bank ofSA v CCMA & Ors (1998)
6 BLLR 622 (LC); Toyota SA Manufacturing (Pty) Ltd v Radebe & Ors (1998)
10 BLLR 1082 (LC); Metcash Trading Ltd tla Metro Cash & Carry v Fobb &
Anor (1998) 19 ILJ 1576 (LC); Komane v Fedsure Life (1998) 2 BLLR 215
(CCMA); SAMWU obo Peni v City of Tygerberg (1998) 11 BALR 1475
(CCMA),' SACCAWU obo Mogolomo v Southern Cross Industries (1998) 11
BALR 1447 (CCMA).
131 _ R & C X-Press v Munro (1998) 19 ILJ 540 (LAC); Lebowa Platinum
Mines Lld v Hill (1998) 19 ILJ 1112 (LAC),' A WUSA obo Ncube v Northern
Crime Security CC (1999) 20 ILJ 1954 (CCMA); TGWU obo Molatane v
Megabus & Coach (1999) 10 BALR 1279 (IMSSA).
132 - AWUSA obo Ncube v Northern Crime Security CC (1999) 20 ILJ 1954
(CCMA).
133 -,- County Fair Foods (Pty) Ltdv CCMA & Ors (1999) 20 ILJ 1701 (LAC);
Tanker Services (Pty) Lld V Magudelela (1997) 12 BLLR 1552 (LAC); NUM
obo KloofGold Mining Co. Ltd (1986) 7 ILJ 375 (IC); NUMSA obo Walsh v
Delta Motor Corporation (1998) BALR 710 (CCMA); SACCAWU obo Ntonga
& Anor v Al Fisheries (1999) 8 BALR 943 (CCMA).
13.J - Chauke & Ors v Lee Service Centre CC tla Leeson Motors (1998) 19ILJ
1441 (LAC).
135 - Air Products (Pty) Ltd v CWIU & Anor (1998) 1 BLLR 1 (LAC);
Johannes v Polyoak (Pty) Ltd (1998) 1 BLLR 18 (LAC); PPWAWU obo
Fortuin v Macrall Timbers (Pty) Ltd (1999) 20 ILJ 1139 (CCMA).
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136 _ It was held in Ellerines Holdings v CCMA & Ors (1999) 9 BLLR 9I 7
(LC) That it was not a defence to an allegation offraud for an employee to
plead that he committed the unlawful act on the instruction of a superior
officer since an employee is not under an obligation to obey illegal
instructions. Similarly, the Industrial Court held in Ntsinande v Union
Carriage & Wagon Co. (Pty) Ltd (1993) 14 ILl 1566 (IC) that the instruction
given to the employee of 32 year service to deliver goods to an area he was
not familiar with was unreasonable and he was entitled to disobey it.
137 _ NUM oho Bogo v Anglogold Ltd (1998) BALR 1642 (IMSSA); Amcoal
Witbank v NUM obo Mamphoke (1999) 8 BALR 965 (IMSSA); East Rand
Gold & Uranium Co. Ltd V NUM (1998) 6 BLLR 781 (CCMA); Seabelo v
Belgravia Hotel (1997) 6 BLLR 829 (CCMA).
138 _. On this see Boardman Brothers (Natal) (Pty) Ltd (1998) 19 ILl 517
(SCA).
139Section 109 Part viii of the Industrial Relations Act 1973 which reads:
Management shall ensure that fair and effective arrangements exist in dealing
with disciplinary matters. "
Section 32 (2) (a) reads:
"No employer shall dismiss a worker unless he has afforded the worker an
opportunity to answer any charges made against him and any dismissal made
in contravention of this paragraph shall be deemed to be an unjustified
dismissal
1.J°The Labour Relations Act 83 of1988 introduced an entirely new definition
of 'unfair labour practice' and amended the statutory procedures for the
adjudication of unfair labour practice disputes. It also for the first time
provided statutory recognition for the concept ofunfair dismissal.
Paragraph (a) of the definition provided that termination of employment for
disciplinaly reasons had to be founded on a valid andfair reason and had to
be executed in compliance with a fair procedure.
141National Automobile Workers Union v Pretoria Precision Castings (Pty)
Ltd (1985) 6 IV 369
/4'-NUM v Durban Roodeport Deep (1987) 8 ILl 156 (IC) at 165.
l.J3 wq. Davey (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA (1999) 20 ILl 2017 at 2023 B as per
Melunsky AJA
In Administrator of Transvaal v Theletsane 1991 (2) SA 192 (4) stated that:
"Fairness is an elusive concept: to determine its existence within a given set of
circumstances is not always an easy task. No specific all-encompassing test
can be laid down for determining whether a hearing is fair - everything will
depend upon the circumstances ofthe particular case. "
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14:1(1985) 6 ILl 369 (IC) at 369,' In Holgate v Minister ofJustice (1995) 16 ILl
1426 (E) Franman J stated: "I am of the view that since the decision of
Administrator Transvaal & others v Traub & Others 1989 (4) SA 731 (A), the
emphasis has rightly been placed on the duty of an administrative decision
maker to act fairly and rationally when exercising public power whenever a
decision is made w.hich determines what a person's rights are. "
145Baxter L, Administrative Law, 1984 Juta & Co. 538-540
The question as to whether it is possible for an appellate tribunal to correct an
administrative decision which is impeachable on the grounds ofunfairness, is
also discussed by Baxter at 588-589, where he states that in the first place, a
complainant is entitled to fairness at all stages ofthe decision making process
and he quotes from the judgement ofMegary J in Leary v National Union of
Vehicle Builders (1971) ch.34, 49 "/fthe rules and the law combine to give the
member the right to a fair trial and the right ofappeal, why should he be told
that he ought to be satisfied with an unjust trial and a fair appeal?
146Brassey et al The New Labour Law, 1987 Juta & Co at 310-311
1:17De Smith et al Judicial Review of Administrative Action 1987 Sweet &
Maxwell p401
J.l
8L.G. Baxter, Fairness and Natural Justice in English and South African
Law 1979 SAL! at 607
149
As per Lawton L! in Maxwell v Department ofTrade and Industry (1974) 2
ALLER 122 (CA)
150In Mohinder Singh Gill v The Chief Election Commissioner AIR 1978 SC
851 at 870, Krishna Iyer J considers 'natural justice' as a pervasive facet of
secular law when a spiritual touch enlivens legislation, administration and
adjudication, to make fairness a creed of life." Again, in Maneka Gandhi v
Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248, the court considers natural justice as "a
great humanising principle intended to vest law with fairness and secure
justice. "
. In Administrator Natal v Sibiya (1992) 4 SA 532 (A) it was held ''At common
law the rules of natural justice are aimed at achieving a minimum standard
for fair administrative hearings. As such, they ensure that the administrative
body applies ifS mind to the matter by adhering to certain procedural
requirements, by acting fairly, by giving the individual an opportunity to be
heard and so on. " . .
151
Grogan J Workplace Law, 2000 Juta & Co p154.
152(1997) 18 ILl 1031 (LC) at 1032
1531993 SCJ 173: In Bundhoo v Mauritius Breweries Ltd 1981 MR 157 the
Supreme Court held that "although, in certain circumstances, an employer
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may be just~fied in terminating the employment ofa worker whose conduct is
suspect in some serious measure, nevertheless where no hearing is granted to
the worker in order to give him an opportunity to dispel the suspicion, then
there is a violation ofSection 32 (2) (a) ofthe Labour Act justifying the grant
ofseverance allowance at the punitive rate. "
154NAAWU v Pretoria Precision Castings (Pty) Ltd (1985) 6 ILl 369 (IC) at
378 E-F; See also Bissessor v Bestores (Pty) Ltd (1986) 7 ILl 334 (IC) at 337
H-I
155Seidman, Constitution in Independent Anglophonic Subsaharan Africa 1969
Wisconsin Law Review Vo!. 83 at 113.
In Administrator Natal v Sibiya (1992) 4 SA 532 (A) the court held "as such
the procedures ensure that the administrative body applies its mind to the
matter by adhering to certain procedural requirements, by acting fairly, by
giving ihe individual an opportunity to be heard and so on"
The same opinion was expressed by Bulbulia M in Moahlodi v East Rand Gold
and Uranium Co. Ltd (1988) 9 ILl 597 (IC); "It is the tacit duty of every
person who is entrusted with the responsibility of having to mete out
punishment to obtain all relevant information about an employee's personal
circumstances as well as his service record and if need be to lean over
backwards in an effort to find other extenuating circumstances in the
employee 's favour. The reason for this is that it enables the person who has to
be handed down the punishment to evaluate the case in its proper perspective
by taking the interests of the employee into account and thereby to consider
alternative penalties appropriate to the circumstances ofthe case. "
156Van Wyk et al ED. 'The New South African Legal Order' chapter on
Procedural Rights by John Milton et al Juta & Co at 401
157NAAWUv Pretoria Precision Castings (1985) 6 ILl 369 (IC) at 377F
158 'Reasonableness I in the sense of objective reasonableness inherently
incorporates an effective approach to fairness. The court is obliged in the
light ofall relevant factors, to consider whether it was objectively reasonable
for the employer to bring about the consequences he did. The test formulated
by Fabriclls AM in NUM & Others v Vaal Reefs Exploration & Mining Co.
Ltd (1987) 8 ILl 776 (IC) perhaps comes closest to the test ofreasonableness
in the sense - a test ofthe prevailing circumstances and social conditions, plus
the good judgment of the workplace. In Davis & Sons Ltd v Atkins (1977)
1RLR 314, it was stated "a determination of reasonableness requires a
tribunal to evaluate the actions of the employer not in terms of whatever the
tribunal thinks it was reasonable but in terms ofwhether an employer would
think it was. "
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The famous judgement of Lord Greene MR in Associated Provincial Picture
.Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation (1948) 1KB 228 gives a better
understanding towards understanding what is reasonable, "it is true that
discretion must be exercised reasonably. Now what does that
mean? .. Unreasonableness has frequently been used and is frequently used as
Q general description of the things that must be done, for instance, a person
entrusted with a discretion must, so to speak direct himselfproperly in law.
He must call his own attention to matters which he is bound to consider. He
must exclude from consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has
to consider ifhe does not obey those rules, he may, truly be said, and often, is
said to be acting 'unreasonably'. Similarly there may be something so absurd
that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of the
authority... 1n another sense unreasonableness is taking into consideration
extraneous matters. It is so unreasonable that it might almost be described as
being done in bad faith. " In FA WU & Others v C. G.Smith Sugar Ltd,
Noodsberg (1989) 10 IV 907 (IC) the court adopted that the evidence
available to the employer at the date ofdismissal must be shown on balance of
probabilities that the disciplinary offence was committed. If this is
established, the employer must have a bonafide belief that the employee
committed the offence.
159"The just", Aristotle says, "is the lawful and the fair...we call those acts just
that tend to produce and preserve happiness and its component for the
political society...Justice. alone of the virtues is thought to be another's good
because it is related to one neighbour. "
Aquinas writes: ''justice alone, of all the virtues implies the notion of duty.
Doing good to others and not injuring them, when undertaken as a matter of
strict justice, goes no further than the discharge ofdebt which each man owes
eve,y other (Quotes taken from Britannica Great Books, The Great Ideas - A
Syntopicon Great Books ofthe Western World, Robert Maynard Hutchins Ltd
Ed. p60.:/)
Lord Haldene said in Local Government Board v Arlidge 1915 AC 120 at 132:
"those whose duty it is to decide must act judicially... The decision must uphold
the spiritual sense of responsibility of a tribunal whose duty is to mete out
justice. " He then stated: "They must deal with the question referred to them
without bias and they must give to each of the parties the opportunity of
adequately presenting the case made.
Justice William Douglas of the US Supreme Court once put it"... the
constitutional concept of justice is about procedural safeguards... it is
procedure that spells much of the difference between rule by law and rule by
whim or caprice. (Joint Anti-facist Refugee Committee v McGrath 341 vs 123
(1951)
In Charanlal Sahu v Union of India (1990) 1 SCC 613 it was observed:
"Justice is a psychological yearning 'in which men seek acceptance of their
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viewpoint before the forum or authority enjoined or obliged to take a decision
before affecting their right. "
160The dictionary meaning ofthe word fair' is reasonable; honest; upright. In
common usage the word conveys some idea ofjustice or equity; impartial; free
from suspicion or bias.
The Frank Report in England has spelt out in broad terms the meaning of
fairness'. Fairness means "the adoption of a clear procedure which enables
parties to know their rights, to present their case which they have to meet
(Wraith R.E & Hutchinson P. G., Royal Institute of Public Administration,
1973 (George Allen & Unwin Ltd p131) In UAMAWU v Fudens SA (1983) 4
IV 212 (IC) at 225 it was said: "in as far as fairness is applicable all relevant
matters surrounding the specific case in the framework that reasonably
belongs to the actual supposition are to be taken into account and the deciding
criteria are to be uncovered, evaluated and weighed"
Within the context ofprocedural fairness, the industrial court has recognised
that a fair predismissal procedure requires a fair hearing prior to dismissal.
In NAAWlJv Pretoria Precision Castings (Pty) Ltd (1985) 6 IV 369 at 378 F
it was stated" this concept offairness or equity in as much as it relates to the
fundamental right to be heard in the field of labour relations implies that a
separate decision as to guilt and sanction should be made and that an
employee must be heard on both aspects." Also see Twala v ABC Shoe Store
(1987) 8 IV 714 (le) at 715 G. See Cameron, 'The Right to a hearing before
Dismissal' 1986 7 IV 183 at 193-195.
In Ngobeni & Others v Vetsak (Co-op) Ltd (1984) 5 IV 205 (IC) at 212 E-F
the court stated: "The fairness, equitableness or reasonableness of the
employee's dismissal must in the opinion of the court be tested with reference
to the procedure that was followed in the dismissal..., and the reason or
reasons which led to the dismissal. "
Cameron also writes in his article, 'The Right to a Fair Hearing before
Dismissal: Problems and Puzzles: (1988) 9 IV 147 part 11 at 164: Dismissals
are perceived as unfair when they occur, run counter to the objects ofthe LRA
because they tend to encourage conflict and this is particularly so with those
dismissals which seem precipitated or ill considered - and virtually all
dismissals not preceded by a proper enquiry almost fall within this category.
Baxter in his article. 'Fairness and Natural Justice in English and South
African Law 1979 SAL! 607 at 634 writes: "In the legal context, the meaning
offairness will automatically come of its own if we are aware of both the
particular function ofthe administrative organ in question and the purpose of




161NUM v Western Areas Gold Mining Co.Ltd (1985) 6 ILl 380 (IC) at 386 C-
D
162(1991) 12 ILl 1395 (Arb)
163Brassey et ai, The New Labour Law; Strikes, Dismissals and ULP in South
African Law, Juta & Co p 78
164Wade H. WR & Forsyth CF, Administrative Law 7edp340
165John Rees (1970) .... 345
'66NAAWUv Pretoria Precision Castings (1985) 6 ILl 369 (IC) at 378
16.7Ntsibande v Union Carriage (1993) 14 ILl 1566 (IC)
168Mondi Timber Products v Tope (1997) 18 ILl 149 (LAC) at 152 H-I; Metro
Cash & Carry v Tshela (1996) 17 ILl 1126 (LAC) at 1130.
169The Frank Report in England describes openness, fairness and impartiality
in the following way: In the field oftribunals openness appears to us to
require the publicity ofproceedings and knowledge ofthe essential reasoning
underlying decisions,' fairness to require adoption ofa clear procedure which
enables parties to know their rights, to present their case fully and to know the
case which they have to meet; impartiality to require the freedom oftribunals
from the influence, real as apparent, ofdepartments concerned with the
subject matter oftheir decisions. (Quotedfrom Wraith R.E & Hutchesson P. G.
Royal Institute ofPublic Administration, George Allen & Unwin Ltd 1973, at
131)
170De Smith et ai, Judicial Review ofAdministrative Action, 1987 Sweet &
Maxwell p376
171(1993) .:I (7) SALLR 18 (LAC)
172(1993) 4 (7) SALLR 18 (LAC)
173Sibiya v NUM (1996) 6 BLLR 794 (lC)
1N Fredman S & Lee Simon, 'Natural Justice for Employees: The
Unacceptable Faith ofProceduralism. (1986) 15 (1) ILlp15 at 25.
175Basson D., South Africa's Interim Constitution, 1994 Juta & Co. p35
176In Horn v Kroonstad Town Council 1948 (3) SA 861 (0) the court stated:
''An unfettered discretion should be exercised according to the rules ofreason
and justice and not according to private opinion. The discretion must be
exer.cised within the limits to what an honest man, competent to the discharge
ofhIS office ought to confine himself"
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177(1994) 5 (6) SALLR 16 (A) at 29.
178(1943) AC 627 (H4) 644-5 as per Lord Wright.
179Cameron et aI, The New Labour Relations Act, 1989 Juta & Co. 111-112.
180(1984) 5 ILl 16 (IC) at 23 F
181 (1985) 6 ILl 380 (IC) at 386 B-C
182(1986) 7 ILl 334 (IC) at 337 G-H
183BA WUv Prestige Hotels cc tla Blue Waters Hotel (1993) 14 ILl 963 (LAC)
184Wade. Administrative Law. 6 Ed 1988 Oxford Press at 562
185Co~ncilfor Scientific & Industrial Research v Fijen (1996) 17 ILl 18 (A)
186In Martin v Murray (1995) 16 ILl it was stated: "What the employer has
right to do, namely, to terminate the relationship by simply giving appropriate
notice of termination, without the need for any prior consultation with his or
her counterpart... "
Mauritius Steam Navigation Co Ltd v Ronsetty 1977 MR 25; Cayeux Ltd v
Maroussen 1974 MR 166; See Also Anderman, The Law of Unfair Dismissal,
1985 Butterworths, p35 where it is stated: "as long as contractual notice of
termination was given, the employer was free to dismiss an employee for any
reason he wished, with no obligation to reveal his reason for dismissal to the
employee, much less justify it. "
Paul Pretorius in his article 'Status Quo Reliefand the Industrial Court: The
Sacred Cow Tethered', 1983 4ILl 167 at 171 states: "Provided that the
prerequisite notice is given, the common law allows the employer to dismiss
the employee, to suspend the employment contract, and to change the terms
and conditions in almost any manner he wishes. "
f87Embling v Headmaster St Andrew's College (Grahamstown) & Another
1991 (4) SA 403 (IC)
188Raman Ismael v UB.S 1986 MR 182
189Ibid
190In Lace v Diack and Others (1992) 13 ILl 860 (w) the court stated: "Where
the employment agreement empowers the employer to appoint a tribunal or
adjudicative body which is charged with a duty to decide, the principles
relating to fundamental fairness must be observed by the individual or body
making the decision. "
191Case decided on 16 May 1984 (No Reference Nr)
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192Medine Sugar Estate Co.Ltd v I Wodally, 1993, Record No. 4691: See also
Tirvengadun v Bata Shoe (Mauritius) 1979 MR 135; Harel Freres Ltd v
Veerasamy and Anor 1968 MR 218; Dunlallsingh v C.E.B 1979 MR 191;
Societe Union Saint Aubin 1989, Record No. 4355; Nadal v Longtill
(Mauritius) Ltd 1984 SCJ No. 23.
193As per Hoexte~ JA in Administrator Transvaal & Others v Zenzile and
others 1991 (1) SA 21 at 36 H-I
19.JGrogan 1, Workplace Law, 2000 Juta & Co. pl02
195Administrator Transvaal & Others v Zenzile & Others 1991 (1) SA 21;
Administrator, Natal & Another v Sibiya & Another 1992 (4) SA at 532
196In Damsell v Southern Life Association Ltd (1992) 13 IV 533 (c) Deventer
AJ stated: It was common cause in argument that the principles of
administrative law had no application in this matter, that the relationship in
..... was governed solely by the terms of the contract between them and the
applicable principles of the common law and the principles ofnatural justice
or fundamental fairness more particularly the audi alteram partem could only
come into play in the field ofcontract where an adjudicating body or tribunal
was contractually created. It was again stated in Lace v Diack and others
(1992) 13 IV 860 (w) that where the employment agreement empowers the
employer to appoint a tribunal or adjudicative body which is charged with the
duty to decide the principles relating to fundamental fairness must be
observed by the individual or body making the decision
197As per Lord Wilberforce in Malloch v Aberdeen Corporation (1971) 1 WLR
1578 (H L Dc) at 1595 H - 1596B, who stated: One may accept that there are
relationships in which all requirements of the observance of the rules of
natural justice are excluded... these must be confined to what I have called
'pure master and servant cases', which I take to mean cases in which there is
no element ofpublic employment or service, no support by statute, nothing in
the nature ofan office or a status which is capable ofprotection. Ifany ofthe
elements exist. then. .. whatever the terminology used, and even though in some
inter partes aspects, the relationship may be called that ofmaster and servant,
there may be essential procedural requirements to be observed, andfailure to
observe them may result in a dismissal being declared void.
1981959 (4) SA 632 (n) at 639 F-640 B; This approach was also followed in
Nchabaleng v Director ofEducation (Jransvaal) 1954 (1) SA 432 (J) at 438
H-439 A .in which a teacher had been dismissed in terms of a regulation
empowering the department to terminate on written notice for reasons
'considered good and sufficient' and approved by a more senior official. The
court found that the provision conferred a common law right to dismiss
without giving reasons, observing that "to require a hearing by the Director in
every case in which the employing organisation wished to terminate the
employment ofone of its teachers would involve too great an inroad upon the
common law freedom ofaction ofthe employer.
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199But although the civil courts have been reluctant to hold that there is an
implied duty to act fairly, the High Court recently came close to holding that
such a term will almost invariably be applied In Key Delta v Marriner (1996)
6 BLLR 647 (IC) a magistrate had granted the respondent damages equivalent
to the remuneration he would have received in 3 months after he was
summarily dismissed without a hearing and for no apparently sound reasons.
On appeal, the employer argued that in terms of the common law, it was
bound only to pay the respondent what he would have received had the
contract been lawfully terminated i. e. one month notice. The court noted that
generally employers and employees were aware ofthe fact that under the LRA
arbitrary dismissals amounted to unfair labour practice. Considering whether
parties had contemplated a term to this effect in the contract of employment,
the court took into account the status of the employee (he was relatively ofa
senior status) and the size ofthe employer. It ruled that the parties must have
understood that the employee could not be arbitrarily dismissed
200A Rycroft and B. Jordaan, A Guide to South African Labour Law, Juta &
Co.p96.
201J Grogan, Natural Justice and Employment Contract. A Rearguard Action,
1992 SALl 109 at 120; Section 193 (2) of the Labour Relations Act 1995
provides: The Labour Court or the arbitrator must require the employer to
reinstate or re-employ the employee unless...
(d) the dismissal is unfair only because the employer did not follow a
fair procedure.
202Section 43 and 46 (a) of the Labour Relations Act 28 of1956 and Sections
115 on CCMA, Section 158 on Labour Court and Section 174 on the Labour
Appeal Court. These Statutory provisions have now replaced entirely the
common law doctrine oftermination at will.
203For review of the industrial courts approach to procedural fairness, see
E.Cameron 'The Right to a Hearing Before Dismissal - Part 1 (1986) 7 III
183 where he noted that the right to a hearing was developed by the industrial
court by virtue of its statutory powers in terms ofSection 43 and 46 (a) ofthe
Labour Relations Act 28 of1956 to reinstate dismissed employees and to make
determinations on unfair labour practice disputes.
20-1Section 2 ofthe Public Service Protection Act 'Public Offi~er' is defined as
'any government servant and any officer ofthe municipal council'. In G. T.A v
The Roman Catholic Education Authority and Others 1987 SCJ 211 the
Mauritian Supreme Court held that a public officer is someone who (a) holds
a post in the service ofthe government in Mauritius as his employer and (b) is
required by that fact to be appointed and is appointed by the appropriate
service commission.
The President ofthe Republic ofMauritius in establishing a post in the public
se:vice pursuant to Section 64 (1) ofthe Constitution ofthe Minister charged
wzth the responsibility for public service and also in accordance with the
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prOVISIons of the Civil Establishment Act (Section 3), is empowered to
establish by regulations known as Civil Establishment Orders, offices in the
public service ofMauritius.
205Such Service Commissions are, for example, Public Service Ordinance 23
of 1953; Public Service Commission of 1959 and Judicial and Legal Service
Commission of 1964. In Yerriah v P.s. C 1974 MR 22 it was held that these
regulations are enforceable in a court oflaw.
206Section 10 (1) States:
Tf71ere any person is charged with a criminal offence, then, unless the charge
is 1-vithdrawn, the case shall be afforded a fair hearing within a reasonable
time by an independent and impartial court established by court.
207Part iv of Public Service Commission Regulations RL 1/129, 1967 ON
'Discipline. '
208Ibid Section 37 (2) and Section 37 (3) (a)
209Ibid Section 37 (4),' Reference can be made to 1 Basco v The Local
Government Service Commission and The Municipal Council of Port Louis
1989 SCJ 320 for illustration ofthe provisions mentioned.
:/oGrogan J, Unfair Dismissal of Contractual Public Sector Employees,
(1990) 11 ILl (4) at 656
21lMonckten v British South Africa Co,. 1920 AD 324
2/2Du Preez and Another v Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1997 (3) SA
204 (AJ at 231 F-G; See also South African Roads Transport v Johannesburg
City Council 1991 (4) SA 1 (AJ at 10 G-I
~/3Nchabaleng " Director of Education (Jransvaal) 19JU (1) SA 432 (J) in
which a teacher had been dismissed in terms ofa regulation empowering the
department to terminate on written notice for reasons 'considered good and
suffiCient' and approved by a more senior official. The court found that the
provision conferred by a common -law right to dismiss without giving reasons,
observing that to require a hearing by the Director in every case in which the
employing organisation wished to terminate the employment of one of its
teachers would involve too great an inroad upon the common law freedom of
action ofthe employer: at -138 H - 439 A
2/-ILaubscher v Native Commissioner, Piet Retief 1958 (1) SA 546 (A), it was
long held that a person was entitled to a hearing only when the action or
threatened action of a public authority have deprived or would potentially
deprive him ofsame existing right.
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In Mokoena v Administrator Transvaal (1988) 4 SA 912 (I) Goldstone J was
of the view that the workers concerned had a right to at least a legitimate
expectation of a hearing because the termination of their contracts deprived
them of the pension benefits to which they would have been entitled had the
contracts run their course.
In R, v Ngwevela 1954 (1) SA 123 (A) at 127fCentlivres CJ said unreservedly
that: when a statute empowers a public official to give a decision prejudicially
affecting the property or liberty ofan individual that individual has a right to
be heard before action is taken against him. "
M Wiechers, Administrative law 1985 at 68-69: "It is the function of
administrative law to ensure that powers which adversely affect the rights and
liberties ofindividuals are exercisedfairly and rationally. "
But where the state is the employer enters into a contract ofservice with an
employee 'as equal parties', and dismisses the employee in accordance with
the applicable service code, then the common law applies rather than the
principle of administrative law, in particular the audi alteram partem rule.
(staatsdiensliga v Minister van Waterwese (1990 (2) SA 440 (NC) at 448 B-C.
In this case as well the court acknowledged that there is a growing tendency to
treat public sector employment contracts from public law perspective (at
448D)
:J51985 (3) SA 335 (Ne)
2J6Ibid at 341 D-E
:I7Ibid at 3../1 H
2/8Ibid at 3../1 F
2J9Ibid at 341 F
220CPD 15 August 1986 case no. 3641/86 unreported
)7J
-- 1960 (1) SA 110 (T) at 115 A-D
222Ibid at 115 A-B
::31987 (1) SA 313 (W),' Similarly in Langeni v Minister ofHealth and Welfare
1988 (4) SA 93 (i-V), the court spent much time justifying its view that
dismissalfor misconduct could be impugned on public law principle where the
employer failed to comply with essential procedural requirements which
includedfair hearing. His Lordship held that since the applicants were in the
service ofthe public authority and their dismissal flowed from a decision ofa
public service official. (1 DOH)
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Again in Administrator Orange Free State v Mokopande 1990 (3) SA 780 (A)
the Appellate Division was called on to decide the legal rights ofpublic sector
employees purportediy dismissed for taking part in industrial action. The
facts were that the applicants were among a number ofhospital workers who
had refused to work until their trade union had been recognised by the
hospital authorities. The court a quo held that the administration should have
accorded the applicants a hearing before dismissing them.
224(1989) 10 IV 34 (W)
225Ibid at 33J-34B
??6
-- Ibid at 34B - C
227National Union of Mine Workers v East Rand Gold and Uranium Co. Ltd
(1991) 12 IV 1221
228Marievale Consolidated Mines Ltd v The President of the Industrial Court
& Others 1986 (2) SA 485 (I).
229National Union ofMineworkers & Another v East Rand Proprietary Mines
Ltd (1987) 8 IV 315 (IC) 321 D-322E.
230National Automibile & Allied Workers Union v Pretoria Precision Castings
(Pty) Ltd (1985) 6lV 369 (IC) at 378 H-l
231Larcombe v Natal Nylon Industries (Ply) Ltd, Pietermaritzburg (1987) 7 IV
326 (IC) at 330 A-C.
232National Union of Mineworkers & Others v Durban Roodeport Deep Ltd
(1987) 8 IV 156 (IC) 163 (C); Administrator, Transvaal & Others v Zenzile &
Others (1991) 1 SA at 36; Administrator, Natal v Sibiya & Another (1992) 4,
SA at 532 (A)
233Poolman T, Equity, thye Court and Labour Relations, 1988 Butterworth
p159
?3-1
- Supra note 26 at 163 F-J
235Ibid at 164 E-G
236(1995) 16 ILl 1575 (IC)
237Clarke v Niman & Lester (Pty) Ltd (1988) 9 IV 651 (IC)
238(1997) 8 (3) SALLR 133 (LC)
239(1995) 16 ILl 933 (IC)
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240Rex Electricity Commissioners (1924) 1 KB 171 at p205; Rex v Legislative
Committee ofthe Church Assembly's (1927) ALL CR Rep. 696
241As per Das J in Province of Bombay v Kushaldas S. Advani AIR 1950
SC222 observed that ifa statute empowers an authority not being court in the
ordinary sense, to decide disputes arising out ofa claim made by one party
under the statute which claim is opposed by another party and to determine
the respective rights of the contesting parties who are opposed to each other,
there is a lis and prima facie, and in the absence ofanything in the statute to
the contrary it is the duty of the authority to act judically and the decision of
the authority is a quasi-judicial act.
242(1972) 1 WL.R 1373
2431989 (4) SA 731 (A)
244C.Forsyth 'Audi Alteram Partem since Administrator, Transvaal v Traub in
the Quest for Justice, ed, E.Kahn, 1995 Juta & Co. p189.
245In Board of Education v Rice 1962 AC 322 the court pointed out that an
administrative agency acting judicially should always give a fair opportunity
to those who are parties on the controversy for correcting or contradicting
any relevant statement prejudicial to their view.
246In A. K. Kraipak v Union of India the court applied its mind to answer
whether the procedure followed was fair in all circumstances (quasi-judicial
and administrative). The court held that if the rule of national justice is
calculated to secure justice, or put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of
justice, it is difficult to see why it should be applicable to quasi-judicail
enquiry and not to administrative enquiry. It must logically apply to both. On
what principle can distinction be made between one and the other? Can it be
said that the requirement of yair play' in action is anyway less in an
administrative enquiry than in quasi judicial one?
In NAAWU v Pretoria Precision Castings (1985) 6 ILl 369 (IC) at 378 (G) it
was stated that the employer has to act judicially before imposing a
disciplinary penalty on an employee and their effect has been to eliminate
arbitrary and rash action against the employees.
247In Abbott v Sullivan (1952) 1 ALLER 226 the court while discussing the
rights of an employee exemplified that the right of a man to work is just as
important to him, ifnot more important, as his right to property. Termination
ofhis' services may mean the destruction ofhis livelihood. Thus in making any
adverse decision against an en:ployee he should have an opportunity to show
cause, unless the words ofthe statute deny it.
In Ridge v Baldwin (1964) AC 40 the court has given a unclear scope to the
application ofprocedural fairness: "The duty to afford procedural fairness is
not however limited to the protection oflegal rights in the strict sense, it also
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applies to more general interests ofwhich the interest in pursuing a livelihood
and in personal reputation have receivedparticular recognition.
248(1995) 16 ILl 1426 (L)
249Breen v Amalgamated Engineering Union (1971) 1 ALLER 1148
250Naglev Fielden (196.6) 2 QB 633 (CA); In Salemi v Mackellar (1977) 137
CLR 396 Jacobs J said, a legitimate expectation "does not mean that the
expectation is itselfa right. The right is the right to natural justice in certain
circumstances and 'legitimate expectation' is one of those circumstances."
But as Wade points out tIthe absence ofa right in legitimate expectation is not
a convincing reason for not enforcing the of natural justice, since for
purposes of natural justice the question which matters is not whether the
claimant has some legal right but whether legal power is being exercised to
his disadvantage. (Wade, Administrative law at 465), it means that according
to the legitimate expectation lest the pre-existing rights ofthe complainant are
not essential for the purposes of natural justice it follows that even persons
who have no antecedant rights that are affected by intended administrative
order or decision are entitled to be heard Thus the concept extends locus
standi to cover the types ofpersons that have previously been regarded as
having no right to be heard (See Everett v Minister of the Interior. 1981 (2)
SA 453 (C)
25/The concept of legitimate expectation was first applied by Lord Denning
MR in Schmidt and another v Secretary ofState for Home Affairs (1969) 2 ch
149 (CA). In that case, alien students ofscientology were refused extensions
to their entry permits without a hearing. They sought an order quashing the
decision of the Home Secretary on the ground of breach of natural justice.
Lord Denning MR in his judgement suggested that natural justice did not
merely protect rights but any "legitimate expectation(s) ofwhich it would not
be fair to deprive him without hearing what he has to say. (at 170).
~521n R. v Electricity Commissioners (1924) KB 171, at 205 Atkin Ll declared
that prerogative writs ofextionari and prohibitian would issue to "anybody of
persons housing legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of
subjects and having the duty to act judicially." Lord Atkins dictum was
interpreted to mean that a decision was only "judicial" or "quasi-judicial" if it
affected vested "rights" and not if it was concerned with the grant or
withdrawal of mere privileges. The courts drew a distinction between the
action that involved deprivation of a right and action that had the effect of
merely depriving or refusing a privilege'. In the case ofthe latter there was
no duty to comply with the rules ofnatural justice before making an adverse
decision.
253Nakkuda Ali v Jayaratne (1951) AC 66 at 78
109
254In Salemi v Mackellar 2 (1977) 137 CLR 396 at 404, it was held that "well
founded expectations should be accorded the same protection of natural
justice as the person's rights or interests. C. ~Forsyth in his article 'A
Harbinger of a Renaissance in Administrative law', 1990 (10) SAU 387,
stated "Now it has been plain for decades that making the application of
natural justice depend upon the existence ofrights is inacceptable... , given the
complexities of modern administration, given the range of boon and benefite
distributed by the state to which the citizen has no right but which may be
crucial to livelihood, simple justice and common sense, as well as a desire to
see good administration, call with ample eloquence for the rules of natural
justice to be applied, flexibly as always, in circumstances where the person
involved has no pre-existing rights. "
255D.Basson, South Africa's Interim Constitution, 1994, Juta & Co Ltd, p34.
2560'Reilly v Mackman (1983) 2 AC 237 at 408-9.
257De Smith et aI, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 1995 Sweet &
Manvell. p421
258United Bus Service Co.Ltd v Toofail MR 1975; C.Hazary v The Union SE
Co. MR 1977; General Construction Co.Ltd. v MRamnaik 1981 Record No.
3048, Compagnie de Beau Vallon v L.Jacquette 1981 Record No.31l1; R.
Maheerally v The P.A.S, Ministry ofLabour Acting on Behalf of HS Oomar
1983 Record No.3066; Tayab Ghoorun v A.G.Nabee & Co. 1984; Noel
Furniture Ltd v S.Khoodeeram 1985 Record No. 3521; A Rayapoule v Taylor
Smith & Co.Ltd 1988 Record No. 4028; Beau Plan SE. Co. Ltd v R.Kisto 1988
Record No.4003; Societe Malesherbes v Jamajaye Beelur 1990 Record
No. 4438: Getan Eric Rene v General Construction Co.Ltd 1993 Case
No. 223/92
259This view finds authority in Administrator, Transvaal and others v Traub
and others 1989 (4) SA 731 (A). The facts were that the six respondents were
serving their internships at Baragwanath Hospital. They had applied for
appointment as Senior House Officers ofthe hospital. Their applications were
turned down. It was contended that for decades the Director of Hospital
Services had, as a matter ofcourse, appointed these positions to those interns
recommended by the heads of the relevant departments. However, on this
occasion some of the recommended doctors were not appointed. The only
reason advanced to explain this was that they (with some senior doctors) had
written a letter to the South African Medical Journal which was critical ofthe
hospital's grave shortcomings. Appointment as senior house doctor was
important, if quite lowly, rung on the career ladder of able doctors; such
appointments were essential if the doctor was to climb to the status of
registrar and specialist. Thus, the doctors turned to law to salvage their
careers. Corbett JA showed that since for decades the "recommendations of
the departmental head, regarding senior house officers, had invariably, as a
matter of mere formality been granted by the Director of Hospital
Services... each of the respondents had a "legitimate expectation that, once his
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or her application for the past of SHO (Senior House Officer) had been
recommended by the departmental head concerned, the Director of Hospital
Services' approval of the appointment would follow as a matter of course;
and. .. that in the event of the Director's contemplating a departure from past
practice, in the form of a refusal to make the appointment for a particular
reason - especially where that reason related to suitability - he would give the
respondent a fair hearing before he took his decision." (at 761J-762D)
Corbett CJ also stated that the classic formulation of the principle refer to
decisions prejudicially affecting an individual in his liberty, property or
existing rights. But even where a person claiming some benefit or privilege
which he has no legal right to, ... he may have a legitimate expectation of
receiving the benefit or privilege and if so, the courts will protect his
expectations byjudicial review as a matter ofpublic law. (Ibid).
For further reference on the effects ofthe doctrine oflegitimate expectation on
the South African Administrative law refer to 1. Grogan's articles 'when is the
"Expectation" of a hearing "legitimate"? (1990) 6 SAJHR 36-47; Unfair
Dismissal of "Contractual" Public Sector Employees' (1990) 11 IV 655-8;
'Strike Dismissals in the Public Sector (1991) 12 IV 1-14; 'Contract v
Administrative Law: Dismissals in the Public Sector' (1991) 108 SAV 599-
606; 'Natural Justice and Employment Contracts' A Rearguard Action;
(1992) 109 SAL! 186-95; Dismissal of Public Sector Employees: The Final
Piece in the Puzzle? (1993) 110 SAL! 422-30; Also refer to C.Forsyth, 'A
Harbinger ofa Renaissance in Administrative Law, (1990) 107 SAV 387.
26oMokoena & Others v Administrator, Transvaal 1988 (4) SA 912 (W): See
also Langeni & Others v Minister ofHealth and Welfare & Others 1988 (4)
SA as (W)
2611991 (1) SA 21 (A) at 36 H-I
2621992 (4) SA 532 (A)
2~3Ibid at 539 A-B. Potential economic loss was also held to be a property
rzght that engaged the audi alteram partem principle in Gemi v Minister of
Justice, Transkei 1993 (2) SA 276 (TK) at 285 C-F
25-11991 (4) SA 458 (E)
.:65Ibid at 466 1- 467 A
266Ibid at 463 J - 464 B
267Ibid at 466 E-F
268Ibid at 467 E - 468 B
)69
- Supra note 78 at 35H-36B
27oL.Baxter Administrative Law, 1984 Juta & Co., p101
III
271M Wiechers Administrative Law, 1985 Butterworths p 77
272Supra note 78 at 36H-I; See also Langeni & Others v Minister of Health
and Welfare & Others 1988 (4) SA 93 w; Mokoena & Others v Administrator,
Transvaal 1988 (4) SA 912 (w).
273E. Cameron 'The Right to a Hearing Before Dismissal - Part 1 (1986) 7 ILl
183
27-1In Embling v Headmaster St.Andrews College (Grahamstown) & Another
1991 (4) SA 458 rE), it entailed not only a setback to the professional
reputation ofthe applicant but also a loss ofaccrued pension rights and other
benefits, includingfree schoolingfor his young children.
275P.J Pretorius & DJM Pitman, 'Good Cause for Dismissal: The
Unprotected Employee and Unfair Dismissal, 1990 Acta Juridica at 133.




Constitutionalisation and Codification of Procedural
Fairness in Mauritius and South Africa.
3.1 Introduction
With the increasing violation of an employee's right to a fair hearing before he/she is
dismissed for misconduct, Mauritian and South African administrative law principles,
through statutory provisions, have provided safeguards against dismissals that are
procedurally unfair.
In Mauritius such statutory provisions are section 10 (though related to criminal
offence, is equally applicable to civil cases) of the Constitution of the Republic of
tvlauritius and Section III of the Code of Good Practice in the Industrial Relations Act
1973. In South Africa similar provisions have been made in section 24 of the Bill of
Rights in chapter 3 of the Interim Constitution No.200 of 1993 and Section 33 of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 which have enshrined the right to
administrative justice of equal importance are Section 3 of the Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 and the Schedule 8 on Code of Good Practice in
the Labour Relations Act 1995 which have codified procedural fairness.
It is noted that neither, unlike the statutory provisions in South Africa, the Mauritian
legislation has provided specifically the "right to fair labour practices" (Section 27 of
the Interim Constitution and Section 33 of the Republican Constitution of South
Africa), nor expressly stated that "administrative action which materially and
~dversely affects the rights or legitimate expectations of any person must be
procedurally fair. (Section 3 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act). Even
the Code of Good Practice in the Mauritian Industrial Relations Act has not provided
in detail the specific requirements that form the content of procedural fairness, as
stated in item 4 of Schedule 8 of the Code of Good Practice in the Labour Relations
Act 1995 in South Africa.
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These major lacunae in the Mauritian legal system make the comparative study
significant. This chapter will, therefore examine the enabling acts on procedural
fairness as stated in the following sub headings:
(i) Constitutionalisation and Codification of Procedural Fairness in Mauritius.
(a) Section 10 of the Constitution.
(b) Section 119 of the Industrial Relations Act 1973.
(c) Section 32 (2) (b) of the Labour Act 1975.





Section 24 of the Interim Constitution 1993.
Section 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa
1996.
Section 3 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of
2000.
Item 4 of Schedule 8 of the Labour Relations Act 1995.
3.2 Constitutionalisation and Codification of Procedural Fairness
in Mauritius
Initially, the concept of procedural fairness did not have a statutory base but was
inherited from Britain well before Mauritius achieved its independence in 1968. It
was held in Central Dock v Colonial Dock: 1
"Our courts would be guided by the practice of English Courts concerning the
review ofadministrative decisions. "
The Supreme Court of Mauritius has, on numerous occassions fallen back on the
English legal system for assistance. In Forget v C.E.B. Association2 the court stated:
"We have practically no rules of our own regulating certiorari and must turn to
English rules ofcourtfor guidance. "
Again, in Augustave v Mauritius Sugar Terminal Corporation3 it was submitted by
counsel for the respondent that this court originally decided to assume jurisdiction in
these matters on the basis that it could exercise all the powers of the English High
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Court and in the absence of any local statute or role of court governing judicial
review, the court would follow the principles evolved in the English law.
In areas where the law is silent the judges have followed the English rules of court. In
Berenger and others v Goburdhun4 Glover AC C.J then was stated:
"Where our rules of procedure are silent, we will follow English practice or be
guided by it. "
It is also of common knowledge that the British Government in accordance with
Article 63 of the European Convention of Human Rights, decided to extend the
application of the Convention to a number of overseas territories for whose
international relations it was responsible, and that later when those territories attained
independence, the continuity of such protection \vas ensured by incorporating in their
new constitutions, guarantees of human rights based on the provisions of the
Convention, with the necessary variations to suit local conditions.5
Mauritius has not only followed precedent set by the English courts, it has also sought
guidance and interpretation of procedural fairness from Article 6 (1) of the European
Convention of Human Rights. Mauritius recognised this article which states:
"In the determination ofhis civil rights and obligations or ofany criminal
charges against hil1z, everyone is entitled to afair andpublic hearing within
a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by
law.... "
The court remarked in Hossen v Dhuny:6
"This court on which it is incumbent to interpret the con~titution may look for
guidance where applicable in the pronouncements and enforcement oftlte clauses
of the convention, namely the European Commission of Human Rights and the
European Courts ofHuman Rights."
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Thus it is clear that the source of the concept of procedural fairness in Mauritius can
be attributed to English case law and Article 6 (1) of the European Convention on
Human Rights. The concept of procedural fairness, imbibed in the Mauritian
Legislation, regulations and administrative directives. The main instrument that gave
a constitutional dimension to procedural fairness is Section 10 (8) of the Constitution
of the Republic of Mauritius, which codified as well the basic principles of natural
justice. It states:
Any court or authority required or empowered by law to determine the existence or
extent of tlny civil right or obligation shall be established by law and shall be
independent and impartial and where proceedings for such a determination are
instituted by any person before such a court or authority, the case shall be given a
hearing within a reasonable time.
Hence with the advent of Section 10 (8) the rules of natural justice in particular, the
rules affecting procedural fairness acquired a constitutional status. The right to fair
hearing is, therefore, no longer merely an implied right to be granted in the absence of
any express words.
Section 10 of the Constitution enumerates the rules of procedural fairness as follows:
Section 10 (1) deals with the requirement of fair hearing.
Section 10 (2) (a) secures the principle of presumption of innocence.
Section 10 (2) (b) deals with notice of the hearing.
Section 10 (2) (d) provides for legal representation and assistance.
Section 10 (2) (e) deals with confrontation and calling of witnesses.
Section 10 (2) (t) permits the assistance of an interpreter if the person charged
with the offence cannot understand the language used at the trial.
Section 10 (9) states the requirements of a public hearing.
It is important at this point to consider whether the content of the concept of faire
hearing as provided in Section 10 (2) and Section 10 (9) is restricted only to person
charged with criminal offence or does it also apply to Section 10 (8) in relation to
civil matters. The Supreme Court analysed this problem in Ramkhelawon v PSSA 7 and
stated:
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"...Ihe lordships although dealing mainly with criminal trials had laid down ..., so
if would appear a general and fundamental proposition of law applicable to both
crlminal and civil case in view of the similarity in the wordings ofthe sub-sections
(1) and (8) ofsection 10 relating to the requirements ofafair hearing "
This decision of the court reinforces the view held in Bawreek v P.s. CS where it was
stated that:
".. ...the basic idea in common law natural justice remain in each case that due
notice be given to matters to be taken into account or the charges against the citizen
and an adequate opportunity to be afforded to the citizen to make representations
prior to thefinal decision or action being taken .... Thus at one end ofthe spectrum
they may approximate to the judicial procedures associated with the courts of law,
e.g clear advance notice of charges or the case to be met, all evidence upon which
tlte decision is to be based openly available to affect parties; opportunities to
produce witnesses and to cross-examine witnesses provided by the other side; no
hearing of one side or the absence of the other possibly, the opportunity to be
represented by a lawyer. "
This quote to a greater extent, summarises the various procedural safeguards that are
available under the Mauritian Constitution. The vital fact is that section 10 of the
constitution constitutes a constitutional guarantee rather than a mere statutory
prescription, which provides for minimum basic entitlements to administrative justice.
The question which has to be determined is whether these procedural requirements are
mandator.y or directory and how they impact on decisions made by adjudicative
authorities? So far as the public sector employees are concerned, the Public Service
Commission are enjoined to follow fair procedures when deciding to apply the
ultimate sanction of dismissing them.9 It is submitted, therefore, that it is mandatory
for the commissions to grant a hearing to an aggrieved party, and any decision taken
in violation of the prescribed disciplinary procedures is subject to review by the
Supreme Court according to Section 119 of the Constitution which states:
"No provision ofthis Constitution that any person or authority shall not be subject
to the direction or control of any other person or authority in the exercise of any
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functions under this constitution shall be construed as precluding a court of law
from exercising jurisdiction in relation to any question, whether that person or
authority has performed thosefunctions in accordance with this constitution or any
other law or should not perform thosefunctions. "
The Supreme Court has thus the power to intervene in the decision making process of
the service commissions, and the failure to observe the natural justice become a
reasonable ground for quashing either because they have perfonned a function which
is not authorised or because they have exercised their functions in contravention to
any law.
There are various cases where the Supreme Court had to intervene so as to evoke
procedural justice. In Bawreek v P.S.C10 the court was of the opinion that:
"the P.S. C did not comply with the procedure of natural justice by abolishing a
hearing. The decision of the appellant was quashed because he was denied a fair
hearing. "
In Sookia v Police Service Commission I I the court quoting from Unuth v Police
Service Commission 12 said that:
"this court nlaY intervene to quash a decision made by a service commission, if it
does son1ething it had no right to do like bringing an officer to task and punishing
hin1 without a hearing. "
In Descelles v P.s. Cl3 in the exercise of its power had been acting in confonnity with
the provisions of the P.S.C regulations and has not infringed the element of natural
justice and right safeguarded by the Constitution of Mauritius.
These cases substantiate to a greater extent Section 10 of the Constitution and suggest
beyond any doubt that although the decisions of the Commissions might have been
correct in the given circumstances, nevertheless, they were unfair as the disciplinary
authorities did not afford the aggrieved parties an opportunity to present their case and
to challenge prejudicial allegations against them. These decisions were, therefore, in
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breach of the principle of natural justice and were liable to be set aside by the trite law
that where natural justice is violated, it is no justification that the decision was in fact
correct.
The Supreme Court has, agaIn, taken different VIew when the Public Service
Commission did not follow all the fair procedures to reach a decision to dismiss an
employee. In HRamdin v The Public Service Commission 14 following disciplinary
. proceedings taken against the applicant pursuant to regulation 37 of its regulations,
the respondent decided to dismiss him from the public service. On certiorari
proceedings the Supreme Court decided to quash the decision on the ground that the .
record thereof was so scanty that it was not possible to say that the service
cornmission had given the necessary consideration to the material at which it should
have looked, namely the report of the committee appointed to investigate the charges.
But when the Commission eventually reconsidered the matter and the record then
showed that it had taken into account all the relevant facts in arriving at a similar
decision to dismiss the applicant from service, the court,
"found no cause to say that, in reaching those conclusions, the Commission acted
perversely or that no reasonable person could have reached the decision arrived at.
It is trite law that we need not and could not take that matter further. We hold that
there is no warrantfor interfering with decision. "
These decisions by the Supreme Court clearly put into perspective the force of
recognition of procedural fairness at constitutional level, and a statutory basis to the
Mauritian law of "unjustified dismissal."
Section 10 of the Constitution has, therefore, provided a reasonably comprehensive
f~rmat to codify procedural fairness in Section 111 of the Industrial Relations Act
1973 which states:
The procedure shall be in writing and shall -
(a) specify who has authority to take various forms of disciplinary action,
and ensure that supervisors do not have the power to dismiss without
reference to more senior management.
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(b) Give the employee the opportunity to state his case and the right to be
accompanied by an officer of his trade union;
(c) Provide for a right of appeal, wherever practicable, to a level of
management not previously involved; and
(d) Provide for independent arbitration of the parties to the procedure with
it.
Similarly Section 32 (2) of the Labour Act 1975 reinforces what has already been
codified in the Labour Relations Act. Section 32 (2) (a) states:
"No employer shall dismiss a worker unless he has afforded the worker an
opportunity to answer any charges made against him and any dismissal made in
contravention ofthis paragraph shall be deemed to be an unjustified dismissaL"
Section 32 (2) (b) states:
"Tile worker nzay for the purpose of paragraph (a), have the assistance of a
representative of his trade union, if any, of an officer or of his legal
representative. "
These prOVISIons In the Industrial Relations Act and Labour Act do not create
completely any new approach to the requirements of procedural fairness as already
provided in Section 10 of the Constitution. Instead they have codified the essential
elements of procedural fairness on which the industrial court has built the format and
substance of an "'unjustified dismissal" jurisprudence. They have simply stated the
requirement that dismissals by reason of any disciplinary act by the employer had to
be preceded by a fair procedure. What was to constitute a fair procedure has not been
laid down by these statutes. For guidance in this regard one may have to refer to the
formulation provided in Section 10 of the Constitution which embodies the criteria for
testing the fairness of an action or practice.
Although the labour statutes have not explicitly stated what was required, they,
nevertheless, influenced immensely the interpretation and application of procedural
fairness in all future cases, and through its various decisions allowed the Industrial
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Court to develop rules or requirements for procedural fairness to the case at hand.
These requirements will be discussed in much detail in the next chapter.
It is novv' proposed to examine the constitutionalisation and codification of procedural
fairness in South Africa. Four important statutes will form the basis of discussion
namely:
1. Sections 24 and 27 of the Interim Constitution 1993.
2. Section 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996.
3. Section 3 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of2000.
4. Item 4 of Schedule 8 of the Code of Good Practice, Labour Relations Act
1995.
It may be noted at the very first glance of these statutes that, unlike Mauritius. South
Africa has established rigorous mechanisms to keep a check on the abuse of
administrative power and unfettered use of discretion on the one hand, and to set the
norms and standards for the exercise of all administrative actions on the other. From
the points of comparison the following features of the South African statutes stand
quite distinct with the Mauritian statutes:
1. The right to procedural fairness as entrenched in the Constitution and The
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act.
2. The Code of Good Practice: its legal status.
3. The interpretation of the Code by the CCMA and the Labour Courts.
3.3 Constitutionalisation and Codification of Procedural Fairness
in South Africa
3.3.1 Procedural Fairness and The Constitution of South Africa
Procedural fairness, a concept basic to administrative justicel5 clause, has been
enshrined in Section 24 of chapter 3 of the Interim Constitution No. 200 of 1993, and
Section 33 of chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108
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of 1996. These provisions have embodied a legal revolution to secure an accountable
administration as well as justification for the acts and decisions of administrative
functionaries. Section 24 of the Interim Constitution States:
Every person shall have the right to
(a) a lawful administrative action where any of his or rights or interests are
affected or threatened;
(b) procedurally fair administrative action where any of his or her rights or
legitimate expectations is affected or threatened;
(c)
(d)
Section 33 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 also provides:
Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and
procedurally fair.
These articles impose a positive duty on the public administration to comply with the
requirements of legality, fairness and reasonableness in its actions. They define the
parameters within which the administration must function and the manner in which it
must perform its functions.
3.3.2 The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act
However, while both constitutions embody a consensus on the right to administrative
action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair, they have not spelt out what
this right actually means in practice. Thus to give effect to this right. as contemplated
in Section 24 of the Interim Constitution and Section 33 of the Final Constitution, and
to create a culture of accountability, openness and transparency in the public
administration or in the exercise of public power or the performance of a public
function, the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act No.4 of 2000 was enacted.
According to section 3 of this Act, procedural fairness is firmly secured as it gives to
individuals the full measure of the fundamental rights referred to in the Bill of Rights.
Section 3 reads as follows:
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(1) Administrative action which materially and adversely affects the rights
or legitimate expectations of any person must be procedurally fair.
(2) (a) A fair administrative procedure depends on the circumstances of each
case.
(b) In order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair administrative
action, an administrator, subject to subsection (4), must give a person
referred to in subsection (1) -
(a) adequate notice of the nature and purpose of the proposed
administrative action;
(b) a reasonable opportunity to make representations;
(c) a clear statement of the administrative action;
(d) adequate notice of any right of review or internal appeal,
where applicable; and
(e) adequate notice of the right to request reasons in terms of
section 5.
3. In order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair administrative
action, an administrator may, in his or her or its discretion, also give a
person referred to in subsection (1) an opportunity to -
(a) obtain assistance and, In serious or complex cases, legal
representation;
(b) present and dispute information and arguments; and
(c) appear in person.
4.(a) If it IS reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances, an
administrator may depart from any of the requirements referred to
in subsection (2).
(b) In determining whether a departure as contemplated in paragraph
(a) is reasonable and justifiable, an administrator must take into
account all relevant factors, including-
(i) the objects of the empowering provision;
(ii) the nature and purpose of, and the need to take, the
administrative action;
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(iii) the likely effect of the administrative action;
(iv) the urgency of taking the administrative action or the
urgency of the matter; and
(v) the need to promote an efficient administration and good
governance.
It is to be noted that these rights are recognised in the Bill of Rights and they are now
extended to persons whose mere interests16 or legitimate expectations are threatened
or affected. I7 Thus, the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act along with the
Interim Constitution and Final Constitution have triggered the right to procedural
fairness as a core clause to protect individuals whose interests or legitimate
expectations are adversely affected by the decision of an adjudicating authority. For
instance, in Administrator, Transvaal and others v Traub and others18 a quasi-right or
quasi-benefit, although not well defined, was expressed as some substantive benefit,
advantage or privilege which a person concerned could reasonably expect to acquire
or retain and which would be unfair to deny without a hearing.
In other cases as well a denial of fair procedure has been considered a fatal
irregularity and invalidates the adlninistrative action. In Ramburan v Minister of
Housing (House of Delegatesi 9 the court found that audi alteram partem was not
complied with as the applicant had not been given an opportunity to defend himself.
This amounted to an irregularity and the board's decisions were set aside. Similarly,
among a host of other cases, in Maharaj v Chairman, Liquor Boarcf°. Nicholson J
held that "procedurally fair administrative action is more than just the application of
audi alteram partem and nemo index in sua causa rules and that it involves the
principles and procedures which are right and just and fair in the particular situation
or set of circumstances."
The coherent principle that has emanated from these decisions is that for an
administrative act to be fair, it has to comply with all the rules of procedural justice.
Thus from the promulgation of the Interim Constitution 1993 and the final
Constitution 1996 which have paved the way for the constitutionalisation of
procedural fairness embodied in section 3 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice
Act. This provision has become a rich source of guidance towards giving
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effectiveness to the realisation of the rights to administrative justice and promotion of
an efficient administration. -
Having codified the administrative procedures in Section 3, it is still to be seen in
which type of adjudicatory models the provision fits in. Does one have to follow the
strict procedures enumerated in Section 3 during a full scale fonnal hearing, or are the
procedures to be follo\\'ed even during an informal hearing?
It seems by codifying the rules of procedural fairness, Section 3 has established a
unifonn code of procedure that is applicable to all the authorities charged with the .
responsibility of conducting administrative adjudication.
There are divergent views about this approach. G.S. OIT is of the view that is neither
possible nor practical.21 The Franks Committee Report or Administrative Tribunal
and Inquiries in England rejecting the idea of a general code for all tribunals
observed:
"We think that there is a case for greater procedural differentiation and prefer that
the detailed procedure for each type of tribunal should be designed to meet its
particular circumstances. ,,21
From this observation, it may not be a wrong assumption that Section 3 has laid down
a very strict and rigid procedure so as to effect administrative justice. The reason for
such strict -requirements may be that, as Yvonne Burns puts it, the constitutionally
entrenched right to procedural justice is
"...a product of our history and is based on a deep mistrust of executive and
administrative power and the recognition of the need to control administrative
power, including discretionary power, to avoid a recurrence ofthe injustices ofthe
past ,,2]
It may be for this reason that Section 3 has defined strict parameters within which the
administration must function and the manner in which it must perfonn its functions.
But, it cannot be overlooked that South Africa has set its march towards the
125
promotion of the constitutional values of an open and democratic society based on
freedom and equality. It may be, therefore, hazardous if not detrimental to the interest
of parties to follow a uniformly strict code of procedure in every administrative
-adjudication. What is therefore, required, without dampening the importance of the
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, is to make provisions for flexibility since
dilatory and formal procedure like that of a court of law may not serve the real
purpose of the legislation in each and every situation.
Two vie\vs have been expressed in favour of this approach. Peter Knoll observes:
"A significant movement has taken place in American Administrative law to
shorten or eliminate altogether formal hearings required by statutes or regulations
through the utilisation ofinformal negotiation. ,,14
And, commenting on the problem of procedure in connection with the administration
of Workmen's Compensation Act in India, J.N.Mallick writes:
"A summary and informal method ofprocedure could alone execute the policy of
tlte legislation for prompt and certain relief. In England, the National Insurance
(Industrial Injuries) Act 1946 abolished the costly and contentious procedure for
settling disputes and provided for National Insurance Commissioner for
adnlinistering the Act. "
Such an approach in the nature of an informal summary trial may be useful for
expediency and which relates to issues which are less technical in nature such as a
disciplinary hearing. But as South Africa is committed to socialism and welfare of
those who have a legacy of the grim past, administrative adjudication cannot be left to
a haphazard approach. Hence, just like the civil and criminal courts have a uniform
pattern of administering justice and centuries of experience in the administration of
civil and criminal laws have borne testimony to the advantages of uniform procedure,
the relevance of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act in unfolding altogether a
more established procedure for ensuring administrative justice cannot be minimised in
modern South Africa. What should be clear, however, is what would be the
procedural requirements during a formal and an informal hearing.
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Asimo~5 has conceptualised two different types of adjudicatory models which would
insist in the compliance of procedural fairness but depending on the type of issues at
stake and on the type of issues that must be resolved. Different levels of forma~ity
will, therefore, be appropriate, depending on the particular claim to administrative
. . 26
JustIce.
During a fonnal adjudication where important rights such as when the state seek to
revoke a professional licence, expel a student from school or impose a disciplinary
sanction against an employee, the procedures stated in Section 3 of the Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act have to be invoked. This means that the individuals must
be properly informed; they must be given an opportunity to put their side of the story;
they must be able to challenge adverse allegations by the administration; must appear
in person and be given an opportunity to obtain assistance and, in serious and
complex cases, legal representation. This section has not however, expressly provided
for the testimony and the right parties to cross-examine. Nevertheless it should be
presumed that any act that is judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative in nature,
requires adherence to procedural fairness.
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The second model, Asimow calls an informal or conference procedure where the
deciding authority is required to provide proper notice and an impartial decision
maker to decide the case exclusively on the record and provide a written statement of
reasons. However, the authority could dispense partially or completely with testimony
by witnesses and cross-examination. Instead, the litigants would be entitled to submit
written statements and to make oral arguments.
Informal procedure would be appropriate for matters where less important rights are
at stake, such as small monetary sanctions or a brief disciplinary suspension from job
or school. It is especially useful where the agency need nof resolve questions of
adjudicative fact. For example, cases involving economic issues such as ratemaking,
licence applications, land planning and zoning are appropriate subjects for informal
procedure; they often involve issues of discretion but not adjudicative fact. Most
factual issues arising in this sort of case can be fairly resolved through written
submissions by experts, followed by oral argument.
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Finally, there are cases which involve relatively trivial stakes or which are
characterised by an extraordinary need for speedy and routine disposition. Here, even
informal procedure may be too costly. The statute might call for a third model called
summary procedure, in which a party is provided an opportunity to tell his or her side
of the story to a decisionmaker. The decisionmaker need not be impartial or
uninvolved in the dispute and need not decide the case on an exclusive record. The
party would be entitled to receive an oral or written explanation of the decision and
would have an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the decision and would have an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the decision at a higher bureaucratic level.
Summary procedure provides relatively little procedural protection, but it is better
than nothing and may be all that society can afford to provide in a wide range of
situations.
It is now up to the administrative lawyers and the tribunals to use the correct model
and apply a set of flexible procedures to suit particular circumstances of each case.2
8
In van Huysteen and others NNO v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism
and others Farlam J stated:
".... the correct interpretation of the meaning of the right to procedurally fair
administrative action entrenched in Section 24 (b) must be a generous one avoiding
what has been called "austerity oftabulated legalism, " suitable to give to individuals
the full measure ofthe fundamental rights ....referred to. ,,29
In the final analysis of Section 3 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, there
can be little doubt that by its codifying the rules of administrative justice, more
particularly procedural fairness, the constitutional right to administrative justice as
provided in Section 24 of the Interim Constitution and Section 33 of the 1996
Constitution, the constitutionally entrenched system of administrative law was
confirmed and given a stamp of effective recognition.
This administrative justice clause will be quite instrumental in bringing out and
resolving contentions issues such as who the bearers of the right to administrative
justice would be, the forms of tribunals where the right to review administrative
. b . d30actlon may e exerCIse and the precise parameters of the right to procedural
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fairness,3l Other questions which the statute has addressed is the exact scope of
administrative action, more particularly where the administrative action effects the
public.32
Such a codification will, hopefully, carry a great advantage of making the
administrative law principles of procedural fairness more precise and accessible to the
entire process of adjudication rather than remaining a somewhat amorphous and
confusing body of law.
Having discussed the concept of procedural fairness in its broader context with a view
to give substance to a just administrative action, it is important now to look at its
application within the narrower context of the law of dismissal due to misconduct. In
this part of the discussion particular attention will be paid to the codification of
procedural fairness in schedule 8 of the South African Labour Relations Act 1995
whose aim is to advance economic development, social justice, labour peace and
democracy in the workplace by means of realising and regulating the fundamental
rights of the workers and employers as entrenched in Section 23 of the Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa which provides that "every person shall have the right to
fair labour practices." The new Labour Relations Act has remained consistent with the
new Constitution33 by providing that in order to be fair, a dismissal which is not
automatically unfair must be for a fair reason and in accordance with a fair
procedure.34 This also reflects the opinion of Cheadle who stated:
The purpose of the new Labour Relations Act is to change the law governing
labour relations and to give effect to section 23 of the constitution in order to
provide simple procedures for the resolution of labour disputes through statutory
concilation, nlediation, and arbitration for which the Commission for Conciliation,
Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) is established. ,,35
The Labour Relations Act constitutes, therefore, the initial component of a new
frame\vork of labour statutes that seek to give a wider dimension to procedural
fairness. Thus item 4 of Schedule 8 of the ~ct has attempted to codify the industrial
court's unfair labour practice jurisprudence ~d hence regulated the law of dismissal
due to misconduct.
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3.3.3 Schedule 8 of the Labour Relations Act 1995
_3.3.3.1 The Code of Good Practice and its Legal Status.
Item 1 (1) of the Code states that the Code is intended to be general, and that
departures from the norms established in the Code may be justified in certain
circumstances. The norms established by the Code in respect of fair pre-dismissal
procedures are contained in Item 4 (1) of the Code. These are:
.:. The employer must normally investigate to determine whether there are grounds
for dismissal, but it need not be a formal investigation.
•:. The employee must be informed of the allegations.
•:. The employee should be entitled to state a case in response to these allegations.
•:. The employee should be given reasonable time to prepare the response.
•:. The employee is entitled to be assisted by a trade union representative or co-
employee.
•:.. The employee should be informed of the decision and preferably be given reasons
for the decision.
•:. Unions must be informed if disciplinary steps are taken against union officials.
It is now important to analyze the general tenets of the Code.
Provisions of the Code
The first impression is that the provisions of the Code are a radical departure from
that adopted earlier by the industrial court. However, closer examination shows that
initially the industrial court~s intention was not to develop procedural fairness
requirements into a rigid. inflexible and legalistic set of rules.
PAK Le Roux \vriting in Cheadle et al Current Labour Law states:
"Finally, the question of the time and costs involved in following the detailed strict
procedures prescribed by many decisions of tlte court for a procedurally fair
disnlissal should be reconsidered. ,~6
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Criticisms like this and numerous others on the stringent requirements for procedural
fairness undoubtedly influenced the reform of the South Africa Labour Law, as can be
seen in paragraph 14 of the explanatory memorandum of the Labour Relations Bill
1995.
There is no doubt that procedural fairness still features prominently under the 1995
LRA in the requirements for a fair dismissal. These requirements are, however, less
. stringent and formalised than was the case under the unfair labour practice
jurisprudence of the industrial court. A different course has been chartered which
requires' a shift from the past and an effort to interpret this new approach. It is .
submitted that commissioners are not interpreting the new Act, but are handing down
decisions as if the old law still applies.
The procedural fairness requirements In respect of misconduct dismissals are
regulated by section 4 of Schedule 8, and entail the following:
Section 4( 1) determines that, normally, the employer should conduct an investigation
to determine whether there are grounds for dismissal. This does not need to be a
formal enquiry.3? Van Zyl and Rudd argue that the wording will create confusion
instead of the desired simplification.38 They continue to say that given the current
relative legal certainty as regards disciplinary hearings and the fact that such hearings
will, in many instances, be regulated by negotiated collective agreements (which take
primacy over the Code), it is likely that, despite the simplification of the process
envisaged in s4( 1), there might be a strong and general tendency to continue to use
formal disciplinary hearings and adhere to the requirements laid down in the case law
over the past years. This, it is submitted, would be an approach that lacks vision. The
terminology used by the drafters surely is deliberate. They chose to avoid the words
'hearing' and "enquiry' Woolfrey states: "The irresistible inference by the Code, from
an enquiry or hearing as contemplated by the Industrial Court.,,39
What the Code does make abundantly clear is that there does not have to be a formal
enquiry. Le Roux points out that this view is supported by ILO Convention 158 and
by the justification of efficiency.4o Unfortunately many of the decisions from the
CCMA are still referring to the jurisprudence of the industrial court instead of
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interpreting the Code which deliberately avoids the formalism of many of the
industrial court decisions. Du Toit et al warn that an uncritical acceptance of the
court's jurisprudence in this area will undermine the new legislative scheme.
41
The
Code should be used by commissioners as a broad guideline rather as Woolfrey puts
. . d d' d d . t t ,,42It: "re-lntro uce lscar e requlremen s or crea e new ones.
At the same time the Code should not be interpreted by employers as an invitation to
disregard the fundamental principles of fairness. 43 It must be remembered that the
Code lays down mininlum standards of fairness that employers must follow. The
principles of natural justice should always define the proper content of procedural
fairness.
Prior notification of allegations
Schedule 8 section 4(1) determines that the employer should notify the employee of
.the allegations using a form and language that the employee can reasonably
understand. The use of the word 'form' must be taken to mean the manner in which
the allegations are conveyed and contemplates either the written or oral medium. As
regards the language requirement, it means the language that the employee can
reasonably understand. It is submitted that this is welcome relief. Nowhere is mention
made of charge sheets, or how to frame them. This will enable employers to
concentrate on the more important substantive fairness and not spend valuable time
adhering to a checklist of procedural requirements developed by the industrial court.
Again it must be emphasized that the Code is framed in general terms and will require
much interpretation. What is good for a specific case may not be appropriate for the
next.
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Opportunity of accused employee to state a case:
Schedule 8 Section 4(1) states that the employee should be allowed the opportuni~ to
state a case in response to the allegations. In the majority of the cases of the industrial
court accused employees were allowed to question employer's witnesses. They were
also permitted to call their own. Van Zyl and Rudd argue that the legislature must, at
the time of drafting, have been well aware of the existence in case law on the "rights"
held to be attendant on disciplinary hearing and that, had it meant to require that such
rights should be recognised under the 1995 LRA, it would have stated SO.44 The fact
that it did not suggests that it will in future be open to commissioners to decide what
constitutes an "opportunity to state a case." It can only be hoped that such opportunity
will not embrace all the formally recognised rights as listed in the Mahlangu case.
Woolfrey points out that this is perhaps the most, fundamental requirement of a fair
procedure.45 However, this requirement has been applied at the workplace as in a
court of law and this requirement has been simplified by the Code in that the
employee is given an opportunity merely to respond to the allegations of the
employer.
Reasonable Opportunity to Prepare a Response
Schedule 8 section 4( 1) determines that the employee must be afforded a reasonable
time to prepare a response. Presumably what is intended here is that reasonable
opportunity to prepare must exist between the time of the notification of the
allegations and the time of hearing is not defined. It is submitted that it will depend on
the nature and seriousness of the allegations. Commissioner may well seek guidance
from case laws when considering what a 'reasonable time' will entail.
Assistance by a co-employee or trade union representative
Section 4( 1) determines that the employee is entitled to assistance from a fellow
employee or trade union representative. Although the right to assistance forms part of
the sentence dealing with the right to reasonable time to prepare a response, it is
assumed that it was not intended to limit the right to assistance to the preparative
stage but also to grant such right in respect of the "investigation" itsel£46
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Section 4(1) appears to restrict the right to representation conferred to internal
representation. It also appears that the right to representation is not a general right and
Chapter 111, Part A, sI4(2)-14(5) of the 1995 LRA and the definition section (s213),
wherein a "trade union representative" is defined as a member of a trade union who is
elected to represent employees in a workplace, that a trade union representative is
more or less what the previous Act referred to as a shop steward. An employee may
not insist that a legal representative or any person outside the workplace be permitted
to assist. Woolfrey highlights the fact that the Code speaks of '"assistance" and not
"representation", leaving the responsibility for presenting a response with the
employee, in or through the person assisting but this may be done in the presence of
the person assisting.
This part of the Code is basically endorsing what the industrial court's view on the
entitlement to be assisted at a disciplinary enquiry was. In NUM & Another v Kloof
Gold Mining Co. Ltd47 the court referred to it as 'an elementary requirement of
justice ~ , especially when workers are illiterate or uneducated.
Notification of decision
Section 4( 1) determines that, after the enquiry, the employer should communicate the
decision taken, preferably in writing.
Notification of Reason for Dismissal and of Rights to challenge Dismissal
Section 4(3) determines that, if the employee is dismissed, the employee should be
given the reason for the dismissal and reminded of any rights to refer the matter to a
council with jurisdiction or to the Commission or to any dispute resolution procedures
established in terms of a collective agreement. Van Zyl and Rudd pose the question as
to whether or not an appeal hearing is required. There is certainly no express
reference to an appeal hearing in s4 of the Code and the provisions of s4(3) appear to
suggest that, after dismissal, the next step (without any interim appeal step) is the
referral of the dispute to the Commission or. any relevant council or collective
agreement-determined dispute-resolution mechanism.48
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Prior Consultation with Trade Union when Accused is a Shop
Steward or Office Bearer of the Union
Section 4(2) determines that discipline against a trade union representative or an
employee, who is an office-bearer or official of a trade union, should not be instituted
without first informing or consulting the trade union. Sceptics of the Code may ask
what is l~nvisaged by this requirement, and what is expected to constitute the content
of the consultation? It is submitted that too much should not be read into this
provision. As Woolfrey points out, the purpose of the consultation is merely to inform
the union of the reasons for the pending disciplinary action and to invite suggestions
on how best to deal with the matter.49 This provision in no way means that special
treatment will be afforded to trade union representatives in the disciplinary process.
Exemption from the procedures in exceptional cases:
Section 4(4) determines that the -exceptional circumstances where the employee
cannot be reasonably expected to comply with the above procedures. The industrial
court may in this instance provide guidelines. These exceptions will be dealt with
later. However, this part of the Code should not be read as an opportunity to dispense
with pre-dismissal procedures in their entirety, hence an adaptation of the procedures
would be more advisable. It is - submitted that that the nature and size of the
employer's enterprise will influence commissioners. The drafters of the new
legislature intended to remove the list of 'rights' of a fair disciplinary enquiry which
was laid down by various industrial court decisions. The classic example being the
Mahlangu case. Is the effect of s4( 1) going to be that the rights laid down in
Mahlangu are no longer going to be recognised as 'rights' and that a failure to afford
the employee such rights will, under the 1995 LRA render a dismissal procedurally
unfair? This remains to be seen but surely these'rights' would have been laid down in
the Code if this were the specific intention. It is argued that the broad and sparse way
the Code has been framed is deliberate in that it will allow commissioners to treat
each specific case on it merits, rather than apply a checklist approach to every
dismissal. The Majaji v Creative Signs 50 case is an example of the CCMA giving
effect to the less formalistic procedures of the Code, where a small employer's failure
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to comply with the procedural requirements of the Code was excused in
circumstances where there was clear evidence of the misconduct being committed and
little chance of the employee being able to forward a suitable explanation.
It is submitted that the Code charts a different approach from that of the industrial
court. Le Roux and Van Niekerk, who list as what they term 'casualties' of the new
approach, confinn this.5I The first casualty they list is the right to a formal and
inlpartial hearing. The Code is clear in that it states that the fonn in which an
employee is granted the right to state a case need not be a fonnal enquiry.52 The next
casualty is the checklist approach to procedural fairness developed in Mahlangu's
case. Employers and the labour courts are entitled, it would seem, to adopt a far more
flexible approach than in the past,53
The following 'rights' also find no place in the Code:
.:. Charge sheets that need to be elaborately formulated;
.:. Evidence no longer has to be led through the medium of witnesses and cross-
examination;
.:. No mention is made of the right to appeal to a more senior level ofmanagement,54
In Nongqayi v Shuter and Shooter EC55 the CCMA, in dismissal was not procedurally
unfair. said that although the hearing may have been flawed in the technical sense, it
was satisfied from the evidence that the charges were put to the employee and he was
given the opportunity to respond. This, it is submitted is the way the new act should
be interpreted.
The LRA confirms the more limited role of procedural fairness in section 193. This
section provides that, but for certain exceptions, the Labour Court or an arbitrator
must grant reinstatement in all cases where the dismissal is proved unfair and where
the employee so desires, except where the employer merely failed to follow a fair
procedure. Here they can award compensation alone, calculated according to the
remuneration the employee would have received between that date of dismissal and
the last date of the arbitration or trial. 56 Unfortunately, in Smith v De Bruyn Park
Ph 57armacy. the CCMA awarded an amount they "deemed appropriate" under the
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circumstances in a dismissal that was only procedurally unfair. One questions if this
was a basic error or a case of the commissioner not studying the Act in this instance?
The intention of the Code is clear - to rid pre-dismissal procedures of the complex
technicality, which the industrial court has evolved in its dismissal jurisprudence.58
The Legislators of the new LRA have adopted a 'broadbrush' approach to procedural
fairness as apposed to the "checklist' approach of the industrial court. This intention is
in line with the economic development purpose of the Act. The problem, it is
submitted, is that a paradigm shift of stakeholders needs to take place to give effect to
this purpose. Trade unions, employers and commissioners need to resist th~
temptation to simply fall back on the jurisprudence of the industrial court but take the
effort to interpret the Code. In many cases coming out of the CCMA, commissioners
either do not interpret the Act or simply have not taken the time to study the Act and
seem to behave as if the old Act still exists. In Monetsela Lekhotla Mabea v Impala
Platinum Refineries59 it is unfortunate that the CCMA found the dismissal to be unfair
because the charge (gross misconduct emanating from involvement in dishonest
activities) was vague and not fonnulated correctly.
Because the Code is vague (deliberately so) in its approach it is clear that the CCMA
should, where pertinent to the cases before it, make an effort to explore and interpret
the provisions of inter alia, item 4 of the dismissal Code, so that some sort of clear
and consistent interpretive jurisprudence in this regard can be established which, in
turn~ is imperative to enable employers and employees to establish the pennissible
parameters of their conduct under the 1995 LRA. If this does not transpire, reference
will continually be made to industrial court jurisprudence.
In Makatsi v Mamello Pre-schoofo the CCMA found that a misconduct dismissal will
be held to be procedurally unfair where the employer:
.:. Did not conduct an investigation before accusing the employee of the misconduct
concerned;
.:. Did not afford the employee the opportunity to disabuse the employer of the belief
that he had committed the misconduct in question;
.:. Did not hold a proper enquiry before dismissing the employee.
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What constitutes a proper enquiry IS an extremely vexed question and no
interpretation of item 4 of the Code is given. In Mkhize v JLR Hay-Yoon Enterprise,61
however, the CCMA provided a useful interpretation of item 4. This approach needs
to be encouraged. In this case the CCMA recommended between following the less
formalistic approach as laid down in item 4 of the Code where no oral evidence is led
and hence no cross-examination. Instead, all that need occur, is that the e.mployee is,
prior to the hearing, presented with the allegations against him which must comprise
not only the nature of the charges, but also the alleged facts that may constitute
grounds for dismissal.
Hence, for example, it would not be sufficient, according to this interpretation, merely .
for the employer to inform the employee that he is charged with theft. Instead the
employer would, in the "allegations", have to set out fully the basis for such charge.
The employee is thereafter given an opportunity to "state a case in response". Rather,
states the CCMA, this can only be done when it is possible to come to a fair decision
without hearing oral evidence during the enquiry. This approach seems to make sense
if one heeds Woolfrey's warning that the Code of Good Practice is merely a
guideline. Decision makers are required to 'take it into account' rather than 'apply'
• 62It.
It is submitted that herein lies the key to the difference between the course the
industrial court developed and the one proposed by the new dispensation. By
switching from 'enquiry' to 'investigation' the drafters have shown that a more
informal approach to procedural fairness will be tolerated. Again Woolfrey warns that
this should not be interpreted as an invitation to 'disregard' the fundamental principles
of fairness.' There is no doubt that the principles of natural justice (the right to be
heard, and the right to decision by an unbiased decision-maker) will continue to
determine if there was a fair procedure.63 In Mekqoe v Standard Bank64 the dismissal
was found to be procedurally unfair ~ the employee was not given a fair opportunity
to be heard prior to making its decision.
The positive approach is that there are various commissioners who are giving effect to
the less formalistic procedures in the code. In ECCA WUSA obo Nkosi and Vilakazi v
Wimpy Kempton City65 where the employer was grabbed, thrown to the ground and
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kicked. absence of a fair procedure was condoned. The CCMA referred to Item 4 of
Schedule 8 ( the Code of Good Practice) which states: "in exceptional circumstances,
if the employer cannot reasonably be expected to comply with this guideline,. the
employer may dispense with pre-dismissal procedures" The CCMA in casu also
referred to the Mjaji v Vcreative Signs and stated:
".....as in the Mjaji case, no procedure or remnant ofprocedure was followed prior
to dismissal but a characteristic shared by both cases is that the operation
conducted by the enlployers is of a comparatively small nature and both of the
employers occupied the position of sole members/sole proprietors and worked in
close association with their employees and as a result ofthe assault were emphatic
that the relationship oftrust and confidence had irretrievably broken down... "
In McDuling v Motor Industries Federation66 the CCMA found that the dismissal of
an employee was not procedurally unfair in consequence of the fact that the appeal
hearing was held in the employers absence. The CCMA motivated its decision by
saying that the Code of Good Practice contained in Schedule 8 of the 1995 LRA does
not require an appeal as arl automatic component of a fair procedure. It is submitted
that this is the correct approach. However where the employer has conferred greater
rights than those laid down in Schedule 8, the fairness of the employee's conduct
should be assessed in accordance with it's compliance with such greater rights. Herein
lies the challenge. many disciplinary codes are highly technical and employers have
spent too much time administering these highly complex procedures, rather than as
Woolfrey argues - ~ getting on with the job at hand.' Employers and unions need to
get around the table and renegotiate these pre-dismissal procedures and rid them of
the complex technicalities. which the labour courts have developed in their dismissal
jurisprudence. At the same time Commissioners are unfortunately ignoring the
provisions codifi~d in the Act and developing their own jurisp~dence in the area of
procedural unfairness.
In view of the aforesaid it is clear that a different, more informal approach was
intended by the drafters of the Code. It is submitted that the following quotation is a
succinct description of the route advocated by the Code:67
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'What is envisaged in the Code is an investigatory (fact-finding) rather an
adjudicative process. The purpose oftltis process is two-fold: first, it aims to ensure
that employers make their decisions with the best possible information at hand;
and, secondly it gives affected parties tile opportunity to participate in the process,
thus legitimating tile ultimate outcome. Unlike an adjudicative process, ·it does not
purport to guarantee a correct decision. What it does do is to ensure a fair decision,
one made upon a judicious and dispassionate consideration of all tile information
at the employer's disposal."
The true test to establish whether the drafters of the Act and the Code succeeded in
. their goal is to evaluate the latest case law in this regard.
3.3.3.1.1 The legal status of the Code
Unlike the British68 or Swazi legislation69 where it is clearly stated that the code of
practice is not enforceable, the 1995 Act makes no such provision. However, section
188 (2) mandates any person considering whether or not the dismissal was effected
by a fair procedure to "take into account" means, the express pronouncement in the
code itself that the ,investigation which the employer enjoined to conduct need not be
fonnal clearly points to the fact that the application of the stringent rules of natural
justice applicable in administrative law is not envisaged and so, the decisions of the
old Industrial Court based on such principles will to the extent that they tend towards
rigidity be inapplicable. When, however, it is recalled that most of the Industrial
Court's decisions in this area had involved the interpretation and application of the
operative employer's disciplinary codes, it follows that such cases will continue to be
relevant unless distinguishable on their facts. It is also to be borne' in mind that the
code is not a substitute for the employer's disciplinary codes nor for the disciplinary
procedures often incorporate in collective or recognition agreements between trade
unions and employers.
7o
The code provisions could only come into play where no
such employer's code is in operation.
Another factor which places some doubts on the legal status of the code is the fact that
it is not, like the provisions of section 189 relating to consultations in the event of
retrenchments for operational requirements,71 contained in the Act itself. This, and the
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other factors raised above~ combine to deprive the code of statutory authority hence it
has been held not to have a force of law in the sense that it cannot on itself find a
cause of action. 72 In other words, the code is a guideline 73 and not, in the words 0 a
-British judge, "an Act of Parliament or a testamentary disposition."74
The distinction between the code provisions and section 189 was adverted to by the
Labour Court in Chetty v Scotts Select A Shoe75 where Landman J held that by so
enacting, the legislature intended that the procedure regarding dismissal for
operational requirements should governed by law rather than by guidelines.
Therefore, the duty on employers to follow the procedure laid down is significantly
higher with regard to dismissals for operational requirements as against dismissals for
misconduct or incapacity.76 Indeed, it has been held that it is not obligatory for an
employer to exhaust all steps set out in the code before resorting to dismissal77 nor
should the chairperson of a disciplinary enquiry stick rigidly to the letters of a
disciplinary code without considering all the circumstances of a case and exercising a
d· . 78proper Iscretlon.
It has further been held that the employer's disciplinary code which is a product of
collective bargaining between the employer and the workers' representatives takes
precedence over the code of practice such that an arbitrator who ignores the
employer's disciplinary code in preference to the code of good practice commits a
"gross irregularity". 79 On the other hand, a Commissioner does not commit a "gross
irregularity" where he/she applies the employer's disciplinary code instead of the
standards laid down in Item 4 of the code of practice. The fact being that the Labour
Relations Act "promotes and encourages parties to regulate their relationships through
privately agreed procedures and processes. Where parties have an agreed disciplinary
code and procedure, that is the process through which they have agreed to resolve
disciplinary issues. The provisions of Item 4 would therefore apply where parties do
not have an agreed process. In the court's view once parties have agreed to a
disciplinary process that encourages a liberal standard, one of them cannot be heard to
argue that a conservative standard contained elsewhere should have been applied.,,80
Similarly, the employer cannot rely on an agreement to the effect that the employee
could be dismissed "immediately" to defeat the statutory requirement of fair
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procedure. "If that was the intention it would be contrary to the spirit and content of
the Code of Good Practice and the case law that has developed over many years.
3.3.3.1.2 The interpretation of the Code By The CCMA And The
Labour Courts:
From the early Labour Court and CCMA reports it appears that the judges and
commissioners realized that the Code, although lacking the force of law, intended a
different approach to procedural fairness. This change was acknowledged by the
Labour Court in Moropane v Gilbeys Distillers & Vintners (Pty) Lts & Another
81
'Procedural fairness under tlte 1995 Act... demands less stringent and formalized
compliance titan was tlte case under the unfair labour practice jurisprudence ofthe
Industrial Court. ,82
This approach was endorsed by the CCMA in Cornelius and Others v Howden Africa
Ltd tla M & B Pumps.83 In this case the commissioner stated clearly that it not
required that each of the procedural requirements listed in the Code be observed, but
that the procedure in aggregate is fair:
'In my view, a holistic approach nlust be adopted. Eachfactor cannot be considered
in isolation but must be looked at to determine whether, on balance, the procedure
adopted amounted to such deviation from tlte Code of Good Practice to justify the
granting ofrelief. ,84
From the reports it appears that the CCMA commissioners have thus far appreciated
and applied the "holistic" approach advocated in Cornelius. The Code in general and
more particularly item 4 thereof, are not treated as prescriptive, but rather as a
suggested approach to procedural fairness. Non-compliance with the specifics of the
Code is not in itself fatal to the cause of procedural justice. Instead, the entire process
is judged and evaluated against the notion offaimess.85
In ECCAWUSA obo Jafta/Russels Furnishers,86 the fact that a unIon was not
informed of disciplinary proceedings against a union official, as is required by the
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Code, was held not to be unfair since there was no indication that non-compliance
with this requirement resulted in an unfair procedure. Similarly, in most instances
where an employee was given short notice to attend a hearing, it was held to be
unfair,87 but in other instances where it was obvious that the fairness of the
proceedings was not compromised, short notice was accepted by the CCMA.88
The CCMA has also ventured beyond the parameters of the Code in the interest of
. fairness. It stated:
'Moreover the requirements for a fair hearing go beyond merely the guidelines set .
out in Section 4 ofSchedule 8. Regard must also had to be the precepts ofnatural
• • ,89Justice.
In terms of the Code, an employee is not entitled to legal representation during a
disciplinary hearing. This has in general been upheld by the CCMA90 but in
Blaauw/Oranje Soutwerke (Pty) Ltcf 1 the refusal to allow an employee legal
representation was held to be unfair, despite the provisions of the Code. In that
particular instance the employer was represented by an attorney, leaving the employee
in a disavantaged and thus unfair position.
The CCMA's treatment of the Code's requirement of an investigation, which need not
be formal enquiry, also merits comment. Closer scrutiny of the few instances where
disciplinary hearings were held to be unfair, not because of the lack of a hearing as
such, but because the dismissed employee was not given an opportunity to state
his/her case92, implying that a 'hearing' is not the same as 'stating a case', thus
endorsing a less formal approach.
The impression must not be created that all commissioners actually appreciate the
new order which the drafters of the Code endeavoured to introduce. In Camhee v
Parkmore Travez9
3
the arbitrator implicated that an opportunity to state a case did not
differ from a hearing.
This. however, does not reflect the CCMA's appreciation of disciplinary proceedings
in general. The following quotation from Sehomo/D&K Coffin Manufaturers94 it is
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submitted, correctly illustrated the meaning of an investigation as envisaged by the
drafters of the code:
"It is common cause among tlte parties that there was a meeting attended by the
applicant, tlte supervisor, the manager, tlte two shop stewards and chaired by
D.Poonee, the Director, to discuss the applicant's behavior. According to he code of
Good Practice, it is not necessary tltat tltere be an formal inquiry. Therefore, I do
not think the applicant's contention tltat what was held was a "discussion" rather
than an inquiry is material and I am satisfied that an "investigation", as envisaged
by the Code was held. "
In most of the other instances where procedures were held to be unfair, it appears that
the unfairness related to the absence of natural justice rather than the requirements of
the Code. This illustrates once again that procedural fairness does not depend on
whether the Code as such was honored, but whether a fair procedure was followed.
The Code is merely a tool used to answer that question:
"The employer may not have fol/owed tlte guidelines relating to fair dismissal as
contained in tlte Labour Relations Act but this does not mean tltat the employee
was not allowed the opportunity to state her case, albeit on the telephone. It would
be unfair to expect the employer, who does not Itave tlte infrastructure, to fol/ow
the guidelines to the finest detail. ,,95
And
"It does not matter whether each of tile procedural requirements have been
meticulously observed. Wllat is required is for all the relevant facts to be looked at
in the aggregate to determine wlletller tile procedure adopted was fair. One must




.The previous paragraph was an effort to reflect on the principles and notions. in
respect of procedural fairness as it emerged from the Labour Court and CCMA
reports. Practitioners and Labour law consultants have expressed conflicting opinions
about their experiences in this regard. From my personal interview with them, I was
able to conclude the following:
Some have indicated that in their experience, CCMA commissioners still require pre-
dismissz.1 procedures to be in the nature as was suggested in Mahlangu's case. One
company indicated that due to bad experiences at CCMA in this regard, it halted its
efforts to introduce a less judicial pre-dismissal procedure and reverted to its pre-1995
disciplinary code. One labour consultant indicated that he still advises his clients to
follow formal predismissal procedures in view of the fact that the applications of the
Code is in his opinion still too inconsistent. Others indicated that in their opinion
commissioners generally understood the impact of the Code and only tested procedure
to establish whether or not the employee was inhibited by anything that occurred
during the hearing.
The latter view seems to be consistent with the sentiments that have emerged from the
reports studied.
3.3.4 Conclusion
This chapter examined the constitutionalisation and codification of the concept
"procedural fairness in both Mauritius and South Africa'. Both countries have,
through their respective constitutions, in particular the Bill of Rights entrenched the
right of procedural justice to an individual. The only difference between the
constitutions of both countries is that by its section 10 the Constitution of the
Republic of Mauritius has attempted to codify the requirements of procedural fairness
and so far South Africa is concerned, Section 24 of the Interim Constitution and
Section 33 of the final constitution have both prescribed, without codifying, a general
principle of administrative legality, which includes the principle of lawfulness, the
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principle of procedural fairness and the substantive principles of justifiability and
reasonableness. The codification part has been effected in section 3 of the Promotion
of Administrative Justice Act which makes it mandatory on any competent
administrative authority to adhere to procedural rules when making any decision that
affects materially and adversely the rights or legitimate expectation of any person.
Section 119 of the Industrial Relations Act and Section 32 (2) (b) of the Labour Act of
Mauritius have not codified the rules of procedural fairness as it has been detailed in
item 4 schedule 8 of the South African Labour Relations Act 1995. To a large extent,
however, schedule 8 does not differ in content to what has been provided in the
Mauritian Labour Statutes. Item 4 of schedule 8 of the Labour Relations Act has
codified what the industrial court has developed over the years. What is significant is
the statutory weight that the Labour Relations Act affords to schedule 8. It has been
held that the code does not have the force of law, it is a mere guideline.
However, the code is not different in content to what the jurisprudence of the
industrial court required for procedural fairness were found through sifting the cases
over the years.
No reference to the statute could provide one with what was required for a fair
dismissal. The rules were at first implicit and gradually more explicit, however, still
case specific. Through codification, these requirements for procedural fairness are
explicitly stated in the statute. It is not case-specific and no evolution ofjurisprudence
can change what is required. This does not imply rigidity since the Code is phrased in
a general way precisely to permit the size and the nature of the business to be
considered. The manner in which the procedures are implemented depends on these
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Requirements for Procedural Fairness in Pre-dismissal cases
for Misconduct in Mauritius and South Africa.
4.1 Introduction
In chapter 2, it was discussed that procedural fairness is the yardstick against which
the employer's pre-dismi'ssal actions are measured and its requirements have
developed from the rules of natural justice of the common law to suit the employment
arena. I The standard of fairness to which much has been alluded in the previous
chapter, represents the minimum content of fair procedure which have been provided
in the Mauritian and South African constitutions, and in their respective labour
statutes. Very little has been discussed so far about the requirements for procedural
fairness in pre-dismissal cases related to misconduct.
The focus of this chapter will, therefore be to examine critically the requirements for
procedural fairness in pre-dismissal cases for misconduct in Mauritius and South
Africa.
In the delineation of this area of research, it is important, at the very outset, to note the
limitations envisaged by the researcher to collect and collate information relevant,
particularly, to the Mauritian law of procedural fairness as there has been fewer
judicial decisions, as compared to South African labour jurisprudence, by the
Industrial Court and the Supreme Court of Mauritius in this regard. The glaring
deficiency that is mostly of note is that the Mauritian cases have not been able to
single out each and every requirements of procedural fairness and examine them with
the thoroughness they deserve, even though Section III of the Industrial Relations
Act and Section 32(2)(a) of the Labour Act have codified, to a certain extent, the rules
of procedural fairness. In fact, these provisions have not spelt out what the
requirements of procedural fairness are. In very broad terms, Section 32(2)(a) has
provided that "no employer shall dismiss a worker unless he has afforded the worker
an opportunity to answer any charges made against him."
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In Mauritius, the notion "an opportunity to answer the charge" has been equated to 'a
hearing' which has to be complied with the provisions of the Labour Act and carried
out in compliance with a fair procedure. In A.I Mamode v F.MJ.P Doger de Speville2
it was stated:
"]t will be noted that subsection (1)(b) (ii) (a) (of the labour act) describes
the procedure traced in subsection 2(a) as a hearing. Undoubtedly, the
cases other than those provided for in 1(b)(ii) (c), that is to say, the cases
where a hearing must take place even when the termination ofemployment
is accompanied by the payment of normal severence allowance and the
payment of wages in lieu ofnotice, for the failure to grant a hearing in this
situation would amount to an unjustified termination ofemployment. (Vide,
in this sense, Bundhoo v Mauritius Breweries (1981) SCJ No.140"
Thus, the notion 'opportunity to answer the charge' needs to be expanded to give
specificity and precision to the requirements of procedural fairness. The courts are, in
fact. uncertain about the varying standard of the concept. For instance in the case of
Natal v Longtill (Mauritius) Ltd,3 the Supreme Court of Mauritius seems to be
uncertain in the degree of formality required in pre-dismissal procedures. It is stated
that
"The word 'hearing' used by the counsel in his submission and the
Magistrate in his judgment was certainly not the word of choice and may
convey the meaning that before dismissing his employee or employer must
as sine qua non institute some sort ofcourt proceedings and hold aformal
hearing. What the law provides is that no worker shall be dismissed unless
he has been afforded an opportunity to answer any charge made against
him... "
The court further held that
"the hearing is not required to be conducted with the formality and all the
exigencies, whether procedural or evidential, appropriate to a court or
tribunal. Vide Tirvengadum v Bata Shoe (Mauritius) Co.Ltd (1979) MR
133). The concept of hearing requires that it should be conducted with
fairness"
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The implication that can be derived from this statement is that pre-dismissal hearings
should not be conducted with all the trappings of a court of law and deviation from
strict procedural rules would be an acceptable norm. This does not indicate, however,
what the requirements of procedural fairness would be.
This opInIon of the Supreme Court is repeated in Tirvengadum v Bata Shoes
(Mauritius) CO.Ltet' where it is stated: "What the law has done is to say that the
. worker must not be prevented from giving an explanation, this can take a number of
forms." One of them, as was envisaged in La Sentinelle v David,5 where the court
held:
~'But, in a situation where an editor of 6 years' standing, who had
previously performed creditably, is charged with committing an act of
serious misconduct by disobeying orders given by the 'director', which
renders him liable to summary dismissal, and the latter puts a number of
reasons which, by all accounts, are not patently flimsy pretexts, in order to
explain or excuse his act, there can be no compliance with the provisions of
the law requiring an employer to give the employee an adequate
opportunity to answer the charge if the hearing resolves itself into an
interview between the employee and the very person whose orders were
disobeyed, who is not the employer. "
In this particular instance, all the requirements of procedural fairness may not be
followed, but again, Tirvengadum v Bata Shoes (Mauritius) Co.Lte! deviates from its
stance and recommends the full compliance of procedural fairness, "where the person
or body of persons responsible for making the ultimate decision to dismiss, hears of
the misconduct at second hand, e.g from a co-worker or junior officer."
Still, none of these cases have specified the requirement for procedural fairness,
though the court has been decisive at one point, that is, that an employee before being
dismissed, should be accorded some form of opportunity to answer the allegations
that may lead to dismissal.
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Thus for lack of adequate precision and clarity on the applicable rules of procedural
fairness, the law of unjustified dismissal in Mauritius has remained very scanty, and
has left any adjudicating authority with a haphazard and guesswork approach to pre-
dismissal hearings.
Perhaps, this situation, as depicted in the Mauritian law of procedural fairness, may be
compared diametrically with the South African doctrine of unfair labour practice at its
offing two decades ago, when its definition had a deliberately imprecise starting point
so as to allow the court to develop, through the years, a comprehensive and exhaustive
set of guidelines for application to cases .related to dismissal due to misconduct.
Subsequently, the industrial court in South Africa was able to provide in its
judgements sufficient guidance for an employer to know with certainty what is
expected of him whenever he decides to dismiss an employee for misconduct. These
guidelines have not only helped the employers but have also enabled the employees
and in particular, the union representatives to exercise their rights to procedural
justice.
With these positive views in mind, the drafters of item 4 of Schedule 8 of the South
African Labour Relations Act, have consolidated the opinions of the industrial court
judgments and given the concept of procedural fairness a well programmed and
logical shape.
In this chapter, reference will mainly be made to Section 32(2)(a) and (b) of the
Labour Act 1975 of Mauritius and relevant cases on procedural fairness. But having
seen that the Mauritian Labour Statutes and decided cases have inadequately
formulated the principles of procedural fairness during pre-dismissal hearings,
reliance will therefore, mostly be placed on the South African labour jurisprudence to
give a holistic approach to the requirements of procedural fairness. The advantage
that will flow from this reliance will show that the Mauritian law of 'unjustified
dismissal' will, undoubtedly benefit from the richness of the resource material
available from the numerous South African industrial court decisions. Proceeding
further, the requirements of procedural fairness will be examined.
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4.2 Requirements for Procedural Fairness in pre-dismissal cases
for Misconduct in Mauritius and South Africa.
The Industrial Relations Act and the Labour Act of Mauritius, have expressly
provided a broad framework on which lies the basic rules of procedural fairness so as
to ensure that the employer collects all the facts before making a decision regarding
an employee alleged to have committed a disciplinary offence. The significance of
this procedure is not unknown as its objective is to improve the chances of an
employer to make a good, substantive decision on the merits of the case.7
But whether an employer should act in a semi-judicial manner, similar to the rigorous
standard of a court of law and follow all the requirements of procedural fairness has
raised controversy and extensive debate.8 On the one hand, the court was of the
opinion that the requirements were sometimes unrealistic, placing unreasonable and at
time unnecessary costs on employers, and on the other it prescribed less cumbersome
and time consuming requirements of procedural fairness.9
However, despite the fact that the courts in Mauritius and South Africa have accepted
that procedural fairness should be flexible in content and what will constitute a fair
procedure will depend on the circumstances of each case, the impression gained from
the decisions is that. as a general rule, "unrealistically strict procedural requirements"
were e-xpected from the employers. 10
These technical requirements often failed to promote the fairness of the procedure yet
an employer who was found to have deviated from these guidelines generally had
difficulty persuading the IC that notwithstanding the lapse in procedure, the dismissal
was still fair.
11
One of the most influential cases in defining the right to procedural
fairness was Mahlangu v elM Deltak, Gallant v Deltak. 12 As elucidated earlier, the IC
prescribed la guidelines which formed the requirements for procedural fairness. The
guidelines in Mahlangu 13 dominated not only IC jurisprudence, but many disciplinary
codes and procedures that sought to ensure compliance with that jurisprudence in the
workplace.
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The drafters of the Code in South Africa signalled a clear departure from this
fonnalism and the stringent requirements of disciplinary fairness by referring to an
investigation as opposed to an enquiry. They emphasised this by stating that "the
investigation need not be a fonnal enquiry." This infonnal approach is preferable,
since the person presiding and other participants usually have little or no knowledge
of court procedures and the rules of evidence. 14 Mauritius does not have such a
provision.
Although the effective implementation of this requirement is clearly illustrated in
Mjaji v Creative Signs,;5 and Makatsi v Mamello Pre-school,16 where the CCMA
established that a (misconduct) dismissal may be held to be procedurally unfair where
the employer;
a. did not conduct an investigation before aCCUSing the employee of the
misconduct concerned;
b. did not afford the employee the opportunity to disabuse the employer of the
belief that he (the employee) committed the misconduct in question;
c. did not hold a proper enquiry before dismissing the employee.
Although these basic requirements ensure fairness, the Code promotes a streamlined
and balanced approach where the employer acts fairly but is not required to follow a
checklist. The above requirements are however indicative of the approach
characterized by the IC and reflect little movement towards a flexible approach to
fairness.
In the first case the CCMA appropriately found substantial compliance with a fair
procedure in the absence of a fonnal procedure and disciplinary hearing. Mjaji was
informed of the offence (assault) and was invited to respond. The decision to dismiss
was communicated to him verbally. The Commissioner stated that although it
appears as though Mjaji was not afforded the assistance of a fellow employee, he is of
the view that despite any shortcomings, there had been substantial compliance with a
fair procedure. He referred to exceptional circumstances which had entitled the
employer party to dispense with the pre-dismissal procedures (ie. conclusive proof of
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the assault and serious nature of the misconduct). Adv van Zuydam stated that "the
more formal and exact procedures would not have brought about a different result
than the informal procedures did." In this instance the Commissioner accurately
interpreted the requirements of the Code.
The CCMA hinted at a movement towards less stringent requirements in Gavander v
Navanethem Pillay & Co l7 where it stated that "no attempt was made" by the
employer party to follow the procedural requirements. The CCMA indicated that "an
attempt may have led to procedural fairness," whilst the total absence of any
procedural fairness led to the finding of procedural unfairness.
A less onerous requirement was also made in FAWU v Snoek Wholesalers (Pty) Ltd
18
where the CCMA referred to the fact that the employer had "largely followed the
provisions of a fair disciplinary procedure." The Commissioner specifically referred
to the necessity for flexibility in this regard. In this particular case the CCMA was
therefore prepared to oversee mistakes of the employer party since overall fairness in
the the procedure existed.
In Gumede v Colors l9 the CCMA however found the dismissal procedurally unfair
due to the fact that the respondent had "dismissed the applicant without convening a
disciplinary enquiry." These and other CCMA cases indicate a lack of consistency.
Although the CCMA has been attempting to set guidelines for pre-dismissal
requirements it should make the effort to interpret the provisions of the Code
consistently so that a clear interpretative jurisprudence in this regard can be
established. In the analyses of requirements which form a pre-requisite for procedural
fairness in the CCMAlLC, a sombre picture develops which often reflects the
requirements stipulated by the jurisprudence of the IC. An influencing factor may
however be Recognition Agreements, which have been put into place by parties and
over-ride the Code of Good Practice.
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Whatever forms the courts of both countries have prescribed, the general consensus
seems to be that the requirements for procedural fairness have enonnous similarities.
These requirements will be discussed under the various sub-headings below.
4.2.1 Notice of Allegations
In NUM & Another v KloofGold Mining Co.Ltd,20 it was held that "if justice is to be
. done then it is essential that an employee be infonned of all allegations and charges
against him prior to holding the inquiry itself."
Such was the debate in Riviere du Rampart Bus Service Co.Ltd v B.HRamjan
21
where
evidence was given to the effect that on 30 July 1976 the respondent left his house at
7.30a.m and returned only at about 6.00p.m when he found a letter asking him to
attend a disciplinary board meeting to answer the charges of inciting the workers to
strike and "virtually paralysing the operations of the company." He was not
scheduled to work on 30 July 1976. On the 31 July 1976, which was a Sunday, he
called for work at the company's office but was informed by the stand regulator of the
company that his services had been tenninated. He reported the matter to the police
and on the next day he complained to the labour office about his dismissal.
The magistrate of the Industrial Court found that the respondent was not afforded an
opportunity to answer the charges levelled against him as required by Section 32(2)(a)
of the Labour Act and consequently the dismissal was found to be unjustified.
The entire issue of fair procedure in this case is centred around whether proper notice
was served to the respondent to give him adequate time to prepare for his defence or
plead in mitigation against the charges levelled against him. It was contended that the
company act~d in haste. The notice to attend the disciplinary board meeting was too
short and the respondent was not to b~ blamed for his absence. This short notice may,
under the circumstances mean no notice at all.
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On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mauritius held that:
It is true tllat tile appellant fIXed the board meeting to an early date ie. the
30th July, 1976. But it must be borne in mind that a strike had virtually
paralysed' the operations of the Company only some two days earlier and
according to the appellant Company it was the respondent who had
formulated all the trouble. The situation demanded quick action and in our
view the Company could not be blamed for having acted promptly. It is
also to be noted that the Company did not act......... It sent copies of the
convocation letter, among others, to the representative of the Union to
which the respondent belonged The union representative received the
letter in time to attend the meeting. It follows that the respondent would
have received the letter in the normal course of things had he been at
home. The respondent said that be came aware ofthe contents ofthe letter
only at about 6p.m on the 30th July,1976. One would have expected him to
go to the Company at the first (Jpportunity to explain his absence at the
board meeting. He did nothing of the sort. He reported the matter to the
police and the Labour Office.
.The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the learned magistrate of the lower court
and held that " we are unable to say that the dismissal was unjustified on the ground
that it did not comply with the requirements of Section 32(2)(a) of the Labour Act.
It is, therefore, apparent from the decision of the court that 'notice of allegations' is
quite an essential requirenlents of' an opportunity to answer charges', which if served
with due consideration fair procedure will have the effect of the law. But what the
court did not deal with, is what would then be considered as a reasonable period of
notice.
According to the South African labour jurisprudence what constitutes notice or
reasonable time within which to present a case22 is a question of fact and will vary
from case to case or, as De Villiers AJ recently put it, "from adjudicator to
adjudicator. ,,23 Although there is no fixed time limit in this regard but it would seem
that a reasonable period that would enable the employee to prepare his case and make
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consultations would suffice. For instance, the Appellate Division found "a drumhead
enquiry on a 45 minutes' notice,,24 to be totally inadequate for the purposes of a fair
hearing. And in a number of cases Commissioners had found inadequate noti~es
issued on the day the hearing was held. Thus in Gxabeka v Samcor,25 the
Commissioner considered that a notification of disciplinary hearing to be held on
Monday 28 July 1997 issued to the employee that morning cannot remotely be seen as
sufficient time to prepare for a hearing and can only be interpreted as being
vindictive. Similarly, even where the employer had proved that the employee had
stabbed a fellow \vorker in the face with a knife, the disciplinary procedure followed
was held to be unfair because the employee was only notified of the date of the
hearing on the day it was held.26 This situation clearly indicates that 'reasonable time'
is a relative concept which can be detennined according to the urgency of the matter.
Hence the first step to be taken in any enquiry, investigation or hearing, whether
formal or informal, is to inform the person against whom the proceeding is being
conducted27 of the allegations against him.
The requirement of notice 1S the beginning of wisdom in the sphere of fair
procedure.28 It is the foundation upon which the common law principle that a person
n1ust not be condemned or punished for an offence or deprived of his personal liberty
or right to his property for an alleged breach of the law, without being offered the
opportunity of being heard is based.29 It has implications for the other requirement
that the employee be allo\ved a reasonable time to prepare his defence which is an
integral requirement of the overall opportunity to state a case. The Privy Council
once stated; "if the right to be heard is to be a real right which is worth anything, it
must carry with it a right in the accused man to know the case made against him. He
must know what evidence has been given and what statements have been made
affecting him; and he must be given a fair opportunity to correct or contradict it. ,,30
The Code provides that "the employee should be entitled to a reasonable time to
prepare the response" to the charge. This requirement relates to the le requirement
which requires that "the hearing must take place within a reasonable period" after the
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allegations of the disciplinary offence have become known to the employer. The IC
further required that the employee be given "timeous notice of the hearing."
"In Mkhize v JLR & Hay-Yoon Enterprises31 the Commissioner explained the various
requirernents for procedural fairness without making reference to the employee's right
to a reasonable period of time to prepare the response. Requirements for procedural
fairness were also discussed in Makatsi v Mamello Pre-schooP2 and Hayward v
Protea Furnishers33 without reference being made to the requirement for "sufficient
time to prepare before the investigation." The deduction which can be made
consistently is that this is one of the less important elements for procedural fairness.
The balanced .requirement of fairness as opposed to the stringent compliance with
each element as set by the IC is thus illustrated by the CCMA.
In FA WU v Snoek Wholesalers (Ply) Ltcf4 the CCMA found procedural fairness due
to the fact that the employer had "largely followed the provisions of a fair disciplinary
enquiry." In its reference to those elements where the employer did follow the
required procedures, the CCMA specifically referred to the existence of "adequate
notification of the hearing and charge." When considering the fact that all
requirements were not followed, yet fairness was present, the importance of this
element in the specific case may be deduced. Also in NEWU v Durban Deep
Wholesale Meae
s
the CCMA specifically motivated procedural fairness in terms of
the requirement that the applicant had received proper and timeous notice of the
enqUIry.
The CC~A has taken a similar route to that of the IC insofar as the nature of the
misconduct will influence the period of time which would be seen as "reasonable."
This is important since more complicated cases may require more extensive
investigation by both the employer and employee,36 while in cases where the
employee implicitly admits guilt, (and time could create a barrier for the employer to
bring witnesses to prove his default), a two-hour warning of an impending hearing
will not be judged inadequate.
37
It is clear that both the IC and the CCMA agree on
these and other aspects/reasons which influen~e ~he timeous arrangement ofhearings.
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In support of the view that the IC and CCMA show similar flexibility in this regard
the following cases are illustrative. In Trauchweitzer v Robert Skok Welding (Ply) Ltd
tla Skok Machine Tools38 the court stated that the fact that the employee had not
objected to the short notice and had not asked for a postponement, did not make short
notice fair~ whilst in FA WU & Others v Amalgamated Bev.lndustry Ltcf9 the Court
was prepared to accept the procedural fairness of a dismissal despite the required
period of notice not being given. Often the provisions of the employers Disciplinary
Code set time limits and these will serve as guidelines for the parties concerned.
4.2.2 Disclosure and Details of the charge
It is now common knowledge tha.t fair hearing pre-supposes a precise and definite
catalogue of charges so that the person charged may understand and effectively meet
it. If the charges are imprecise and indefinite it can be a fatal defect which may vitiate
the entire disciplinary proceedings.
Neither the Mauritian Industrial Relations Act nor the Labour Act have provided for
the disclosure and give details of the charge to the employee accused of misconduct.
Apparently the industrial court has not paid serious attention to this aspect of the
procedure. In the South African context, the Code of Good Practice along with
industrial court decisions, have given significant importance to the disclosure and
details of the charge against an employer.
In Mahlangu v ClM Deltak. Gallant v ClM Deltak40 it was stated that ifjustice is to be
done, it is imperative that an employee should be informed of all relevant allegations
and charges before the holding of an enquiry.
In Bassett v Servistar (Pty) Ltet l the employee complained that no charge had been
put to him and was not sure what the nature of the accusation was. The company
argued that the employee had been given sufficient information and could have asked
what the charges were if he was in any doubt. The court responded that the employee
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could not be expected to know what charge the chairman of the enquiry was
investigating unless he had been told.
Cameron argues that it would be grossly unfair to summon an employee to a fairly
timed enquiry but leave him ignorant of what the charges are until the hearing
commences. Preparation by the employee for such a hearing would be meaningless.42
In this regard. the court made an important decision in Metal & Allied Workers Union
& Others v Transvaal Pressed Nuts and Bolts & Rivets (Pty) Ltd.43 In this case the
court found that two out of three employees claiming reinstatement in an unfair labour
practice hearing had been given procedurally defective hearings. In the one instance
the alleged offence was not disclosed in the notice to attend the hearing which also
failed to inform the employee of the right to representation and to call witnesses. In
the other instance no written notice of the enquiry was given at all. The employee
was also not informed of the alleged offence. Cameron is of the opinion that this case
is significant in that the court criticised the defects in procedure, not on the basis of
any disciplinary code, but on the basis of the general principles offairness.44
Similarly in NUM & Others v Transvaal Navigation Collieries & Estate Co.Ltcf5 the
applicant employees were simply confronted with the charge that affidavits had been
made by certain persons who alleged that they had been intimidated by the applicants.
The names of the deponents of the affidavits were also not disclosed because the
deponents feared for their lives if their identities were to be known. Although the
employees were given the opportunity to respond to these allegations they could not
do so effectively without the knowledge of the exact allegations being made against
them. The court found that these employees had not been provided with sufficient
particulars of the charges in order to defend themselves adequately.
The code of Good Practice in the South African Labour Relations Act requires more
than merely informing the employee of the charge against him. It states that the
"employer should notify the employee of the allegations against the employee". The
item appears to promote a procedure where no oral evidence is led and the
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"allegations" must therefore mean the alleged facts may constitute the grounds for
dismissal.46 In addition, it requires that the employer must "use a form and language
that the employee can reasonably understand." The IC too, placed these requirements
on employers, in a clear and unambiguous way.
This IC requirement is illustrated in the following two cases. In both Fihla & Others
v Pest Control Tvl (Pty) Lter7 and FBUSA & Another v East Rand Bottling Co (Pty)
Ltet8 the reason for dismissal was in dispute, the employer claiming in FiWa that the
employee had been disrnissed for repeated absenteeism and drunkenness and in East
Rand Bottling for gross incompetence. But it was clear in each case that the
employee had not been confronted with the allegations on the basis of which the
employer had sought to justify the dismissal. For these and other reasons both these
dismissals were held to be unfair and reinstatement ordered.
In NUM & Another v Kloof Gold Mining C049 the IC stated that if justice is to be
done, it is essential that an employee should be informed before the holding of the
disciplinary enquiry of all relevant allegations and charges. It would be grossly unfair
to summon an employee to an enquiry without informing him/her of the misconduct
until the hearing commences.50 The IC also illustrated the requirement in
Trauchweitzer v Robert Skok Welding (Pty) Ltd tla Skok Machine Tools51 where the
employee was under a misunderstanding as to the charges he was to be confronted
with at the hearing. The IC held that the hearing should have been adjourned in order
to enable him to prepare. Where the evidence refers to an offence unrelated to the one
with which he was charged, the IC requires the holding of a new hearing in respect of
the new charge or charges. 52 This requirement is indeed essential insofar as fairness
requires that employees receive the necessary time to prepare themselves in order to
present proper defence.
The CCMA too, has placed this ob~igation on the employer and warned against
procedural unfairness should it fail in this regard. In Snell v SSM Manufacturing,53
the CCMA specifically referred to the Company's failure to "inform Snell at any point
along the way that his conduct was a problem and could lead to disciplinary action."
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The Commissioner continued that the employee should be given sufficient time to
prepare for the hearing and be notified of which charges he is required to meet. The
Commissioner specifically referred to the fact that "numerous complaints about
Snell's conduct and performance were brought forward for the first time at the
arbitration hearing as part of the Company's attempt to justify his dismissal." The
CCMA therefore found in Snell v SSM Manufacturing
54
that the company failed to
show that a proper procedure was adopted when dismissing the employee.
In SACWU v Harvey's Curnow55 the CCMA found procedural unfairness and made
specific reference to the fact that the employee was charged with insubordination,
whilst neither of the hearings made mention of this. The COIlL1!l1issioner put it clearly
that "where the evidence establishes the commission of an offence unrelated to the
one with which charged, the holding of a new hearing should take place in respect of
the new charge or charges." The CCMA's approach in terms of overall fairness
justifies this decision, since the employee was not able to prepare himself and could
therefore not properly defend himself. Also in NEWU v Durban Deep Wholesale
Meat56 the CCMA acknowledged fairness by confirming that the employee party had
understood the charge against him. The upholding of this requirement by the CCMA
enhances the following of a fair procedure in the workplace.
The allegations need not be elaborately detailed since the employer is not expected to
describe the employee's misconduct or poor work performance with absolute
precision and in minute details. 57 However, since the purpose of that requirement is to
enable the party to defend himself or answer to the complaint, it must follow that the
notice must be sufficient to enable him adequately to prepare his defence or answer.58
The notice must therefore convey sufficient information of the facts of the allegation,
"the gist of the case" which the accused person has to answer.59 In any event, the type
of information which will satisfy this requirement will in 'each case depend on
whether it is the employee's conduct or his incapacity that is being investigated. For
. . 1I.Tdl 60Instance, In IVI ovu v Transnet Ltd fla Portnef, a senior management employee was
notified that she had to appear at a disciplinary hearing to face charges relating to her
intentional failure to disclose to the employers during her interview for employment
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that her services had been terminated by her previous employer because of certain
acts of dishonesty. The Labour Court held that the employee had been informed of
the charges against her were and that if she needed further details or an opportunity to
deal with information disclosed in evidence, she was at liberty to ask for further
information or a postponement of the inquiry but not to rush to court to challenge the
routine disciplinary hearing.
To further illustrate the foregoing proposition is the Labour Appeal Court decision in
Eskom v Mokoena. 61 While upholding the principle that a dismissal for incapacity
which consisted of poor work performance, should be preceded by a fair hearing, the
Court held that there was no need to put each detail of the case before the employee as
there was only one "charge", namely, incapacity, hence the decision of the Industrial
Court that there should have been a full enquiry into each complaint against the
employee was incorrect especially where the length of the counselling process
indicated that the respondent had been fully apprised of the complaints regarding his
performance. and had been offered considerable assistance to overcome his problems.
The.Court drew a distinction between dismissal for misconduct and dismissal based
on poor work performance in so far as the information which the employee must be
given and what the employer will he expected to prove are concerned. Kroon lA held:
In the present case what the appellant was required to establish was tlte
respondent's alleged incapacity. It was not necessary for tltat purpose titat
the alleged conduct on the part ofthe respondent wllicll formed tile subject
of the conIplaints nwde against IIim to be establislted as if tllat conduct
constituted nlisconduct justifying the respondent's dismissal. It was tile
widespread dissatisfaction of tile staff in the respondent's division and the
power station, of which the complaints were evidence, and tlteir perception
of the respondent as being incapable that was tlte problem. It was the
problenl conveyed to the respondent and on wltich tlte appellant was
required to give him a hearing. It may well be tltat certain of the
conlplaints could well have been elucidatedfurtlter by NZimande, but in my
judgenlent sufficient detail ofthe substance ofthe complaints was conveyed
to the respondent to enable IIim to respond to the actual cltarge against
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hinl, viz. that of incapacity. The fuller investigation into the truth of the
various allegations embraced in the complaints and' the confrontation of
the respondent with more specific details, which in Maytham AM's view
had been necessary, had therefore in fact not been required. I am therefore
unable to uphold the first basis on which Maytham AM held that the
respondent's dismissal had been procedural/y unfair. 61
4.2.3 'Ways of Communication and Consequences of Splitting the charge
Procedural fairness in all its ramifications contemplates that the offence which the
dismissed enlployee has allegedly committed should be communicated to him in the
language he understands.63 This will enable him to know what issues to address in his
defence. By this requirement too, once a person is charged with an offence -
crimina164 or disciplinary - he should be tried and, either found guilty or absolved of
liability in respect of that offence; it is wrong to find him guilty of an entirely
different offence of which he had no notice.65 Nor is it fair to split the charge and
multiply them where~ as in Ntshangane v Speciality Metals cc,66 the employee was
charged with lateness and absenteeism and his unacceptable and false explanations
provided the employer with the ingredients to formulate yet a third charge, that of
breach of duty of good faith to the company. Mlambo J held that it was clear that the
basis for finding the employee guilty of lateness and absenteeism was his
unacceptable explanation and that using the same explanation to formulate a third
charge was unfair and took the issue beyond the realms of fairness. But the linking of
the charges of drunkenness and disorderly behaviour in a hotel with the charges
relating to incidents at the same hotel with that pertaining to the consumption of
dagga \\'as held not unfair in Coal/ink v TWU obo Pieterse.67
Where an additional charge is merely an amplification of the original charge,68 or
where an employee is found guilty of a charge formulated differently from that which
she was summoned to answer the procedure would not necessarily be unfair if the
substance of the charge remains the same and the employee is not thereby
prejudiced.
69
The principal question here is whether formulation or re-formulation
had the effect or amounted to the creation of anew charge of which the employee had
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no opportunity to respond. 7o Thus in Boardman Brothers (Natal) Ltd v CWIU71 the
Supreme Court of Appeal held that the real thrust of the case against the employees
was that they had dishonestly taken money for work not done and that the charge
against them for dishonesty claiming payment from the employers for time not
worked was an incorrect formulation, nevertheless nothing turned on that difference
since all the facts were canvassed at the Industrial Court and the nature of the
en1ployee's alleged dishonesty "is ultimately a matter of inference from those facts."
Sin1ilarly, Marcus AJ held in Nel v Ndaba & Others72 that there was no question of a
new charge being introduced. As much as the original charge of accepting bribes
might have been inept, the essence of the offence was "trading in an unacceptable
manner." In any case, the employer was entitled to I'take a dinl view of the
employee's conduct" - the employee having conducted himself in a manner
incompatible with the employment relationship by receiving commission for turning
customers from his employer. 73
4.2.4 Opportunity to state a case
Section 32(2)(a) of the Mauritian Labour Act reads:
"No employer shall dismiss a worker unless he has afforded the worker an
opportunity to answer any charges made against him..."
This provision is the direct replica of the ILO's Recommendation74 and Convention
which state:
"Before a decision to dismiss a worker for serious misconduct became finally
effective, the worker should be given the opportunity to state his case... " and "The
employment of a worker shall not be terminated for reasons related to the worker's
conduct or performance before he is provided an opportunity to defend himself
against the allegations made... "
The gist of these provisions is to state decisively and unequivocally that in a case of
dismissal the employee must be given an opportunity of presenting his or her case
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either to justify hislher conduct or argue in mitigation thereof. This confirms the need
to apply the audio alteram partem principle when adjudicating cases related to
d· . I ~ . d 75IsmIssa lor mIscon uct.
Just like Mauritius, South Africa has also entrenched this requirement in its Labour
Relations Act 1995. The Code states that "the employee should be allowed the
opportunity to state a cas~ in response to the allegations." In other words the
employee "should be allowed to respond to the allegation during the disciplinary
enquiry and may, for example, give reason for the misconduct or deny the charge."76
In South Africa, while the industrial court initially stressed that the content of the
right to be afforded a hearing of some kind would not be inflexibly or mechanically
enforced, it was so firm and consistent in its emphasis, that the right to a hearing
became referred to as the "trite rule of the industrial relations and practice."77 Its
entrenchment in the South African law of labour relations has become so complete
that the industrial court's practice has, in effect, started to cast an onus on employer's
failing to respect this right.
In NAA WU v Pretoria Precision Castings (Pty) Ltd78 the IC referred to the ILO
Recommendation79 stating that in a case of dismissal the employee must be given the
opportunity of presenting his case either to justify his conduct or argue in mitigation
thereof. The le emphasised that "such recommendation relating to the principle of
audi alteram partem should not merely be viewed as a recommendation, but in fact
forms part of our law." Of all the rules of natural justice, the most important is
enshrined in the maxim audi alterem partem, literally "hear the other side. ,,80
The IC's unequivocal expectation In this regard has been entrenched in the
requirements of the 1995 LRA. The Code states that "the employee should be allowed
the opportunity to state a case in response to the allegations." In other words the
en1ployee should be allowed to respond to the allegation during the disciplinary
enquiry. The employee may, for example. give a reason for the misconduct or deny
the charge. 81
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Commissioner Matlhabe stated in Hayward v Protea Furnishers,82 that "there is no
evidence that the employee failed or refused, without good cause to attend and
participate at a hearing when an opportunity for him to do so was granted." The
Commissioner continued that "the company hastily chose a convenient path to deviate
from following proper procedure, and thereby dismissed the employee without
affording him an opportunity for a fair hearing." The emphasis placed on the audi
alterem partem principle is clearly illustrated by the CCMA's statement that "the
. Company's actions were not only unfair, but must be completely rejected."
The CCMA's requirement in this regard is illustrated in a variety of cases where the .
Commissioners have simply refused to allow a dismissal to be procedurally fair where
the employee has not been granted the opportunity to state his case. In Gumedi v
Sojiha's Take Away,83 the applicant had been instructed by the employer's brother that
she ·was dismissed, no procedures were followed. In Gubayo v King Louis Bakery84
the parties could state their case. The Commissioner found that "no just cause existed
for dismissal." This clearly illustrates the necessity of procedural fairness to ensure
substantive fairness. even in small companies as was applicable in this case. In Power
Rig (Ply) Lld v Grobler85 the employer called the employee one morning, gave her
two weeks notice pay and the month's salary. Although this case was found to be
substantively fair, procedural fairness was absent since the employee did not have an
opportunity to respond to any allegation made against her.
Thus in as much as the Labour Court or arbitrator is not expected to apply the rigid
requirernenis of the common law in testing the employer's handling of disciplinary
matters. it is clear that basic procedural decencies would be expected of the employer
especially if he is a big employer.86 And in this regard, the Commissioner's award in
NCFAWU on behalf of Roberls v Ors Handelshuis Koop87 is instructive. There was a
hearing but ~he proceedings left much to be desired. First, the chairman of the
enquiry treated the allegations of th~ft levelled against the employee as evidence
hence the complainant was not called at the initial hearing or the appeal to testify
while the evidence of the prosecution was in conflict with that of the accused.88
Secondly, the onus of proof was placed on the employee to prove his innocence thus
172
undermining the principles of a fair hearing in that it led to a one-sided proceeding. A
tribunal, formal or informal in its outlook, is not entitled to reverse the burden of
proof placed on the parties by the law which, in this instance, is that the employer has
to show on a balance of probabilities that the employee committed the offence for
which he is being tried at the enquiry but not that the employee should prove his
innocence.
Perhaps no case exists In the books to illustrate the catalogue of· irregularities
perpetrated in SA CCA WU v CUi Kern. 89 The employee was dismissed after the
employer had initiated two investigations into thefts which had taken place while the
employee was overseas. Her dismissal had arisen from evidence tendered at the
enquiries tending to implicate the employee of complicity but the employee denied all
that. The arbitrator found the dismissal to have been substantively unfair and that the
employer's witnesses appeared to have been "coached". The two investigations were
accordingly set aside on the follo\ving grounds:
The chairperson of the disciplinary enquiry was also the chairperson of the
second investigation. In other words, she had prior knowledge of the case and
therefore did not approach the disciplinary enquiry with an open mind thereby
exhibiting the elements of bias. In the opinion of the Commissioner. "...the
investigating officer and the chairperson could never be one and the same
person. Such would result in one person being the judge and prosecutor at the
same time, which could never constitute a fair hearing. The investigating
officer is expected to present the case of the employer, and that is not the duty
of the chairperson."
The employee was not afforded the opportunity to state his case in response to
the allegations against him. Rather, the employees were "bombarded and
interrogated with questions and were never afforded an opportunity to state a
case in response. Witnesses were not sworn in arid "this is a serious
procedural defect."
Not a single employee had been represented during the hearing. In view of the
fact that the charges against the employees related to serious offences, the
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chairperson of the enquiry should have postponed the hearing in order to allow
• 90representatIon.
The employees were not allowed to call witnesses of their choice whereas the
chairperson elected to call the witnesses who merely implicated the accused.
Furthermore, where a person is accused of an offence such as stealing or
dealing in property belonging to the employer, he must be allowed the
opportunity of confronting the witnesses face to face and to cross-examine
them. It is a breach of fair procedure91 not to allow the accused person even in
disciplinary matters the opportunity of cross-examining his accuser.
92
The chairperson neither explained to the employees about their right to plead
in mitigation nor were they given the opportunity to do so, in effect, the
chairperson had failed to hear all the personal circumstances of the employees
in accordance with Item 3(5) of the code of good practice.93
A mass hearing was held in this case raising doubts as to whether justice was
seen to be done. It was totally unnecessary since hearings 'en masse' are only
allowed in exceptional circumstances such as strikes, where it is not possible
to give individual hearings.94
Even though a formal hearing may not be necessary in all cases,95 sometimes, the
question turns on whether what took place could properly be described as a "hearing."
That was the question in Concorde Plastics (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA & Others.96 There
were no notices of any disciplinary enquiry and no charges were put to the employees.
They were simply brought into the manager's office and asked whether they wished to
resign. They were also treated collectively without any attempt by the official in
charge to identify the particular role played by the individual employee during the
defamation trial between the managing director and the employee's union. The
employees had been subpoenaed but only two of them gave evidence in an action for
defamation brought by the managing director of the company against the employee's
union and one of its officials. Consequently, the employees were informed that their
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contracts of employment had been terminated. The employer regarded their conduct
in the defamation action as an act of "severe disloyalty" and "intended dishonesty in
that any evidence given against (the managing director) would have been blatantly
untruthful." Marcus AJ held that equity demanded that the employees ought to have
been given a hearing before they were dismissed. "The nature of the hearing is
determined by exigencies of the situation so that it may, in appropriate circumstances,
be attenuated." But in the present case, there were no special circumstances which
would have justified the entire absence of a hearing before dismissal. There was
therefore a manifest failure of natural justice and the dismissals were procedurally
. en
unfaIr.
In Cornelius & Others v Howden Africa Lfd fla M & B Pumps98 the Commissioner
adopted the view expressed in Moropane v Gilbeys Distillers & Vintners (Pty) Ltd &
Anor99 that procedural fairness under the 1995 Act is less stringent than that under the
previous laVl such that each requirement in the code need not be meticulously
observed. On the other hand, what was required was for all the relevant facts to be
looked at to determine whether on balance the procedure adopted amounted to such a
deviation from the Code of Good Practice as to justify the granting of relief."loo It
was held that the employees concerned were given adequate time to prepare, afforded
a full opportunity to respond and rebut the charges against them, and had abandoned
their right to an internal appeal.
In addition to the fundamental requirements that an employee accused of misconduct
or incompetence should be confronted with the evidence against him, be given the
opportunity to controvert that evidence, be present throughout the h~aring so that he
can deal with any evidence put against him and to cross-examine the witnesses, 101 it
has already been observed that it is also necessary that even after the employee has
been found guilty, he should be prompted by the chairperson to lead evidence of
personal circumstances and generally plead in mitigation. It has been well established
that a disciplinary enquiry does not only establish the guilt or otherwise of the
employee, it is also intended to enable the enquiry to deal with the appropriate
sanction \vhich, after taking every circumst~ce. into account including the length of
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service and disciplinary record of the employee, a decision is taken whether dismissal,
suspension, demotion or warning is the appropriate sanction. It is therefore unfair for
the enquiry chairman to fail to give the employee the opportunity of dealing with the
question of appropriate sanction. 102 The duty of taking evidence in mitigation is on
the chairman of the enquiry and not the arbitrator or Commissioner of the CCMA as
the employee in Ne! v Ndaba & Others103 appeared to have misdirected his attack.
4.2.5 Cross Examination of Witnesses
It has always remained a debatable issue whether or not to allow cross-examination of
witnesses at a pre-dismissal hearing. In Mauritius, the Supreme Court has evaluated
the standard of fairness applicable to various situations in numerous dismissal cases,
and has recommended cross examination of witnesses on certain occassions and
denied this right in others - for instance, in Mamode v Doger de Speville 104 the court
stated:
"...in domestic hearing or enquiries ofthis kind, failure to call a person as
a witness is not necessarily a breach ofnaturaljustice in the conduct ofthe
hearing or the enquiry, if the substance ofthe allegations ofthat person is
otherwise put to the person in respect of whom the hearing is being
conducted and the latter is given the opportunity ofexplaining his conduct
and puttingforward his version ofthefacts. "
On a similar note in South Africa, the Commissioner in Mkize v JLR &- Hay-Yoon
Enterprise,105 stated that if it is possible to come to a fair decision without hearing
oral evidence then such evidence may be dispensed with.
However, if this is not possible, as would normally be, the case where serious disputes
of facts exist, oral evidence must be heard as was stated in the Medine Sugar Estate
Co Ltd v Woodallyl06 where the Supreme Court of Mauritius held:
"It is essential ingredient of that hearing, more particularly at the hearing
before the court, that it should be fair. The element offairness is lacking
when evidence of the material facts is led by a person who conducted an
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enquiry from others without those otller persons being heard so as to give
an opportunity to the alleged offender to confront tltem and cross examine
them. "
The employee is, therefore, entitled to hear the evidence on which the employer relies,
to cross-examine the employer's witnesses, to state his case and to call witnesses in
support of it. Substantiating this view, the Commissioner in Mkize's case was of the
opinion that "should the employee be found guilty of an offence he must also be given
an opportunity to lead evidence and to address the chair person of the enquiry in
mitigation of the sanction." The case was found to be procedurally unfair because the
employee "should have been given the opportunity to hear evidence on which the
employer relied. and to cross examine the employer's witnesses."
In other cases the industrial court in South Africa has held that a Presiding Officer
should be slow to refuse an application to call a particular witness before such witness
is heard (Ntsibande v Union Carriage and Wagon Co (Pty) Ltd. 107 Direct or indirect
refusal to call witnesses has resulted in gross unfairness. An indirect refusal occurred
where the enquiry would be so timed as to prevent the employee from preparing an
adequate defence. 108 It was further required by the IC that the opportunity to question
should be granted face-to-face. The employee should be present when the evidence
against him or her is received and should there and then be able to put questions to the
witnesses.
The Code is silent on "calling of witnesses for cross-examination." It is suggested
that the question of whether or not the chairperson of the enquiry should allow a party
to call a witness or cross-examine depends on the facts of the matter. I09 Grogan11O
may have support insofar as he describes it as a fundamental requirement that an
employee accused of a disciplinary offence should be permitted to call witnesses in
his defence or in mitigation. The employer then has the right to cross examine such
witnesses. It is however important that in cases where the involvement of witnesses is
not granted, this be seen in the larger context of the management of the investigation
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and not summarily seen as unfair. It should in my opinion, as suggested by the Code,
not be evaluated in a narrow·sense.
Although the process to question and cross-examine witnesses could give the pre-
dismissal procedures a technical, legalistic and formal look, yet the advantage that
flows from this cannot simply be overlooked. Cameron is more positive in his
opinion:
An accused should be able to put questions to a witness to challenge
the reliability of their version and highlight any weaknesses in the
accusers case." III
And he refers to the following reasons for allowing employees to challenge the
reliability of their accuser's:
Questions enable the accused to bring out weaknesses in the accuser's case;
and
Questions will enable the witness to comment on the accused employee's
version and to rebut it by reacting to it.
The opportunity to question and reply is probably the only adequate means of
weighing two or more conflicting versions fairly against each other. Where it is
possible to come to a fair decision without hearing oral evidence, this would be the
most appropriate route to follow to reduce unnecessary technicalities. 112
4.2.6 The Right to Representation
What does proper representation mean? Fabricus AM said in National Union ofMine
Workers & Another v Blinkpan Collieries Lld:
"Proper representation does not entail the mere physical, impassive
presence of another. A representative should at least assist an alleged
offender in the preparation and presentation ofhis case. This is especially
so in the case of an illiterate and uneducated worker. A representative
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must ask the offender ifhe wishes to be actively represented. If the answer
is in the negative, he should inform him of the charges and ask him
whether he understands them; explain the procedure to him (if there is
one); and explain to him that he can challenge any adverse evidence on the
merits and'on the proposed sanction. If the reply is in the affirmative, he
should consult himfully (where necessary) witnesses are consulted and are
available; address the tribunal on merits and punishment; and ensure that
the employee has presented his case as fully as the circumstances permit.
There are elenlents ofnaturaljustice which should apply•.. ,,113
How is the. right to representation accoinmodated in the Mauritian and South
African law of procedural fairness?
There is noticeable similarity between the labour statutes of Mauritius and South
Africa in so far as the employee has to be informed of the charges against him and to
be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges, but the
.labour statutes of both countries have different approaches to where it is proposed to
give a reasonable opportunity of making representation.
Section 32(2)(b) of the Mauritian Labour Act provides:
"The worker may, for the purpose of paragraph (a), have the assistance of a
representative of his trade union, if any, of an officer or of his legal
representative. "
With this express provision, the court in Mauritius has had no difficulty in applying
effectively the right to representation. In very clear terms the supreme court has ruled
that an employee has the right to choose whoever he wishes to represent him. It can
either be "representative of his trade union, an officer of his legal representative:,,114
the court stated:
"It is for the enlployee to choose. An ill-advised employer could very well
object to the enlployee being assisted by both a trade union representative
and a legal representative but the employer cannot dictate who, between the
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representative of the union and the legal representative will assist the
enlployee. It is the employee and the employee alone to decide who will
assist him. "
Two important legal aspects seem to emerge from this court's ruling. Firstly an
employee's right to representation is uncontestable; secondly, the employee has the
right to be represented either by a union representation or a legal representative. The
court is quite emphatic about the point that there is no distinction between being
represented by a union or a legal representative.
This is where South African labour jurisprudence seem to differ from the
jurisprudence in Mauritius. The South African Constitution, like most common-
wealth African constitutions; 15 is silent on the right to legal representation in civil
matters although it guarantees the right to just administrative action which is lawful,
reasonable and procedurally fair. 116 The court in South Africa is under constant
dilema in its determination of the fact that, if "procedurally fair" includes, as it must,
the observance of the recognised principles of natural justice well entrenched in the
legal system, does it by definition cover legal representation in administrative and
disciplinary matters?
It would appear that the question of one's entitlement to legal representation in the
determination of one's civil rights and obligations will depend on whether the matter
is before a court of law l17 or whether it is simply at the level of a domestic tribunal
where the application of the right to counsel remains a subject for debate and
conflicting judicial opinion. I 18
Decided cases are overwheln1ing on the side of refusal of legal representation in
disciplinary proceedings. I 19 The broad proposition which was postulated by Van Zyl
J in Lace v Diack & Others l20 while considering legal representation in an internal
disciplinary enquiry in a company whose code only allowed for representation by an
employee or shop steward, was that: "there is certainly no absolute right to legal
representation in our law."
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The Code of Good Practice stands to support this statement and provides for a right to
assistance by a trade union representative (not a trade union official)or a fellow
employee and places the election of this person in the hands of the accused employee.
Although the court has set the minimum requirements, an employee is generally not
entitled to be represented by an advocate or attorney. 121 The CCMA confirmed this in
Khosa v Gypsum Industries Ltdl22 by stating that "allowing the accused employee, to
be repre3ented at the initial hearing and at the appeal by an attorney is an unusual
privilege... " Unless there is a contrary arrangement in an employer's disciplinary
procedure, the IC has usually limited representation to a co-employee. Employees
were generally not entitled to be represented by a union official or a legal
representative.
Again, the Appellate Division had made it clear in Lamprecht & Nissan SA (Pty) Ltd v
AlcNellie l23 that the term "representative" in the employer's disciplinary guidelines
does not include a legal representative l24 and, in any case, whether the principles of
natural justice \vill apply to an employee whose emplOYment had no public element
would depend on the express and implied terms of the employee's contract. In other
words, unless the employee's contract of employment or employer's disciplinary code
so states, the employee will ordinarily not be entitled to legal representation in such
proceedings.
In order to consider whether the new constitutional dispensation and the labour
regime have changed the pre-1994 situation, one has to look at the surrounding
circumstances. First, the right to legal representation at the CCMA when the
arbitrator is considering dismissals based on conduct or incapacity is not automatic;
whether it will avail depends on a number of statutory factors. 125 Secondly,
individual employees, co-employees and office bearers or officials of that party's trade
union or employer's organisation all have been given a right of audience in the Labour
Court and the Labour Court of Appeal. 126 These factors tend to confirm Jali AJ's
viewpoint that time has not yet arrived when public policy would demand the
recognition of such a right in disciplinary hearings. 127 Thirdly, the express
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constitutional provisions on legal representation deal with persons accused in a court
of law and "had no application to domestic disciplinary tribunals." 128
Thus, following in the example of Page J in Cuppan v Cape Display Supply Chain
Services, 129 Jali AJ had affirmed the pre-1994 situation in so far as legal
representation in employment disciplinary proceedings is concerned and has come to
the conclusion that the coming into effect of the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions had not
altered that state of affairs. In Police & Prisons Civil Rights Union v Minister of
Correctional Services & Others, 130 the collective agreement between the
applicant/union and the respondent/employer provided that "every employee has the
right to be represented by a fellow employee of his choice, or a representative of his
employee organisation (shop steward) and a union official, should he so wish." It was
held that the inference to be drawn from this stipulation in the collective agreement is
that as there is no other form of representation allowed except for representation by a
fellow employee or shop steward, no other right to representation was intended to be
conferred at such an enquiry. According to Jali AJ, if the employee accused of
misdeeds feels that the charges are complex and that there is need for legal
representation, or that justice would only be done by having legal representation, the
appropriate remedy for the accused would be to raise this issue with the chairman of
the disciplinary enquiry.131
However, common sense and fairness dictate that where the employer is represented
by a legal practitioner in a disciplinary proceeding, it is only equitable that the
employee be allowed such representation as well. The issues in Blaauw v Oranje
Soutwerke (Pty) Ltd132 present an interesting dimension to the problem. The
en1ployee had been "prosecuted" in the disciplinary enquiry by a qualified attorney.
When the employee's attorney applied to represent her at the enquiry, the application
was turned down by the chairman and the employee was unrepresented throughout the
enquiry. To further complicate the employer's already weak case was the fact that the
'prosecutor'/attorney was the wife and partner in a law firm of the attorney to the
employers. Hambidge C found this arrangement not only capable of creating "the
impression of bias" since as the wife and partner of the attorney to the employer, she
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had an interest in the outcome of the disciplinary enquiry but also the failure to allow
the employee to be represented by an attorney rendered the employee "automatically"
to "a disadvantage". Justice was not seen to be done. To further strengthen the case
for legal representation in this instance was the fact that the employee was a manager
and no other senior member of staff was available to represent her. 133
The question is: can a he~ing, investigation or enquiry be invalidated because the
. f hi h· ?134 Inemployer refused the employee a representatIve 0 s own c OIce.
. 135 h d· h h· h· hMotswenyane v Rockface PromotIons, t ere was no Ispute as to t e eanng w IC
the employee conceded was properly conducted both prior to the dismissal and on
appeal but it was contended that it was "amazing" in this day and age that the
company should have refused the employee's union's request to represent the
employee at the appeal hearing and that the employee should not be limited in her
choice of representative to a fellow employee as was the company's policy in this
matter. The company's policy is that an employee in an internal hearing can only be
represented by a fellow employee and not by an outside organisation such as a trade
union or legal firm. It was argued for the employee that the company's refusal to
allow union representation at the hearing and the appeal rendered the employee's
dismissal procedurally unfair. Rejecting the employee's argument which was
unsubstantiated by evidence, Marcus C held that this practice is not uncommon in the
South African industry and was not found to be "intrinsically unfair by our labour
courts in the past as long as the employee is afforded the right of representation by at
least a fellow employee (as was accorded to Ms Motswenyane in the present case). I
do not believe the code of good practice alters this position. 136 "There may be
instances where an arbitrator might find that to exclude union representation or even
legal representation for internal hearings would be unfair, but this was not such a case
where there was nothing to suggest that the employee was not afforded the
opportunity of a fair hearing in which to present her case. Her dismissal was held to
be procedurally fair. An employee is left in no better stead where his union
representative walks out and the hearing is held in his absence.,,137 It was thus held
that when the representative walked out of the office, he had no intention of
proceeding with the hearing. Nor did he attend when given a later starting time. In so
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doing, the union waived its right to state a case in defence of the charges against the
employee. The company might have re-scheduled the hearing for another date, and
its insistence on proceeding may have been rather hasty, but that, in itself, does not
. render the disnlissal procedurally unfair. 138
Some of the other cases decided by the South African labour court. have agaIn
clarified the position of the court with regard to the right to representation either by a
union representative or a legal representative. The court has sent out mixed messages
around this issue. Cmneron, for instance, states that the decision in the National
Union of Mineworkers v East Rand Gold & Uranium Co 139 seems anomalous and.
unacceptable. The applicants accused of assault wished to be represented by a union
official. This was refused despite a written assurance that "in terms of company
policy you are entitled to a representative of your choice if you so wish." The
company went even further and disallowed the request of an employee to be
represented by his co-accused. Cameron states that these rulings constituted a gross
dereliction of elementary procedural fairness.' The refusal to grant the applicants any
relief on the basis that they were not too insistent about representation moved
Cameron to say that the court's approach to justify its decision was 'feeble. tl40
In NUM & Another v Kloof Gold Mining Co Ltd,141 the need for a representative to
assist an accused at a disciplinary enquiry was described as "an elementary element of
justice," especially where workers are uneducated or illiterate. Further in the opinion
of the IC, even an educated employee who may not be familiar with disciplinary
procedures·or may not be sufficiently articulate to defend himself is entitled to have a
representative. However where the employee decides that he does not require
representation. the procedure will not be unfair. 142
In SAA WU ~ Another v Sleiner Services (Pty) Lld, 143 a hearing was held to be unfair,
inter alia, because the employer h~d not informed the employee subject to a
disciplinary hearing that she was entitled to be assisted by a fellow employee. The
enlployer should generally inform the employee of his right to be represented. If the
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employer declines to bring a representative, the employer, however IS under no
bl·· ·d 144o IgatIon to proVI e one.
. In NET/VU v Durban Deep Wholesale Meat145 the CCMA referred to the presence of
the applicant's representative, as an argument supporting procedural fairness. By
these recommendations of the CCMA, the perception is created that should the
applicant be denied the support of a representative, this would suggest procedural
unfairness. The right to assistance is in my view essential since the employee is
generally nervous, under pressure and may find it difficult to articulate himself. He
may feel intimidated and therefore find it hard to argue his case well, especially in the
presence of a hostile and/or biased chairperson.
After analysing the facts of numerous cases decided on the question of legal
representation in Mauritius and South Africa, one may deduce that Mauritius has
expressly advocated for legal representation, whereas, South Africa feels that this is a
contentious issue. But although there is a statutory provision for allowing legal
representation in disciplinary hearings in Mauritius, the court has not amply analysed
the exigencies under such legal representation would become an essential requirement
for procedural fairness. Thus, supplementing the labour statutes, the court in
Mauritius should give a clear direction on those exigencies which would make legal
representation during pre-dismissal hearings an absolute necessity.
In South Africa, the law has not developed to the extent where "the right to legal
representation can be regarded as a fundamental right required by the demands of
natural justice and equity." 146 Van Zyl J stated in this regard:
"There is certainly no absolute rig/It to legal representation in our law, to
the best of my knowledge, although I am of the opinion that, where an
enlployee faces the threat ofa serious sanction such as dismissal, it may, in
the circumstances, be advisable that he be permitted the representative of
his choice. ,,147
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This approach certainly points to the direction that an employee when choosing a
'representative of his choice', has the option of choosing an attorney as well. But Van
Zyl J cautions on the use of this right under exceptional circumstances such as "~eat
.of serious sanction such as dismissal." The question then will be what are those
exceptional circumstances which will warrant the use of legal representation in pre-
dismissal hearing? In this regard guidance may be found in English and Indian
judicial decisions which have persuasive elements advocating the right to legal
representation in complex and difficult issues. 148 The reasonings expressed in the
various court decisions in England and India may provide some useful guidance
which, may be at convenience, adapted to suit the systems prevailing in Mauritius and
South Africa. It is to be noted that in these countries as well, the normal rule that
prevails during a departmental proceeding is that, one cannot claim as a matter of
right that one should be allowed to be represented by a lawyer. But in cases of
exceptional nature where there are large number of charges, voluminous records, the
severity of the charge and the events leading to it and taking into account the
education and experience of the employee, the help of a lawyer may be allowed.
In Pelt v Greyhound Racing Association149 Lord Denning said:
The plaintiff is here facing a serious charge...if lie is found guilty, lie may
be suspended or his licence may not be renewed The charge concerns his
reputation and his livelihood On such an enquiry, I think tllat lie is
entitled not only to appear by IIimselfbut also to appoint an agent to act for
hin,. Evell a prisoner can have hisfriend. .. Once it is seen that a man IIas a
right to appear by an agent, tllen I see no reason why tllat agent should not
be a lawyer. It is not every man wllo IIas tile ability to defend himself on
his OWIl. He cannot bring out the points in his own favour or the weakness
in the other side. He nlay be tongue-tied or nervous, confused or wanting
ill intelligence. He cannot examine or cross-examine witnesses. We see it
everyday. A nzagistrate says to a man: "You can ask any questions you
like"; whereupon the nlan immediately starts to make a speecll. lfjustice is
to be done, he ought to have the help ofsomeone to speakfor him; and who
is better than a lawyer who IIas been trained for the task? I should have
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thought, therefore, tllat when a man's reputation or livelihood is at stake,
he not only has a right to speak by his own mouth. °He has also a right to
k b I /
.. 150spea ~ counse or so ICltor.
Lord Denning said that "much water has passed under the bridges," 151 since 1929
when Maugham J., expressed, a different view in McClean v Workers' Union 152 that
before domestic tribunals, counsel has no right of audience. Lord Denning said that
this dictum may be correct when confined to tribunals dealing with mino~ matters
where the rules may properly exclude legal representation. He cited as an example,
Re McQueen and Nottingham Caledonian Society,153 where a dispute between a
o member of a friendly society and the managing members thereof respecting a claim
on the sick fund was under the rules of the society referred to three arbitrators.
The claimant wanted to be represented by counsel, which the arbitrators refused. In
these circumstances, the court held that under the Friendly Societies Act, the
arbitrators could decline to hear counsel. Lord Denning further went on to say:
"The dictum in McClean's case does not apply, however, to tribunals
dealing with matters which affect a man's reputation or livelihood or any
matters of serious import. Natural justice tllen requires that he can be
defended, ifhe wishes, by counsel or solicitor. ,,154
III India the attitude of the court has been similar to the opinion expressed by Lord
Demling. For instance in the case of Nitya Ranjan v State the Orissa High Court held
that the principle involved in legal representation before such disciplinary enquiries
was that:
Though in a departmental inquiry the delinquent public servant may not be
entitled as ofright to legal assistance to defend himself, nevertheless, there
may be special circumstances connected with the case - such as complexity
offacts, volunles of evidence, the educational attainments and experience
of the public servant etc. which may show that without legal assistance he
will not be able to adequately cross-examine the witnesses or to establish
his innocence. In such circulllfta.nces, denial of legal assistance may be
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equivalent to denial of "reasonable opportunity" within the meaning of
Art. 311(2) and the entire proceeding is liable to be quashed 155
. In the instant case, the court allowed the petitioner's contention that he had been
denied a reasonable opportunity of defending himself in consequence of the refusal of
the tribunal holding the inquiry against him to allow him to be represented by a legal
practItIoner. The petitioner was comparatively a junior officer of the forest
department and was in service for about six years before the departmental inquiry was
started against him. The total number of witnesses examined was 91. The number of
documents exhibited was 166. The deposition of witnesses alone ran into 437 pages
and the written stateInent of the petitioner consisted of 25 volumes. The report of the
tribunal ran into 139 typewritten pages. The charges dealt with criminal breach of
trust, falsification of accounts and forgery. The court held that in the circumstances of
the case the petitioner did not have intellectual attainments and experience to enable
him adequately to cross-examine witnesses. Besides, the prosecution was conducted
by an experienced prosecutor and, therefore, the denial of a lawyer in the instant case
was held to be denial of reasonable opportunity to the petitioner.
In another case. Dr Janendra Nath v State ofOrissa 156 applying its own earlier dictum
the Orissa High Court held that the refusal by the disciplinary tribunal of legal
assistance to the petitioner in the circumstances of the case did not amount to denial
of reasonable opportunity. The court referred to the fact that the petitioner had his
education abroad and was fairly senior in age (it is not mentioned in the report how
old he was), that the charges of misconduct were simple in nature; that he elaborately
cross-examined the witnesses for the prosecution and gave a long explanation meeting
each one of the charges and the evidence connected therewith.
But there are instances where a disciplinary authority is dealing with matters affecting
a man's reputation and livelihood or any matters of serious import, then, undoubtedly
natural justice would require that he can be defended, if he wishes, by a lawyer. It is
important therefore, to discuss those exceptional circumstances where legal
representation would be required. Reference to a few Indian cases will definitely go a
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long way to identify the criteria involved before one would assess the viability of the
presence of a lawy-er in and adjudicative proceeding. (It is to be noted that the Indian
cases deal with civil servants, but they are equally applicable to private sector
employees).
1. If the prosecution is conducted by an experienced lawyer:
In Nitya Ranjan v State 157 9ne of the additional grounds on which the court said that
the petitioner should have been given legal assistance at the departmental proceedings
was because the prosecution was conducted by an experienced police officer who was
well acquainted with criminal court work. Therefore, in the circumstances the refusal
amounted to a denial of reasonable opportunity under article 311(2).
The Supreme Court in Jagannath Prasad v State of Uttar Pradesh
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also examined
the facts in determining whether denial of legal assistance to the petitioner would
amount to denial of reasonable opportunity in that particular case. It was alleged by
the petitioner that the case for the prosecution was conducted by a lawyer whereas he
was not allowed to appear by counsel. To this the court observed that the person who
appeared on behalf of the prosecution was not a practising lawyer and anyway he did
not take any part in the examination of witnesses or cross-examination.
Therefore, it would appear that if the civil servant's impeachment was entrusted to an
officer acquainted with court work or someone with legal qualifications the request
for permission to appoint counsel in defence may not be unreasonable as its refusal
may greatly embarrass the defence. In James Bushi v Collector ofGanjam 159 it was
argued for the petitioner that when he was denied legal help the authority conducting
the case against him should have also been denied legal help and both parties should
have been put on an equal footing. This argument was based on article 14 of the
Constitution. The petitioner who was head clerk of the civil supplies branch of
Ganjam collectorate was charged with corruption and was finally dismissed from
service. It was admitted that the evidence against the petitioner at the departmental
proceedings was marshalled by a C.LD. inspector but the court held that the officer
was not familiar with conducting cases in criminal courts, as is the case with court-
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sub-inspectors or prosecuting inspectors. If, as a fact, the proceedings against the
petitioner had been conducted by a court-sub-inspector or by a prosecuting inspector,
the court held that:
There may be some justification for holding that the denial oflegal help to
the petitioner may amount to unfair discrimination and as such offend
1 if l C
.. 160Art. 4 0 t le onstltutlon.
Moreover, the court also took into account the fact that the petitioner was not an
illiterate .layman but an experienced member of the staff of Ganjam collectorate who
had worked for 13 years in several branches of that office. So, in the absence of
further materials, the court refused to hold that the petitioner had been prejudiced in
his defence by the mere refusal of the enquiring officer to afford him legal assistance.
2. If the Enquiry officer is a lawyer
The facts in S.Harjit Singh v J G.Police, Punjab 161 were as follows: The petitioner
was a head constable in the Punjab police. One B.S. registered a case against three
persons for abducting his daughter. The petitioner was entrusted with the
investigation of the case and he exonerated two of the three persons. When B.S.
learnt this. he became inimical towards the petitioner and the report says he "resolved
to harm him."162 A complaint was consequently made by B.S. with the deputy
superintendent of police alleging demand and receipt of illegal gratification by the
petitioner. Thereupon, the petitioner was charged with nlisbehaviour towards the
deputy superintendent of police and departmental proceedings were initiated. At the
enquiry, the petitioner requested that the enquiry officer being a law graduate, he
should also be permitted to engage a counsel. This request was disallowed. After
some days, the inquiry was transferred to another more senior police officer. On his
report finally, the petitioner was dismissed from service. Regarding representation by
counsel DuaJ.. had this to say:
lA] person against whom a departmental enquiry is held has no inherent
right to be represented by a professional lawyer and that there is no rule of
naturaljustice conferring such a right. Ifthe statutory rule governing such
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enquiries gives such a right then the effect ofits non-compliance would be
governed by the language of the rule itself. But apart from such a
provision, as at present advised, I do not find it easy to persuade myself to
hold that merely because an employee has not been afforded the facility of
being represented by a projessionallawyer the enquiry against him must be
. I· ,I' l l·r I· t· 163struck down as VIO atlve oJ t le ru e oJ natura Jus Ice.
With due respect, several, objections can be raised with regard to this judgment.
Firstly, to the request that the petitioner should be allowed to be represented by
counsel because the enquiry officer had a law degree, the court did not say anything.
However, it -is submitted that only on this ground it may not be necessary to hold that
the petitioner should be represented by counsel - the enquiry officer is not to take
sides with either party and if at all, his legal training may help to conduct the case
impartially and justly. In Union ofIndia v Kula Chandra l64 the district magistrate was
the person appointed to conduct the departmental enquiry against the respondent who
had been charged with conspiracy to cheat the government of large sums of money.
.At the enquiry the respondent's request to be represented by a lawyer was turned
down.
Therefore, it would appear that whether the enquiry officer is legally qualified or not
is not of consideration in the question whether the delinquent officer should be
represented by counsel.
The learned judge in Harjit Singh's case did not make any reference to the facts of the
case as the other courts 165 had done to see if the denial of the assistance of a lawyer to
the civil servant in the circumstances was denial of reasonable opportunity within
article 311 (2). The report says that B.S. resolved to harm the petitioner because he
was annoyed at t~e way the latter had carried out his professi0Il:al duty and so lodged
a complaint that he had accepted a bribe. It is somewhat difficult to see the
connection from here that thereafter the petitioner was charged with misbehaviour
towards the deputy superintendent of police. However, it is submitted that since the
possibility of a false charge was there, from a complainant who had become inimical
towards the petitioner because of the way the latter carried out his duty, this is surely
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one of the cases where help of counsel ought to have been given to the civil servant
.who would have been better equipped, by cross-examination mainly, to cast doubts on
the truth of the charges. The court flatly denying that the officer had a right. to
counsel without looking at the circumstances of the case and to see if such denial was
reasonable within article 311(2) is, it is submitted, wrong and should not be"followed.
Also, to deny legal assistance before such quasi-judicial tribunals without looking into
the merits of the case is almost like saying that a surgical operation should be done
only by a person not qualified in surgery.
Another objection to the judgment of Dua,J., is that, if there was a statutory rule
governing such enquiries giving such a right, then that right would be governed by the
language of that rule. It is submitted, that a statutory rule cannot detract from the
constitutional guarantee given to the civil servant under article 311 (2) of having a
reasonable opportunity to defend. Somanatha Iyer,J., in Muniswamy v State of
Mysore said:
The constitutional duty to afford an opportunity which conforms to the
required standard of reasonableness not being discretionary but
nzandatory, that inlperative duty cannot by a rule be transformed by the
Goyernor into a discretionary function. 166
Therefore, if there is a service rule in point, it would govern the situation, but the rule
itself must not be repugnant to the provisions of article 311 (2) of the Constitution.
3. If the Employee is legally Qualified.
If the charge is against a member of the judicial service, then can he still claim to be
represented by a lawyer? There are two interesting decisions, one of the Calcutta
High Court and the other of the Orissa High Court on the point.
In Nripendra Nath v Chief Secretary, Govt. of West Bengal,167 the public servant
concerned who was dismissed from service was a senior member of the state judicial
service and an additional district judge towards the end of his career of service
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extending over a quarter of a century. Nevertheless, the majority of the judges held
that the denial of legal help to him, even for the limited purpose of taking notes, while
the departmental proceedings were going on, of inquiry into eleven charges against
him, was tantamount to denial of an adequate opportunity to defend himself. In
coming to this conclusion, they were mainly influenced by the volume of the
deposit~ons and number of witnesses and documents in the case. Bose,J., who
dissented from the majority opinion on this point, based his view mainly on the
following:
The petitioner was himself an experienced judicial officer sufficiently
conversant with law and the practice and procedure of conducting cases
and so he was not as helpless as he represented himselfto be.168
As pointed out by Bose,J., it would have been sufficient in this case to engage a
stenographer who could have taken more copious notes than what a junior lawyer as
requested by the petitioner would have taken down if it was only for taking notes of
depositions adduced by the prosecution.
In Braja Kishore v State of Orissa169 the Orissa High Court held that no special
circumstances existed in this case for assistance of a lawyer to the public servant. The
court referred to the fact that the delinquent public officer held a law degree and he
had been a munsiff and a subordinate judge of the state judicial service for more than
10 years. He was asked to compulsorily retire from service as a result of the
departmental proceeding. The facts of the case were not unduly complex especially
for a judicial officer, the court said, because the charges dealt with specific instances
of bribery., irregularity in the holding of trials in civil suits and purchasing a car
without the necessary permission from the government. Although the Calcutta case
had been cited before the Orissa High Court, the latter case did not deal with it on this
point.
These two cases show how differently the courts can interpret almost similar facts,
where judicial officers have been charged, to the requirement of legal representation.
Of course. it is clear. especially to a lawyer, t~at every case can be distinguished from
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another on the facts. However, some uniformity of approach so as to make the law
more certain is desirable rather than each case depending on its particular facts only.
4. Arguing the case Oneself
Another ground for enlargement of the opportunity to be given to the government
servant to be represented by a lawyer is that the civil servant concerned who is so
much involved in his own case may not be able to look at the facts from a distance as
it were, and present the case properly. This is what an American judge had to say in
170one case:
Petitioner tried his own case. He introduced no evidence, except to make a
fonnal statement which unfortunately, we find far from clear. This
perhaps illustrates the fact that a party who tries his own case is like a man
cutting his own hair - in a poor position to appraise what he is doing.
Lord Denning in the Pett case had also said, "fairness may require an oral hearing; and
. h I h . h I I . ,,171WIt an ora eanng, t en ega representatIon.
The Allahabad High Court l72 has held that personal hearing includes a right to argue
the case and that personal hearing at the inquiry stage is part of the reasonable
opportunity guaranteed under the Constitution. Personal hearing enables the authority
concerned to watch the demeanor of the witnesses and the party appearing to persuade
the authority by reasoned argument to accept his point of view.
Therefore. if oral hearing must be given to the civil servant at the inquiry stage, then
following Lord Denning's reasoning, legal representation also follows. This, it is
submitted, is sound reasoning, because, as already mentioned earlier, the person
charged may become tongue-tied or nervous or be not otherwise competent to make
personal representation or cross-examination, so that assistance of the lawyer, if he so
desires. ought to be given as of right.
Also. in such cases, where a civil servant has a right to be heard and to show cause, to
call witnesses and cross-examine witnesses, get the relevant documents and marshall
the evidence and where he has to do these himself without the aid of counsel, this
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right may prove quite illusory except in the simplest of cases. Where some
knowledge of law and legal art is required, the courts recognize that a lay person
cannot meet the case in the court himself and provision is made for appointment of
counsel in undefended criminal cases or as amicus curiae or where persons sue in
forma pauperis. Therefore, on principle, it is submitted that unless there are
considerations of public policy, over-riding the claims of natural justice in any
particular class of matter~, the assistance of counsel is necessary if a reasonable
opportunity is to be given to a civil servant to meet the case against him. 173
5. Reservations about the consequences of the Disciplinary Action
In Dr K.S Rao v State,174 the petitioner had been removed from service on the ground
that he had disobeyed government orders and stayed away from duty and also that he
had cast unwarranted aspersions on the integrity, independence and judgement of the
medical board. At the enquiry, he had requested to be represented by counsel but this
was refused. The Andhra Pradesh High Court held that:
Rightly or wrongly when the petitioner was under a reasonable
apprehension that the enquiry was the result ofa preconceived plan and a
concerted action on the part of the Medical Department, his request for
professional help was certainly justified and the enquiry officer should
have given him that opportunity. His refusal to accede to that simple
request has certainly deprived the petitioner in the circumstances of the
case ofall opportunity to defend himself./75
It is submitted that this view is correct and it may be noted that the court did not go
into the facts of the case - whether they were complicated or not, the number of
witnesses and so on - but instead said that from the point of view of the petitioner, it
was a serious matter which affected his official career and which might, as indeed had
happened in the case under reference, result in his dismissal from service.
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Thus an employee against whom disciplinary action is to be taken, which entails any
of the serious punishments of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, should not by
judicial interpretation be given a narrow scope. The right to reasonable opportunity
cannot also as a rule be detracted from. Legal representation, if he so desires, to the
civil servant against whom disciplinary action is taken, should not be denied to him
by the courts saying that he can by his age, experience, the number of witnesses,
nature of evidence and charges effectively conduct his own defence. This is not
taking into account the serious consequences of the disciplinary action, viz, the fact
that in a case where a civil servant's livelihood and reputation is at stake, where for
example he is about to be dismissed after long years of service on certain charges, he .
wants to get the maximum possible help and succour from all available sources - and
surely a competent lawyer to present his case is a friend to whom, at least the courts
themselves should not deny him access. It is submitted that the courts should, in the
interpretation of article 311 (2), lean more in favour of legal representation in such
cases, than give it a restrictive meaning because to err on this wider meaning would
be less harmful in the circumstances. Besides, one must also not forget that a lawyer
would be an important actor in the stage of a "life and death" drama which the civil
servant is trying to enact against a powerful collosus, viz, the government machinery
who has all the brains, power and finances at its disposal.
To make this important plea for legal representation depend finally in each case on the
way the court would review the facts would mean, that a civil servant who has already
been punished, will go through another expensive and protracted case in the courts to
vindicate his rights. On principle, therefore, it is submitted that unless there are over
riding claims of public policy in any class of matters, which must be laid down, it is
necessary to give the civil servant a right to be represented by counsel and the law
should be suitably amended and made clear on this point.
The principles emerging from these d~cisions can, without doubt, assist Mauritius and
South Africa in the formulation of a substantive basis for a more programmed action,
either through legislative enactments or case law, towards making legal representation
in disciplinary proceedings a constructive strategy to bring relief to employees who
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need assistance in exceptional circumstances, especially when hislher livelihood is at
stake. In fact, both through the instrumentality of section 32 (2) (b) of the Labour Act
and Section 3 (3) (a) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act respectively
formally recognised the significance of legal representation as a cornerstone of
procedural fairness within the context of dismissed due to misconduct.
4.2.7 Right to Disciplinary Decision free from Bias
This requirement embodies the principle of procedural fairness expressed by the
maxim' ne~o index in sua causa' which means no man should be a judge in his own
cause. The Rt.Hon. Lord Mackay of Clashfern summarises this requirement in the
following manner.
"The chiefobjects ofcourts ofjustice must be to secure that justice is done
and the idea ofjustice contemplates at least an independent, impartial and
nOIl-partisan judge... It is ofcourse vitally important that judges should be
able to decide for and against the executive in all its branches according to
the nlerits of the case without any influence whatever from the executive,
except in the forn, ofsubmissions put before the judge in accordance with
the principles of natllral justice with an opportunity for them to be
countered by any opposing party. ,,176
In the concept of impartiality ofjustice lies the foundation of the law of Bias which in
its wider sense means that no one acting judicially should have, or appear likely to
have, a bias 177 in favour of one side or the other. As an intrinsic requirement of the
administration ofjustice, it is "rooted in confidence and confidence is destroyed when
right-minded people go away thinking that the judge was biased. 178
Grogan points out that the rule against bias in administrative law requires that an
officer presiding at a disciplinary hearing not only be impartial, but also that there
should be no grounds for suspecting that his decision might be shaped by extraneous
.c. 'f h·· h 179lactors, even 1 t IS IS not t e case. In employment law the requirement seems to be
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that the 'presiding officer should not be involved in the incident which gave rise to the
h
. 180eanng.
Thus it has long been established that the rule against bias applies to "every person
who undertakes to administer justice, whether he is a legal officer or is o'nly for the
. k fd ·d· th . h f th ,,181occasion engaged In the wor 0 eCI Ing e ng ts 0 0 ers.
We are concerned here with industrial and social justice, and dismissal from
employment not only involves decision of some sort especially when it involves
dismissal for misconduct or incapacity, dismissal consequent there from involves the
imposition of the ultimate sanction which had aptly been described as "akin to capital
punishment in criminal law" 182 for it takes away the employee's means of livelihood
and completely crushes him economically. It therefore involves a decision affecting a
right to work, the right to earn a living and a determination of right. Such a
determination must at least respect the elementary principles of procedural decencies
at common law.
In Mauritius and South Africa this requirement is unquestionable whenever the issue
relates to the disposition of the person investigating the misconduct of an employee.
The Supreme Court of Mauritius, in very unqualified terms stated:
"There is no doubt, however, that the very purpose ofthis provision ofthe
Labour Act Section 32(2)(a), requires that the hearing should take place
with fairness. We do not think that the purpose ofthe law isfulfilled where
four Ollt of the five members of the Disciplinary Committee were either
victims or else the imnlediate witnesses of the alleged insubordination.
Witnesses and victims of an alleged offence cannot be expected to assume
the nzantle of adjudicators, however hard they may try to split tlleir
personality and exercise their integrity in determining whether these
offences took place or not. We do not think, therefore, that the trial court
was wrong in holding, if only for tltis reason, that the dismissal of the
respondent was unjustified ,,183
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From this decision of the court, it leaves no doubt, that there is a duty on the decision-
maker, in the present case, the employer, to comply with the rule against bias or any
likelihood of bias. The witnesses in the present case had become personally interested
in the subject matter of the case, and, therefore, in the interest ofjustice, fair play and
equity, it is inconsistent with proper administration ofjustice.
Just like Mauritius, the non inclusion in the Code and Labour Act of the requirement
that the chairperson investigating against the employer or the chairperson of the
disciplinary hearing should conduct the proceedings in good faith, does not mean that
this important aspect of natural justice is thereby excluded from the South African
Labour jurisprudence for it is implicit in the requirement that the party against whom
the disciplinary charges have been brought should be afforded the opportunity to state
hislher case, such a case could only be fairly stated if it is addressed to a body or
person or tribunal that is constituted in such a manner as to ensure its independence
and impartiality. The all-embracing principle of opportunity to state a case or of
acting fairly or indeed of procedural fairness generally, is elastic enough to embody
the obligation on the part of the person conducting the enquiry to place himself in
such a position that he is manifestly and undoubtedly disposed to receive the
employee's testimony and generally conduct the proceedings with an open mind.
Such a person or body must be purged of all prejudices, bias and partiality against the
party appearing before him of whom he has to decide his guilt or innocence
unfortunately because of its segregated and closed shop policies, the employees in
South Africa were comparatively more sensitive to the notion of bias than in
Mauritius. In BTR Industries SA (Ply) Ltd & Others v Metal & Allied Workers Union
and another,184 Hoexter lA depicts how the South African industrial relations is
marked by dishannony and mutual distrust:
"We are dealing with a highly sensitivejield. The relationship between the
managenlent and workers in this country and many others has historically
been tense and strained for much of the time. In a relationship that is
characterised by a high degree of mutual suspicion, at times of acrimony
and hostility, and understanda~le reasons in that there are fundamental
conflicts of interest between ma~agement and workers, or at the very least
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what are perceived by them as beingfundamental conflicts ofinterest. The
industrial legislation recognises all this. It recognises that this is not an
area in which one easily gets people to see the other side's point of view,
that it is not an area in which one easily gets give and take, that it is an
area in which people are highly partisan, in which they tend to see matters
. dfi l' • if' 1,,1asin their own Interests an rom t,lelr own pOint 0 view on y.
With such a historical background, the employer in South Africa has to be careful to
ensure that the hearing is run in such a way as to place it above suspicion of actual
partiality, however, with reference to numerous decisions of the industrial court one
can easily see how wisely the feeling of bias has been counteracted. Wherever, if it
appeared "that there is, or is to say a probability of (actual) bias on the part of the
decision maker or adjudicator," 186 the court has nullified those deCisions.
Take for example, the case of Ntsibande v Union Carriage & Wagon Co (Pty) LtdI87
where the chairperson admitted that when he was approached to chair the disciplinary
hearing, he was shocked to learn that the applicant whom he knew too well had been
disobedient and that he least expected such conduct from him. Bulbilia DP held that
this \.vould imply that the chairperson had already formed a perception as to the
applicant's guilt and this fact alone, if known at the time, could have disqualified him
from presiding over the hearing. 188
The chairperson of the enqUIry must conduct himself in such a manner that his
impartiality cannot be doubted by the accused employee or for that matter by an
officious bystander. "the legal fiction of the reasonable man...the hypothetical
reasonable man,,189who. observing the proceedings, would go away concluding that
the chairman was not disinterested and impartial and ought not sit to hear the
matter.
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The chairperson must not by his conduct I91 or utterances I92 betray his
prejudice towards one side or the other in the dispute or allow his personal knowledge
or feelings to impair his sense of judgement thereby rendering himself incapable of
assessing the evidence tendered in a rational manner. 193 It is well established common
law norm that a person closely associated with a matter in terms of financial or
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personal interest or relationship or previous knowledge of the subject matter of the
dispute be disqualified to sit in judgement over such matter. 194
Even though the rule against bias is "a cornerstone of any fair and just legal
system" 195 a sine qua non of fair hearing in both criminal and civil cases in the courts
of law as well as administrative tribunals, as it is too well-known in Commonwealth
public law, 196 may not nec~ssarily be applicable in its full strength, and perhaps may
never be rigidly applied in the employment sphere given the infonnal setting of
disciplinary panels in business undertakings, and sometimes too, the existence of
structural departmental bias or prejudice,197yet, there remains the basic requirement
that some form of detachment or independence be maintained between the
chairperson of the enquiry and management. 198 What has been said elsewhere199 may,
with respect, be repeated here with equal effect: "The rule against bias in the
adjudicatory process...contemplates that the membership of a tribunal hearing or
investigating an allegation of wrong doing on the part of any person must be such that
it would not have any interest in the outcome of the investigation, enquiry or
adjudication. Members of the panel must be seen to be independent, impartial and not
prejudiced in favour or against one party or the other.2oo Or simply put, the person
taking the disciplinary decision should not be biased 201 or appear to be SO.202 He/she
should enter into the proceedings with an open mind203 so that the enquiry should not
appear to be an attempt to whitewash what was a decision already taken.204 The
person taking on the investigation must not be the accuser or witness to the facts
sought to be established. 205 The haring must not be conducted in such 'a domineering
and highhanded way' that the bona fides and complete impartiality of the conductor is
put to question.
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It is always preferable that the person who conducts the
proceedings should make the decision himself and not delegate or abdicate that role to
some superior officer or management. ,,207
A chairperson need not necessarily recuse himself or herself from presiding over the
disciplinary proceedings simply because the employee requests him/her to do SO.208
Evidence of bias or reasonable suspicion of it must be shown on the part of the
chairperson of the enquiry to support an application for recusal. It is not sufficient to
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allege that he/she is of a different racial group from that of the accused since the
differences in race do not per se suggest that even-handed justice could not thereby be
administered by a member of a racial group as against the other 209 Of course, the
application for recusal \vill be treated differently if, through his conduct, actions or
utterances, the presiding officer is known to have harboured racial prejudices.
Refusal of an application for an adjournment is in itself not a ground to apply for
recusal nor would these two factors put together support an allegation of bias.2lO For
as Zondo J (now AJP) put it in Afrox Ltd v Laka & Others211 where it was contended
that the arbitrator lacked impartiality:"...the test for bias is the existence of a
reasonable suspicion of bias. The question therefore is whether, on the facts on which
the applicant relies, it can be said that the applicant's representatives at the arbitration
proceedings developed a reasonable suspicion of bias on the part of the fIfst
respondent. The suspicion of bias or impartiality must be one which might reasonably
have been entertained by a lay litigant in the circumstances of the applicant. If such a
suspicion could reasonably have been apprehended, the test of disqualifying bias is
satisfied. It is not necessary to show that the apprehension is that of a real likelihood
that the first respondent would be biased or was biased. ,,212 However, the
Constitutional Court, in the unusual application to rescue several of its members from
sitting in the controversial SARFU litigation, had indicated its preference for the test
of "apprehension of bias" to that of "suspicion of bias" in view of the "inappropriate
connotations which might flow from the use of the word 'suspicion"'. 213 The full
Court held that the test - which is an objective one - is whether a reasonable, objective
and infonne"d person would on the correct facts reasonably apprehend that the justice
in question' had not or would not bring an impartial mind to bear on the adjudication
of the case, that is, a mind that is open to persuasion by evidence and submissions of
counsel.
A person cat:m0t preside over an enquiry hearing or an appeal hearing in a situation
where he is a witness in that he was present when the officers of a security company
interrogated the employees who were accused of stealing and dealing in employer's214
property or where he had witnessed the incident leading to the charge against the
employee.
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In both instances, it was held that their impartiality must have been
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impaired since none of them could have entered into the hearing with an open mind
thus transgressing the revered principle of natural justice.216 In Goosen v Caroline's
Frozen Yoghurt Parlour (Pty) Ltd & Another,217 a tape recording evidence which was
"admitted in evidence showed that the chairperson of the enquiry, an attorney, held
discussions with two members of the company's management in respect of the
disciplinary matter before him. The Industrial Court accepted the employee's
allegation of bias on the part of the chairperson and held that the employee had not
been afforded an objective "and fair hearing. The chairperson had not acted in an
independent manner. He has collaborated with the company management, did not
keep an open mind and had acted mala fides. It also appeared that the company was
intent on getting rid of the employee and the disciplinary enquiry was a mere charade.
The court also dealt with certain cases where there was obviously no attempt by the
person chairing the enquiry to adhere to the basic tenets of natural justice. Such
indications have taken the form of notice of dismissal having been prepared and
signed prior to the employee being invited to state his case. Therefore in Nodlele v
Mount Nelson Hotel and another,218 the court took into account the "applicant's
appraisal of the meeting that the hotel had already decided to dismiss him." In NUM
and another v Kloof Gold Mining Co.Ltd, 219 the court found that the chairman of the
enquiry had taken a "jaundiced view of the case." The court said this was clear from
the record, which showed he had only taken into account factors which were
unfavourable to the employee. The court also found that his decision to dismiss had
been influenced by the fact that the union had called for a legal strike and the
employee was the chairman of the shaft stewards committee.
Again the courts have taken, to some extent, a conflicting approach to the problem of
bias in disciplinary procedures and Le Roux uses Sappi Fine Papers v Yumata and
others
22o
and Anglo American Farms v Konjwayo221 to illustrate this. In the Sappi
case certain employees, who had not taken part in a legal strike complained that
employees participating in the strike, had addressed threatening remarks to them.
Over a period of eight days the general manager of the mill conducted separate
hearings for each of the employees against whom complaints had been lodged. The
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result was that all these employees were dismissed. In the subsequent appeal the
general manager confinned the dismissals after rehearing all the witnesses. The
employees approached the industrial court, which found that they had been unfa~rly
dismissed. The employer appealed to the labour appeal court.
The employees argued that the procedures had been unfair on two grounds. The
pertinent argument was that the employees had been prejudiced as a result of the fact
that one manager had presided over all the disciplinary hearings and another over the
appeal hearings. The prejudice, that the employees were alleged to have suffered, was
based on the argument that the evidence against the employees was provided by three
or four witnesses who gave evidence at more than one of the disciplinary hearings.
The result was that once the evidence of one of the witnesses had been accepted at a
specific disciplinary hearing, the disciplinary committee could not reject the same
witness's evidence at any subsequent hearing. The committee could therefore not
approach the subsequent hearing with an open mind. The same applied to the general
manager who had heard all the appeals.
With the above in mind, the labour appeal court came to the conclusion that 'a
sufficient likelihood of bias for it to be said that the hearings were unfair and clearly
prejudiced flowed there from.' On the employee's argument that in the ordinary
courts presiding officers were not prevented from hearing a case merely because
witnesses would be heard who had already given evidence in another case, the court
said that trained judicial officers would not create the impression of bias. However,
where a lay-person such as a manager was faced with this type of situation 'such
observers may well gain the impression of bias. ,,222
In the Anglo American Farms v Konjwayo the labour appeal against the decision of
the industrial court which had held that a waiter had been unfairly dismissed for
stealing a can of cooldrink from the Boschendal restaurant. It was argued that the
manageress who chaired the enquiry had been biased due to her involvement in the
incident which resulted in the dismissal. She had questioned the dismissed employee
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on the alleged theft and heard his explanation. During the enquiry she had described
what she had seen and heard in connection with the case.
The court found that her involvement had been 'fairly peripheral' and had not
concerned any matter which had subsequently been placed in dispute by the
employee.223 Unlike the Sappi case the court found that an independent observer
would not reasonably have thought that the risk of an unfair detennination was
unacceptably high. The court also found that the discussion that was held between the
chairperson of the enquiry and her senior who had presided over the appeal hearing
was not procedurally incorrect. Neither was the fact that the group's industrial
relations manager who advised her of consequence.
Le Roux highlights a significant viewpoint in this case. He points out that at
disciplinary hearings presided over by laymen, it could not be expected that all the
niceties that a court of law would adopt would always be observed.2
24
There must be a realisation that in the employment relationship, there is always a
possibility of some prejudging having taken place due to the proximity of the parties.
Le Roux comments that the 'concept of an unbiased and disinterested judge hearing
the matter in splendid isolation from the parties, his mind unburdened by
preconceptions based on often intimate knowledge of the behaviour and attitudes of
the protagonists, is very difficult to apply in the employment sphere.'225
The foregoing illustrations notwithstanding, breaches of fair procedure do not in all
cases vitiate a hearing however trivial they may be.226 The split decision of the Labour
Appeal Court in Mondi Timber Products v Tope227 which can be contrasted with the
cases of Goosen and Moqolomo is authority for this proposition. It also suggests that
the rule against bias may be viewed from a less fonnal spectacle when it comes to
employment disciplinary enquiries. Like in Goosen, the chairperson in Mondi had on
at least two occasions caucused with members of the management team, to wit,228 the
operations manager and the human resources manager, before the employee was
found guilty of repairing his own motor vehi.cl~ at company expense and before his
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dismissal and the terms thereof were announced. It was the operations manager who
first confronted the employee with the allegation, he suspended the employee and
framed the charge-sheet. These two management personnel were present at the
enquiry. The Industrial Court found these circumstances to have been in breach of the
principles of fair procedure. The question before the Labour Appeal Court was
whether the operations manager should have been present during the caucuses at all.
Although Goldstein J thought that in an ideal situation, the operations manager ought
not to have been present during the caucuses, on the facts however, he came to the
conclusion that as the employee had admitted guilt, was "heard fully and fairly" and
on "a moral or value judgement as to what is fair in all the circumstances" there was
nothing that rendered his presence unfair. Since the facts alleged in the charge-sheet
were admitted, and the suspension justified, there was nothing unfair in the
participation of the operations manager in "these mechanical acts. ,,229
The courts have also stressed that given the inevitable interaction between such a
Presiding Officer and co-employees; and his involvement in the daily activities of the
company, it cannot be expected that such a Presiding Officer will maintain the same
state of isolation as a judge in the court of law.23o It therefore follows that the fact that
a Chairperson consults with the initiator would not necessarily render the dismissal
procedurally unfair due to bias. This would rather depend on whether such
consultation had the effect that the Chairman, in reaching his decision, did not
exercise his own discretion.
4.2.8 The Duty to Give Reasons
There is a lack of general consensus amongst the common law jurisdiction as to
whether or not time has arrived for making reasons for a decision a general duty at
common law. Some jurisdictions have been encouraging while others still believe
that the position at common law has not been altered and the deciding authority is not
. bl' d' 231.In anyway 0 Ige to give reasons. But SInce the modem view with regard to
administrative justice requires that the decision has to be reached after due
consideration of the merits of the dispute, uninfluenced by extraneous considerations
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of policy or expediency, statutory provisions have been made to remedy where the
common law has fallen short in influencing the concept of duty to give reasons.
Reference can be made to various statutes which have as their aim to improve the
adjudicatory process. In England, for instance, the importance of giving reasoned
decisions was recognised by the Donoughmore Committee as early as 1932.232 The
committee formulated the principle that a party is entitled to know the reasons for the
decision and recommended the acceptance of this principle as part of the doctrine of
natural justice. Nothing happened till the Franks Committee, reporting in 1957,
insisted that there should be a general practice that adjudicatory bodies give reasons
for their decisions.233 Accordingly, the obligation to give reasoned decisions was
imposed by the Council and Tribunal Act, 1958. But the reasons are to be given only
when demanded by the party concerned. In the United States of America, a similar
obligation is imposed by the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.234 In
India, the Law Commission in its Fourteenth Report relating to Reform in Judicial
Administration recommended:
"In the case of adnlinistrative decisions provisions should be made that
they should be accompanied by reasons. The reasons will make it possible
to test the validity ofthese decisions by the machinery ofappropriate writs. "
Accordingly the Administrative Tribunals Act 1985 has underlined that an
administrative authority should record its decisions. Supporting this provision the
Supreme Court of India in Travancore Rayons Lld v The Union235 of India observed
that the necessity to give sufficient reasons which disclose proper appreciation of the
problem to be solved. and the mental process by which the conclusion is reached in
cases where a non-judicial authority exercises judicial functions is obvious."
The Mauritian and the South African legal system have not been immune to the
expanding horizon of procedural fairness which requires over and above other
requirements~ the duty to provide reasons by an administrative authority for its
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decision. The Mauritian Constitution, in its Bill of Rights, has entrenched in Section
10(3) the following provision:
"Where a person is tried for any criminal offence, the accused person or any
person authorised by him on that behalf shall, if he so requires and subject to
any payment of such reasonable fee as may be specified by or under any law,
be given within a reasonable time after judgement a copy for the use of the
accused person of any record of the proceedings made by or on behalf of the
court."
This provision has a specific application in the Mauritian law of dismissal due to
misconduct. Section 112(d) of the Industrial Relations Act 1973 provides:
"details of any disciplinary action shall be given in writing to the
employees and, if he so wishes, to his workplace representative."
In the South African context reference can be made to three statutory provisions,
namely, Section 33(2) of the Constitution, Sections 3(2) and 5 of the Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act and Section 4(3) Schedule 8 of the Labour Relations Act
1995.
Section 33(2) of the constitution states:
Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action
has the right to be given written reasons.
Section 3(2)(e) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act reads:
In order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair administrative action, an
administrator...must give a person (whose rights and legitimate expectations
are m.aterially and adversely affected) ....
(e) adequate notice of the right to reql:lest reasons in tenns of Section 5 and Section 5
provides:
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5.(1) Any person whose rights have been materially and adversely affected by
administrative action and who has not been given reasons for the action may,
within 90 days after the date on which that person became aware of the action
or might reasonably have been expected to have become aware of the action,
request that the administrator concerned furnish written reasons for the action.
(2) The administrator to whom the request is made must, within 90 days after
receiving the request, give that person adequate reasons in writing for the
administrative action."
(3) If an administrator fails to furnish adequate reasons for an administrative
action it must, subject to subsection (4) and in the absence of proof to the
contrary, be presumed in any proceedings to judicial review that the
administrative action was taken without good reason.
More specific within the context of dismissal due to misconduct is Item 4(3) of
Schedule 8 of the Labour Relations Act which reads as follows:
If the employee is dismissed, the employee should be given the reason
for dismissal.
The nonn set by the statutory provisions of the various legal jurisdictions is that
fairness requires the additional procedural safeguard of reasons, so that the applicant
could know what issues the adjudicating authority had addressed and on what basis of
the fact it had reached its decision. Now that Mauritius and South Africa have
expressly provided in their respective Codes of Good Practice the duty to give
reasons, the employers are enjoined with the duty and responsibility to see to it that in
adjudicating disciplinary proceedings they adhere to reasoned decisions so that those
affected by the decisions are assured that their cases have received proper
consideration at the hands of the said authorities, and that such decisions have been
reached according to law and have not been a result of caprice, whim or fancy or have
been reached on ground of policy or expediency.236 Thus what the employer is
required by this requirement of procedural fairness is not a mere formality but to give
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the reasoned finding so that the employee may canvass the correctness of the decision
on appeal to a higher level of management or for judicial review. Therefore,
"The reasons, if disclosed, being open to judicial scrutiny for ascertaining
their nexus with the order•.. , the refusal to disclose the reasons would
equally be open to the scrutiny of tile court; or else, tile wholesome power
of a dispassionate judicial examination of the executive orders could with
;,npunity be set at naught by an obdurate determination to suppress the
reasons. Law cannot permit the exercise of a power to keep the reasons
undisclosed if tlte sole reason for doing so is to keep the reasons away from
. d· . I . ,,237JU ICla scrutiny.
This view of the court supports the general meaning contained in the Mauritian and
South African statutes. It may, however, be mentioned that unlike South Africa
where, under the general heading of 'just administrative action', a person who is
aggrieved or threatened by an adverse decision, the statute has made a clear and
unqualified provision for the right to be given written reasons', the Mauritian statute
does not have any specific provision that deals solely with 'just administrative action'
which are qualified as "lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair." The Mauritian legal
system has not put into place any structure as contained in the Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act which enjoins the decision maker to follow fair procedures
in arriving at a decision that is 'lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.' Though
constrained by lack of these provisions, the Mauritius Constitution Order 1966
providing for the Public Service Commission Regulations, 1967 has laid down
specific procedural approach when dealing with a public officer charged with
n1isconduct Section 39 reads:
"If the Secretary to the Council of Ministers or a responsible officer, after
having considered every report in his possession made with regard to a public
officer, is of the opinion, that it is desirable in the public interest that the
service of such public officer should be terminated on grounds which cannot
be suitably dealt with under any other provisions of these Regulations, he shall
notify the public officer, in writing, specifying the complaints by reason of
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which his retirement is contemplated together with the substance of any report
or part thereof that is detrimental to the public officer."
Within the content of this provision that the employees in the Mauritian public sector
have found an administrative process whereby the state becomes accountable for its
disciplinary actions and liable to judicial scrutiny. Similar protection is provided to
the private sector employees by section 112 of the Code of Good Practice in the
Mauritian Industrial Relations Act. The provisions of both statutes require reasons to
be given in support of a decision to dismiss an employee, and such a decision, may
without reason, be considered as wholly defective in the eye of the law.238
In South Africa Item 4(1) of the Code of Good Practice requires that 'after the
enquiry' the employer should notify the employee of the decision taken. Strydom
explains that:
"In terms of this guideline the employee must be informed of the verdict.
FurtlternlOre, if tlte employee is found guilty the employer must inform the
'3°enlployee ofthe penalty. ,,-
Thus to give validity to an employer's decision the modem administrative law
principles dictate that employers are bound to give reasons for dismissing an
employee. Procedural fairness therefore, demands as one of its requirements that an
applicant should have access to reasons for a decision and in the present context, the
employee needs to know whether the employer has acted lawfully, reasonably and
with procedural fairness, and whether the employee may have grounds for appeal or
judicial review.
Mauritian law of 'unjustified dismissal is deficient in appropriate cases dealing with
the issue of duty to give written reasons for dismissal. But in Mkize v JLR and Hay-
Yoon Enterprise,240 the l\rbitrator in South Africa found the dismissal was
procedurally unfair in that the employee was "not infonned that he had been found
guilty and thereafter given an opportunity to place mitigating factors before the
chainnan of the disciplinary enquiry."
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This decision of the CCMA lays to rest the sweeping argument that reasons which are
given after the decision has been made, cannot be required by natural justice or
fairness, which was only concerned with procedure at a hearing. This argument was
expressly rejected by McCowan LJ. in R. v Court Service Appeal Board, ex parte
Cunningham,241 who recognised that other procedural inputs such as "the opportunity
of a party to state his case would be nugatory of procedure for these purposes ended
with final speeches." He concluded that "the form of the recommendation is part of
. d b' h' f I . . ,,242the procedure of the hearIng an ."su ~ect to t e requIrements 0 natura JustIce.
Behind this reasonIng is the recognition that the law presumes that reasons are
formulated before a decision is made, and hence they do relate to the process by
which a decision was reached. This reasoning does not rely on the wider argument
that like other procedural requirements, a duty to give reasons may enhance the
quality of the decision by improving the way in which it was made, because a
decision maker \vho knows that he must explain his conclusion will be likely to reach
it more carefully. Thus the implications which can be drawn from a failure to give
reasons was described quite appropriately by Lord Keith in R v Secretary ofState for
Trade and Industry, ex parte Lourho:243
"Tlle absence ofreasons for decision... cannot ofitselfprovide any support
for suggested irrationality of the decision. Tlte only significance of the
absence for reasons is that if all other known facts and circumstances
appear to point overwhelmingly in favour of different. decision, the
decision-maker cannot cOff'plain if the court draws the inference that he
has had no rational reason for his decision.
It has also been observed that in the absence whether it is impossible to determine
whether or not there has been an error of law, hence "failure to give reasons amounts
to a denial of justice and is itself an error of law.244 The non giving of reasons would,
therefore, militate against the principle that justice should not only be done but should
manifestly be seen to be done.245
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Thus by mere insistence of the duty to give reasons in their statutes, Mauritius and
South Africa have- re-established not only a positive attitude towards the giving of
reasons in administrative decisions, but have also promoted the duty to give reasons,
especially, where the 'rights or legitimate expectations' of a person are affected.
Unfortunately, this area of the law being in its initial stage in both countries, it lacks
precedents through judicial decisions, and which needs to be applied with greater
consistency. However, since there is already statutory duty to give reasons in place,
the implication is that the decision of a deciding authority will be invalid for non-
compliance with this statutory requirement. Hence the court can compel the
adjudicating body to give reasons for its decisions. In this regard Wade246 wrote:
"...nevertheless there is a strong case to be made for the giving of reasons
as an essential element ofadministrative justice. The needfor it has been
sharply exposed by the expanding law ofjudicial review; now that so many
decisions are liable to be quashed or appealed against on the grounds of
improper purpose, irrelevant consideration and errors of law in various
kinds... "
It may be noted that an administrative decision may not contain reasons, but at least,
the record should disclose reasons.247 It is not required that reasons should be as
elaborate as in the decision of a court of law.248 The reason may be precise. It cannot
be laid down that an order is a non-speaking order simply because it is brief and not
elaborate.
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Every case has to be judged in the light of its own facts and
circumstances what is necessary in that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to
indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy.
The advantages that emanate from compliance with the duty to give reasons will
perhaps give the Mauritian and South African law of dismissal a further insight into
its serious application.
Firstly, this requirement acts as a restraint on the employer as an adjudicative
authority against any possibility of use of his/its power in an arbitrary manner.
Needless to say that Mauritius and South Africa, being committed to "democratic
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values, social justice and human right," will find this requirement of great significance
especially where so many administrative authorities are being given quasi-judicial
powers. It is, therefore, the dictate of prudence that chances of misuse of power by
such bodies are minimised, and reasoned decisions by such authorities become a pre-
requisite for fair dismissal.
Secondly, an employee would be in a better position to plead his/her case before a
. higher level of management if he/she is aware of the reasons on which the lower body
has held against him. Undoubtedly, in the absence of reasons, he has to grope in the
dark, and thus, cannot be held to have had a fair hearing before the higher authority if
he is not aware of the points which have been made against him/her. He/she can,
therefore, argue effectively before the higher tribunal only if he/she knows the
conclusion of the lower tribunal. Besides this, reasons also enable a reviewing
authority to understand the basis of the decision better; thus allowing that authority to
carry out the appellate function more effectively and in a better way.
Thirdly, as already stated in Section 3(4)(b)(v) of the Promotion of Administrative
Justice Act of South Africa that "the administrator must take into account all relevant
factors, including the need to promote an efficient administration and good
governance," the duty to provide reasons for an administrative decision is essential to
the efficient functioning of the workplace machinery. In this context, the giving of
reasons affords the decision making process a measure of impartiality and gives the
appearance ·that the decisions are free from arbitrariness and bias, thus giving
employee confidence in the system of administration. Reasons also tend to give
legitimacy to administrative decisions, encouraging acceptance of a decision even
where they are adverse to the person affected, since reasons would appear rational,
unbiased and logical.
Last but not the least, in these days .of hierarchial quasi-judicial adjudication, for a
process not to be a sham or showy, but effective to uphold the due rights of the
people. it appears to be a matter of first principle that a decision making authority
must give its own reasons for its decisions.
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All these advantages have been summed up quite succinctly by Davidson CJ in Potter
v New Zealand Milk Board:
25o
"The giving of reasons helps to concentrate the mind of the tribunal upon
the issues for determination. It enables litigants to see that their codes have
been carefully considered and appreciated; it enables the litigant
dissatisfied with a decision to more readily consider whether there are
grounds for appeal; and it enables an appellate court or tribunal to
ascertain the determinations of the tribunal or questions offact, to which
appellate courts pay difference on the hearing of an appeal and also
enables the appellate court, where the decision includes findings of law to
know what principles of law have been applied and to consider whether
such were correct.
Thus the duty to give satisfactory reasons for reaching a decision to dismiss is a duty
of such decisive importance in the entire process of procedural fairness that it cannot
be lawfully disregarded. As this duty is vital for the purpose of showing an aggrieved
person that he is receiving justice, Mauritius and South Africa should make this duty
mandatory in all disciplinary processes, especially if the final sanction is dismissal.
4.2.9 The Right to Internal Appeal
In the context of dismissal from employment, the major significance of the grounds
for appeal is that they enable a dismissed employee to challenge his dismissal on the
grounds that the decision to dismiss him was taken in disregard of procedural
requirements, including the rules of natural justice, or that it was so unreasonable that
no reasonable body could have taken it.251
Section III of the Mauritian Industrial Relations Act 1973 states:
The procedure shall be in writing and shalL ..
(c) provide for a right to appeal, wherever practicable, to a level of
management not previously involved; and
(d) provide for independent arbitration if the parties to the procedure wish it.
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Although the right to appeal has been expressly provided in the labour statute, it
seems employees mostly prefer to make use of the Industrial Court, because of its
specialised jurisdiction, to appeal rather than rely on internal appeal procedures. This
feature seems to be quite conspicuous in the South African jurisprudence. Although
the Code of Good Practice has not made provision for an employee to appeal to a
higher level of management against the outcome of a disciplinary enquiry, he/she has
a recourse to the CCMA which, with its simplified procedures, can serve as an
adequate substitute for domestic appeal.252
For lack of judicial decisions an internal appeal, a brief look at the Mauritian
Industrial Court's jurisdictional power to review decision on disciplinary matters will
be quite appropriate here.
4.2.9.1 The Jurisdiction of the Industrial Court in Mauritius
Section 3 of the Industrial Courts Act provides for the setting up of an Industrial
Court with exclusive civil and criminal jurisdiction to try any matter arising out of the
enactment set out in the first schedule253 to the Act. The Industrial Court, thus, has
jurisdiction to hear and determine all claims arising out, or brought, under these
enactment, irrespective of the amounts claimed.
One of the enactments found in the first schedule of the Industrial Courts Act is the
Labour Act LA. It will be recalled that section 2 of the LA defines "Worker" as
excluding a person whose basic wage or salary exceeds Mrs 72,000 a year. As a
result, the employee who cannot satisfy the criteria of "Worker" of the LA cannot
have access to the Industrial Court.254 On the other hand, the Supreme Court held in
Kosseeal v DougeP55 that "the Industrial Court has jurisdiction to hear all matters
pertaining to the breach of the contract of employment, for example, a request for the
payment of severance allowance, as long as they are provided for by part VI of the
LA which concerns all employees irrespective of the amount of his salary or wages."
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Section 7 of the ICA256 provides that proceedings before the Court are instituted and
conducted in the same manner as proceedings in a civil or criminal matter before a
District Magistrate. It follows that, the worker himself or his attorney, may institute
proceedings before the court. However, instead of going directly to court, an
aggrieved worker may go and seek help at the Ministry of Labour and Industrial
Relations. It is to be noted that in respect of procedure for cases of unjustified
dismiss2.l, the worker should refer the matter to the officer within 7 days after he has
been notified (s32(3)(c)LA. There, an officer will consider his case and may even
contact the employer to try and settle the matter. But, if they fail to reach a solution
agreeable to both parties (the employer and the employee) the officer may then lodge
a complaint with the clerk of the court signed by him. So as to guarantee the
employee access to the court, the legislator has provided257 that no court fees shall be
chargeable on any proceedings commenced by the Permanent Secretary on behalf of
any worker against his employer. In such a case the worker will have no expense at
all to bear, not even that of his representation in court in so far as the employment
inspectors represent him.258
Further, to help the worker who may be unaware of the real identity of his employer,
proceedings against a body corporate are validly instituted if instituted against a
person who is concerned in the management of the body corporate.
Before the court, the burden of providing that the termination of employment
relationship was justified will lie upon the employer because he will be the one who
has to prove that he could not in "good faith" take any other course if he is to be
dispensed with paying any severance allowance.
At the close of the case the magistrate, may by virtue of s9(2)(e) ICA order the
plaintiff or the defendant to pay to the other party such amount by way of
cOITlpensation for the wages lost, or expenses incurred, in attending the court, as he
thinks fit. Finally, every order or judgment of the court shall be enforced as if it were
an order or judgment of the District Court and the Magistrate may make any order as
to costs that a District Magistrate may make. ':.
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4.2.9.2 Informal powers of the Magistrate of the Industrial
Court
The Magistrate of the Industrial Court is endowed with certain informal powers. The
first of those informal powers is found in s5(l )(a) of the ICA which provides that any
person may apply to a magistrate for advice, guidance or help in the settlement out of
court of a dispute arising or which is likely to arise, in respect of a matter within the
jurisdiction of the court, even though no action has been entered or complaint made.
The magistrate would be playing the role of conciliator. This would be to the benefit
of both the employer and employee because it offers them the chance of resolving the
dispute between them peacefully without undergoing any cumbersome court
procedures.
Further, under s5(2) of the ICA the magistrate may at any time offer his advice,
guidance or help to any person if he considers that such a course is desirable to
promote good industrial relations. In practice, this provision may find its application
where the issue is already being tried before the court and the magistrate feels on an
analysis of the circumstance of the case that an out of court settlement is possible and
might be conductive to good industrial relations.
These informal powers of the magistrate demonstrate the intention of the legislator to
make justice more accessible and cheaper to the parties, especially the employer.
4.2.9.3 Review of decisions of the Industrial Court
A Reviewing Authority, who may be either the Chief Justice or any other judge as he
may depute, is created by s12 of the ICA. Though a reading of the Industrial Court
Act (lCA) indicates that it is the Chief Justice who decides proprio motu to cause a
case to the reviewed, in practice, the Reviewing Authority is solicited by one or both
of the parties to the matter before the Industrial Court.
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There is a delay of six weeks from the date of the judgement of the Industrial Court
after which no review proceedings can be commenced. After reviewing a case, the
Reviewing Authority is empowered to give such judgement and make such order as it
thinks desirable in the interests ofjustice.
The establishment of a Reviewing Authority is in accord with the general philosophy
of the ICA, NAMELY, to reduce cost and energy to a minimum.
4.2.9.4 Appeal to the Supreme Court
There are two situations where the issue of an appeal to the Supreme Court will arise:
(i) An appeal to the Supreme Court from a judgement of the Industrial Court
Magistrate~
(ii) an "appeal" to the Supreme Court from a decision of the Reviewing Authority.
4.2.9.4.1 Appeal from a decision of the Magistrate
When the Magistrate delivers the judgement, section 11 of the ICA lays down the
duty of the Magistrate to inform the losing party of his right to appeal, plus, the
conditions under which this right may be exercised.
In the case of Moorlee and Ramphol v Permanent Secretary, Ministry ofLabour and
Industrial Relations
259 the Supreme Court held that the Magistrate should make a note
in the record that he has informed the losing party as to the latter's right to appeal.
This is peculiar to the Industrial Court, and is yet another example of the legislator's
wish to afford protection to the worker whom he considers not to be on the same
footing as the other party to the litigation, namely the employer.
We should note here that, though proceedings can be instituted by the Secretary of the
Ministry of Labour and Industrial Relations for and in the name of a worker, it was
held in Lee v Labonne
26o
that by initiating such proceedings in the name of a worker,
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the Permanent Secretary does not become a party to the suit and therefore, should not
be made a party on appeal. .
An appeal from a final judgement of the Industrial Court is subject to the same
conditions as an appeal from tl:e decision of a District Magistrate.
4.2.9.4.2 "Appeal" from a decision of the Reviewing Aut~ority
Whether such a recourse is available was considered in the case of Mauritius Tuna
Fishing and Canning Enterprise Ltd v Manne.261 In this case, the worker (Mr Manne)
was dismissed for a serious misconduct and he brought an action before the Industrial.
Court. The action was dismissed and the worker applied for the decision to be
reviewed. The Reviewing Authority found in his favour, and his employer appealed.
The question arose as to whether an appeal could be made against a decision of the
Reviewing Authority. The Supreme Court concluded as follows:
"When a case tried by tlte Industrial Court is reviewed, the Industrial
Court's judgenlent becomes final and appealable, when the Authority has
completed its Review. The Reviewing Authority's decision is not afinal and
appealable one. "
In Keerodhur v J R Overseas Investment Ltd,262 the point was raised whether an
appeal still lies to the Supreme Court if the Reviewing Authority decides that there is
no ground to do so. The Court held that in that situation the decision of the Industrial
Court is deemed to have been a final one on the day it was delivered and the time to
appeal starts to run from that date.
The above decision of the court raises a problem: a person has 21 days during which
to appeal to t?e Supreme Court from a decision of the Industrial Court. If the person
has asked for a review and he is not s~tisfied when the Authority claims there are no
grounds for review of the decision it is very likely that the 21 days would have
elapsed. The time to appeal would have run out because it would be considered to
have been running from the date the Industrial Court gave its ruling and not from the
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date of the decision of the Authority. This goes against the spirit of the ICA and of
the LA. It should be mentioned here that the ICA has been amended by section 5 of
the Judicial and Legal Provisions Act such that now an appeal lies against the decision
of the Industrial Coun as it has been amended by the Reviewing Authority. The
problem still remains for the instances where the Reviewing Authority finds no
grounds to alter the decision of the Magistrate.
4.2.9.4.3 Appeal Against Service Commission Decisions·
The independence of the Service Commissions or Tribunal, as provided by Section
118(4) of the Constitution, does not exempt their decisions from being reviewed by
the Supreme Court. The court's power to review an appeal is not limited to the Public
Service Commission only, it also applies to the Judicial and Legal Service
Commission and the Police Service Commission.263
But it is also stated in Yerriah v P.s. C64 that the court "will not interfere with the
decision of the Commission for a breach of administrative rule." In Unuth v Police
. Service265 Commission, there was a suggestion that in exercising its power of review
under Section 119 of the Constitution, the court cannot act as in a case of appeal
against a magistrates's judgement. This suggestion was upheld by Justice Ahnee in
Norton v Public Service Commission266 where he made the point that bodies like the
Service Commission are not subject to appeal, although they have no more powers
than those conferred upon them by the constitution.
It is now therefore, settled that the court will not interfere to review a decision but
only to look at the decision making process.267 But the court would interfere in a case
where it is obvious that the irregularity was so gross as to render the whole decision
making process void.268
It is however, not enough for the Commissions to show "that they have followed the
procedure laid down" and that they have not "contravened any provision of any other
law or the Constitution".269 The court would apply the principles laid down in the
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leading English case of Anisminic vis Foreign Compensation Commission
270
where it
was held that an otherwise valid decision would be a nullity if the public body making
it fails to comply with the requirements of natural justice or misconstrues .the
provisions giving powers or directs itself to irrelevant matters or has left out relevant
matters.
In the case of Y.Descelles v PSC271 P. de Ravel Judge stated that:
"Following tile principles laid down in the case of Yerriah v PSC
72
I am of the
opinion that this Court has jurisdiction to enquire whether the Public Service
Commission in the exercise of its power has been acting in conformity with the
provisions ofthe Public Service Commission Regulations and has not infringed the
elenlent of natural justice and rights safeguarded by the Constitution of this
country. "
With regard to the first rule of natural justice namely the right to a fair hearing the
Court will quash a decision if the whole proceedings are tainted with manifest
injustice. If relevant evidential material is not disclosed at all to a party who is
potentially prejudiced by it, there is prima facie a breach of natural justice,
irrespective of whether the material in question arose before, during or after the
hearing. If the deciding body receives or appears to receive evidence ex parte which
is not fully disclosed, the case for setting the decision aside is obviously very strong;
the maxim that justice must be seen to be done can readily be invoked.
For instance if the inquiring body or officer acts on evidence received behind the back
of the "accused" in that evidence is never made available to the latter or to his
Counsel, this would be most improper and would amount to a blatant breach of the
I f 1:: • • I· h h . 273ru e 0 laIrneSS In re atIon to t e earIng. In that case the inquiring body set up to
hear the case against the applicant acted upon a report which was never made
available to the latter to find one of the charges proved. The respondent acting on the
finding of the board retired Mrs Hafejee in the public interest. The decision of the
respondent was quashed because "of the manifest injustice which tainted the whole
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proceedings when evidence forming the basis of the guilt of the applicant was
received behind her back. "
The court will also see to it that in arriving at a decision, the disciplinary authority
"has taken into account all the relevant considerations and has not been influenced by
considerations which are either irrelevant or not borne out by the record. Faced with a
situation where such does not appear to be the case, this Court has no option but to
h h d .." 274quas t e etermlnatlon.
It goes without saying that this court also controls whether a hearing has been given
or not. It is not because the same conclusion would have been reached even had a
hearing been afforded that the importance of the hearing should be minimised.275
What the rules of natural justice require, therefore, in such a case is that those persons
who have to determine a particular charge must keep an open mind. There should be
nothing in their conduct that should arouse any 'reasonable suspicion of a real
likelihood of bias'. Mere presence of those persons is not enough. Nor would it be
sufficient to show a mere suspicion of bias. And the burden rests on the complaining
party to show' reasonable suspicion of a real likelihood of bias'.
The court also expects that "the record of the commissions speak for itself' and "if a
record shows that no reason is apparent for a decision, the court is entitled...to assume
that the decision was taken for no particular reason, hence to quash it.276 The court
also requires the commissions to act on relevant facts, and on relevant facts only. It is
important in this respect that the commissions ask themselves the right question.
Another important question which arises is whether the court may control the sanction
imposed by the disciplinary authority. In other words can it pronounce itself on the
severity of the sanction~ie. can it control "l'adequation de la severite de la sanction a la
gravite de la faute?" The court's answer is in the affirmative as it has been held in the
case of lsmael v UBS
77
that "the jurisdiction of this court should not only (a) to
pronounce on the severity or otherwise of disciplinary measures affecting salary and
inappropriate cases, to substitute a less severe: s~ction ...but also (b) to pronounce on
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the question whether such sanction was justified at all or else was so grossly
disproportionate to the misconduct found... ' This means that the court may intervene
if the sanction is not proportionate to the misconduct.
The intervention of the Supreme Court under Section 119 of the Constitution is
limited to three occassions:
(1) When the relevant service commission has perfonned a function which it is
not authorised to perfonn;
(2) When it has in the perfonnance of a function which it has power to fulfil,
violated a provision of a Constitution;
(3) When in the fulfilment of such a function it has contravened any other law.
The principle according to which the sanction pronounced should be proportionate to
the 'faute' being derived from the common law, it is submitted that the Supreme Court
should be able to pronounce itself on the severity of the sanction imposed by the
commissions. Contrary to the situation in Labour Law whereby the Supreme Court
may even substitute a less severe sanction, here the court may only quash the decision
and remit the matter back to the appropriate authority to impose another sanction as it
is only the latter which, pursuant to the Constitution may impose a disciplinary
sanction upon a public officer unless it has delegated its powers to another person in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. In Ramdin v PSe-78 it was held
that "the court's function is not to substitute itself for the respondent in determining
what is the appropriate punishment to be meted out to an erring public officer." Even
though the judges are persons to whom the service commissions may" delegate their
powers, so far they have not done so.
The next question which arises is, does the court also have the power to review
the decisions made by a person or whom the Senrice Commission has delegated
its power to discipline an officer?
It has been held in the case of Sookia v the Commissioner ofPolice & Anor279 "the
limitations set out by Section 119 of the Constitution on the court's power to review
decisions of the service commissions...must apply also to our jurisdiction in relation
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to decision made by a person to whom the service commission delegates its powers."
In other words the Court may review the decisions of the commissions' delegate but
the power of review is a limited one. The Court may only intervene to quash the
decisions of a commissions' delegate if it has done something it has no right to do.
In this case the applicant applied for judicial review of disciplinary proceedings in
which the respondent, acting under powers delegated to him by the co-respondent in
accordance with Section 91 (2) of the Constitution, found that he had committed acts
which constituted breach of the Police Force Code of discipline. Pursuant to
regulation 44 of the Police Service Commission Regulations 1974 the applicant
exercised his right of decision, but reduced the punishment originally inflicted. The
Court heard the case on the merits and the application was set aside because there was
no breach of natural justice. The fact the Court heard the case on the merits stands to
reason that even though there has been an unsuccessful appeal, the more so that the
question was raised by the Court itself and counsel were invited to argue on it.28o
It is therefore these shortcomings which the reviewing court will set out to investigate
into. The court is not concerned with as to whether the decision is correct or not. In
other words, the court cannot substitute itself for the commissions and interfere with
the commissions' appreciation of the relevant facts in relation to a particular
decision
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but it is equally important that all the relevant facts, and only relevant facts,
are taken into consideration before reaching a decision.282
4.2.9.5 The Right to Internal Appeal against Dismissals in the
South African Labour Law
Unlike Mauritius, the South African Code of Good Practice does not make provision
for an employee to appeal to a higher level of management against the outcome of a
disciplinary enquiry. It is however, granted in Section 7(2)(a) of the Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act which reads as follows:
"...no court or tribunal shall review an administrative action ofthis act unless any
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internal remedy providedfor in any other law hasfirst been exhausted"
and Section 6(2)(c) states:
"A court or Tribunal has the power to judicially review an administrative action
if. ..
(c) the action was procedurally unfair."
Two important points have emerged from these two clauses. First of all, by the mere
reference to an 'internal remedy' concept it implies that the decision of an
adjudicating authority may be challenged and subject to review. Secondly, once the
internal remedy has been exhausted the applicant aggrieved by the determination may
appeal to a court or a tribunal for review of that decision which was taken without due
regard to procedure.
Referring specifically to appeals against disciplinary decisions this is somewhat of a
different nature, as they have no constitutional or statutory basis, yet they have
become a regular practice in the South African Labour relations. The right of appeal
and the provision of the appellate machinery are common features in employers'
disciplinary codes and procedure agreements283 that the employer is under an
obligation to inform an employee of his right of appeal in the event of a finding of
guilt. The question, however is: does the fact that the Code is silent on the question of
disciplinary -appeal mean that it is not part of the right to a fair procedure under the
Act? One thing is clear: the Act places a premium on fairness, equity, and
employment justice as its hallmark.284 It follows from this, that the right of appeal is
an integral part of the overall principle of the opportunity to state a case under the
present legislative scheme. It is an essential part of fair procedure in employment
disciplinary matters. Where, therefore an employment code provides for the right of
appeal, the absence of similar provision in the Code of Good Practice cannot excuse
the employer from complying with the stipulations of its own code. The employer
must inform the employee of his right to appeal and go further to convene the appeal
hearing in accordance with his code if the employee desires it.285 Where there is no
disciplinary code or the right of appeal is not provided for in an existing employer's
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disciplinary code, the problem of the absence of the right of appeal in the Code of
Good Practice becomes a crucial issue. This being an employment relationship, it
would appear that in the absence of statute or contractual tenns, the employee may be
hamstrung to insist that such a right exists.
In response to the employer's contention that its disciplinary procedure allowed for a
"review" which did not require the attendance of the employee or his representative
where the em.ployee alleged that the appeal hearing was held in his absence, Marcus C
observed in Mekgoe v Standard Bank of South Africa, that it was for the
Commissioner to decide in the circumstances whether the procedure followed was in
consonance ~ith the general tenor of the misconduct prior to dismissal. It was held286
that as the code made no reference to an employee's right of appeal against a decision
to dismiss him, once a right of appeal was conferred by a disciplinary code a proper
procedure should be observed by the employer. That proper procedure is the audi
alteram partem principle which "must be incorporated into the appeal procedure as
well as the initial hearing in the absence of good reasons to the contrary. ,,287
Accordingly, the failure to afford the applicant employee the opportunity to make
representations to the person detennining his appeal, was a breach of the audi alteram
partem principle of natural justice entitling a person accused of misconduct to be
heard in the matter, whatever the forum whether it be at the initial hearing or the
appeal.
It is important to distinguish between an appeal process proper where the employee is
to be afforded an opportunity to state his case and the situation where management
interferes with the findings of the enquiry. Take the case of Kohidh v Beier Wool
(Pty) Ltd.
288
The employee was found guilty of complicity in a theft of employer's
property. The decision of the enquiry was that he be given a final written warning but
in its apparent desire to maintain consistency, management changed the sanction to
one of summary dismissal. Van Dokkum C found this to be a serious defect and a
gross violation of the principles of natural justice which would not be condoned under
any guise. Since the chairperson of the enquiry was the employer's appointee, his
agent. thereby authorised to make a decision on his behalf, the employer is bound by
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that decision and is not at liberty to change it at whim or because he does not agree
with it. On the other hand, if the employee had appealed against the decision of the
hearing and the appeal hearing had instead substituted a more onerous sentence, ~en
that would be a different matter, as an appeal is initiated by the employee and in doing
so he is taking the chance of having his sentence increased or the fortune of having it
decreased or for that matter thrown out entirely. On its own initiative, the employer
had substituted a decision handed down by a properly constituted hearing, on the
d h . d'd . h h d .. 289groun t at It 1 not agree WIt t at eCIslon.
The case of SAAfWU obo Nkuna v Lethabong Metropolitan Local Counci/290 is not too
different from the foregoing except that the disciplinary committee had recommended
dismissal whereas the appeal hearing set the penalty of dismissal aside and
substituted, as they were empowered to do, a demotion and a fine. The council
declined to accept the appeal finding and confirmed the employee's dismissal. There
was no challenge involving the regularity of the disciplinary hearing and the appeal
committee but it is clear that the council did not invite the employee to make a
representation to it before it decided to confirm his dismissal. This was found to be a
breach of the basic principle of workplace justice and the principle of natural justice.
The employee's absence from this crucial stage of the proceedings was a breach of the
elementary rules of natural justice and there was no way representation before an
inferior body will substitute for that of the superior body which proposes to
implement an adverse determination against the employee. Adv.Jajbhay's reasons for
arriving at this decision is better reproduced than paraphrased:
Where an employee is afforded the right to appeal from an adverse finding
by a disciplinary inquiry, the proceedings at the appeal must amount to
nlOre than mere formality. The members of the appeal panel must apply
their nlinds fairly and in partially to all relevant factors and considerations
in the same nlanner as the disciplinary inquiry itself. In the present matter,
neither of the parties argued that the fairness of either the disciplinary
comnlittee or the appeal committee was in question. In the present matter,
the enlployee was clearly disadvantaged by the method adopted by the
council in acting as it did. It can be stated that in not being afforded the
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opportunity to be present during the deliberations at the council, the
employee was not afforded tile opportunity of speaking in rebuttal or in
mitigation of the complaint in accordance with the audi alteram partem
rule.191
Thus, when a right to appeal exists in the disciplinary procedures applicable to the
case, the prescribed procedure should however be observed and followed by the
employer and employee. Although the Schedule does not make reference to the
dismissed employee's right to appeal, should such right be present in the disciplinary
procedure of the employee these requirements override the Code. This is the route
. followed in both Mekgoe v Standard Bank of SA 292 and NEWU v Durban Deep
Wholesale Meat. 293
4.2.9.6 Does Management possess Review powers over
Disciplinary hearings?
Modem law of procedural fairness is riddled with problems of interpretation and
giving meaning to the way disciplinary action is taken and whether or not appeal
procedures are followed. But more perplexing is does the management possess
review powers over disciplinary hearings?
Granted that a right of appeal may by implication be read into the Code of Good
Practice, can such also be said of the employer's prerogative to review disciplinary
proceeuings? The question is: does the employer retain a general review power over
disciplinary enquiries instituted by it in the undertaking? In other. words, since the
employer decides ultimately whether to dismiss or not to dismiss in any given case,
can he, in taking such a decision review the findings of a disciplinary enquiry
instituted by his authority? Can he cancel the findings or substitute it with his own?
Put differently, can the employer proceed against the employee twice over for the
same offence?
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This aspect of the law has not caught the judicial thinking of either the Industrial
Court or the Supreme Court of Mauritius. In fact, as already discussed, such
reviewing powers have been devolved on the Industrial Court and Supreme Court,
which, therefore, leaves no room for the management to play any role in reviewing
the decision of the disciplinary authority.
But in South Africa when this question came before the Industrial Court for the first
time,294 it considered it unfair for senior management to set aside two months after it
had made a decisioI: of a properly constituted tribunal set up in terms of the
company's disciplinary procedure with the facts adequately canvassed in accordance
with the company's disciplinary code and to subject the employees concerned to a
fresh enquiry. Like in this case, the employer in the second case295 also substituted a
final warning with dismissal after a second enquiry had found the employee guilty.
The employee's appeal was dismissed. The Industrial Court found this second
enquiry and the subsequent appeal to have been tainted by the bias of the chairman
but it however observed, obiter, that there may be circumstances where an earlier
enquiry may justifiably be set aside and reheard.296
In the subsequent case of Botha v Gengold Ltcf97 the Industrial Court held that it was
procedurally unfair for the employer to hold the second enquiry drawing analogy from
that well-known r\merican constitutional protection against double jeopardy298 which,
at common law is presented as the pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict,299
and recognised in the Canadian Charter of Rights300 and the South African
Constitution as an essential element of the right to a fair trial in criminal matters.301
The employee. a general manager of the company, was found guilty of fraudulently
claiming travelling expenses and was given a final warning. The company's audit
committee which had authorised the enquiry in the first instance was unhappy with
the penalty as perpetrators of similar fonus of dishonesty had been dismissed in the
past. A fresh disciplinary enquiry was arranged whereupon the employee was found
guilty and dismissed. The Court found that the official who conducted the first
disciplinary enquiry was competent to do so, and that the hearing had been fair.
Further. the company's disciplinary code did not provide for the audit committee or
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any other body to set aside a finding by a disciplinary committee at the instance of the
company. A secnnd enquiry on the same facts exposed the employee to double
jeopardy and was accordingly unfair. Stating the reasoning behind this decision Van
Zyl AM said:
The respondent's disciplinary code does not make provision for the audit
committee or any other official to set aside the finding of a disciplinary
hearing. To allow such procedure would amount to powers of review,
which would be unthinkable as it could lead to never-ending enquiries
against an employee. Bearing in mind that a disciplinary enquiry remains
a matter offairness it is evident that a second enquiry on the same facts
cannot be allowed, as it will amount to double jeopardy. We have come to
the conclusion t/tat it was unfair for the respondent to subject the applicant
d . ,,301to a secon enquiry.
A similar question was considered in Strydom v USKO Ltd.303 The employee was
charged before a disciplinary enquiry for theft in that he removed rusted and unused
tools valued at R50,OO. The chainnan of the enquiry found that the unauthorised
removal of the tools by the employee was an infraction of company disciplinary code,
but that dismissal was not the only appropriate punishment and imposed a written
warning as penalty. Under the employer's disciplinary code, no dismissal could be
effected without the approval of the manager or the divisional manager. In exercise
of this power, the manager substituted the penalty of a written warning for dismissal
because he was of the view that the chainnan did not give sufficient weight to certain
aggravating factors. The code did not expressly authorise the manager or divisional
manager to review the findings of the enquiry or to set aside the penalty imposed.
Patel C held that it was ultra vires the powers of the divisional manager under the
company's disciplinary code to act as a review body to the panel findings, and had the
code allowed such a procedure, it "would be tantamount to vesting powers of review
in the hands of senior management; such empowennent would indeed be
unconscionable since it would be nothing but a second enquiry against an
employee. ,,304 Accordingly, the disciplinary enquiry is a matter of procedural fairness
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and any further enquiry, under the subterfuge of a review, on the same allegations or
facts cannot be countenanced since it amounts to double trial.305
The principle in Botha was considered In NUMSA obo Walsh v Delta Motor
Corporation (Pty) Ltcf°6 with varying conclusion. Subsequent to an assault
perpetrated by the applicant on a fellow employee, the supervisor whose duty it is to
prefer disciplinary charges against the employee, had decided instead to confine
action against the employee to counselling. As a result, it was agreed that the
employee pay the fellow employee's medical expenses and lost earnings. The
company's personnel department ordered the supervisor to prefer formal charges an~
the employee was subsequently dismissed. The union argued on behalf of the
employee that this precluded the employer from taking further disciplinary action
against the employee since he would effectively be disciplined a second time for an
offence for which he had already been disciplined. The employer contended that what
the supervisor did was not part of what he was authorised to do under the company's
disciplinary code and therefore should not be regarded as a formal disciplinary action.
In any case, argued the employer, the continuance of such an arrangement in respect
of serious, dismissible offence, such as assault, would lead to the inconsistent
treatment of the employee when compared to other employees who had been
dismissed for the same offence. Distinguishing Botha where there were two proper
enquiries in respect of the same offence, Le Roux C found that the institution of
disciplinary action in respect of the incident did not amount to double jeopardy, 307 but
merely to comply for the first time with employer's policies. The procedure was
therefore fair.
The only factor common to the USKO type situation and that in Nyembezi v
NEHA WU
308
is that of undue interference by some higher organ or person with the
findings of ~ panel of enquiry. Otherwise, Nyembezi contains several irregularities
some of which were similar to those ~n Concorde Plastics. Yet Nyembezi contained
ingredients which distinguishes it from these lines of cases. The applicant in
Nyembezi was an official of the union who was dismissed for drinking and disruptive
behaviour at one of the union's regional congresses. He was charged by an ad hoc
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disciplinary committee. which found him guilty and decided that he be issued with a
final warning. The national executive committee subsequently reversed this decision
and dismissed the applicant. The first breach in the union's disciplinary proceedings
was that the employee was not charged nor were relevant witnesses called by the
employer. The enquiry was like an interview; the chairperson put the charges to the
employee; he denied them, he was then told that the committee will make a
'recommendation to the regional executive committee. Secondly, under the union staff
code. any staff member may be disciplined by "the structure he or she is accountable
to" and "in case of branch officials this is the BEC" (branch executive committee).
Here, the employee, an official of the .East London branch, should have been
proceeded against by the branch executive committee of the East London branch and
not the ad hoc committee. No explanation was offered as to why the union staff code
was not followed. Thirdly, the contention that the national executive committee had
the power under the union constitution to "hire and fire" and therefore had the power
to amend the recommendation of the ad hoc committee was untenable. This was also
a breach of fair procedure. Fourthly, even though the staff code did not provide that
after an employee has been found guilty of the charges levelled against him, it is the
case that the chairperson should give him the opportunity of leading evidence in
mitigation. None of the various organs that handled this matter complied with this
requirement. The ad hoc committee made their recommendation without inviting the
employee's plea in mitigation. So, too, the regional executive committee endorsed it
without hearing evidence in mitigation neither did the national executive committee
which overturned that decision and dismissed the official. All these the Industrial
Court found, rendered the dismissal procedurally unfair.
The distinction between Delta Motors approach and that in Usko and Botha is clear.
The employee in Delta underwent only one stage enquiry as the conciliatory approach
of the supervisor was not such enquiry as envisaged in the c'ompany's disciplinary
proceedings hence it was properly discountenanced. Even if equating disciplinary
procedures in the employment context to criminal proceedings in the ordinary court is
"false analogy" with "unfortunate consequences" as Le Roux has submitted,309 an
employee is entitled, after the conclusion of a disciplinary hearing and the appeal, to a
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feeling that the matter is finally put to rest. The re-opening of the issue by senior
management in the form of review or for whatever reason (except fraud and
impropriety in the conduct of the proceedings and this must be attributable to. the
employee) would be tantamount to harassment of the employee. The reasoning that
an employer could set aside a hearing process if it is found to have been in violation
of the procedures laid down in the employer's disciplinary code, comes up against the
essence of an appeal process which, for all practical purposes, is to review the earlier
proceeding, examine the facts and affirm or set the decision aside. Sometimes, it is
not a matter of the time it took to overturn the decision, but of the fairness of the
second enquiry, indeed, the entire process/IO fairness being the overriding
consideration in contemporary labour disputes settlement whether at the level of the
undertaking or the labour tribunal.311
4.2.9.7 Can a defective hearing be cured by a subsequent
appeal?
Reading the awards of the CCMA and the IMSSA, one encounters expressions clearly
indicating that:
the procedural defect "has been remedied by this arbitration",3120r
"there was no reason why any unfairness could not have been cured at the
subsequent inquiry",313 or
"as the chairperson of the appeal hearing was a different person and as there
was no allegation of bias on that other chairperson, this must be taken to have
cured the original defect. ,,314
In all these circumstances, procedural defects had occurred at the initial hearing. It is
also important to note that these rulings find support in the decision of the Appellate
Division in Slagment.
315
Although that Court had refrained, in the same manner as the
P . C .1316 d h 317nvy ouncl an t e House of Lords in England had, from laying down a
general rule in this regard, the majority held in that case that where a decision to
dismiss two employees summarily without a hearing had been taken due to no fault of
the employer. but was the result of the intransigent attitude of the employees, there
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was no reason in principle why an unfairness at the stage of the dismissals should not
have been cured by a full and fair hearing on appeal.
The approach of English courts
The question here is: whether a hearing which was conducted in breach of the rules of
natural justice could be cured by a well conducted hearing on appeal? The awards
referred to earlier tend to portray the matter in very simplistic light, thus tending to
suggest that a clear-cut answer could be found for this very thorny problem of natural
. justice. The fact is that the answer to this question has not always been straight-
forward for when the matter first arose in the English courts, Megarry J held that: "If
the rules and the law combine to give the member the right to a fair trial and the right
of appeal, why should he be told that he ought to be satisfied with an unjust trial and a
fair appeal?" His lordship went on to lay down: "...As a general rule...! hold that a
failure of natural justice in the trial body cannot be cured by a sufficiency of natural
justice in an appeal body. ,,318 In his determination of what, at that time, was a novel
question in English law except for a dictum of Lord Reid in Ridge v Baldwin,319
Megarry J had to consider a maze of conflicting decisions from Canada320 and New
Zealand.321
Although the Privy Council in Calvin v Carr322 thought that the general rule
formulated by Megarry J was too broadly stated, it held that where there was a
contractual nexus such as where a person has joined an organisation or body and was
deemed, on the rules of that organisation and the contractual context in which he
joined, to have agreed to accept what in the end was a fair decision, notwithstanding
some initial defect, the task of the courts was to decide, in the light of the agreements
made and having regard to the course of the proceedings, whether at the end of the
proceedings there had been a fair result reached by fair methods. However, Lord
Wilberforce stated that: "Naturally there may be instances when the defect is so
flagrant, the consequences so severe, that the most perfect of appeals or rehearing will
not be sufficient to produce a just result. Many rules (including those now in
question) anticipate that such a situation may 'mise by giving power to remit for a new
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hearing. ,,323 The question how far in domestic and administrative two-tier
adjudicatory systems a procedural failure at the level of the fITst tier can be remedied
at the level of the second tier was not decided in Lloyd v McMahon because "~he
question arising in the instant case must be answered by considering the particular
statutory provisions here applicable which establish an adjudicatory system in many
respects quite unlike any that has come under examination in any of the decided cases
to which we were referred. We are concerned with a point of statutory construction
and nothing else. ,,324
But it is neither Calvin v Carr nor Lloyd v McMahon, both of which fall within the
public law divide, that had influenced the development of English law' in this field. It
has been the decisions in West Midlands Co-operative Society. Ltd v Tipton325 and
Polkey v AE Dayton Services Ltcf26 that h8:d directed the path the industrial tribunals
in England have threaded when considering whether the dismissal procedure was fair
viewed holistically and whether an improper initial hearing was cured by an appeal
hearing conducted in accordance with the rules of natural justice. While it was held in
"'27Qualcast (Wolverhampton) Ltd v Ross"' that a properly conducted appeal does not
provide justification for unfair procedure at a lower level, it was held in Sartor v P&O
European Ferries (Felixstowe) Ltcf28 that although the employee ought to have been
told the tenns of the charge against her prior to the hearing before the captain, the
appeal which was by way of rehearing and well conducted had cured any defects on
the initial trial. The Court of Appeal however held in Westminister City Council v
Cabaj329 that the failure of the employer to observe the contractual appeals procedure
regarding the composition of the appeals tribunal was a significant contractual failure
but that an employer's failure to observe its own contractually enforceable disciplinary
procedure does not inevitably require an industrial tribunal to conclude that a
dismissal was unfair since the question which the tribunal had to determine was not
whether the employer acted reasonably in dismissing the employee but whether the
employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating the reason shown as sufficient
reason for dismissal. It was further held that the relevance of that question of a failure
to entertain an appeal to which the employee was contractually entitled, as Lord
Bridge pointed out in West Midlands Co-operative Society v Tipton,330 was whether
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the employee was "thereby" denied the opportunity of showing that the real reason for
dismissal was not" sufficient. And as Lords Mackay & Bridge i"ndicated in Polkey v
AE Draylon Services Lld,331 it is also relevant to consider whether the employer acted
reasonably if he actually considered or a reasonable employer would have considered
at the time of dismissal that to follow the agreed procedure would in the
circumstances of the case be futile.
The case law before Slagment
Before Slagment, there were contradictory judicial decisions on this subject in South
"Africa. The Appellate Division had held in Turner v Jockey Club ofSouth Ajrica332
that the various procedural transgressions committed by the Inquiry Board against a
member charged with bribing an apprentice jockey could not be corrected by a
remittal or by further evidence, or in any other manner short of a hearing de novo.
The other case which is also not an employment case was Council of Review, SADF
& Ors v Monnif & Ors333 where the Appellate Division emphasised that the
proceedings before a court-martial subject of the appeal was in substance a court of
law even though it was a court of laymen the propriety of its proceedings should be
judged by the normal standards pertaining to a court of law. Accordingly, as the
court-martial should have recused itself on the ground of likelihood of bias, it means
t~at the trial which it conducted after the application for recusal had been dismissed
should never have taken place at all. What occurred was a nullity. The irregularity
was fundamental and irreparable so that an appeal to the council of review could not
in any way validate what had gone before the court-martial.
There are two decisions of the Labour Appeal Court presided over" by Combrinck J
both of which support the reasoning that where procedural irregularities had occurred
at the first hearing, an appeal hearing would not cure that defect. In Empangeni
Transport (Pty) Lld v Zulu,334 the hearing was riddled with many irregularities that it
was held that the appeals tribunal hearing which "did not fare much better" could not
cure such deficiencies. The reasoning here, is that "once the appeal takes the place of
the disciplinary enquiry the employee is denied his right of appeal. He is furthermore
placed in the position that at the appeal he bears the burden of displacing an adverse
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decision which for lack of natural justice ought never to have been reached. ,,335
Combrinck J came to a similar conclusion in SACTWU & Anor v Martin Johnson
(Pty) Ltci36 where there was no hearing in the first instance. The logic here is that
where there was no hearing, no evidence and no finding to appeal against, there could
be no question of the appeal hearing which was undoubtedly "a full and fair hearing"
curing the defective 'hearing'. Van Zyl J arrived at an opposing conclusion in Henred
Freuhauf Trailers (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA & Ors.337 It was held that the denial of the
employees' rights to be represented by a trade union official was cured by the appeal
hearing where such representation was allowed. Since the appeal hearing amounted
to a rehearing and it was not suggested that it was by any means unfair, except in
regard to the failure of the appeal body to consider mitigating factors in respect of
each individual respondent, these defects could be cured.
The cases since Slagment
Not only that the decision in Slagment (Pty) Ltd v BCAWU & Ors338 cannot be
regarded as conclusive of the issue discussed in this section, but that decision should
also be confined to its peculiar facts and could accordingly be distinguished. If it may
be recalled, the employees in that case had insisted on a joint hearing. They had 12
clear days within which to take advice and consider the employer's offer. They were
given a full opportunity of meeting the case against them of which they were fully
informed. In such circumstances, the initial procedural unfairness had been overtaken
by the appeal hearing and such unfairness had no influence on the course of that
hearing or its eventual result. This decision provided Maytham AM with the
ammunition to distinguish Slagment, when faced with the respondent's suggestion that
any defects in the original enquiry were cured by a subsequent appeal which took 'the
form of a further hearing in Ndwandwe v M & L Distributors (Pty) & Anor.339 It was
held. that the debate on curability does not extend to a situation where there was in
effect no disciplinary hearing and therefore nothing to cure. To extend it to such a
situation would in effect be tantamount to saying that an employer was entitled to
summarily dismiss employees, provided that he allowed them a right of appeal.
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A number of lessons emerge from the cases decided since Slagment which were
squarely brought home by the recent case of Nasionafe Parkeraad v Terbfanche.340
The first point is: whether the holding of a proper appeal would cure the defect in the
initial hearing would depend on the circumstances of each case. Secondly, where the
failure to observe the rules of fair procedure amounts to "technical procedural
irregularity,,341 which will be of no material consequence to the overall fairness of the
disciplinary measure, that initial defect will not affect the outcome of the case. It
would appear that this is the attitude the courts take of the failure to allow the
employee already found guilty to lead evidence in mitigation.342 Thirdly, where the
subsequent hearing is a rehearing, then the initial defect is cured. In Nasionale
Parkeraad, the Labour Appeal Court affirmed the finding of guilty of fraud and
unauthorised absence from work on the part of the dismissed pilot on the merit. It
also found that by discussing the pilot's disciplinary record with the prosecutor in the
absence of the pilot, the chairperson of the enquiry was in breach of the rules of
natural justice since the pilot was not given the opportunity to plead in mitigation.
However, the Court held that where the appeal took the form of a rehearing, an earlier
departure from the rules of natural justice could be rectified. This was especially in
labour law where an employee is afforded further opportunity of approaching a court
or arbitrator and in the present case, the employer's disciplinary procedure also
permitted defects in a disciplinary hearing to be corrected on appeal.
In contrast to both the facts of Ndwandwe and Nasionale Parkeraad is Coin Security
Group (Pty) Ltd v TGWU 343, where unlike Ndwandwe, there was a hearing, albeit a
procedurally defective one, and unlike in Nasionale Parkeraad, the appeal hearing was
equally procedurally flawed. The disciplinary proceedings were vitiated, firstly, by a
reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the shop stewards who feared that the
chairperson would not give them a fair and unbiased hearing in that he, (the
chairperson) had-referred to them as "bullshit shop stewards." Secondly, the demand
by the shop stewards that they be represented by an official of the union was refused
by the chairperson. Even when the request was subsequently approved by
management, the chairperson would not postpone the hearing to a date when the
union representative could be present. Thus in the absence of the union representative
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and behind the back of the shop stewards the chairperson proceeded with the
disciplinary hearings over charges of undermining discipline against the shop
stewards after they had refused to participate in the hearings. These were held to be
fundamentally unfair and amounted to a failure of justice. Yet the appeal fared no
better. The wrongful refusal of the chairperson of the disciplinary hearing to recuse
himself was raised, but the presiding officer dismissed the point. He did so on the
basis of a private and secret telephone conversation which he had with the same
chairperson. The details of that conversation were not conveyed to the representative
of the shop stewards. This compounded the irregularity. It was held that the fact that
the shop stewards were subsequently afforded an appeal hearing did not, in th~
circumstances, cure the fatal defects attaching to the disciplinary hearings.
The Namibian Labour Court approach
The question which arose in the Namibian Labour Court & Ors v Kuisch Fish
Products Ltci44 was whether the appeal hearing in a case where the employees
charged with violence, intimidation and threats on board the respondent's fishing
vessel was in accordance with a fair procedure and whether the dismissal on appeal
was for a fair reason in accordance with section 45 read with section 46 of the
Namibian Labour Code 1992. In the first hearing, the records of past misconduct had
been taken into account in deciding to dismiss the erring employees without giving
them the opportunity to admit or deny their previous misconduct. O'Linn J held that
whether a hearing at the appellate level cures the defect in the initial hearing would
depend on whether it is a full rehearing or an appeal on the record since an appeal in a
disciplinary code may have in mind the setting aside of the proceedings of the initial
inquiry, precisely because such initial inquiry was unfair. In such a case the appeal
corrects the procedure and considers the issues afresh or on new evidence adduced at
the rehearing. The Court rejected the approach of Combrinck J in Empangeni345 and
,South African Clothing
346
as being "too formalistic and loses sight of the objective of
the law, namely to maintain the right of the worker not to be unfairly dismissed, not
the right to have two hearings, each of which must be fair. ,,347 He rejected any attempt
to transplant the South African approach to Namibian labour law. "After all, our
Labour Act requires a fair hearing and a fair reason for dismissal, whether or not this
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was done in the course of a single hearing or in the course of more than one hearing
and irrespective of whether one of those hearings is labelled an 'appeal' hearing. ,,348
According to the judge: "Even where the employer's disciplinary code provides for an
initial hearing and a subsequent appeal, such provision must not be allowed to obscure
and frustrate the aim of the Labour Act to protect workers against unfair dismissals
and on the other side of the coin, protect employers from being forced to keep
'employees who are in fact and in truth guilty of serious misconduct. ,,349
4.3 Conclusion
It is not unknown in the Mauritian and South African Labour Jurisprudence that the·
essence of procedural justice requires that a person who is to decide must give the
parties affected a fair hearing enabling them to state their case and views. From the
abovementioned, various requirements for procedural fairness during pre-dismissal
hearings have been discussed.
During the course of discussion certain pertinent Issues were highlighted. The
requirements of pre-dismissal procedures in Mauritius and South Africa, have taken
many years to evolve to their current form. From the influences of the common law
to the ILO recommendations and conventions, the industrial courts of both countries,
in their preoccupation to provide procedurally fair pre-dismissal rights, evolved a
series of procedural requirements that needed to be satisfied before making a
dislnissal due to misconduct fair. The courts have consistently required that an
employee who is faced with dismissal for misconduct should be given an opportunity
to present his/her case so as to rebut the charges or plead in mitigation.
The chapter discussed the various requirements that mike up the components of the
notion opportunity to present his/her case. It is important to note from the various
courts decisions in Mauritius and South Africa, that the employer had to, at least,
adhere consistently to fair disciplinary procedures whether such rules were formalised
in a written code or established in the workplace through precedent or practice. These
procedures that aim to promote the requirements of fairness have been summarised
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very clearly in SA laundry, Dry Cleaning, Dyeing & Allied Workers Union & Others v
Advance Laundries Ltd tla Stork Napkins where Bulbulia AM said:
Such a procedure should provide, interalia, for the individual to. be
informed of the charges against him and give him the opportunity to state
his case. He should enjoy the right to call witnesses and if need be have
sonleone of his choice, including a shop steward or union official, to
represent him at the hearing. A fair procedure will also provide a right of
appeal and lay down the procedure to befollowed Proceduralfairness and
substantive fairness are the foundations upon which the audi alteram
I ,,350partenl ru e rests.
A general consensus seems to prevail in the approach to the basic understanding of
what constitute the requirements of procedural fairness in Mauritius and South Africa.
As was indicated by the Supreme Court of Mauritius in Tirvengadum v Bata Shoe
(Mts) Co Ltd,35l that an employer, before dismissing a worker guilty for gross
misconduct, should not "turn himself into a court of law and hold a fonnal hearing,"
clearly prescribes that not all the requirements of procedural fairness need to be
complied with. Effectively, the South African Labour Relations Act puts an
obligation on the employer to conduct an investigation and not a "fonnal enquiry. ,,352
Woolfrey353 explains that by this procedure, the drafters of the Code have signalled a
more infonnal approach to procedural fairness which obviously means that the
employer should adhere to the core requirements, and the deviation of the nonn is
pennissible in proper circumstances.
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Chapter 5
Exceptions to Procedural Fairness in Dismissals for
Misconduct
5.1 Introduction
In the foregoing chapters it was discussed that there has been a general recognition in
the Mauritian ~nd South African law of 'unfair dismissal' that an employee's right to
an adequate and fair hearing before hislher dismissal for misconduct remaIn a
consistent and unanimous theme in their respective Labour Relations Acts and
industrial court judgn1ents. Cases abound in both countries in which employees allege
to having been prejudiced by a failure on the part of the employer to observe the
requirelnents of predismissal fair procedures.
It is assun1ed in the reasonings of all the cases that the main objective of holding an
enquiry is to establish facts. and~ accordingly, the reasoning goes, if there appear to be
no facts to be established. there need be no enquiry. I It is obvious that the possibility
that an enquiry may bring to light facts relevant to determining whether a worker is
guilty of the offence charged and. if so. what the appropriate penalty should be, is the
central reason for holding an enquiry. 2 In National Union of_Mineworkers & Others v
Durban Roodepoorl Deep Lld3 it was observed:
The prinwry object of the ellquiry, whatever form it takes, is to endeavour to
investigate allY complaillt agaillst an enlployee, as honestly and as objectively as is
possiple, so that he or she is Ilot dismissed for want of a just cause and without
having beell afforded a fair alld. reasollable opportunity of speaking in rebuttal or
ill 111itigatioll ofthe complaint in accordance with the audi alteram partem rule. "
Thus in a particular case the circumstances of the alleged misconduct may be such as
to suggest that there was another side of the sto.ry and that fairness required that the
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applicant be given a chance to explain the extent and the reasons for any involvement.
Hence. an enquiry will be "desirable to enable the parties to unearth the underlying
causes and grievances which led to the unrest in the first place. ,,4
This principle has been discussed and critically analysed in the previous chapters. It
was observed that the concept and requirements of procedural fairness have been
firmly established in the Mauritian and South African labour jurisprudence. There
are. however. instances where an employer may dispense with pre-dismissal
procedures under exceptional circumstances.
In the present chapter, it is proposed to discuss those exceptional circumstances where
the employers have deviated from the accepted norms and deemed it unnecessary to
hold disciplinary hearings. But the contentious issue that immediately comes to mind
is. does the deviation from procedural fairness not recreate the British situation
whereby the en1ployer could be excused because a hearing, even if it were held,
'\vould make no difference?" The other issues which need to be resolved are whether
or not an employer is exempted from pre-dismissal hearings where the instances relate
to n1ass dismissals and managerial or executive level employees. Finally, the chapter
will discuss Item 4(4) of the South African Labour Relations Acts and the judicial
decisions illustrating those' exceptional circumstances' where employers are exempted
from holding disciplinary hearings..
5.2 Court's views on Instances where Employers have made
Exceptions to Procedural Fairness at Dismissal for Misconduct
5.2.1 No Difference Argument
In England. initially. the court did emphasise the importance of employers adhering
strictly to the basic procedural standards of fairness taking as their guide the Code of
Good Practice or Industrial Relations. In one of the earliest cases, Earl v Slater
T1'heeler (Airlyne) Lld.
s
Sir John Donaldson said that a dismissal for misconduct
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without giving the employee a chance to state a case rendered a dismissal unfair
unless "there can be no explanation which could cause the employers to refrain from
dismissing the employee". 6 So it had to be almost inconceivable that the hearing
could have made any difference. This' inconceivability' test has since been replaced
by even more lenient standards. It was first held to be "too universal," 7 th'en it was
nlodified to the point where the test was whether a hearing would have been highly
unlikely to have made any difference 8; and, finally it came to the test laid down by the
Employment Arbitration Tribunal in British Labour Pump v Byrne 9 where it was held
that the test is whether on the balance of probabilities the employer would have taken
the same course even if he had held the enquiry. It was stated:
"...even ifjudged in the light of circumstances known at the time of dismissal, the
entployer's decision was 1I0t reasonable because of some failure to follow a fair
procedure yet the dismissal can be held fair if, on the facts proved before the
industrial tribunal, the industrial tribunal comes to the conclusion that the
employer could reasollably have decided to dismiss if he had followed a fair
procedure. "
But substantial linlitation on the "no difference" argument has been achieved by the
decision of the House of Lords in Polkey v A.E Dayton Services Ltd. 10 In
determining whether a dismissal is procedurally fair or unfair for the purposes of
S57(1) of the Enlploynlent Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, it is not for the
industrial tribunal to apply a hindsight test in order to determine hypothetically
whether a hearing would have nlade any difference. The House of Lords held that:
If the facts known to the enlployer at the time of dismissal made it reasonable to
dismiss the employee for the relevant offence, even without a hearing, then the
dismissal will be fair. But if the facts did not at the relevant time indicate to the
employer that a hearing would be "utterly useless" then he/she could not have
acted reasonably in dismissing, no nwtter how substantial the underlying reason.
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The facts in the Polkey case strongly illustrate the point. There it had become
urgently necessary for the employer's enterprise to shed certain van drivers. The
appellant was called in~ suddenly and 'quite out of the blue', and handed a redundancy
lener. He was then immediately driven home by a fellow employee. 'There can be no
more heartless disregard of the provisions of the code of practice [requiring pre-
dismissa~ consultation] than that'. the industrial tribunal found:! Yet, because 'the
result would not have been any different' if the requirements of the code of practice
. had been applied. the industrial tribunal felt compelled under the then existing law to
reject the clain1 that the dismissal was unfair.
The House of Lords held that this approach was wrong. It was not correct to draw a
distinction between the reason for dismissal (eg redundancy) and the manner of
dismis~al as if these were mutually exclusive. The English statute showed that 'at
least some aspects of the manner of dismissal fail to be considered in deciding
whether a disn1issal is unfair since the action of the employer in treating the reason as
sufficient for dismissal of the employee will include at least part of the manner of the
d· . I ,(..,ISllllssa. -
Lord Bridge further added:
"... ill tlte case of misconduct, the enlployer will normally not act reasonably unless
he investigates the complaint ofnliscOlldllct fully andfairly and hears whatever the
employee wishes to say in his defellce or in explanation or mitigation.•.if an
enlployer has failed to take the appropriate procedural steps in any particular case,
tile oue question the industrial tribullal is not pernlitted to ask in applying the test of
reasonableness posed by S57(3) of the EP(C) A1978 is the hypothetical question
whether it would have nwde allY difference to tile outcome if tile appropriate
procedural steps had been taken. 011 tile true construction ofS57(3) tllis question is
simply irrelevallt. It is quite a different matter if tile tribunal is able to conclude
that the el11p/oyer hil11self, at the tinle of dismissal, acted reasonably in taking the
view that, ill the exceptiollal circumstances of tile particular case, the procedural
steps 1I0rmally appropriate would have been futile, could not have altered the
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decision to dismiss and therefore could be dispensed with. In such a case the test of
reasonableness under S57(3) may be satisfied. "
The cnlcial elements of this decision are that, before a decision is made by the
enlployer to disnliss an employee. the following should be considered:
(i) the enlployee's knowledge as it existed at the time of the dismissal;
(ii) rejection of any approach involving hindsight and hypothesis;
(iii) affinnation of the principle that there is a lack of equity inherent in the failure
to accord an enlp!oyee pre-dismissal fairness;
(iv) the question whether a dismissal is fair cannot be judged without considering
the manner of the disnlissal.
Most important of all the considerations. the House of Lords has dra\vn the instances
when procedural compliance will be excused very narrowly. It has ruled that warning
or consultation will be redundant only if at the time of dismissal it appears that either
will be "utterly useless" .
.The above principles have had a trenlendous impact on the Mauritian and South
African labour jurisprudence. The reviewing and appellate powers of the Mauritian
Industrial Court and Supreme Court respectively, and the South African industrial
court's unfair labour practice and status quo jurisdiction have made procedural
fairness a necessary_ though not sufficient. condition for dismissal.
In its pursuit of establishing procedural justice. the industrial court has endorsed both
fairness and functional considerations in the law of dismissal. The effect of this is
that the courts in Mauritius and South Africa have intervened with utmost rigour in
situations where a dismissal is not preceded by a hearing, or an adequate hearing, on
the ground that the employee would still have been dismissed even if an enquiry has
been held. The Suprenle Court of Mauritius has unequivocally stated:
"Proof of gross nlisconduct is a necessary prerequisite to dismissal, whether at an
informal hearing conducted under section 32(2)(a) of the Labour Act or a more
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formal hearing before the Industrial Court. It is an essential ingredient of tllat
hearing. that it should be fair. The element offairness is lacking when evidence of
l1U1terial facts is led by a person who conducted all enquiry from others,...without
those other persolls being heard so as to give an opportunity to the alleged offender
to confrollt thenlalld to cross-examine them... ,,13
In Ta.vab Ghoorum l' A.G. Nabee and Co. 14 the Supreme Court laid down the
principle that:
NoJV hefore there could be a hearing, the person concerned must be nJade aware of
the charge against him and he nlust further be afforded an opportunity to be
assisted br a trade ulliollist or a legal advisor ofhis choice. In the present case, the
plaintiff was called to explain for his absences and there is no evidence wllatsoever
that a charge was levelled against Izim. I, therefore, uphold the submission of the
coullsel that there had been no hearing proper. I, therefore.• find that the dismissal
of plaintiff was unjustified and the defendant is amenable to pay severance
allowance at punitive rate. "
In South Africa. the industrial court being empowered under its unfair labour practice
iurisdiction and status quo position 15 has attempted to remedy the situation where a
disn1issed en1ployee \yas not treated unfairly in that an enquiry would have made no
difference. The cou11 has. on nun1erous occassions rejected the basis of this argument,
and as a n1atter of policy. has discharged all arbitrarily managed dismissals, not only
because they are unlikely to be fair. but because even if they are eventually shown to
be fair. the dis111issed e111ployee is unlikely to know anything of the justification of the
dis111issal and will see only arbitrariness in it. It means that the court's unfair labour
practice jurisdiction not only tries to avoid conduct that produces results that are
unreasonable. capricious or harsh. but also tries to promote fairness that recognises the
dignity of the hl1I11an being and enhance equitable labour relations. 16 It was, therefore,
the court's decisi\'e ruling in Bissessor v Beastores (Ply) Ltd fla Game Discount
11/orli 7 that:
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It is cOllducive to fair alld equitable labour relations that it is in accordance with
principle that before all employee is disnlissed for alleged misconduct tile employer
should hold as full and proper an enquiry into the circumstances of tile alleged
miscollduct as possible.
It is thus the view of the court that every employee faced with dismissal is entitled to a
hearing regardless of whether or not it is probable or even possible that the procedure
will bring new facts to light or make dismissal any less likely.
The statutory basis for the imposition of the requirement of procedural fairness in
Mauritius and South Africa is, therefore, the functional consideration that the non-
con1pliance of any of its requirements will always constitute an unfair labour practice.
5.2.2 Hearing in Mass Dismissals
There is some suggestions in the case law that the number of workers involved in a
disciplinary infraction. if large enough, may excuse an employer from the
requirelnents of procedural fairness. 18 This proposition has not been favoured by the
cOUl1. especially in a strike situation. In National Union ofMineworkers & Others v
D,urban Roodepoorl Deep Ltd l9 the court dismissed the employer's argument that, the
case which involved 348 workers. it was impractical to hold an enquiry or a number
of separate enquiries. The court held:
"... There is 110 reasoll why the reSpOlldellt could 1I0t have arrangedfor allY suitable
procedure, suitable ill the circumstances, whereby it could have put charges to those
whom it illtellded disnlissillg, and affording the accused employees a fair and
reasonahle opportunity of respollding to such charges. The fact that it may simply
be inC(~I1Velliel1t or bothersome to hold {Ill enquiry involving hundreds ofemployees
is 110 just({iclltioll for 1I0t wishing to hold 011 enquiry at aiL 10
The Supreme COUl1 in Mauritius could have envisaged such a situation in G.Nadal v
Longtill (Mts) Lld 21 where mass dismissal was contemplated by the employer,
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without a hearing. due to concerted stoppage of work and refusal to work, inspite of
being requested to do so. by the applicant and sixty other workmen. The court.
however concentrated mainly on the plaintiffs case and held that the conduct of the
appellant amounted to gr?ss misconduct warranting summary dismissal. (This case
will be dealt with later on in this chapter as an exception to procedural fairness).
In the South African industrial context the dilemma that has confronted the decision
making process in disciplinary matters has manifested itself where acts of misconduct
are perpetrated but the en1ployer is not in a position to pinpoint the offending
elnployee nor are the employees disposed or willing to co-operate with the employer
in tracking down the perpetrator(s). The questions that one may ask under these
circUlllstances are:
1. Is the en1ployer in such a situation expected to hold individual enquiry so as to
ascertain the extent to which each employee contributed to the act complained
of or to be able to pin down the real perpetrator(s) of the act or should the
n1anagelnent dismiss them' en masse' without a hearing?
'1 Can the enlployer. for instance. visit 'virtually all staff with mass dismissal in
a situation where there is a massive and systematic theft?"
This question \vas pointedly put b) Cameron lA in Chauke & Ors v Lee Service
Cenlre CC f, a Leeson Alolors22 : ",vhere misconduct necessitating disciplinary action
is proved. but nlanagenlent is unable to pinpoint the perpetrator or perpetrators in
what circun1stances will it be pelTIlissible to dismiss a group of workers which
incontestably includes thenl?" Judicial opinion is divided on the issue. According to
one line of reasoning. the employer cannot dismiss the workers collectively because
the concept of collective guilt is "wholly foreign to our system and repugnant to the
requiren1ents of na.tural justice." 23 The main objection to the collective guilt approach
is that those employees \vho did not participate in the unlawful act or who did not
associate thenlselves \vith the behaviour of the perpetrators will be punished along
\vith the wrongdoers. The consequence therefore is that the collective guilt approach
endorses the dislnissal also of innocent employees.24 While upholding the rule against
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collective guilt. Moletsane C held in FEDCRA W & Ors v Librapac CC5 that there
was no legal duty on the employees to disclose the name of the perpetrator although
there might be a moral duty to do so. In any case, the chairperson of the disciplinary
enquiry had been involved in the preliminary investigation and that once the employer
decided that there was a collective guilt, individual mitigating factors should have
been considered. In an application by the union and the employees to make the
Conlmissioner's award an order of court and the employer's cross-application to
review the same. the Labour Court had to decide whether the review application had
any chance of success and came to the conclusion that there was no justification for
holding that pre-dismissal procedures were impossible to fulfil. 26 Indeed disciplinary
proceedings were instituted. but the fact that they "took a turn to the frustration of the
applicant. in that the evidence it believed should be presented, was not presented, did
not pernlit it sinlply to terminate the disciplinary enquiries and to resort to a finding of
collective guilt"n . This was not one of those "exceptional" circumstances
contemplated in Item 4(4) of the code whereby the applicant could be rescued from
the substantive defects in its case against the bulk of its employees.
Although the other school of thought fully recognises the repugnancy of the collective
guilt approach. which generally endorses the onus on the employer to prove the guilt
of any individual employee it intends to dismiss for misconduct, it holds that
en1ployer's collective action and collective sanction can indeed be justified in certain
circunlstances. For instance. it has been held28 that the principle of fairness was
satisfied \vhere the enlployees knew of a system to check stock shrinkage (the so-
called 'shrinkage action plan') and of collective team control. so that it was possible to
hold the individual elnployee liable as a group. In line with this reasoning, what Item
9 of the code requires in terms of poor work performance, it is contended, is that the
enlployee be nlade aware that he/she had failed to meet the standard of performance
set by the enlployer and that he/she be given the opportunity to meet that standard
failing \vhich disnlissal will follow as a consequent sanction.29
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In accordance with this approach. where a group of workers act as a "cohesive group"
and in Sf) acting unlawfully 'causes physical or economic hann to an employer. then
there is no reason why the employer should not be entitled to interdict such hann by
reference to collective unit. Thus in Oconbrick Manufacturing (Pty) Ltd v SABA WO
& Ors.30 the Labour Court held that where the workers had formed a cohesive group,
acted in conce11 and obstructed access to the employer's premises - these not being
individual unlawful acts but conscious acts of striking workers acting in concert - it
.would be "anonlalous" within the context of the Labour Relations Act, "to treat
'workers as a collective. especially where collective bargaining is concerned, and yet to
retreat to an individualistic approach when it comes to facing up to the consequences
of collective industrial action. ,,31 The Court distinguished the earlier cases of Ex parte
Consolidated Fine Spinners & Weavers Lt~2 and Mondi Paper (A Division ofMondi
Lld) l' PPH~4~vu & Ors33 on the facts. It will be recalled that in both cases the High
COU11 had adopted the approach that in respect of interdicting workers committing
acts of nlisconduct during a strike. such interdict would not be granted against a group
of e!l1ployees unless and until the individual perpetrators are identified.
Meanwhile. the collective sanction principle has eminently been bolstered by the
judgment of South Africa's highest labour tribunal. In Chauke & Ors v Lee Service
Cenlre CC I/O Leeson MOlors.3~ the Labour Appeal Court constructed a theoretical
foundation for the justification of the employer's action in treating the employees'
nlisconduct as a collective issue and responding to that accordingly. The Court held
that to insist that enlployees should. after repeated collective confrontations, in
response to repeated collective action. have been afforded further step of individual
hearings. 'w'ould inlpose an unjustifiable element of formality upon the requirement of
a hearing. which in this case would have been without any demonstrable purpose.35
111 c0111ing to the conclusiorl that the enlployer could not be blamed for treating the
nlisconduct as a collective issue. the court had approached the problem from two
angles. a for111ulation which no doubt takes a cue from the Appellate Division's earlier
approach \vith regard to collective dismissals ~n strike situations.36 The first category
276
in the court's forn1l1lation is where one of only two employees is known to have been
involved in "nlajor irreversible destructive action" but management is unable to
pinpoint which of them is responsible for that act. In this instance, the employer may
be entitled to dismiss both of them including the innocent one, in so far as all avenues
of investigation have been exhausted. The rationalisation here is that of operational
requirement. namely that action is necessary to save the life of the enterprise. The
second category represents disnlissal on the ground of misconduct where management
may have sufficient grounds for inferring that the whole group is responsible for the
misconduct or are involved in it. In postulating a two-fold justification in this latter
regard. the (ourt created an implied duty o"n an employee in such a group including
the actual perpetrators. to assist management in bringing the guilty to book,37 a duty
akin to that of trust and confidence essential in the emploYment relationship, a breach
of vvhich in itself justifies disnlissal. 38 In effect, the price the innocent pays in this
circumstance. is for exercising his or her right to remain silent. As a second
justification in this category of nlisconduct is the inference of involvement whereby
.the enlployer is entitled to infer that all employees either participated in the
nlisconduct or lent their support to it positively or passively.39 In both of these
.instances. the enlployer is entitled to discipline the enlployees for misconduct as a
collectiYe group.
Furthernlore. the enlployer is not required to refrain from disciplining employees
guilty of nlisconduct in group situation because other culprits could not be identified.
-to Take the case of l\lorkels Slores(Pty) Lld l' Woolfrey NO & Anor41 • The employer
had held sonle 50 disciplinary enquiries resulting in the dismissal of nine employees
(including the enlployee in this case) for intinlidation during picketing. Although the
Conlmissioner found that the enlployee had breached picket rules he nonetheless
found that the enlployer had acted unfairly because the entire group of workers had
been equally guilty. The Labour Court held that the employer was permitted to take
paI1icular steps against individual enlployees who had perpetrated specific acts of
nlisconduct but that it could not have been expected to take collective action against
all the strikers because. in the circunlstances. it had not been able to identify all the
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perpetrators. It \\"as equally held in Alabinana & Ors v Baldwins Steel 42 that the only
basis of the en1ployees' claim that they had been selectively dismissed was that the
employer could have identified more culprits but that the failure to identify ot~er
n1en1bers of the group is not in itself indicative of bad faith or ulterior purpose.
Further that witnesses who could have identified other culprits were not called at the
disciplinary enquiry could not be held against the employer. In any case, the
en1ployees' attack on the d~sciplinary procedure could not be permitted as they had
indicated in the comi a quo that they do not allege procedural unfairness.
The Labour Appeal Court rejected the dismissed employees' argument in SACCA WU
& Ors \' lrvin & Johllson~3 to the effect that by not dismissing some of the employees
\yho had also participated in the den10nstrations, the employers had applied discipline
inconsistently. The cou11 held that too n1uch emphasis was placed on the so-called
'pany principle' \vhich is simply an element of disciplinary fairness whereby every
en1ployee must be n1easured by the san1e standards and recognises that discipline must
not be capricious. PaI1icularly pertinent to the discussion in hand is the court's ruling
that' the en1ployees out of the 39 charged with misconduct were not found guilty
because they were not adequately identified from the photographs taken from the
den10nstrations \vhich served as the only evidence since the employees were not
forthcon1ing \\'ith evidence for fear for their lives. The fact that those employees were
not punished and they doubly deserved to be punished does not mean that they should
have escaped the san1e fate,
5.2.2.1 Must the Employer hear the Striking Workers?
In answer to this question !\1cCalI J in Plascon Ink & Packaging Coating (Pty) Ltd v
l\~cob() & Ors-l-l said:
Alt"ollg" it is accepted t"at it is generally necessary to observe the audi alteram
pm"tem rule and to afford individual enlp/oyees the opportunity ofa hearing before
dismissing t"em for 11liSCOllduct, t"ere is no such general principle with regard to
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the dismissal of workers ellgaged ill an unlawful strike, after they have been given a
reasonable ultinllltum.
There is a greater similarity between the above reasoning of the South African Labour
Appeal Court and the decision of the Supreme Court of Mauritius in G.Nadal v
Longtill (Aits) Lttf5 In the latter case the respondent pleaded that the appellant was
dismissed for gross misconduct which it particularised as follows: "plaintiff and
approxin1ately sixty other workn1en took part in a concerted stoppage of work on 11
May 1979. refused to \vork in spite of their being requested to do so; they further
disturbed a site meeting which was in progress and later when again requested to
resume work. failing which they would be dismissed, they became agitated and
abusive." The learned Magistrate. after hearing the case concluded that the conduct of
the appellant amounted to gross misconduct warranting his summary dismissal. On
appeal. the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower court and stated:
"He (the appellant) participated ill a concerted stoppage of work although told that
his griel'allces would be heard by the personnel officer later in the day and
systematically refused to resume work though he was told that his name would be
recorded alld !le would be sacked...It call hardly be contended that, in those
circllmstances, his enlployer had to allow hinl a hearing before sacking hint. "
The ruling of the cOUl1 clearly stipulates that the offence of the appellant is manifestly
clear that the respondent employer. on the facts known to it, took the view that
whatever explanation the en1ployee would advance, if ever a hearing would have
taken place. it would have made no difference.
In South Africa. this was the line of thought taken by Goldstein in NUMSA v Haggie
Rand Lld. ~6 He said:
"...to expect 111ll11llgemellt to emasculate the ultimatum by subjecting its threat of
dismissal to 1I hearing is to denllllld of it to sheathe the sword and to render it
ineffective or virtllal(l' so. And that is not fair. There is also something quite
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artificial alld ullacceptable ill requiring all enlployer wllo is directly affected by tile
flagraJlt, unnlistakable nlisbelwviour ofan employee to conduct an enquiry himself
illto such nlisbehaviour after such employer has himself deemed it necessary to
issue a tlisnlisstilultinUltUl11 as a result thereof."
The recent case that caused a considerable stir in the law of mass dismissal of striking
enlployees is !via/uti Transport Corporation Lld v !vIR TAWU & Others47 where the
individual respondents were' dismissed after they went on strike in sympathy with
workers who had been disn1issed for participating in an overtime ban. The employer
contended that the strike was illegal. not functional to collective bargaining and in
violation of the peace clause in the collective agreement and a court interdict.
Although the Inajority-l8 would not condone the conduct of the workers during the
strike as acceptable behaviour. and while appreciating the fact that the employer was
clearly entitled to bring matters to a head at that stage, they considered that the crucial
question was \vhether it went about it in a proper manner. The majority found that:
(a) prior to the disnlissal of the 39 elnployees, they were given an ultimatum to work
overtime: (b) the ultimatum did not specify the sanction that would follow upon nOll-
conlpliance: (c) at the tilne when the 39 employees were instructed to work overtime
it was kno\\'n to the empioyer that the entire workforce had decided not to work
overtinle: and (d) follo\ving upon their failure to work overtime, the 39 workers were
disnlissed \\'ithout a further hearing. It was held that the failure to state in the
llltimatunl that it intended to disnliss the 39 workers if they failed to work overtime
\vas a factor to be considered in assessing the ultimate fairness of the dismissal. The
COll11 accordingly upheld the Industrial Court's decision that there was no urgency for
disnlissing the 39 enlployees without a hearing. It was also held that there was no
good reason for the elllployer to change its mind on the date it set for return to work
. .
by the rest of the enlployees so that its ultimatum to the workers to return to work
earlier than the original date was unjustified and that the subsequent dismissal of the
workers for not doing so was unfair.
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In a strong dissenting judgn1ent, Conradie lA held that the conduct of the workers
during the strike was "defiantly illegitimate" from beginning to end. As for the 39
workers. they could not expect any more final written warnings, having received such
warnings previously and paying no heed to them. "It is inconceivable that these
en1ployees could for one 1110111ent have thought that management would try another
\\:aming before resorting to dismissal. The only possible sanction if they persisted
with their conduct was disn1issal. It was not necessary to spell it out. In this
confrontation everyone knew where the lines had been drawn. ,,49 He disagreed with
the luajority view that the 39 employees should have been given individual
disciplinary hearings and that the failure of the employer to have listened to each one
individually before disluissing hilu made the dismissal unfair. These hearings would
have given each en1ployee an opportunity to state why he felt compelled not to work
overtin1e. COl1radie lA could not see the purpose such disciplinary hearing would
serve since both the employees and the employer knew what the issues were and why
the employees refused to work overtime. In his opinion, it is not fair to suppose that
the holding of individual disciplinary hearings in the circumstances "would have
occuned to a reasonable e111ployer". nor "would it be fair to suppose that it might have
occuned to a reasonable employer that if it were to hold an individual enquiry the
employee under investigation n1ight collapse. break ranks with his fellow strikers and
undel1ake to resun1e his overtilue work. If he did not, he would be dismissed, there
\\"~s no need to e\'en debate this sanction at a disciplinary enquiry. If a disciplinary
enquiry could accomplish nothing useful I do not believe that it needed to be held." 50
Surely. where e111ployees engage in collective industrial action, they should be dealt
with collectively and not to treat the employees individually because they were
individually instructed to work. therefore. it would be unfair to deal with them
collectively. There was clear evidence that the mood of defiance was such that no
en1ployee could be persuaded to attend a disciplinary hearing and there is no scope for
finding that disciplinary enquiries should have been held. Accordingly, the dismissal
of the 39 en1ployees was not unfair. And on the dismissal of the rest of the workers,
Conradie lA held:
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I would have said that, as a matter offairness, the appellant was, after the
uproar Oil 7 November, entitled to dismiss the enlployees immediately after
IIaving given adequate ultinwtunl. Its initial decision not to do so was in
tile nature of an indulgellce. It had not even issued an ultimatum to the
employees to returll to work on 23 November. It was evidently holding its
optiolls opell. To 1101£1 tllat the appellant was bound by the indulgence to
tile extent of 1I0t being able to withdraw it without showing good cause, is
Ilot, ill my opinion, a cOllclusioll distated by the requirements offairness. It
has, in any event, shown a good reason for what it did. III my view the
appellant IIas convincingly denlOnstrated that itfollowed a fair procedure in
diJil11issing tile second group ofstrikers as well. 51
Like Froneman DJP. Conradie JA held that "it goes against the grain to come to the
assistance of strikers who had so grossly misbehaved" however, unlike the Deputy
Judge President. the Judge of Appeal did not feel "impelled by the inexorable pressure
of the facts or the law (in which I include fairness) to come to their assistance. ,,52
It is not clear how the n1qjority decision in Maluti Transport would influence the
development of the law in the code era. One would therefore not be surprised to find
decisions based on the code regime not differing too significantly from those earlier
cases froil1 the Labour Appeal Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal. We have
already seen that Benjan1in AJ held in Fibre Flair53 that a hearing was necessary in the
circurnstances of that case but one would not be surprised to find Conradie JA's type
of appl'oac.h in future cases. Indeed. the indications from the Labour Court are that
n1ay well be the trend. Jajbhay AJ \-vas somewhat echoing those sentiments when in
A1arapl//a & Ors l' Consleen (Pty) Lld54 he observed that "despite its collective nature,
the disn1issal of striking workers is a dismissal nonetheless, just as all other
disl11issals. it operates to tern1inate the services of the individual. The Code of Good
~ractice in 111Y opinion does not contemplate a separate enquiry." But it is the
judgment of Revelas J in MalcOlnes Toyota on the question whether a hearing should
be held in the circUlnstances of an unprotected strike that underscores the prevailing
thinking:
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111 a strike situarioll, particularly all unprotected strike, where employee are warned
of dismissal ill all ultimatum, if would hardly make sense to conduct a hearing just
before the dismissal is imposed. Apart fronl the fact that it promises to be very
impractical to have hearings during an unprotected strike about participation in the
strike itself, a requirement for disciplinary hearings to be held prior to taking action
durillg all ullorotected strike would mean that the employer's endeavours to bring
all elld to unprotected action is seriously hanlpered. A requirement to have
hearillgs after the dismissal had already taken place, would be, in my opinion,
lll11lllnlOUllf to tlte employer second-guessing its own decision. Such a process
could 1I0t serve i/l till)' meanillgful way to resolve the issue at hand.../ do not agree
tltat till tlte prillciples applicable to disnlissal for misconduct as set Ollt in the Code,
should he followed in the case of dismissal for participation in unprotected action.
The legislator has deemed it fit to deal with these matters separately.55
The judge further held that the reasonable step the employer should take in the
circun1stances of this case would be to invite the employees to show that there was a
good reason for their panicipation in the unprotected strike~ such as intimidation and
that if they were given the opportunity of providing an explanation, they would have
so stated. None of the employees had made any such case since the Act does not
require the en1ployer to follow this course or hold any hearing for dismissals
follo\ving pat1icipation in unprotected strikes, there is no reason to find that the
dismissal was procedurally unfair simply because no such process had been
followed.
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It \\'ould seen1 that where the misconduct arises from improper behaviour
of e111ployees engaged in a protected strike. such misconduct would call for a hearing,
and investigation before any disciplinary action is taken against the employees and the
collective treatn1ent should not be allowed to interfere with the principle that only the
offenders should receive punishlnent for their conduct after it has been ascertained
that they con1111itted those acts. This would maintain the line of demarcation drawn by
the law on protected and unprotected strike.
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5.2.2.2 The' Crisis Zone' and Exemption from Hearing striking
Employees before Mass dismissal.
The' crisis zone' is a unique situation exemplified in the South African law of unfair
dismissal which anticipates an instance of overriding extremity where the need for a
hearing may not be necessary. This concept is still foreign to the Mauritian Labour
Legislation. The South African approach to deal with exceptional circumstances
where the enlployer is exempted from conducting a pre-dismissal hearing before
ternlinating the services of striking employees' en masse' may be regarded as a matter
for consideration in future for Mauritius.
In the case which laid the foundation for this exception, Lefu v Western Areas Gold
l\lining Co Ird. 57 the employer's mine was racked over a two-day period by a major
riot in which nine people lost their lives. 349 were injured and production losses and
danlage to buildings and equipment totalled millions of rands. As the situation
cooled. the enlployer took drastic action. It isolated 205 employees whom its officials
had 'positively identified' as having been amongst those who had 'encouraged, incited
or actively pm1icipated in the violence'. and sacked them summarily. Many
enlployees disputed the fairness of this action: they said. had been wrongly identified;
or explanations \\"ere possible for what they had allegedly been seen doing, or their
actions \\"ere nlitigated by various considerations. None of this could be brought
forward on the day they were dismissed. since they were bussed to their migrant
homes alnl0st in1n1ediately.
In COU11 the enlployees urged that the sun1mary procedure adopted raised great risks
that substantive unfairness had been perpetrated. They should have have been
accorded sonle form of a hearing before they were dismissed. But the argument was
rejected:
(A)cceptallce of this subnlissioll would involve adopting an armchair
approach to the problem and furthermore it would not take sufficient
acco/lllt of the fact... t/Illt a tense situation prevailed whilst the dismissals
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took place alld that the dismissal ofsome 205 persons out ofa work-force of
sonle 14()OO black enlployees may have eliminatedfresh unrest. ,,58
The court relied for this approach on the 'widespread unrest which caused loss of life
and dan1age to property and placed other lives and property in danger':
Faced with the respollsibility of nlaintaining law and order on the mine, a
situatioll caused by the peculiar circumstances ofthe mine where the social
conmlullity cOllsists ofenlployees, it cannot be said that the respondent was
obliged to hold a hearing in respect of the applicants before terminating
their services. ,,59
There are criticisms to be made of the Lefu judgment. Its endorsement of summary
procedure occurred not amidst the tension of a post-riot lull but in the reflective
atn10sphere of court proceedings - where, it may be argued, it is important that
considerations of faill1ess should be decisive. The court was plainly anxious that its
finding should not be derided as that of an 'armchair' or academic critic of the harsh
procedures \vhich might be required in the harsh world of mining discipline. But
would insistence on elementary fairness have been evidence of an academic
approach? One way of avoiding harm to both the employer - if the workers' continued
presence on the mine really posed a threat of renewed rioting - and to the employees
then1selves would have been to suspend them and to institute proper procedures at a
later point. This \vould adn1ittedly have been cumbersome and probably expensive,
since the sacked workers 'vvere n1igrants who would have had to be transported back to
face the disciplinary proceedings. But no reason is given in the judg~ent for rejecting
the suspension option. And the deputy president of the industrial court himself later
raised this suggestion in answer to a similar argun1ent by a mine:
If ill fact the respolldellt cOllsiderel/ at that stage that the presence of the
applicallts Oil the mille cOllstituted a threat to disrupt workings at the mine
byfurther acts ofintinlidation or violence at the mine no reason existed why
{~fter cOllsultation with u/lion officials these particular applicants' services
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could not by agreenzent have been suspended until a date when tile dust
caused by tile strike had sufficiently subsided to grant them afair trial. 60
No reason indeed: though this latter case may well be distinguishable from Lefu61 in
that its facts are not as extreme. This point is indeed the saving grace of the Lefu
doctrine - that it n1ay be applied only in cases of overriding extremity. In a series of
cases argued shortly after Lefu the presiding officer in that case established the limits
of the exception. 62 Here the same en1ployer sought to invoke the same circumstances
to justify the absence of a hearing in the case of employees who were sacked some
weeks after the riot was over. The argument failed. Given the mine's organizational
resources. it could not claim to be unable to handle several hundred enquiries over a
period of several weeks. and indeed it appeared from the company's own depositions
that enquiries had been held in the case of certain other employees allegedly involved
in the subsided violence:
I am unable to hold... ~hat the situation which prevailed when Lefu and his
co-applicallts were disnzissed was in any way comparable to that which
prevailed when tile present applicants were dismissed. There is no
justification for holding that because the charges are similar the respondent
may dispense with the procedural fornzalities which generally apply even
O/lce the siTuation had returned to normal. 63
It is thus evident that Lefu exists chiefly to show that the hearing requirement is not
in1n1utable: once that has been established the clearest facet of the decision is that the
exception it creates will be afforded employers only in the most exceptional
circUlllstances. Lefu is often invoked but the attempted analogy is almost invariably
rebuffed. 64 So far as is kno\vn it has never actually been applied in another case,
though the exception it recognizes has been widely accepted. Both the existence of
the Lefu exception
65
and the chariness with which attempts to rely on it are treated
reflect the general position in adn1inistrative law. 66 The leading South African writer
on the subject has argued that the' exceptional circumstances' proviso to the rules of
natural justice should be abandoned: sufficient flexibility is retained if it is borne in
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nlind that procedural fairness should not be applied outside its 'proper limits'. 67 It
nlay well not be inappropriate for a refomlulation along these lines to take place in the
industrial court's jurisprudence.
The words of Sir J.Donaldson MR in 68 may be quoted as an apt summary of the
'crisis zone' situation. He said:
" ••• 110 anwullt of industrial warfare, and no antount of heat can of itself
justify failillg to give all enlployee all opportullity ofgivillg an explanatioll
of his conduct. What industrial warfare may do is to create a situatioll ill
which conduct which would Ilot normally justify dismissal because conduct
which does justify dismissal, alld if there is no possibility of the employee
giving an explanatioll of cOllduct which is alleged, or if it is plaillly
1Illnlitted. thell there may be no cause to ask him for all explanation."
5.2.3 Are Executive Employees entitled to Procedural Fairness when
dismissed for Misconduct?
It has been a strong contention on behalf of companIes which have dismissed
managerial or executive level enlployees that they are not entitled to pre-dismissal
hearing either because the Labour Relations Act do not apply to them or because it
would be inappropriate for the com1 to lend assistance to high level employees.
The Labour Act 1975 of Mauritius seenlS to provide an umbrella protection to every
employee against disnlissaI based on unfair procedures. For instance, in Sentinelle
Lld l' DaviJ'9 considering the position of an editor of a newspaper who was dismissed
for failing to carry out an instruction of the editor-in-chief. the Supreme Court held:
"... there is 110 cOlllp!iallce with the provisions of the law requiring an
employer to give the employee an adequate opportunity to answer the
charge if the hearing resolves itself into an interview between the employee
alld the person whose orders were disobeyed, that person not being the
eI11plo)'er. "
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Thus the fact that Section 32(2)(a) of the Labour Act is applicable to an editor of a
newspaper. it means that the section would certainly be applicable to any other
employee in an organisation. But the Industrial Court had also this to say in Goder v
d 70Bafa Shoe Co.Lt :
"Summary disnlissal for gross misconduct is still permissible and a warning
may he dispellsed with where tile employee has made it clear that he does
Ilot illtelld to inlprove - for exanlple he is at odds with the company's policy
or where his capacity is so bad as to be irredeemable or where, as ill the
case of sellior nlQ11agemellt, the employee already knows exactly what is
requested ofhim so that a warning would be irrelevant".
It is evident fron1 the Industrial Court's decision that in case of a senior management a
\varning or procedural fairness may be dispensed with as it is expected of the senior
executive to kno\\' the company policy and the standard of conduct required of
him/her.
In South Africa this is a contestable issue. Although the court in one case maintained
that a disciplinary code usually does not apply to managers,71 it stated in another case
(where the dis111issal of a director \vas in issue) that it did not want to prescribe
procedural guide-lines and would therefore follow the provisions of an existing
disciplinary code which applied to the director. 72 In the absence of a disciplinary
code the court will have regard to the rules of natural justice. 73 Normally the
en1ployer is °not required to give reasons for the dismissal of a senior employee, except
where the circu111stances of the case are such that fairness so requires (for example,
where reasons can indicate that a disciplinary committee was not influenced by its
previous decision). 7~ As far as warnings are concerned, the court stated in one case
that -
'those en1ployed in senior management may by the nature of their job be fully aware
of what is required of then1 and fully capable of judging for themselves whether they
are achieving that requirel11ent. 75
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In another case. however. the court took account of the fact that a manager had never
been told that he had been incompetent or could not get along with the staff. 76 It was,
furthermore. explicitly held that even in the case where a manager is to be dismissed,
. bd 'h 77it does not follow that warnIngs can e one away WIt .
In n1any cases concen1ing the dismissal of senior personnel the court has required,
even in cases of alleged incompatibility or incompetence, that a disciplinary enquiry
111Ust be held before dismissal. 78 It has been stated explicitly that the dismissal of
senior en1ployees does not constitute an exception to the general requirement of a fair
hearing. 79 1.11 two cases. however. exceptional circumstances were found to exist
which justified a deviation from this general rule that a disciplinary enquiry should
have been held. viz where there was indeed a valid and substantive reason for
dis111issa1 8o and where the granting of a reinstatement order would be totally contrary
to the interests of the en1ployer. since the dismissed managing director of the
en1ployer bank had been involved in illegal transactions. 81 The holding of a fair
hearing is not only generally required. but may sometimes be imperative, as in the
case where the allegations are of such a nature that they have to be investigated at a
hearing. 82 Although a fair hearing or disciplinary enquiry is generally required, it
appears that the court adopts a more flexible attitude as to what would constitute such
a hearing or enquiry. On a fevv occassions the court was satisfied that a meeting (or
n1eetings) bet\veen the senior en1ployee and other senior personnel of the employer
could qualify as a disciplinary enquiry. albeit an informal one. 83 A contrary finding,
however. was n1ade where the meeting had another purpose and had not been intended
as an enquiry. 8~ or where the employer had not raised the allegations made against
hin1 with the employee. 85 or where the en1ployer had decided upon dismissal prior to
the meeting. 80 In other cases as well the prior decision to dismiss was found to be
ilnproper and to amount to procedural unfairness. 87 Previous warnings cannot take
the place of a disciplinary enquiry. 88
In cases where a disciplinary enquiry had been held, the court found that the enquiry
had been defective since the dismissed senior employee had not known what the
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charges against hinl had been. 89 or the dismissed employee had been refused access to
the notes of the enquiry. 90 or the decision to dismiss had been taken on the strength of
the evidence of one witness only. 91 The err.ployee must be heard not only with rega~d
to his version of the facts. but also with regard to an appropriate remedy. 92 In one
case the court was dissatisfied with the decision of a governing body that the issuing
of a serious warning to a director (as decided upon by a previous disciplinary
cOll1nlittee) be replaced Wit'l a decision to dismiss. 93 In spite of the senior status of a
nlanager he was nevertheless entitled to representation. 94 In contrast it was on
occassion also stated that a manager is usually not afforded representation. 95 In a
nunlber of cases the court took cognisance of the fact that representation had been
allowed96 and declared that the refusal to grant representation at further levels of
disciplinary proceedings where it had been granted initially was irregular. 97
Inlpartiality is seen as being of the utnlost importance. The court reversed the
decision of a second disciplinary enquiry to dismiss a director where it appeared that
he \vas disnlissed on more or less the same allegations and factual bases as those
\yhich had been in issue during the first enquiry and where the majority of the
nlen1bers of the last enquiry \vere the sanle people who took the initial decision. 98 In
this regard the coul1 stressed that the applicable test was not whether there had
actually been partiality. but whether an impression of partiality had been created. 99
The granting of a right of appeal to senior enlployees does not appear to be a sine qua
11011. A conl1110n-sense approach has been followed by the court where the appeal was
heard by the same senior person or persons who had taken the initial decision. In such
a case the refusal to allo\-\" an appeal was 110t inlproper. 100 Neither could the employee
be expected to lodge an appeal. 101 Having regard to all the above-mentioned
procedural guidelines. the C0U11 found in a few cases that procedural unfairness had in
fact been proyed. IO~ Finally. it should be noted that the court stated in one case that
the usual retrenchl11ent guide-lines should be followed in the case of the retrenchment
of a nlanager. IUy
Apart frol11 nlinor inconsistencies and nlinor deviations prompted by a common-sense
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approach. it appears that the procedural guide-lines laid down by the industrial court
in regard to the dismissal of executive employees do not differ materially from the
guide-lines followed when other employees are dismissed. This applies to the
principles concenling the applicability of a disciplinary code lO4 and the rules of natural
. . IO~ h ~ h d· . 1106 • 107 ~. h . 108 d IJustIce -. t e reasons lor t e IsmIssa ,warnIngs ,a laIr eanng an appea s,
109 as \vell as to the applicable retrenchment guide-lines. 110 It is evident, however,
that in ceI1ain respects the court reveals a more flexible attitude in the application of
these principles where the dismissal of an executive employee is an issue.
Thus. although the industrial court has on at least two occasions declined to exercise
its powers in favour of a wronged executive on the ground that to do so would be
unfair to the conlpan/ 11. it has uniformly asserted that in principle its powers extend
to the relief of unfairly treated executives and has often exercised them. It has now
also been authoritatively established that there is no jurisdictional bar preventing the
industrial court from adjudicating the claims of unfairly dismissed senior executives,
including directors of companies. Their claims to procedural fairness before dismissal
must therefore be assessed in the sanle way as those of other employees, namely with
due consideration of all the relevant circumstances.
5·.2.4 Can Waiver or Quasi-Waiver by the Employees to be heard be
tantamount to an exception to Procedural Fairness?
The concept of waiver to the right to be heard is explained in W&J Wass Lld v
Burns 112 where Sir George Baker explains:
"] am 1I0t, ] hope, so ullworldly as to reject tile possibility tllat if tile
elllployee had beell asked to explain or mitigate, he would simply
have...givell the "v" sigil witll or without an appropriate oral outburst."
The nearest Mauritian equivalent to this situation occurred in Societe Malesherbes v
1I '
Janlajaye Beelur j where the section manager related that four cows had died
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apparently by reason of toxic ingestion. A veterinary surgeon was called in to carry
out a post mortem examination. The police were also called and the workers
employed in the feeding of those animals, including the respondent were detained for
purposes of enquiry. After the respondent's release he was asked by the section
manager whether he had any explanation to give, he said he had none - it was in those
circumstances that he was told that he should not resume work and that a decision was
to be communicated to him by letter. The magistrate did not make any definite
pronouncement on which of the two versions he was acting upon but he referred to the
fact that it was not essential to hold a formal hearing by way of a disciplinary
committee, suggesting perhaps that he was accepting the version of the section
manager. Thus the Supreme Court held an appeal that:
We are oftlte opinion tltat tlte assumption that the Magistrate was to act on
the version of the section manager tlte very fact of his asking for
explanations and the answer given by the respondent that Ite had none to
give complied with the requirements ofSection 32(2)(a) ofTlte Labour Act.
The Supreme Court took this line of reasoning not simply because the employee had
waived his right to be heard, but because the facts were verified on investigation by
the General Manager and the employee knew of his guilt. The Supreme Court
summarised the facts as follows:
In our judgment, this should be all the more for two reasons. Firstly, the
General Manager, Mr R. Lanlbert, wlto was called to tlte spot from tlte
main Port Louis office ofthe appel/ant on the 26 November 1986 stated:
J'ai fait mon enquete persollnel/e paral/element aupres de tout le monde et
principalement aupres de tous les travaileurs de la ferme concernant les
mo~tons aussi bien que les vaches morts ce jour la. '! And that witness was
not cross-examined. Secondly, we are not dealing with some isolated
incident occurring in nebulous circumstances but with a series of blatant
act of vandalism, so that the respondent cannot but have been fully aware
ofwhat was suspected.
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The Supreme Court. therefore. found the dismissal without a proper hearing to be fair
because the accused enlployee had a constructive knowledge of his guilt and he opted
to allow the disciplinary action to take place against him without him rebutting the
facts or pleading in nlitigation.
Sinlilar situation has ansen in the South African case of Mfazwe v SA Metal &
A!lachine Co. Lld. II-l The facts were that a worker had been given a series of warnings
about his attitude and speed of work. These culminated in a final warning in tenns of
which he was threatened with dismissal if these factors had not improved by the end
of the day. His supervisor then approached him in order to tell him exactly what was
expected of hinl. The worker confronted him with a tirade, treated him with
contempt. clearly showing that he was not interested in participation in the working
relationship. The industrial court held that the absence of any fonnal or infonnal
enquiry before disnlissal was not an unfair labour practice:
Tile conversation between [the supervisor] and the applicant 011 that specific
day inllllediate(l' prior to his disnlissal and after the series of warnings in
m)' view nwkes it clear tllatthe applicant was treated fairly throughout and
tllat nothing could have been expected of a reasonable employer along tlte
lines (~ffurtller investigations and enquiries. 115
This decision illustrates that an enlployee can by his or her conduct abandon or waive
the right to a pre-dislnissal hearing. Waiver in law occurs when a person with full
knowledge of a legal right abandons it. 116 In the employment context it would be
unrealistic to apply the full requisites of the legal doctrine of waiver before an
enlployee's conduct could be said to exempt an employer from the hearing
requirement. All that should be required is that the employee should indulge in
conduct which establishes that the enlployer can no longer reasonably or fairly be
expected to furnish an opportunity for a pre-dismissal hearing.
The cases in which strikes took place and in which the industrial court held that
application of the hearing requirement would be unreasonable seem to illustrate this
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principle. In the judgn1ent it is son1etimes suggested that the reason why the right to a
predisn1issal hearing is not enforced in such cases is the fact that the workers involved
are so many or that they are acting in concert or that their stand is collective. Il7 None
of these reasons can provide support for the denial of procedural justice. The case in
question sho\vs. however. that CirCll111stances may exist which entitle the employer to
concludt' that the workers have abandoned their entitlement to normal pre-dismissal
procedure. This n1a1' be because they have repudiated their contracts of employment
or because they have engaged in other conduct which renders the enforcement- of pre-
disn1issal procedures pointless. Whether the workers do so by concerted action or not
is ilTelevant. though participation in a mass withdrawal of labour may, depending on .
the circun1stances. furnish evidence of the kind required. The point of concerted
action is generally not that it is concerted or that the participants in it are numerous
but that its nature is evident: if the employer is justified in regarding it as a repudiation
of the contract of employn1ent he or she will not need to hold hearings in order to
ascertain the facts.
What is in1pol1ant is that the right to a hearing will not be enforced in South Africa,
any n10re than in England. \vhere to do so would be 'utterly uselessrll7 Where a
worker's conduct establishes that no purpose would be served by holding a hearing,
whether by display of the 'VI sign. by indulging in a contemptuous outburst or by
participating in n1ass action the purpose and nature of which is plain, then the right to
a hearing n1ay have been abandoned. The point is illustrated by posing a case where
the reason. for the withdrawal of labour was not clear. In Black Health & Allied
VVorken Union of SA & Others \' Garden City Clinic 118 workers engaged in a work
stoppage after the disn1issal of a colleague. The reinstatement application of the main
body of workers was rejected since it was plain why they acted as they did and also
that \\"hat they did was illegal. a repudiation of their contracts of employment and
.grossly unfair' to their elnployer. But this was not clear in the case of all the workers:
The .five night workers fire on a different footing. It is not clear what their
motivation was for acting as th~y did because a proper enquiry was not
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held. It appears they stopped working. Why, we do not know...The
housekeeper termillated their services because she believed their actions
amounted to a strike or that they supported their colleagues who were on
strike. From the papers it is not clear to me that her belief was sound.
They may have had other reaSOIlS, eg fear ofthe strikers. This should have
been investigated...l do not thillk that the housekeeper 011 behalf of
respondellt should have acted so hastily. I understand her agitation,
impatience alld concerll...she should have realized, however, that exactly
that situatioll most probably would cloud her judgment and that she could
. . ifi d I' 119Jump to UIlJustl 1e COliC liSIOns.
The night workers had thus not engaged in conduct which indicated that a hearing
would be 'utterly useless'. They had not impliedly abandoned their rights to
procedural fairness before being dismissed. If the categorization suggested here is
accepted it n1ay be said that unlike their colleagues, whose actions and motives in the
strike were beyond dispute. the night workers had not made it plain by their conduct
. that a hearing would be pointless and thus had not waived their right to its benefits. 120
. The cases discussed above sufficiently exemplify that procedural fairness is not an
absolute right available to an en1ployee when he/she is faced with disciplinary charges
and liable to face the ultin1ate sanction of dismissal. There has been obvious
similarities adopted by both i\1auritius and South Africa in their respective approaches
to deal with case \vhere an employee through his/her conduct indicate unwillingness
to co-operate \yith the enquiry or investigation to unearth the truth in the allegation
n1ade against hin1/her. A word of caution would definitely be that as much as
procedural fairness is not an absolute right. as it can be dispensed with under special
circun1stances. denial of it on flin1sy grounds would create more disharmony and
arbitrariness in the en1ployer/employee relationship.
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5.2.5 The Labour Relations Act and Judicial Decisions on Exemption
from Procedures in Exceptional Circumstances.
5.2.5.1 The Mauritian Experience
Neither the Mauritian Industrial Relations Act 1973 nor the Labour Act 1975 have
n1ade provisions for except~ol1al circun1stances where an employer could be exempted
fro111 follo\ving procedures during pre-dismissal hearings. However, numerous cases
are illustrative of the fact that some misconducts are so manifestly heinous that the
need for a disciplinary hearing does not arise.
In the \Villoughby College vC. Chukooree 122 the facts were that the respondent, a
n1an'ied n1an. was a teacher at the appellant's college. The wife of one of the two co-
owners of the college was also a teacher at the college. The respondent. it appeared,
was having an affair with the \vife. The co-owner/employer got wind of it and
suspended the respondent. Disciplinary proceedings were instituted against him on a
nun1ber of charges relating to tampering with attendance registers and other matters.
But the charges did not include the behaviour of the respondent regarding the wife.
The respondent did not attend the hearing nor did his counsel.
Two reasons 111ilitated against the respondent's plea not to dismiss him. Firstly, he
\\'as charged with gross 111isconduct and secondly. his contract of service was a yearly
one, and it \vas due to expire at the end of the year. On a point of technicality, as
provided in Section 32( 1)(b)(ii) I~3. the Inagistrate of the Industrial Court found that
"since tile letter of termination was sent 9 days after tile Ilearing and not 7
day.',., as required by sectioll 32(l)(b)(ii) oftile Labour Act, tile 'dismissal' of
tile respolldentwas ulljustified. "
Surprisingly. the Supren1e Court took a tangent view on the express charges meted out
against the respondent and dealt at length with the implied charge, that is, "the
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reprehensible behaviour of the respondent regarding his employer's wife", which the
Supreme Court acknowledged that "in the particular circumstances, might have
constituted ground for respondent's instant dismissal if only it had expressly been so
invoked at the time". With respect. this may be a misdirection, as the Supreme Court
deviated from the issue at hand and took upon itself to uncover the facts which though
related to the case. were never brought out as heads of argument. It, however,
quashed the decision of the lower court.
The significant issue that the Supreme Court has, however, brought into light is that
.an en1ployer need not go through the disciplinary procedure, once the facts have been
reasonably assessed to be true. The employer may thus dispense with a predismissal
hearing. The Supreme Court. therefore, held:
One need not be nluch ofa man ofthe world to understand that the formal
process of going through the motions of disciplinary proceedings on the
charges that were brought against the respondent was an administrative
expedient for 1I0t OIl(V saving face for the college but also sparing the
employer lIlld his wife ullderstandable embarrassment and public scandal.
What is clear is that the respondellt 1I0t only well knew for what reasons his
services were beillg dispensed with but also that these reasons were
foullded. So much so that he heavily relied Oil his affair with the wife in an
attempt to show that the other charges were trumped up. There would, in
the circumstances, hllve beell 110 lIeed for a hearing in respect of his
misbehaviour with the wife sillce, as it turned out, the respondent heavily
relied 011 that sanle scallda/ous behaviour in order to prove his claim.
In another case. there was no plea that a decision was taken by the employer to
disnliss the enlployee without providing him the advantage of a pre-dismissal hearing.
This was due ll1ainly to the gravity and wilful nature of the misconduct. In
L.E.AIoulon \' A.Bonieux & Co Lldl2~ there was ample evidence to show that the
appellant was caught in the act of removing 'mazout' (diesel) from the lorry, which he
was instructed to deliver to Mon Desert Alma Sugar Estate. On the same day, the
297
appellant ,.vas asked whether he accepted having taken 'mazout' from his lorry, he
begged for excuse. Thus. without invoking the rules of procedural fairness before
dismissaL the Suprenle Court following the dictum expounded in Harel Freres Ltd v
Jeebodhun l25 • reaffirmed the principle that "whether an employer cannot, in good
faith. do otherwise than dismiss a worker is a question of fact with which the appellate
court will not lightly interfere unless the conclusion of the trial court is one which no
reasonable trial court could have reached." In the present case, on conclusion from
facts elicited. the Suprenle Court refrained from 'disturbing' the decision of the
Industrial Court. and held that the dismissal was justified.
A different approach is discussed in G.Pattar v Compagnie Sucriere de St.Antoine
Ltee 126 . It shows there is no justification for a disciplinary hearing to be held where the
plaintiff. by repeated breaches of his contract of emplOYment, had himself brought
about the termination of his employment. The Industrial Court held:
It is clear that regardless of the sick leave, local leave, Sundays etc. the
plaintiff failed to report for work on repeated occassiolls, without
llOt(!icatioll, explallation or perl1lission. Although the law involves a
worker to be absellt from work for two consecutive days without giving any
reaSOIl, yet all abuse ofit callnot be expected to be tolerated by all employer
who has primari(r to ensure the efficient running of his undertaking or
enterprise. In the case of the plaintiff, I find that the systematic absences
have been so excessive that the defendant was entitled to consider that the
piailltiffhad caused a breach ofhis cOlltract ofemployment... "
This view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in M Maissin v Textile Industries Ltd,
127 where the appellant appealed against his tennination of employment on the
grounds that he \vas "neither given an opportunity to give an .explanation as to his
absence nor had been requested to resume work before the respondent took the
decision to terminate his employment." The Supreme Court again held that once the
enlployee. by his own conduct. repudiates the contract, there is no need for the
enlployer to hold any disciplinary hearing. It was stated:
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Moreover, once the appellant had absented himself from work for more
than a nlOnth without good and sufficient cause, as found by the learned
Magistrate, he had brokell his contract ofemployment with the respondent-
vide section 30(4)(a) of the Labour Act. The respondent was therefore
justified in treating that COiltract as terminated and was not under any legal
dllt)' to give the appellallt an opportunity of explaining his absence or to
reqllest the appellant, given the nature of its own plea, to resume work
before ternlinating his enlployment. The appellant's complaint in this
regard is consequently baseless.
The Mauritian Labour Jurisprudence relating to 'unjustified dismissal' due to lack of
procedural fairness in the disciplinary hearings, has another provision which gives the
en1ployer in1n1unity from holding pre-dismissal hearings before terminating the
services of an en1ployee. Section 32
(i)(b)(ii) states:
(i) No en1ployer shall dismiss a worker...
(b) for alleged n1isconduct unless
(ii) B \V·here the misconduct is the subject of criminal proceedings...
It means that where a misconduct is the subject of criminal proceedings, it is left open
to the en1ployer. if he so w·ishes. to wait for the outcome of the proceedings rather
than instituting a parallel internal disciplinary hearing. In Mauritius Meat Authority v
Bissoon A1ungroo
J28
where the accused was accused of the criminal offence of
swindling and \vas found guilty. the question was whether there was any need for
subjecting the respondent again to a disciplinary hearing. The Supreme Court held
that:
The learlled nlllgistrate first Cll/ne to the conclusion that the appellant
havillg opted for the provision relating to the situation where the
Illiscollduct is the subject of crinlinal proceedings(Section 32(i)(ii)B of the
Labollr Act) there was 110 necessity for a hearing. We agree and hold that
when the alleged misconduct is the subject of criminal proceedings the
worker is thlls afforded the opportunity to answer the charge against him as
contemplated ill Section 32(2)(a) ofthe Act."
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In the South African context. the employer should, however, still have regard to the
record of criminal proceedings and allow the employee to make representations as to
whv he or she should not be dismissed. It mav be unfair, it is submitted, to subject the., .,
employee to a double jeopardy. 129
Though the Mauritian Labour legislation is deficient in the provisions exempting an
employer fron1 holding predismissal hearings. unlike Item 4(4) of the Code of Good
Practice in South Africa which has expressly codified exceptional circumstances, the
foregoing judicial decisions are evident of the fact that procedural fairness in
Mauritius is not a lnagic concept applicable to each and every situation. There have
been glaring instances where the court has made an exception to the rule and
condoned en1ployers from holding disciplinary hearings before dismissal due to
nlisconduct.
5.2.5.2.2 The South African Experience
The SOll.th African law of unfair disnlissal has the advantage and support of both the
Labour Relations Act and the rich resource material providing instances of exemption
from procedures before an elnployer decides to dismiss an employee.
Section 4-(4-) of Schedule 8 of the Code of Good Practice in the Labour Relations Act
1995 expressly provides:
"In exceptional circumstances. if the employer cannot reasonably be
expected to conlply with these guidelines, the employer may dispense
'vvith pre-disnlissal procedures."
Though the Code does not state what these exceptional circumstances are, the case of
Mjaji and Creati\"e Signs 130 seenls to give adequate direction in this regard.
The facts of the case were that the employee was dismissed after putting his hand up
the enlployer's wife's dress and touching her bottom. The employer/husband
confronted the enlployee with the allegation..:gave him his notice pay and a week's
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leave pay. In defence to a claim of unfair dismissal, the employer contended that the
previous warnings given to the employee and the informal procedures followed prior
to his dismissal were sufficient to justify procedural fairness. Holding that the
employee's disn1issal was both substantively and proceduraUy fair, the Commissioner
found in respect of procedural fairness that as much as no formal hearing was held,
the employee "vas infoffi1ed in no uncertain teffi1S the offence against him, was invited
to respond and the decision to dismiss him was communicated to him verbally.
. Although there was evidence that the employee was not offered the assistance of a
fellow employee. the Commissioner was prepared to find that in spite of any
shortcomings in the procedure followed there was a substantial compliance with a fair
procedure. In any event. the employer was entitled to dispense with the pre-dismissal
procedures given the following exceptional circumstances of the dispute, viz:
the conclusive proof of the assault~
the serious nature of the misconduct; and
the fact that more fOlmal and exact procedures would not have brought about a
different result than the infoffi1al procedures did.
The case is a good illustration of a situation where the employee could be said to have
been caught in the act son1ewhat resen1bling that often cited example of Lawton LJ
where a worker was seen on the shop floor by the works manager and others to stab
another 111an in the back with a knife. In such a case. the procedural defect will either
be superfluous or unin1po11ant in con1parison with the substantial merits of the case.
131
I~'"
In HaYlI'ord r Pro/eo Furnishers.)- no threat or danger to the company was
foreseeable. the en1ployee having been suspended prior to the dismissal. Although the
hearings scheduled in two separate occasions were both postponed, there was no
evidence that the elnployee was tenninally ill or had no chance of recuperating or had
r~fused \vithollt good cause to attend and participate at a hearing when an opportunity
for hin1 to do so "vas granted yet the company chose a convenient path to deviate from
following proper procedure thereby dismissing the employee without affording him an
opportunity of a fair hearing. There was equally nothing exceptional in the
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S 133 . h . Icircumstances of A1thombeni l' HOSPER 'A to constItute t e exceptIona
circumstance contenlplated by the code to justify the employer not holding an enquiry
before dismissal for alleged misconduct. The Commissioner rejected the
union/elnployer's argument that the dismissal was procedurally fair where the
provincial secretary of the union was accused of becoming involved in "worker
politics". He was sinlply given a letter setting out the complaints against him and
invited to respond. The Cqnlmissioner held that even if the provincial executive of
the union could not hold the enquiry because of their involvement in the matter, the
head office of the union ought to have done so perhaps by engaging an outsider to do
it on its bepalf. The alleged turmoil in· the union at the time could not have
constituted exceptional circumstances whereas a proper and impartial procedure
would have "cooled temperature in the union by helping to re-establish
constitutionality." 134
The so-called CrISIS-ZOne situations apart, there are other circumstances where the
employer's failure to hold an enquiry may not necessarily lead to a finding of
• 13':;procedural unfairness. .
A situation may arise \vhere the failure to hold an enquiry is the fault of the employee
and not that of the enlployer such as where the employee fails to turn up for the
enquiry or hearing but even here. the lack of an enquiry will not be excused if the
enlployer fails to give the enlployee 8. second chance. 136 Another example is where,
as in Slagnlent
137
• the enlployees imposed some stringent conditions on their
participation in the enquiry. 138 or where the employee unjustifiably refuses to
participate in the enquiry. or where an opportunity is offered but the employee
declines to avail hinlself of that opportunity to present his case 139, or where the
enlployee and his representative \valk out of the disciplinary hearing. 140 Bearing in
nlind that fair procedure does not always mean that an oral hearing must be held in
every case
l41
• it follows that there are circumstances where oral hearing or a hearing at
all nlay not be necessal) such as where the parties are sufficiently aware of the
respective issues involved and a fair opportunity to address them. 142 Another instance
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is where· the employee had repudiated his contract of employment. Even here~ he
ll1USt have absconded vv'ith a view not to return or would by his utterances or conduct
evinced a clear intention not to continue with the employment l43 or must have been .in
desertion or absent from work for an unreasonable period of time 144.
It is not every ternlination of enlploynlent that amounts to dismissal for it is obvious
that a termination which falls outside those five categories laid down in the Act 145 will
not be protected by.the lav.; of unfair dismissal. For instance, it is not a dismissal
where an enlploylllent contract is terminated on the ground that the employee has
reached the norll1al retirenlent age 146 hence an employer is under no obligation to
consult the enlployee before exercising his right to retire the employee who has
reached or after the normal or agreed retirement age in accordance with s187(2)(b) of
the Act. Surely. the statute has itself pronounced on the fairness of that termination.
1-+7 Again. where the disnlissal is automatically unfair, 148 and it is clearly established
that a particular disll1issal fits into that statutory description, there will be no need to
enquire further as to whether it was effected by a fair procedure. A fair procedure is
reqtiired \vhere there is a disnlissal and such dismissal is based on employee's
nlisconduct or incapacity in the form of poor work performance or physical inability
such as ill health or on the ground of operational requirements of the employer.
There are other instances where the court has the discretionary power to refuse relief
to an ell1ployee who has been dislllissed \vithout any disciplinary hearings.
In Stel'enson \' Sterns Jell'ellers (Ply) Lfd148• for instance, the employee, who had been
appointed as ll1anaging director. was dismissed without a hearing. The court made its
decision' in accordance with equity based on the particular circumstances' of the case.
1~9 The court ell1phasized that its decision was not based on the 'misconductlhearing'
concept (by which it appeared to 111ean the traditional notion that if an employee is
dislnissed for misconduct a prior hearing will almost always be necessary), 'but rather
011 the equities of the case considering all the circumstances referred to"50. These
circumstances included the brief period of service with the employer (three weeks; the
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generous offer of three months' notice pay; the consideration that 'life at the top' may
often 'involve quick decisions that n1ay ex post facto be deemed harsh'; the
unlikelihood of a meaningful settlement; and the conception that, having regard to the
applicant's senior manage~1ent position. it could not be said overall that he had been
d .c:. I 151treate unlalf y.
What is important about the Stevenson judgment is that it stresses that lapses in
procedure are not as a rule to be countenanced. The decision was not based on a
traditional approach to misconduct but on the notion that, notwithstanding the absence
of fair procedure. it could not be said that the applicant had been unfairly treated.
Another way of looking at this decision would be to say that in all the circumstances it
would have been an unfair exercise of the court's statutory power to reinstate the
sacked managing director. This was indeed the perspective adopted in Maubane v
The .1fhcan Bank Ltd l53 where the applicant was also a peremptorily sacked managing
director. Again. the court made it clear that although it could not condone the absence
of an enquiry it did not consider that it would be a just exercise of its jurisdiction to
grant the applicant relief.
III tile view of tile court it would indeed be inappropriate to reinstate the
applica11t. This is 1I0t because the exceptional circumstances of this case
are sucll tllat it CllllllOt be reasollably expected of the respondent that it
sllould have provided all opportullity to the applicant to state Itis case prior
to his dismissal...Nor is the case similar to that in Stevenson... where tlte
decisioll was 110t based on the "ntisconduct hearing" concept but rather on
tile equities of tile cllse considering all the circumstances....Rather the court
in tllis case IIl1s in mind the observation of Nicholas AJA in Consolidated
Franle Cotton Corporation Ltd v The President, Industrial Court & others
(1986) 7 ILJ 489(A) lit 495£ that the legislature must be presumed to have
intended tllllt tile powers lof the court] would be exercised reasonably and
equitably. lInd with due regard to the interests not only ofthe employees but
also ofthe employers. ,,15-1
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The court was therefore satisfied that to grant reinstatement would be to disregard the
interests of the elnployer 'to an extent that would be most unfair'. 155 The perspective
adopted in Maubane. as pointed out in the passage quoted above, is somewhat
different from that in Stevenson. In Stevenson, the decision is ultimately rooted in the
notion that. all things considered and in the exceptional circumstances of the case, the
elnployee was not treated unfairly despite the denial of a hearing. In Maubane the
decision was based on the prejudicial unfairness that a reinstatement order would have
inflicted on the cOlnpany. again despite the denial of due process to the employee.
But the difference of perspective is not substantial. In both cases the court recognised
that breach of a right had occurred but refused to remedy it because the overall
dictates of fairness pointed the other way.
In ROSIOll & 'n ander l' Leel/poort Jvlinerale Bran (Edms) Bpk156 the court adopted a
not wholly. dissinlilar stance in the case of one of the applicants whom it found had
been dismissed for good reason but without the benefit of a hearing. The court
decided to withhold interiln relief despite the procedural unfairness, which it refused
to condone 157. because it took the view (criticized in the following section) that its
statutory nlandate in terms of section 43 of the LRA precluded it from granting relief.
But the grounds for the refusal of relief here were narrow and technical rather than
broad and equity-based as in the case of the other two decisions. It is doubtful
whether Rostol offers either a useftl1 or enlightening precedent.
There has been instances where the Courts have held in consonance with the Code's
exception to the requirenlent that an ultimatum or indeed a hearing or both may be
dispensed with. 15X Such exceptional circumstances have been found to exist where
the ultinlatUlTI will not produce the result for which it was intended, that is, collective
negotiations and collective settlenlent of disputes. The question in NUMSA v Vetsak
Co-operative Ltd & Or.~·159 was whether the issuing of an ultimatum by the employer
and the subsequent dismissals of the workers who failed to respond thereto constituted
an unfair labour practice. The majority of the Court laid down in this case that
whether a strike be lawful or unlawful. there reached a point when the employer was
305
In fairness justified in dismissing the striking employees, not for striking but for
prolonged absenteeism. 160 However. the employer's level of tolerance will depend on
its economic vulnerability. The point was taken further in NUM v Black Mountain
Development Company (Pty) Ltd161 where it was held that there came a time when the
process of negotiation must be acknowledged to have failed so that an ultimatum and,
in the absence of cOlnpliance. tem1ination of the strikers' employment would be
justified. When this point is reached. fairness dictates that dismissal is justifiable.
The ultimatum given in this case was neither premature nor unfair.
Neither that point of despair on the part of the employer had been reached nor did any
exceptional circumstance exist to justify the dismissals in NUMSA & Ors v Fibre
Flair CC I/O J.:ango Canopies. 162 The employees had been issued with written final
warnings for "n1isconduct due to withholding labour collectively and unprocedurally"
and were \varned of possible disciplinary action. The workers, after serving notice on
the en1ployer. however took part in a national protest over the Employment Standards
Bill hilt for onlv a 35-n1inute duration. Those of them on final warning were
sumn1arily disn1issed. \\ ithout any disciplinary enquiries, although they were advised
that they could re-apply for re-employn1ent at lower wages and could lodge an appeal
\vithin 48 hours. Benjan1in AJ rejected the en1ployer's contention that an enquiry in
the circurnstances would serve no useful purpose and went on to find that the
dismissal was proceduraIly unfair for the following reasons:
the en1ployees \vere working at the time they were dismissed;
"i:here were no exceptional circumstances present that made it impossible or
in1practicable for an enquiry or investigation to be held before the dismissal;
and
the en1ployers were unreasonable in not allowing the union to lodge an appeal
six days after the dismissal when it sought to do so. 163
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Although the contents of the Code in disciplinary matters generally and the question
of issuing an ultimatum in particular are derived from the law and practice of labour
relations under the past labour dispensation, and the present code is thus a codification
of those principles and practices. it has nonetheless been held that under the current
labour dispensation. non-compliance with an ultimatum to return to work is viewed in
a nlore serious light than was the case under the 1956 Labour Relations Act. Reveals J
held in NUA1SA & Ors v lvJalcomess Toyota, a Division of Malbak Consumer
Products (Pt)) Ltd'6~ that the protection against dismissal following participation in
unprotected strike action is now limited. This limitation is demonstrated by the
introduction of the code into the Act which now classifies this type of conduct as
"nlisconduct. "
5.3 Conclusion
Although a full and proper hearing conforming with the various requirements of
procedural fail11ess is normally indispensable. if subsequent disciplinary action against
an enlployee is to be deenled fair. it is found that it is not an absolute requirernent, as
the judicial decisions in Mauritius and South Africa evidently have shown that there
are' exceptional circunlstances' where the employer cannot reasonably be expected to
conlply to all the requirenlents and l11ay dispense with the pre-dismissal procedures.
The chapter analysed those circumstances in which the courts have ~ondoned the
enlployer's failure to hold pre-disnlissal hearings. Some of the circumstances were
such that. objectively speaking. the employer could not have expected to hold one
where the enlployer is conlpelled to dismiss instantly, in order to protect lives and
property or to give effect to an ultimatum. and where the employees have by their
conduct abandoned or waived their right to hearings or where the employees have
adnlitted their guilt. The chapter also looked at situations where the employees
concerned are of senior status. In Mauritius and South Africa the legal position
renlains the sanle. The right to procedural fairness is extended to all employees
irrespective of their status or seniority. Another exception to procedural fairness that
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the chapter considered \vas whether it was necessary to hold disciplinary hearings
where the employee has been charged with the same offence in the criminal courts.
Judicial decisions show that wtere the employee has already been convicted, it is
possible for the employer to rely on the criminal court's finding, thereby dispensing of
his own disciplinary procedures.
308
*********************************************************************
I Knoelze v Ruslenburg Plalinum Mines Ltd (1985) 6 IU(IC) at 425D: The
applicanl. dismissed withoul aformal enquiry, admitted an assault on afellow
l+'orker and did not deny that he had earlier admitted to one of the
re!:Jpondent's deponents lhat the assault had been unprovoked. "An enquiry
would thus have hrought nothing further to light. Consequently, I am of the
view that there )1.'as 110 prejudice to the applicant, and that his dismissal took
place qfier consideration ofall the relevant facts. "
::General ~Vorkers Union & Another v Dorbyl Marine (Pty) Ltd (1985) 6 IU
52(IC) at 58 A-B
3(1987) 8 lLJ 156 (IC) at 164-5
-Ilhid
6l bid al p1-19
Carr 1" Alexander Russel Ltd (1976) IR.L.R 246
SLoll"lIdes 1" Specialist He(n~v Engineering (1976) IR.L.R.246
1/ The Code (?l Practice issued by the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration
SelTicl' und ifS legal e.flect ([re set OlLt in Elias & Others, Labour Law - Cases
and J\1aferials 1980 af 580-5
1::(198-) 3 fT'IR 1153 rHL) at 1163 E-F
J3 The A1edine SlIgar Estofe Cv.Ltd v I Woodally 1993 SCJ Record No. 4691
/-1 198-1 seJ: 1n Bundhvv 1" Mauritius Breweries (1981) SeJ 140, the Supreme
Cour! held that "Failure fV grant a hearing would amount to an unjustified
ter171inafion of e171ployl71enf. The hearing need not be conducted with the
'/ormqliry and all the exiKencies appropriate to a court of law", See also
Tirl'engadlll71 1" Bafa Shoe rA;Jts) 1979 MR 133
1
5
Section -13 and Sectivn -16(9) of the 1956 Labour Relations Act; See also
Brassey et af. The /Vell' Lahour Law (1987) at 198-9
309
16/v'ational Automobile & Allied Workers Union v Pretoria Precision Castings
(Pry) Ltd (1985) 6 ILJ 369 (le) at 378 H-I
17(1986) 7 ILJ 33-1 (AC) at 337 G-H
ISRikhotso & Others v Transvaal Alloys (Pty) Ltd (1984) 5 IV 228 (IC) at 242
F-H: See also Metal & Allied Workers Union v BTR Samcol (1987) 8 IV 815
(IC) at 833 D-E
19(1987) 8 lLJ 156 (IC),' See also Leboto v Western Areas Gold Mining Co.Ltd
(1985) 6 lLJ 299 (lC) at 302 Hand 303A. In this case it was held that the
employer \I'as not just?(ied in denying procedural fairness to about 200
emplo.vees who were dismissed over a period of some weeks after a severe
riot.
::0lbid at 16-1 F-H
::1 198-1 SCJ Record No 3377
::::(1998) 19lLJ 1-1-11 (LAC) at 1-146 para. 27
::3Per Grogan AM in NSCA WU v Coin Security Group (Pty) Ltd tla Coin
Security (1997) 1 BLLR 85 (IC) at 91F-G. See also NUM v Durban Deep
Roodepoort Ltd (1987) 8 ILJ 156 (IC).
::-ISee T'an lViekerk. 'Dismissal of the innocent: derivative misconduct' (1999)
14(6) EmploymenT LOHI 15
::5(1997) 9 BLLR 12-16 (CClvlA)
::6See Librapac CC \' lv/oletsane NO & Ors (1998) 19 IV 1159 (LC). The
Labour Appeal Court decision in this case (1999) 6 BLLR 540 (LAC) turned
on condonationfor late review and enforcement ofarbitration award.
::-(1998) 191LJ all 166 para 38
::sSACCA TtVl./ l' Cashbuild Lld (1996) .:I BLLR 457(IC); SACCAWU v Pep
Stores (1998) 19lLJ 939 (CCAM)
"'9- SACC~4J;VU\' Pep Stores (1998) 19 ILJ 939 (CCMA) at 946G
3°(1998) 1? lLJ 868 (LC): (1998) .:I BLLR 408(LC). In J.acklens & Ors v Pep
Stores (1999) 6 BALR 673 (CCMA), the employees were made aware ofstock
losses through counselling, cautions. warnings that they would be held
individually ([nd collectively responsible for any further shrinkage. Their
union was involved in attempts to curb further shrinkages. When all these
yielded no positive result. the employer summoned the employees to a
disciplincllT hearing and dismissed them. The Commissioner affirmed the
310
dismissals.
31Per Pretorius AJ (1998) 19 IV 868 (LC) at 872-3 para 19
3~(1987) 8 IV 97D
33(1997) 18 1LJ 8-1D
3./(1998) 19 IV 1-1-11 (LA C)
35(1998) 191LJ 1-141 (LAC) at 1451 para 46
36See e.g. NUMSA v Vetsak Co-operative & Ors (1996) 6 BLLR 697 (A) at
717G-H with the famous theme: "The workers acted collectiveZy. Vetsak
responded collectively". See also Professor Brassey's popular aphorism: "the
collective must be dealt with collectively" in MAN Truck & Bus (SA) (Ply) Lld
\' Uniled African Motor & Allied Workers Union (1991) 12 IV 181 (Arb) at
192F-H: Zondi & Ors v The President ofthe Industrial Court & Anor (1997) 8
BLLR 98-1(LAC) at 1002A-D
JiThis effectively overrules the decision ofthe Commissioner in FEDCRA W &
Ors v Librapac CC (1997)9 BLLR 1246(CCMA) discussed, supra
381n his judgement, Cameron JA (1998) 19 IV 1441 at 1447 para 31 states:
"Where a l-Forker has or may reasonably be supposed to have information
concerning the guilty, his or herfai/ure to come forward with the information
may irse(( amount to misconduct." By so holding the court has introduced a
new implied term in the employee's contract of employment thus placing an
additional burden on the employee, that is, the duty to disclose any
il?formation relating to the conduct of other employees known to him or of
It'hich he is reasonably expected to know if such conduct has any bearing on
the employer's business andfailing to do so, he faces disciplinary action. This
dUfy was previollsly placed on the shoulders ofmanagement personnel and not
on subordinate employees. The Labour Appeal Court was obviously following
the fiJorsreps of the English HOllse ofLords decision in Malik & Anor v BCC1
(} 99 7) 3 .-iLLER i where a new implied term in the contract ofemployment to
rhe effect that an employer lIJould not conduct his business in such a manner
as to destroy the relationship of trust and confidence between him and the
employee H'as created by their Lordships.
39This line of reasoning was initiated in FA WU & Ors v Amalgamated
Beverage industries Ltd (J 99-1) i5 1LJ 1057 (LAC) at 1063B
311
.f(jCF Federated Timers (Pry) Lld v Lallie NO & Ors (1999) 20 ILl 348 (LC)
wnere Jvlaserumllle AJ refused to interfere with the Commissioner's findings
t!Jat the employer's failure to observe the events of the day when
approximately 50-60 striking employees marched casual workers out of the
premises of the employer could not be relied upon to justify the dismissal of
the two ident~fied employees and the consequent non-discipline of the third
unident(/zed for physically manhandling some of the casual workers. This
conclusion was prompted by the fact that the third employee could neither be
ident(/ied by reference to a video .film which was viewed by the Commissioner
nor by one ofthe managers who personally witnessed the incident.
-1/ (1999) 29 IV 572 (LC)
-I~l(1999) 5 BLLR 453 (LAC)
-13(999) 20 IV 2302 (LAC)
-1-1(199';) 18 ILJ 327 (LAC) al 338F
-15 198-/ SCJ Record No.3377
-16(1991) 12 ILJ 1022 (LAC) al1028 G-1029A
-1"'(1999) 8 BLLR 886 (LA C)
-I81TJer Froneman DJP. lvicholson JA Concurring
-IYSupra note -/'1 at 888-889 para -/9
511lbid at 899 para 50
5/Ihid at 950 para 68
5:lhid para 7(J
j]lvUAfS.--1 & Ors \' Fibre Flair CC I/a Kango Canopies (1999) 20 ILl 1859
5-1(999) 20 ILJ 183- (LC) para 53
55/,/UAfSA & Ors \' lvlalcomess Toyota. a division of Matbak Consumer
Products (Pty) Lld (1999) 20 IV 1867 (LC) at 1833 para 119, 120 and 122
56lbid Of 1???13 para l2l
5SIbid at 313 G-H
5VIhid Of 313 D-F
312
6()National Union ofMineworkers & Others v Transvaal Navigation Collieries
& Estate Co.Ltd (198.6) 7 ILl 393 (IC) t 397 B-C
61 (1985) 6 ILl 307 (IC)
6]Leboto v TYestern Areas Gold Mining Co.Ltd (1983) 6 IV 299 (IC)
63Ibid at 303 F-G
6.JA good instance is National Union of Mineworkers & Others v Durban
Roodepoort Deep Ltd (1987) 8 IV 156(IC) at 163-4. An example of a case
·where comparison ·with Lefu can at best be described as far-fetched but where
it H'as none-the-Iess invoked by the employer is MfaZl-1/e v SA Metal &
A1achinelY Co.Ltd (1987) 8 ILl -192 (IC) at 492-3
65R \' Ngwevela (R1U(1) SA 123(A) at 131H where it was held that rules of
natural justice would apply unless "there are exceptional circumstances which
}vouldjust~fynon-application
661udicial suggestions that cry of 'emergency' will not justify disregard of the
requirements of procedural fairness where an alternative procedure can be
devised to enable the affected person to state his or her case properly include
Dlamini \' Minister ofEducation and Training & Others 1984(3) SA 255(N) at
261 C-D
6-Baxter AdminisTrative Law (l98-1) at 571 n 230. 579 n 276 and 593 n 363
6S(19(8) j RLR 2 j 5 at 218 para 20
-()098-I)(lC) Labour Laws of Akluritius Venchard L.E. and Angelo A.H Eds.
p63-1
-/098-) 81L.J 53- (lC) at 5-1-1 H-1
"'~ROSSOUll' \' SA .\lediese Navorsingsingsraad (1) (1987) 8 IV 660 (IC)
-31YhilclIll \' Cumplller Diagnustics & Engineering (Ply) Ltd (1987) 6 IV 356
(IC) at 356F
-:.JSupra nute -:2 at 668 1 - 669 D
"'5Ste\,enS0l1 \' Sterns Jewellers (Pty) Ltd (1986) 7 IV 318 (IC) at 324H
-6 Larcomhe \' .l\iatal ~v:vlon Industries (Ply) Ltd, Pietermaritzburg (1986) 7 IV
326 (lC) at 33 j B-C
313
i7Bissessor v Beastores (Pf)~ Ltd tla Game Discount World (1986) 6 IV 33-1
(lC) a! 336.1-2271. See also Beck v Foschini Stores (Pty) Ltd case No NH
13/2/303 unreported judgment delivered on 11 February 1987 in which the
court took account ofthe fact that the manager had received two written final
warnings.
-8
I Supra note 76 at 330 A-B. 330F-331A, 331D-E
79Maubane l' The j~frican Bank Ltd (1987) 8 IV 517 (IC) at 521-522A: See
also Ste1'enson v Sterns Jewellers (Pf}) Ltd (1986) 7 IV 318(IC) at 326 I
'where the decision ,night leave the impression that the equities of the case
'would imp!.v that a disciplinaly enquiry in the case ofsenior personnel is not
required. Apart from the fact that such a view is not substantiated by later
decisions of the court. it may also ~e argued that an informal enquiry was
indeed held.
~n( Rostoll & 'n ander v Leeuport Minerale Bron (edms) Bpk (1987) 8 IV 366
(IC) at 376A. At 376 C it is stated that the condition is that the employee
should not have been prejudiced by the absence ofan enquiry.
8/Supra note 79 at 522 E
8:Long & Another l' Chemical Specialities TVL (Pty) Ltd. (1987) 8 IV 523
(lC) at 536 A-D where ulterior motives could have been the reason for the
dismissal.
83Erasmus \. BB Bread Ltd. (1987) 8 IV 537 (IC) at 544.
8../Sllpro note 76 at 33U 1-331A
85Cammie l' R.H. Johnson Crane Hire (Pry) Ltd case no NH 131211393;
unreportedjudgment delivered on 5 l\iovember 1986
86Hallon l' Alurray & Roberts Civil (Pretoria) Ltd & Another. Case no NH
13/2/2508: unreportedjudgment delivered on 26 November (1987) at 2-3
8-
Supra nOfe 85 af 11: See also Coetzee v Georg Kopp Investments (Pty) Ltd
I/a Competition A40tors & Engineering Case no. NH 13/21531, unreported
judgment delivered on 29 JU(l' 1987. (An offer to hold a disciplinary enquiry
subsequenf to dismissal was rightly refused by a director where the employer
refused fa reinstate him pending the holding ifsuch enquiry.
8°BrolFl1 v Oak 1ndllsfries (SA) (Pty) Ltd (1987) 8IV 510 (IC) at 516 H
89
Basset! v Servistar (Pty) Ltd (1987) 8 IV 503 (IC) at 507 G-I
314
91lbid at 508 C
9:llbid at 509 C-D
93Supra nOfe 72 at 658 E
9-1Supra note 89 at 507 D-G
95Supra nofe 83 at 5-15
9°lhid at 5-15 J-5-16A
9-Supro note -:2 at 658 G-l
98lbid af 665 l-J. 666H
9C)lbid at 662 F-G. 666J-667A, 667D-668D
wnSupra note 82 at5-16C
101Supra note -2 at 659 C-D
10' --Supro note /6 at 331 D-E
!030osthuizen l' Rwo lvii/Is (1986) 7IV 608 (le) AT 611F; 611l-6l2A
In-lBrasse1' el af. The i\'elt' Labour Law. 363-4 at a
I05lbid af -108-9
11I6Ibid of -109- J()
11)-
. lbid al -IJU-J 2
Inslbid 0/ -112-19
IIJ9Ibid ([f -I J9-20
I/!Supro note -5 ond Supra nofe 79
113 J990 SeJ Record lv'o. -1-138
1/-1(198 7) 0 ILJ -192 (le)
I/5lbid al -193 G-H
315
1160n ·waiver in contract see Christie, the Law ofContract in SA (1963) Ch. 12
at -131-8: Wille & Millin, Mercantile Law ofSA (18 ed.1984) at 163-4
117Rikhoto & Others v Transvaal Alloys (Pty) Ltd (1984) 5 ILl 228 (IC) at 242
F-H: lV/elal & Allied T-Vorkers Union v BTR Sarmcol (1987) 8 ILl 815 (lC) at
833 D-E
118Polkey l' A.E. Dayton Services Ltd (1987) 1 ALLER 974 (HL)
119(1987) 8 IV -162 (IC)
/2°lbid at -165-6
I] IOn ·waiver of an entitlement to natural justice in Administrative law see
Baxter L. Administrative Law (1984) at 591-2
I]]1989 SC} Record No.-1465
1]3Section 32(i)(b)(ii) of the Labour Act 1975 provides: No employer shall
dismiss a worker
(b) for alleged misconduct unless -
(ii)the dismissal is affected within 7 days of
(c) in erer) other case, the day on which the employer becomes
aware ofthe misconduct.
See also Balu Shoes (Mt::'j Lld l' Nfohassee (1975) MR 146 where it was held that
under Section 6(2) of the Termination of Contracts of Service Ordinance, 1963, an
e171plo)'er may not dismiss a worker for alleged misconduct unless such dismissal is
effected within seven days qjrer the employer becomes aware of such misconduct.
TYhat the emplo.ver musl, under the section be aware of is the employee's misconduct,
that is to sa)', not merely o/acts or omissions and circumstances that may constitute
misconduct bur of aClS or omissions and circumstances which would allow an
employer. upon a reasonahle view, to reach the conclusion that the employee had
been guilty of rhar ope of gross misconduct which alone entitles him to dismiss an
employee summarily. ·whar section 6(2) requires is that the dismissal be affected
l-t'ithin seven days qjrer the employer is in possession ofsuch information as ought to
satisjj: a reasonable employer that the worker is guilty of misconduct. The time
operates from that moment.
1'./- 198-1 Se} Record No. 3-1-13
/]51981 A1R 189
1]61979 (lC) Case No 35/79
316
1171993 SC} Record No -1721
1181991 SC} Record No -1608
129Randburg Town Council v National Union of Public Service Workers &
Others (1994) 15 IV 129 (LAC)
13()(1997) 3 BLLR 321 (CCMA)
131CA Parsons Ltd v Mclaughlin (1978) IRLR 65. See also Anderman, Labour
Law: Management Decisions & Workers Rights (2ed) 142-143
13~(1997) 5 BLLR 632 (CCMA)
133(1999) '7 BALR 792 (CCMA)
13-1Ibid aT 795A
13jSee further Grogan. ijlrorkplace Law (1999) 147; Le Roux & Van Niekerk,
The SouTh African La11' ofUnfair Dismissal (1994) 174-6.
136In Henn v Eskom (1996) 6 BLLR 747 (IC), although the employee was
absenT from work due to stress related illness for a period of 5 months in 2
years and his dismissal was principally due to his refusal to return to work
afTer he had heen given clear" insTruction to do so constituted insubordination,
the 1ndusTrial Court found the dismissal to have been procedurally unfair
because The employer had not adequately consulted the employee regarding
his illness. or taken iT into account at the appeal stage. A hearing was never
held although this could have been remedied by a full appeal, the employee
lfas ne\'er given a chance to lead evidence or state mitigating factors even at
The appeal STage. The dismissal was held to be procedurally unfair. See also
Sibiyo \' NUM (1996) 6 BLLR 794 (IC); Sondarha & Ors v Crichley Dairy
1ndwe (} 996) 9 BLLR 1186 (lC).
IrSlagmenl (PTy) LTd \' BC~~ T,VU & Ors (199.:1) 12 BLLR 1 (AD).
138Reckjfl & Culemon SA (Pry) Lld v CWIU & Ors (1991) 12 ILl 806 (LAC) at
813B-D: Alaphopa \' FA Tf'U (199-1) 11 BLLR 48 (IC) at 55A-C.
J '9
.-' Anglugold Lld \' lVUlvJ oho Macucule (1999) 8 BALR 971 (IMSSA).
'-I()TU'L' obo A4abele v AUlonet (1999) 9 BALR 1164 (IMSSA).
1-11DirecTor: NJineral Development, Gauteng Region & Anal'" v Save the Vaal
Environmenl & Ors 1999(2) SA 709 (SCA) at 718}; Chauke & Ors v Lee
Service Centre CC t/a Leeson Motors (1998) 19 IV 1441 (LAC) at 1451 para
-16: Mqjolo & Ors \' D & A Timbers (Pty) Ltd (1997) 18 IV 342 (LAC).
317
f.I:lCounci! for Industrial & Scientific Research v Fijen (1996) 6 BLLR 685
(AD).
I-I3Ngindana \' Grahamstown Municipality (1994) 11 BLLR 68 (IC).
1-I-ISouth .1fdcan Breweries Ltd v FAWU obo matshwayo (1998) 6 BALR 782
6:'1SS.-:1).
1-I:~S186 dejines dismissal as constituting jive categories of termination,
nameZl'.' (a) termination by notice,' (b) termination ofjixed term employment
with reasonable expectation of renewal,' (c) refusal to allow an employee to
resume work afier maternity leave; (d) selective re-employment; (e)
constructive dismissal.
1-16Badenhorsl v GC Baars (Pty) Ltd (1995) 16 IV 1596 (IC); (1995) 10 BLLR
19 (IC) at 26: Schmahmann v Concept Communications Natal (Pty) Ltd
(1997) 18 IV 1333 (LC). This issue has been extensively considered in the
judgmenr of Zondo J in Schweitzer v Waco Distributors (A Division of
Follex(Pty) Lld) originally reported in (1998) 10 BLLR 1050 (LC) but now
replaced with (1999) 2 BLLR 188 (LC).
Ir1n Schweir=er l' J-raco Distributors, supra. The Namibian Labour Court
decision in i'vamibian Development Corporation v Visagie (1997) 18 IV 657
(LC}/) is 10 the same eftecl.
1-I8S18-. Labour Relations Act 1995.
1-1°(1986) -; ILJ 318 (le)
IW/b·/ 3)-- lC ar _)
151Ibid ar 326 E-F
15~Ibid (If 325 A-F
J5'~(i987) 8IV 517 (le)
15-1Ibid ar 521-2
155Ibid or 522F
156(198'":) 8 IV 366 (lC)
157Ihid af 373 G and 375 E-F
318
1581n Dube & Ors v Nasionale Swiesware (Pty) Ltd 1998 (3) SA 956 (SeA) at
969F, it was held that there is a limit to which courts would insist on the
giving ofan ultimatum or holding ofa hearing.
159(1996) 6 BLLR 697(AD). See the article by Fabricius, "The Dismissal of
Strikers: A New Value Judgment? National Union of Metalworkers of South
Africa l' Vetsak Co-op Ltd & others (1996) 17 IU 455(A)'
160See also per Ngcobo AJP in Triple Anchor Motor (Pty) Ltd & Anor v
Buthele=i & Ors (1999) 20 1LJ 1527 (LAC) para 36.
161 (1997) ./ BLLR 355 (A).
16](1999) 20 ILJ 1859 (LC)
163lbid at 1863-186./ para 17.
16./(1999) 20 ILJ 1867 (Le) para 107.
319
CHAPTER 6
Conclusion and a Proposal Towards a Mauritian systelll of
Legal Regulation of Procedural Fairness within the Context
of Dismissal for Misconduct Comparative to the South
African Unfair Labour Practice Proceedings.
6.1 Conclusion
In looking for an apt conclusion for this legal treatise an important question
needs to be answered. What was the rationale for this research?
The topic under research was: The Mauritian Law of Procedural Fairness within the
. context of dismissal for misconduct. A comparative study with the South African
Doctrine of unfair labour practice. The focal points of the theme were:
a) to discuss and critically examine, from a comparative perspective, the concept
of procedural fairness in Mauritius and South Africa within the limits of unfair
labour practice jurisdiction; and
b) to make proposals towards a legal regulation of procedural fairness within the
context of dismissal for misconduct in Mauritius.
In the treatment of the subject matter some interesting common features as well as, I
would not say differences, but. unique legal concepts to suit the respective labour law
jurisdictions. related to the application of procedural fairness to pre-dismissal hearings
in Mauritius and South Africa, have been highlighted. They are discussed as follows:
6.1.1 Common to both countries are the basic principles that regulate the
employment relationship. The common law contract of employment has its
basis on the general principles of contract which gives either party
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(employer/employee) to terminate the contract by giving the required notice.
But an employee can always be dismissed with notice on no notice at all. It
means that, as was stated in Raman Ismael v United Bus Service I , the
employer has the inherent discretionary power under the common law to
dismiss the employee at will more specially, as Grogan2 has put it, where the
employee is charged with gross dismissible misconduct which in legal
parlance, is a breach of a vital term of the contract, irreparably damaging
thereby the mutual trust and working relationship between an employer and an
employee.
Within this developed doctrine of dismissal due to misconduct, lies in both
countries a juridical foundation which is concerned with the concept of abuse
of disciplinary power by the employer and the prevention thereof. Imbibed
with this trend of thought, and with a view to bring relief to unfairly dismissed
employees. both countries have infused into their respective labour
jurisprudence the administrative law principles of natural justice. It
effectively means that the courts of both countries have, beyond the strict
common law rules the unfair dismissal introduce the public law remedy to
rationalize the decision of an employer in this regard. Thus for
methodological reasons, the courts have set two broad requirements to make a
dismissal fair. namely. that the termination of the contract must not only be
substantively fair. but it must also be procedurally fair. Hence to justify a
dismissaL the employer needs not only have a good reason, he must also
establish the facts through a fair procedure.
But the problem that both countries had to address was that procedural fairness
which derives its source from the rules of natural justice, namely, audi alteram
parteIJ:l rule and nemo index in sua causa, have no place in the realm of the
common law principles of con~ract. It has no provision for, in case of gross
misconduct to provide an opportunity to an employer to be heard so as to
rebut the allegations or plead in mitigation.3 In Thandroyen v Sister Annucia
of another the court had, therefore, stated:
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" the principles of natural justice will only apply if the parties have
inlported thenl into their contract. To give effect to this provision in
contract, the parties should have provided specifically something in the
nature ofa tribunal to decide matter affecting their relationship. But if the
contract litis no such provision, then the affected party (the employee on
dismissal) will have no recourse to any public law remedy. ,,4
Bulbulia M. however is of the opinion that "it should be borne in mind in this context,
that failure by the employer to observe the requirements of a procedure forming part
of the employee's contract is a breach of that contract and may be an unfair labour
. practice.,,5
Thus the prevailing legal position under the common law principles of contract in
Mauritius and South Africa is that, unless the parties have specifically agreed upon
setting a tribunal to discuss pre-dismissal issues, there is no obligation on the
employer to warn the employee before finally dismissing him/her, or to conduct an
enquiry before dismissal; or to grant the employee an opportunity to improve hislher
conduct or performance; or to consider alternatives of dismissal; or to provide reasons
for dismissal. But if there is such a provision, then the court will compel the
employer to adhere to it.
Having identified the deficiency of the common law principles of contract, the
research focused on an important question, i.e., how did the Mauritian and
South African labour jurisprudence circumvent this deficiency of the common
law principles, and provided relief to employees whose dismissals have been
procedurally unfair?
In Martin v Murray6. Marais J. seemed to understand the predicament, but shifted the
. .
onus to find a solution beyond the common law principles to statutory provisions. He
said:
Truisl11S about the innate dynanlic capacity ofthe common law to accommodate
changing societal mores and policy in an evolutionary manner provide no
justification for the propounding of an aggressively intruisive philosophy of
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judicial interventionisnl in the common law relating to employment. The common
law does not swing about like a weathervane in whatever direction any passing gust
wind nzay blow. The legislature is the only institution which can respond quickly
and effectively to frequently fluctuating
circumstances ofsocio-economic nature.
The Mauritian law of "unjustified dismissal", therefore, found remedy in the fonn of
sections 109-112 of the Industrial Relations Act 1975 and section 32 of the Labour
Law Act 1975 where the principles of procedural fairness have been enshrined which
makes it mandatory on the employer to adhere to the requirements of natural justice
and to give the employee a fair opportunity to "answer any charge made against
him.,,7
In South Africa this intervention into the law of unfair dismissal was effected by the
introduction of the unfair labour practice concept into the Labour Relations Act 94 of
1979 by stating that an unfair labour practice was 'any labour practice which in the
opinion of the industrual court is an· unfair labour practice'. With the task of defining
the concept being left to the industrial court, the latter was mandated to develop and
ensure compliance with fair employment standards. From the influences of the
comn10n law, the ILO Recommendations and Conventions, the industrial court,
therefore, in its pre-occupation to provide procedurally fair-pre-dismissal rights,
evolved a series of strict and quasi legal requirements which were enumerated in
Mahlangu v G M Neltak. Gallan! v elM Delta.8
Unlike South Africa, Mauritius did not set a series of strict and quasi-judicial
requirements for procedural fairness. What it did, in fact, established were the
minimal but important requirements which essentially concerned themselves with the
legality of the means or the manner used by the employer in reaching the decision
rather than the correctness of the decision itself. Although the decision might have
been correct in given circumstances, nevertheless it was unfair as it was made by a
biased tribunal9 and without affording the dismissed employee an opportunity to
present his/her case and to challenge prejudicial allegations against him/her. 1O In the
first instance. its was decided. the employee must be informed of the charge by being
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given a proper notice. II The employer should allow cross examination of witnesses 12,
and should not deny the employee of the right to be represented. 13
Thus wit:1 the advent of the Industrial Relations Act and the Labour Act in Mauritius,
and the unfair labour practice concept in the Labour Relations Act in South Africa,
though the common law remains the primary source which governs the contract of
employm.ent and its termination due to the misconduct of an employee, the arbitrary
power of the employer to dismiss at will has become subject to judicial scrutiny, and
has made the relationship between the employer and the employee a partnership
where equity and fairness play a predominant role. On the basis of proper
interpretation of these statutes the courts now refrain from treating misconduct as a
criminal offence~ and have become more sensitive to the wider social and economic
implications of their decisions. The courts have also become mindful of the fact that a
large number of employees associate together in trade unions with the aim of
providing a framework within which disputes are resolved either by negotiation,
arbitration or determination, and they are therefore entitled to assistance from their
union representatives during predismissal hearings.
These rights. as entrenched in the Constitution of both countries14, have regulated to a
greater extent, the disciplinary procedures at the workplace. While in Mauritius any
deviation from the procedural rules the court has termed it 'unjustified dismissal, in
South Africa any conduct by the employer which is contrary to the principles of
equity and fairness, is commonly known as unfair labour practice. Although different
terminologies n1ight have been used to denote concept of procedural fairness, there is,
however. a distinct parallelism in the substance and application of the concept in
Mauritiu.s and South Africa.
Thus from the decided cases. the labour jurisprudence of both countries have sought
to establish whether or not the manner of dismissal is germane to the question whether
a dismissal is fair or unfair when the employer has failed to follow fair procedures
during pre-dismissal hearings. The courts of both countries have emphasized that the
essence of fair procedure is the conduct of ~n investigation, an enquiry which will
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enable the employer get to the root of the matter, and if there be an. allegation of
misconduct or poor work performance, whether the employee committed the act or
whether he was indeed incompetent. After all, it is he, the employer, who bears the
onus of establishing that the misconduct in fact occurred or that the employee was
incompetent if he relies on any of these grounds as justification for the dismissal. I5 In
any case. an investigation will enable the employer to hear the other side of the story.
This requirement which, at common law, is sometimes referred to as the audi alteram
-pat"tem rule is designed to facilitate accurate and informed decision n1aking. I6 At least
it "satisfies the individual's desire to be heard before he is adversely affected; and it
provides an opportunity for the repository of the power to acquire information which
may be pertinent to the just and proper exercise of the power. I7 It is about mutual
respect understanding and discipline in modem industrial relations. It is about
predictability. harmonious personnel relationship, and a sound recipe for industrial
peace. That the right to be heard is so vital to the adversary system of adjudication is
epitomized by the speech of Megarry J. who once said: "As everyone who has
anything to do with the law well knows, the path of the law is strewn with examples
of open and shut cases which. somehow, were not; of unanswerable charges which, in
the event were completely answered; of inexplicable conduct which \vas fully
explained: of fixed and unalterable determinations that, by discussion, suffered a
charge:,18 Hence. all that the courts are trying to impress upon is that the ideals of
procedural fairness can only serve its purpose at the best when an employer makes a
reasoned decision based on consideration of relevant matters and discarding the
. . 19
Irrelevant ones.
In the application of these requirements the courts in Mauritius and South Africa have
found that disciplinary proceedings can range from completely informal to formal in
nature. In cases. specially where it is a small business or it involves a domestic
servant the concept of procedural fairness requires less than trial-court peculiarities.
In this context Asimow has provided different adjudicatory models where hearings
could be described either as a full-scale formal adjudication, or informal type, or
where the need for an enquiry is entirely dispensed with because the situation is
characterized by an extraordinary need for speedy and routine disposition. In fact,
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many of the cases decided in Mauritius and South Africa are quite illustrative of types
of models that are suitable for different circumstances.
Inspite of the distinction in the degree of formality, it appears, particularly in South
.Africa that "many employers took the prudent view and invested their disciplinary
procedures with the trappings of a judicial process. ,,20
In adopting or adapting such a process that manifests clearly in the South African law
of procedural fairness, the Mauritian jurisprudence has to note the uncertainties that
the South African system is riddled with. Employers, for instance, have allowed legal
representation not because it was fair, but because they feared the sanction of the
Industrial Court if they did not allow it. As a result technicalities and point-taking
normally associated with a judicial process, have crept into disciplinary hearings.
Procedure was thus followed for the sake of procedure:
'The elaborate procedures with which employers were expected to comply in the
workplace therefore served little purpose other than to satisfY the court that its
procedural guidelines had been followed prior to dismissaL The result was the
insistence on procedurefor the sake ofprocedure ... ,21
It is perhaps wrong to state, as inferred in the above question, that the Industrial Court
consistently called for formal procedures since Industrial Court judges often warned
against it.22 However, the Court did broadcast confusing signals and perhaps as a
result of this inconsistency, more than anything else, employers have developed
formal procedures.
There also seems to be a common approach to the courts understanding with respect
to remedies for non-compliance of procedural fairness in predismissal hearings in
Mauritius and South Africa.
In the Medine sugar Estate Co. Ltd v Wodally23 , for instance, the Supreme Court of
Mauritius stated:
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"It must be recalled that BUl1dhoo v Mairitius Breweries Ltd 1981 MR 15 was a
case where the court held that althouglz, in certain circumstances, an employer
may be justified in terminating the employment of a worker whose conduct is
suspect in some serious measures, nevertheless where no hearing is granted to the
worker in order to give him an opportunity to dispel the suspicion, then there is a
violation of section 32 (2) (a) of the Labour Act justifying the grant of severance
allowance at a punitive rate. "
From the reasoning of the court, it is sho\\Tn that an employee's dismissal though
substantially fair but procedurally unfair, the aggrieved employee may not be
reinstated but may be granted severance allowance at a punitive rate.
In South Africa. although the court has favoured the above question, it has remained
quite undecided in varying circumstances. No clear guidelines have emerged from
the industrial court jurisprudence concerning what does it regard as an appropriate
remedy where a dismissal is found to be substantially fair but procedurally unfair.
In National Automobile and Allied Workers Union v Pretoria Precision Castings
(Ply) LtJA the workers were reinstated with six months' pay period since dismissal
but in De Villiers v Fison Pharmaceuticals (Pty) LtcP5, where the procedure was held
to be grossly irregular. reinstatement was nevertheless not ordered since the court felt
the employer had good reason to dismiss. The court only ordered payment of
compensation. In National Union of Metalworkers of SA & another v Barlow
Tractors CO. 26 the COUl1 a\varded compensation for the period of the employee would
have remained in employ if the respondent had followed proper procedures. Since the
amount could not be calculated mathematically the court awarded the sum of R80,OO.
This approach was also echoed in Farmec (Edms) Bpk h/a Northern Transvaal Toyota
v EIs.27 In this case the court did not award any compensation, since, the court held, if
a fair procedure was followed. it would have been on the same day of the original
dismissal and a fair procedure would still have resulted in dismissal. The employee
thus suffered no damages as a result of the unfair procedure. These orders seem to
contain something of what was later envisaged in section 194 of the LRA. In Misch v
Edgard Retail Trading (Pty) Ltd.. 28 the Industrial Court ordered neither reinstatement
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nor compensation. but merely issued a declaration to the effect that an unfair labour
practice was committed since the dismissed employee could not prove any
patrimonial loss as a result of her procedurally unfair dismissal.
6.1.2 Shortcomings in the Mauritian Law of Procedural Fairness
Since the Mauritian labour jurisprudence has not created an unfair labour practice
jurisprudence. the court has solely relied on the limited provisions of the Industrial.
Relations Act and the Labour Act. Thus many contentious issues implicit in the
application of procedural fairness to pre-dismissal hearings are either inadequately
answered or are left unresolved.
Crucial elements of procedural fairness such as the employer's knowledge existed at
the time of the dismissal (the test of reasonableness); rejection of any approach
involving hindsight and hypothesis; absolute affirmation of the principle that there is a
lack of equity and fairness inherent in the failure to accord an employee pre-dismissal
fain1ess. and of the principle that the question whether a dismissal is fair cannot be
judged without considering the manner of the dismissal. Besides these important
procedural requirements. neither the industrial court nor the supreme court of
~auritius have given sufficient direction on what they would consider as 'exceptional
circumstances' where the employer would be exempted from holding disciplinary
hearings.
In addition to the above. during the course of discussion in the aforegoing chapters,
there are certain distinct and significant departures from the orthodox principles that
have emerged in the South African labour jurisprudence of which the Mauritian law
of procedural fairness has to take cognizance. No doubt, with intelligent and wise
borrowing~ Mauritius will be able to institutionalise a guiding standard on procedural
fairness within the context of dismissal due to misconduct. The principles discussed
are:
(a) Initially. the South African common law principles distinguished
between a 'pure master and servant' relationship and an ordinary
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master and servant relationship. The purpose of this distinction
was to categorise employees who are governed by statutes and
those governed by the common law principles. The right to natural
justice, it was held, is only applicable to statutory employees, while
in relation to other common law employees not governed by
statute, such right is not readily available. But since the decision of
Administrator, Transvaal v Zenzile and others29 there is no such
distinction between the two types of employees, and procedural
fairness is applicable to both in cases of dismissal far misconduct
or otherwise.
(b) The South African labour jurisprudence does not make any
difference between a summary dismissal and dismissal on notice
for procedural fairness to be applied. It is only under exceptional
circumstances that procedural fairness can be dispensed with.
(c) In the early stages of legal development the rules of natural justice
had application only to judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings in
which the authority concerned was required by law to act
judicially. Thus the rules of natural justice were held not to be
applicable to situations where the administrative body was acting
in a purely administrative capacity. However, since the decision of
Administrator, Transvaal & others v Traub & others30 the
classification of judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative function
of a deciding authority was rejected. Corbett C J said: "it was
artifical reasoning based on the 'classification' approach that led to
some of most unfair denials of natural justice. The requirements of
procedural fairness are, therefore, applicable to judicial, quasi-
judicial as well as administrative function of an adjudicating
authority.
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(d ) Since the landmark decision of Traub the court has broken away
the right-privilege dichotomy in administrative decision making,
and paved the way towards a more flexible and satisfactory
approach to the application of the rules of natural justice. Against
this background, the current labour relations practice in South
Africa has developed to the point where an employee can claim
legitimately an expectation to be heard before he is deprived of his
livelihood. either by notice or otherwise. Hlophe has summarized
this aspect of the law clearly in his article, 'The Doctrine of
Legitimate Expectation and the Appelate Division' :31
"Th us an enlployee ... can use the legitimate doctrine to protect his employment where
a long standing employment practice has been breached or when certain assurances
have been nwde by the enlployer".
(e) Another point. which may not necessarily be a unique feature of the South African
labour j urisprud~nce but nlay necessarily be called when compared with the
Mauritian law of procedural fairness, is that court in South Africa has focussed
quite extensively on whether or not procedural fairness is applicable to situations
where employees are charged with collective guilt and sentenced to collective
sanctions on this issue. the court has. however, taken quite a stern position when
employees are disnlissed 'en nlasse', specially during a strike situation, without
being given an opportunity to be heard individually or in a group. It was held in
NSCA WU v Coin Security Group (Pty) Ltd tla Coin Security32 that the "employer
cannot dismiss the workers collectively because the concept of collective guilt is
wholly foreign to our system and repugnant to the requirements of natural
justice".
This position has not been well canvassed in the Mauritian labour
jurisprudence.33 The decision stated above in the NSCAWU case is no doubt
a way forward for the Mauritian law of procedural fairness so as to make it
more dynamic and expanded in perspe~tive ..
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(t) There is still vagueness and confusion surrounding the legal position whether or
not an employer has a duty to provide an opportunity to a senior executive before
dismissing him or her for misconduct. The Mauritian court has given very little
direction on this matter. It is, however, presumed that an employee at a higher
level of management should be proficient in his/her job and be thoroughly
conversant with the company's policy and code. Failure to adhere to any of these
may lead to his/htr instant dismissal, mostly without a hearing. But the South
African court has provided adequate protection to a senior executive in Basset v
Servistar (Pty) Ltd. 34 Rees se said:
Basset was not informed ofthe charges against lIim at the beginning ofthe enquiry
and could /lot have been expected to know wllat the cllarges, were. Basset,
although a senior employee, was not allowed assistance at tile enquiry and was not
permitted to tape record the proceedings; the company refused Basset a copy oftile
record of the proceedings; he was not given a proper opportunity to address the
enquiry on the appropriate penalty and his part service and other mitigating
circunlstal1Ces were 110t taken i11tO consideration. The termination of Basset's
employnlent was thus primafacie substantive/y and procedurally unfair.
These unique features in the South African labour jurisprudence are quite consistent
with the modern approach to workplace governance which can effectively enrich and
benefit the Mauritian law of 'unjustified dismissal'.
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6.2 Proposal Towards a Mauritian System of Legal Regulation of
Procedural Fairness within the Context of Dismissal for Misconduct
Comparative to the South African Unfair Labour Practice
Proceedings.
Before conceptualizing and formulating a proposal of this nature, it is important to
understand the form and structure of the foundation on which such a proposal is going to be
laid. As the subheading indicates. the structural form of the proposal should be conceived to
reflect the South African unfair labour practice proceedings. Hence, a brief note on the
doctrine of the unfair labour practice will give a greater insight into its scope and limit of
application.
From a glance at the Labour Relations Act of 1979, 1988 and 1991, it is clear that the
doctrine of unfair labour practice is not exclusive to the law of unfair dismissal, but is an all
pervasive concept that is applicable to every situation in the industrial relations practice that
is deemed to be unfair. In the present context, to give a proper dimension to the proposal the
concept has to be modelled within the limits of procedural fairness applicable particularly to
dismissal for misconduct.
It is also to be noted that. unlike the 1956 and 1988 Labour Relations Act, the 1995 Labour
Relations Act does not contain and provide an 'opentextured' definition of unfair labour
practice. Instead iten1 4 (1) of the schedule and of the Code of Good Practice has set out the
requirements for a fair pre-disn1issal procedure reflecting whereby the content of the doctrine
of unfair labour practice which the court has, during the course of their numerous judicial
decisions, given substance. Put it in a different way, item 4 (1) has codified the requirements
of procedural fairness which is nothing else but the substance of the doctrine of unfair labour
practice that has been enriched and articulated by the industrial court for decades.
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The Code of Good Practice in the present study, can very well serve as a point of departure in
establishing a situation for a Mauritian system of legal regulation of procedural fairness....
within the context of dismissal for misconduct.
Therefore~ in fonnulating the prop0sal the following aspects need careful examination:
(i) The general format of items 4 (1) of the Code of Good Practice
(H) The perspectives of a modern and fair Disciplinary Code.
(Hi) The advantages and disadvantages of a code similar to item 4 (1) for Mauritius.
(iv) A draft proposal for the Mauritian law of procedural fairness in the context of
dismissal for misconduct based on item 4 (1) of the Code of Good Practice and
the South African promotion of Administrative Justice Act.
6.2.1 The General Formal of Item 4 (1) of the Code of Good Practice
The drafters of the Code signalled a clear departure from the IC's cumbersome and
fonnalistic requirements for procedural fairness. It indicated this departure by referring to an
investigation as opposed to an enquiry. The drafters further emphasized this by stating that
the investigation "need to be a fornlal enquiry". This move towards a less stringent approach
was successfully illustrated in Mjaji v Creative Signs35 where the Commissioner established
procedural fairness in the absence of a disciplinary enquiry. The Moropane v Gilbeys
Distillers and Vintners (Pry) Ltd and another36 is a further case where the interpretation of the
Code was accurately applied.
It was also discussed through various cases that the competence of an employer to discipline
an employee for misconduct not covered in a disciplinary code, depends on a multifaceted
factual enquiry. This enquiry would include. but would not be limited to, the nature of the
misconduct. the nature of the work performed by the employee, the employer's size, the
nature and size of the employer~ s workforce, the position which the employer occupies in the
marketplace and its profile therein. the. nature of the work or service performed by the
employer~ the relationship between the employee and the victim, the impact of the
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misconduct on the workforce as a whole. as well as on the relationship between the employer
and employee and the capacity of the employee to perform his job. At the end of the enquiry
what would have to be determined is if the employee's misconduct "had the effect of
destroying or of seriously damaging the relationship of employer and between the parties".37
A study of IC cases further showed that requirements for procedural fairness were rigorous
and often had a juridic nature. One of the most influential cases, Mahlangu v ClM Deltak,
Gallant v DeltaP8 illustrated this well and provided employers with a set of requirements,
which soon became the "10 commandments for procedural fairness." These requirements
placed time consuming obligations of a technical nature on employers. In my opinion the
Court became rigid. and ultimately counter-productive in its approach to procedural fairness.
A comprehensive search of South African Labour Law Reports for Case Law reflecting the
minimalistic approach which was the initial intention of the Code failed to produce strong
evidence of this practice. In Govender v Navanthem Pillay CO.,39 FAWU v Snoek
Wholesalers (Pty) Lttf° and SADTU v Marine Taxis Cel where the employers failed to
follovv' a fair procedure. the CCMA explained its minimal requirement for fairness. It
therefore follows that although the Commissioners are stating that they require non-formal
procedures. when "push comes to shove" a comprehensive procedure is required. This is
illustrated in Gumede v Colors,42 where the employee was caught red-handed committing
theft to which she admitted in the presence of the police. The Commissioner however found
that "the dismissal was not preceded by a fair procedure and was thus unfair." This case is a
typical example of a situation where the employer applied minimalistic requirements set by
the Code but the Conunissioner was not able to interpret the Code as intended by the
drafters. This and other cases to \vhich I have referred in the body of this. research, reflect the
variable decisions n1ade by the CCMAlLC resulting in inconsistent jurisprudence to date.
One of the reasons for the technically loaded requirements by CCMA Commissioners could
be the Collective Agreements by which en1ployers are bound which are more stringent than
the Code. Where agreements are in place the employer has a duty to follow these and the
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CCMA's requirements of employers (especially smaller Companies) who are not bound by
Collective Agreements; yet are required to follow strict procedural requirements. In Power
Rig (Pty) Ltd v Grobler43 the Commissioner explained that he was convinced that
"considering that the employer is a small business, the dismissal was for a fair reason." He
continued that the employer had however failed to follow a fair procedure as required by Item
4 of Schedule 8 of the LRA.
It is expressly stated in the LRA, 1995. that "the form and content of the disciplinary rules,
will obviously vary according to the size and nature of the employer's business. In general, a
large business will require a formal approach to discipline. ,,44 Contradicting results have
however unfolded regarding more stringent requirements expected from smaller companies
whilst at times larger employers were allowed less technical procedures.
The CCMA has attempted to indicate that the Code determines fairness within the unique
circumstances of each case. The Code specifically states that a "rigid approach should not be
categorically applied,45 and categorical, statements which ignore the larger context should
therefore be avoided. I support this insofar compartmentlising elements for procedural
fairness is neither an efficient nor an effective manner for determining procedural fairness,
yet I have referred to cases where the CCMA has fallen into this trap. The intention of the
Code should be the investigation of the case as a whole, the totality of the employer's actions
need to be tested for fairness.
In the two cases cited. the CCMA has successfully applied this requirement. In FAWU v
Snoek Wholesalers (Pty) Ltet6 the CCMA found that the employer had "largely followed the
provisions of a fair disciplinary procedure." These include adequate notification of the
hearing and charge; holding of a disciplinary hearing; allowing representation and the
employee a chance to respond to allegations." In NEWU v Durban Deep Wholesale Meat47
the Comn1issioner stated that "viewed in an overall context" there had been procedural
fairness. He further found that on balance, not enough evidence to support a finding of
procedural unfairness could be found.
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My analyses of CCMNLC elements acting as a pre-requisite for procedural fairness have
provided a somber picture characterized by inconsistencies. The CCMA jurisprudence in
many cases reflects the requirements as stipulated by the jurisprudence of the IC.
Nevertheless there are cases where Commissioners have accepted a minimalistic approach.
Recognition Agreements may be a contributing factor, many cases have shown that this is not
always in fp.ct tnle. I have furthermore tried to identify patterns regarding smaller employers
- in some ca.ses my hypothesis regarding less stringent requirements was confirmed, in others
not.
6.2.2 The Perspectives of a Modern and Fair Disciplinary Code
It is submitted, in this study, that item 4 (1) of the Code has provided reasonable requirements
for a brief pre-dismissal procedure, but it has not covered all aspects of potential and
procedural pitfalls. which give the appearance of a mini court trial. In most of the instances,
for example. where procedures were held to be unfair, it appears that the unfairness related to
the absence of natural justice rather than the requirements of the Code. This illustrates that
procedural fairness does not depend on whether the Code as such was observed, but whether
a fair procedere was followed according to the rules of natural justice. Thus this attitude of
those applying procedural fairness to dismissal cases may be considered as acting against the
spirit of the Code.
What is then the spirit of the Code? The commissioners, in numerous cases, have actually
appreciated the ne~· order which the drafters of the Code endeavour to introduce. In
Sehomo/D & K Coffin Manufaclurers48 it was submitted:
According to the Code of Good Practice it is not necessary that there be a formal enquiry.
Therefore, I do not think the applicant's contention that what was held was a 'discussion'
rather than an enquiry is nzaterial and I anI satisfied that an investigation: as envisaged by
the Code was held. "
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Similar views were expressed in Cornelius & others v Howden Africa tla A1 & B Pumps49
where it was stated:
"it does not Inatler whether each of the procedural requirements have been meticulously
observed. What is required is for all the relevant facts to be looked at in tile aggregate to
determine whether the procedure adopted was fair. One must guard against the rigid
inlposition ofjudicial style proceedings in appropriate situations."
Thus. following the reasonings of the two judicial decisions, the framework contemplated for
Mauritian law of procedural fairness should take into account of not over judicialising the
pre-dismissal hearings, but allow greater flexibility in dispensing justice. Hence,· in
formulating the proposal, the following points may be considered as important since they
reflect the sentiments of modem democratic values in labour management:
6.2.2.1 The Terminology
In an effort to give disciplinary proceedings a less judicial countenance, it is suggested that
employers endeavour to remove terms normally associated with a court process from their
disciplinary codes and replace it with more neutral terms. The following are only examples:
Initiator instead of prosecutor; disciplinary investigation instead of trial or
hearing notification to attend disciplinary investigation instead of charge sheet;
employee instead of accused. Report instead of judgement. Sanction instead of
penalty, punishment or sentence.
6.2.2.2 Procedure for Enquiry
As was mentioned above it would be very difficult to imagine a disciplinary enquiry that is
procedurally correct in all respects \vithout it assuming the appearance of a court trial. For
that reason it is suggested that the enquiry (both during the initial enquiry and sanction stage)
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follows the traditional order of proceedings in a court case viz: opening statements~
examination-in-chief, cross-examination. re-examination and closing statements.
It suggested that the following deviations from the traditional procedures be allowed:
1. In general the chairperson should apply the same rules of evidence in respect of
leading questions and hearsay. However the chairperson should, depending on the
skills of the employee or his representative, allow some leniency in this regard. In
cases where documentary evidence is intended to be used, it should be discovered, but
once again the chairperson should allow. some leniency.
2. Unless the matter is particularly complicated, it is suggested that 48 hours notice Qf
the enquiry is enough.
3. The major shift away from the traditional process, it is suggested, is perhaps in the
role of the chairperson. It is suggested that the chairperson take an active role in the
proceedings and ask questions~ not only for clarification purposes, but also if it is
believed that the representatives neglected to ask certain questions. In addition, if the
chairperson believes that additional witnesses should be called, he or she should be
free to call those witnesses and question them.
Support for this notion has also been expressed in the labour court in South Africa:
'What the Code requires on the part of the employer is an investigation into allegations of
misconduct, /lot the dispassionate court-like hearing by a notionally independent person
that was a requirement of the jurisprudence developed by the Industrial Court. An
investigation, by definition, requires the active participation ofthe employer to establish the
substance ofany allegation ofnzisconduct by the employee concerned. ,50
However. the chairperson will have to be careful not to create a perception of bias. In
NUMICSO Valuations (Pty) LIdS I the chairperson of the disciplinary enquiry made a
telephone call to establish certain facts. On arbitration this was held to be unfair. The correct
approach for the chairperson. it is submitted, would have been to call the witness and to allow
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both parties °to cross-examIne him. In another matter Aranes/Budget Rent A Car52 , the
chairperson made observations and expressed criticism during the hearing. On arbitration it
was held to be unfair since it created the perception that a finding of guilt was preordained.
These comments should have been made in the finding of the chairperson. The following
conduct by the chairperson in this case was held to be unacceptable viz:53 the tone by the
chairperson in ruling against cross-examination, the prominent role that the chairperson
played in the enquiry - overshadowing the facilitator, sceptical observation, interruptions and
cutting short of cross-examination and warnings not to lie before the conclusion of evidence.
In a way the employer is a judge in his own case if the chairperson is also in the employ of
the employer and for that reason additional care must be taken to select a chairperson who
has nlininlum previous contact with the employee. This will not always be easy in a small
business. but the following remarks (in a judgement where a witness during the initial inquiry
acted as chairperson of the appeal hearing) can be used as a guideline to determine whether
the particular person should act as chairperson:
.'The principle seems 10 be this: while allowance will be made for the unavoidable
practicalities of previous contact, personal impression and mutual reaction in tlte
eJ11ployment relationship, any further feature wltich precludes tlte person /tearing tile
complaint from bringing all objective and fair judgement to bear on the issues involved -
such as bias or presumed bias stenlll1ing front a closed or prejudiced mind orfrom afamily
or other relationship - will render the procedure unfair. ,,54
A question that the chairperson should ask him/herself before the enquiry commences, is to
what extent he/she will be able to give evidence in respect of the material issues at hand. If
he/she can give evidence of that nature the person should not act as chairperson. This may be
difficult in a small cash-strapped concern and the courts may look upon such a situation with
more sympathy. but an outsider should be commissioned in such a case if possible.55
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4. No right to internal appeal should be included in disciplinary codes. This only adds to
the judicial nature of the proceedings. The appeal function is now in the hands of the
CCMA.
Apart from the inquisitorial dimension, the enquiry, however will still be the same as
the traditional South African court procedure. That is not to say that a disciplinary
enquiry not following the aforementioned procedures and routines will necessarily be
held to be unfair. Indeed~ as was shown above, commissioners have from time to time
held that procedures are fair despite the absence of all these elements. But the simple
reality is that it is very difficult to accommodate all aspects of procedural fairness
without the. process of assuming judicial proportions.
The best that employers can therefore, do at this stage, unless clear guidelines
emanate from the CCMA and the courts, is to keep the procedures as brief as possible,
to introduce inquisitorial aspects to the disciplinary enquiry and to remove
unnecessary procedures, such as appeals, from pre-dismissal codes.
6.3 The Advantages and Disadvantages of a Code Similar to Item 4 (1)
for Mauritius
The remarks that follow are not intended to canvass the arguments for and against
codification exhaustively. but merely to highlight some important considerations relating to
the drafting of a proposal for Mauritius in line with Item 4 (l) of the Code of Practice of the
South African Labour Relations Act.
One of the cogent reasons for codifying procedural fairness in the law of dismissal for
misconduct. is the principle of legality. This requires that it be relatively easy for employers,
employees, trade unions and legal practitioners to ascertain th~ contents of procedural
fairness so that they may know what the law forbids under the sanction of unfair labour
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practice, and may conduct themselves in such a way that they do not transgress the nonns and
standards of procedural fairness.
As the law of procedural fairness has transcended the limits of private law to find remedy in
public law, it may be argued that it may as well qualify for codification. This' aspect of the
law, though did not enjoy primary importance in the labour jurisprudence, can be regarded as
'democraticatisation of the law of unjustified dismissal', in that it should become easily
accessible to all employees whose job security is threatened at the workplace.
Another argument in favour of codification of the requirements of procedural fairness is that
such codification will afford an opportunity to state the law of procedural fairness as a whole,
to regroup the rules and eliminate inconsistencies by systematizing the underlying legal
principles.
Because of various discrepancies in the application of the requirements of procedural
fairness. one may look at the codification as a measure to create a fixed starting point for
ascertaining what procedural fairness is. It will, no doubt, constitute an official and
authoritative statement of the rules of conduct which employers will be obliged to confonn
upon the sanction of their decision being declared unprocedural and, therefore, invalid.
There is one argument. however, that. may be raised against the codification of procedural
fairness. It is that it causes the courts to lose their power to amend or adapt the law to
changing circumstances. According to such critics, codification usually leads to
'ossification' of the law and codification of the rules of procedural fairness, will, therefore,
tend to make the rules immutable. This may be one of the strongest if not the strongest
argument against codification.
My answer to this argument is that the code can be amended or updated in order to reflect
new ideas about the dynamics of procedural fairness. It is to everyone's common knowledge
that the parliament in any country has the power to change law after proper research and
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deliberation. Adapting law to a changing society is, therefore, more a task for the legislature
than for the judge.
In this regard, judicial creativity, it should be understood, is based largely on analogies, and
since analogies, through case laws on procedural fairness have their limits, defining and
providing broad contents to procedural fairness should be more a legislative than a judicial
responsibility. Furthermore, the power of the industrial courts and even the supreme court to
identify and remedy the shortcomings in the law is limited. The courts have normally to wait
until a suitable set of facts arise before they are in a position to intervene, whereas the
parliament is free to change the law whenever it is required.
It should also, however, be considered that the codification will not cause the courts to
become mere rubber stamps in a process of mechanical application of the code. The courts
will, undoubtedly, continue to play a creative role in interpreting the provisions of the code.
As th~ code will not contain an exposition of each and every rule of procedural fairness down
to the finest detail, it will be left for the courts to fill in the details. Finally, it is also a known
fact that a code should contain no more than guiding principles and should merely reflect the
positive law in a series of clear, simple rules deliberately shorn of countless details.
6.4 A Draft Proposal for the Mauritian Law of Procedural
Fairness in the Context of Dismissal for Misconduct Based
on Item 4 (1) of the Code of Good Practice and the South
African Promotion of Administration Justice Act 3 of 2000.
Disciplinary Procedures for Dismissal due To Misconduct
(1) The management shall ensure that fair and effective arrangement exist for dealing
with disciplinary matters. These shall be agreed with the trade unions concerned and
shall provide for full and speedy consideration by management of all the relevant
facts.
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1 (1) A fair disciplinary procedure shall be a formal procedure except in very small
establishments where there is close personal contact between the employer and the
employees.
1 (2) In order to give effect to fair disciplinary procedures, an employer shall:
(a) notify the employee of the allegations using a fonn and language that the
employee can reasonably understand.
(b) allow the employee the opportunity to state a case in response to the allegations;
(c) provide the employee with a reasonable time to prepare a response;
(d) give an opportllnity to obtain assistance of a trade union representative or a fellow
employee or a legal representative of hislher choice, in serious and complex cases;
(e) after enquiry. communicate the decision taken, and preferably furnish the
employee with written notification of that decision;
(f) inform the employee of any right to review or internal appeal, when applicable, to
a level of management not previously involved; and
(g) provide for independent arbitration if the parties to the procedure wish to.
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